This POD is based primarily from the work of Pulitzer Prize winning biographer Edmund Morris.
This article by him has most of the stuff that he puts in his second volume of his Roosevelt trilogy.
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JIW/is_2_55/ai_88174230/
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The Evening of December 15th, 1902
Theodor von Holleben, Ambassador of the German Empire to the United States, was besides himself with worry. He had spent most of the day traveling from Washington to Manhattan, under the cover of heavy snow to meet with the German consul-general Karl Bunz. Bunz knew Roosevelt well, and would be able to tell von Holleben whether or not the President was bluffing. Unfortunately, Bunz had slipped on that very snow and was in the hospital with a concussion and a broken arm. The members of Bunz's staff simply did not have the personal experience with Roosevelt to advise him on this matter.
After consulting with his naval and military attache, and perusing the opinion of the Wall Street crowd, von Hollben opted to send a message on the 16th only slightly stronger than his previous ones noting "President Roosevelt's continued and strong emphasis on the Monroe doctrine and the concentration of significant naval assets in the Caribbean. The President is known for rash action and may be tempted to do so if not mollified by acceptance of his arbitration proposal"
The urgency of the Roosevelt's "very definitive" threat of war was entirely lacking from von Hollben's telegram and the Kaiser scoffed at the timidness of his ambassador and at the Cowboy running the White House. He would not accept arbitration.
The 17th came and went with no action, and Roosevelt's orders to Admiral Dewey went out.