Limited Pacific War

Prior to World War II, the Japanese needed the resources in the Phillippines, and this was one of the major drivers for the attack on the US. Fighting a large-scale multiple-front war was not logistically feasible for the Japanese military. Could they have fought a more limited war for the Phillippines? Would the US have been nearly as motivated/ focused on a colony that they were never going to keep over the long term? What would this mean for the Dutch East Indies and other areas that the Japanese coveted?
 
First off, you might want to get this moved to post-1900.

More broadly, your premise is reversed.

They didn't want the resources in the Philippines themselves (which, mostly, there aren't any of interest to 1941 Japan). They wanted the resources in the Dutch East Indies, and to a lesser extent, places like Malaysia. They invaded the Philippines because it was in the way (which meant a hostile US could cut their supply lines to and from those Indonesian resources at will), and didn't trust the US to sit by and let them take those areas (since the US had been the leader of international opposition to Japanese expansion in China).
 
The problem is Japan can't fight any sort of limited Pacific War. Continue the war in China, and they need to seize the resources (especially oil) that the US/UK/Netherlands will no longer sell to them. That means seizing the NEI, Borneo, Malaya - the "free" occupation of French Indochina is a nice thing. Since the IJA won't quit the war in China, this is what Japan must do. Leave the PI alone and the US can cut the supply lines to the forces in SEA and the resources flowing to Japan any time - so you have to seize the PI. Seize the PI and you have a war with the USA.

The Japanese thought that if they kicked the Americans in the balls hard enough the USA would give in. When that didn't work, they thought if they made the USA bleed enough for each island they would end the war on terms the Japanese could live with. That didn't work. Once things started absent a Japanese, or a combined Japanese/German delegation dictating terms to the Americans in the White House...
 
Prior to World War II, the Japanese needed the resources in the Phillippines, and this was one of the major drivers for the attack on the US. Fighting a large-scale multiple-front war was not logistically feasible for the Japanese military. Could they have fought a more limited war for the Phillippines? Would the US have been nearly as motivated/ focused on a colony that they were never going to keep over the long term? What would this mean for the Dutch East Indies and other areas that the Japanese coveted?
Not going to happen for the Philippines, but I think the best bet for a limited pacific war would be if they just fight south for the DEI and ignore the USA.
It does risk the US making the Philippines invulnerable and then joining in later cutting you in half with the 2 ocean act navy and the US is moving to join in anyway, but the Japanese should be able to overrun the DEI without immediate US help in the short term.
 
If I am guessing correctly Blue Mesa wants to have a war just between the US & Japan. Hypothetically that is possible circa 1938 if the US reacts very differently to the China War, the Panay sinking, and having its diplomat beaten, ect...

There have been a few discussions of a 1930s Pacific War, none in real depth. Back of the envelope calculations show the USN with a clear naval advantage in 1938, except it will take 12-18 months to move the fleet to the war. With the primary base in California, PI badly underdeveloped, and Oahu no far enough west the US fleet can't operate near enough to Japan to be a threat. The two navies can raid and harass, but getting at each others throats would require a large scale build up.
 
Hypothetically that is possible circa 1938 if the US reacts very differently to the China War, the Panay sinking, and having its diplomat beaten, ect...
Why would GB not join in to help the US, at least in a low key gradual way?

Once the RN/USN are joined in the far east its probably imposable for the US not to reciprocate for the war in Europe, that GB really fears by 38?

So RN subs and fast destroyer convoys will help supply the PIs from the start as Singapore is built up. At the same time GB offers to help joint training and technology development and starts to benefit from the US treasury paying for the war effort.

Somewhere down the line the USN battle line with a bit of fast BC RN support can deploy from Singapore much closer to the PI to fight the IJN....
 
Why would GB not join in to help the US, at least in a low key gradual way?....

Certaiinly possible. Theres many ways this can trace out. Once the Japanese see Britain is in it likely leads to a change of government and negotiations. They might convince themselves they can treat the distant US the same as Russia in 1905, but Britain is another matter entirely. Something that has been largely forgotten, but which Japan was very conscious of was that Britain leaned its naval preparations towards a Pacific war. i.e.: its large submarine fleet included a modern class of very long range and deep diving boats. The main defect with the RN was its RAF crippled air arm. Anyway, once the Brits commit to intervention the Japanese leaders, or at least the sensible ones, would see it as game over & inquire about negotiations.

Once can speculate on a suicidal course as in late 1941, but if they don't have their backs to the wall as in 1941 a early end is possible.
 
In the later 1930s the Japanese are probably even less prepared to fight the USA not just from a military standpoint but from an economic one just as importantly. As the USA ramped up economic sanctions the Japanese did their best to stockpile oil, raw materials and so forth. If war starts after the Panay Incident or somewhat later these stockpiles either don't exist or are quite small. Even if the UK, France, and the Netherlands don't join in I doubt very much that they will sell the Japanese oil, tin, rubber, rice, etc from SEA and get much ill will from the USA. If any of this is sold, especially rice, I expect it would be cash only in foreign currency/hard currency which is in very short supply in Japan.

In 1941 when the full oil embargo hit Japan had 12+ months of oil reserves for military and industrial use. During WWII Japan was able to use oil from SEA to keep the wheels turning after a fashion until later in the war when the Allies cut off transportation fro SEA to Japan. In the scenario of a US-Japan war in the latter third of the 1930s, even assuming Japan had the same stockpile of petroleum as OTL 12/41, within 18 months Japanese industry would be halted and the IJN and IJA have dry fuel tanks and that is the most optimistic scenario. A potential wild card is the USSR selling petroleum to Japan, for cold hard cash of course, but even then the ability of the USSR to transport large quantities of oil to Japan via the trans-Siberian RR is limited. Furthermore certain products, such as aviation gasoline, were in short supply in the USSR and Japan's ability to refine it was limited starting with crude. There is no way Japanese tankers could go from Japan to the Crimea to take on crude without being sunk, and the Soviet tanker fleet was limited and Stalin would not risk it taking oil to Japan on "neutral" ships.

Japan getting in to a war with the USA was a bad move period. In this scenario, where the USA can devote 100% of its effort to the Pacific, where the UK, France, Netherlands can be friendly neutrals or even more, and as in the previous paragraph Japan is cut off from all the raw materials its military and society in general absolutely need, it is even worse.
 
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