Peacekeeper is much better, but the US only had 50 deployed compared to 800-1000 Minutemen, so keeping only Minuteman saved money, plus Peacekeeper being new had not had all the bugs worked out yet. Both Peacekeeper and Minuteman III were MIRV'd, but Minuteman had 3 350kt, while Peacekeeper could carry 10 475kt or 12 350kt. With the Treaties the US had to remove the MIRVs from Minuteman to keep them on TridentI know the US got rid of their Peacekeepers for treaty obligations, but in terms of weapons system, how does it compare to the Minuteman III? Outside of the Peacekeeper being a MIRV, I don't know a ton about it.
IIIRC 10 mirvs vs 3. Probably more accurate. My understanding is that today the minuteman 3 only carries a single warhead.I know the US got rid of their Peacekeepers for treaty obligations, but in terms of weapons system, how does it compare to the Minuteman III? Outside of the Peacekeeper being a MIRV, I don't know a ton about it.
That was only for the underground version of the racetrack scheme. Rail-basing would have been much simpler, and that was what they eventually wanted to do. The first Peacekeepers only went into silos because the trains weren't ready for them. The real problem was trying to rail-base 100-ton heavy ICBMs instead of 35-ton Minutemen or 15-ton Midgetmen.If I remember correctly the mobile basing sceme would required almost all of the US's cement production at the time
There were a number of fairly clever options, the shell game with retractable roofs in the desert was only one of them, and probably the worst.If I remember correctly the mobile basing sceme would required almost all of the US's cement production at the time
I seem to recall reading commentary that basically came up with valid reasons why the simple mobile basing solutions were not particualry viable for the U.S. (at least vis a vis the MX.) Most if not all of it seemed to make sense to me at the time.The Peacekeeper was eventually an excellent missile, although there were some seriously embarrassing issues during its deployment. It was, however, more or less nothing but a bargaining tool during Start II since the main advantages of the missile was supposed to be a less vulnerable basing system, something that was never developed. The concept for mobile basing was a good one, the Soviets/Russians, Chinese, and Indians have all put into operation, but the U.S. overthought it (a not uncommon problem with U.S. weapon design where the quest for perfect defeats the best of intentions) resulting in costs spiraling out of control.
The need for the system was also greatly reduced by the improvement of the accuracy and the reprogramming of targeting of the D-5 Trident II, both of which allowed the SLBM to be a serious counterforce weapon system. These days the two land based legs of the American Triad are primarily back-ups just in case the SSBN force is suddenly made vulnerable by some tech breakthrough.
At least until the more advanced GPS system went in to effect, the one "weakness" in a mobile based system for the USA has to do with missile guidance. All of the CEP/accuracy figures are based on the missile knowing precisely where it is at launch time. Every small error in launch location leads to a greater CEP. This is why land based missiles were generally more accurate than sub based, the location of each silo was VERY accurately surveyed and this was updates periodically to account for movements of the crust. This means the missle train need to stop very precisely at pre- surveyed locations, or use the sorts of systems subs did and accept less accuracy. With modern GPS, this can be avoided.
True, but would the satellites be available in any crisis where the launch of the land-based part of the triad is realistically likely? In addition to jamming techniques, the satellites themselves could be attacked. That might not be enough to require a nuclear launch in response, but it would certainly degrade the effectiveness of any systems which relied on them.