Less destructive purges/better prepared USSR

Quite a few topics dealing with USSR issues, but i'd like to add another angle (i hope). What if the purges are not that destructive, i.e. they kinda focus in eliminating real or perceived top class (top as in military and party top) undesirables, without going all the way down to destroying the very structure of the military, and creating havoc in industry and economy, i.e. no prison based OKBs and all that.

Going from that, how could the military be better prepared for WW2? (this mainly big boy stuff). I did read some older topics on roughly this theme, it was mentioned some army brass had ideas such as tank armies which were dismissed, at least until WW2, not holding so many forces so close to the borders would have spared a lot of them destruction and capture (btw as known, some theories say that really the disposition of forces only point to Stalin preparing to attack himself, maybe in July), other helpful things being more radios for tanks, prehaps better attention to keep those 20,000 tanks (maybe a tad bit fewer) in better availability, and of course better overall training for the soviet soldier (air, land or sea) if possible etc.

I was thinking perhaps putting the I-180 in full production in 1939/1940 would probably give VVS several THOUSANDS of these in 1941 given soviet aircraft production rates. I kinda like the I-190 too but probably not worth it, though still better than the I-153 which was in production until 1941 iirc. Based on what i read the thing is about equal to Bf-109E, still a big step from the I-16. Probably this will make the I-185 also enter production so the Po-1 and Po-3 (my ATL designations) would replace most or all the Lavochkins as the war winning fighters. Maybe they can also adopt schwarm tactics as they should know about them from the Spanish civil war. Or how about a better KV, in OTL it had the same gun as the T-34 so no real advantage there, only being more complicated and heavier plus had less mobility. It appears they could have an 85mm (F-39?) or even larger gun (107 mm F-42?) on it as early as 1940/41, that would shock the germans even more. Also personally that KV-2 really scratches my brain, wouldn't it be better to just make the monster a proper SPG and not put the gun in that grotesque turret, sorta like that SU-100Y? Then you can have the SPG lineage evolving into something similar to the OTL SU-152, while the tank lineage evolves into something like the IS series.

Given all this, and assuming a better performance of the Red Army in 1941, does the massive industry relocation takes place, or at least have it on a smaller scale with less disruption? Perhaps one can have the (hopefully fixed) AM-37 in production in 1941 powering the Tu-2 and MiG-3. I know about the end of production for the MiG-3 in 1941, perhaps in this TL the need for Il-2s is not THAT pressing so the improved MiG-3 models could be built until 1942 or 1943, so you have Tu and Pe light fast bombers (i would have the Tu-2 replace Il-4 asap), Po, MiG and Yak fighters and Il-2 sturmoviks, and preferably some more Pe-8s too.

Anyway, just some ideas, would love to hear others.
 
A less destructive purge might mean that the Soviets do better in the Winter War against Finland, which in turn could have all sorts of geopolitical ramifications in the run up to WW2.

Another thing that a less destructive purge could potentially entail is that there would be more potential successors to take control of the Soviet Union once Stalin kicks the bucket, especially among the old Bolsheviks that were murdered IOTL. Maybe Bukharin and the Right Opposition will survive.
 
A less intensive purge e.g. might mean that Tukhachevsky's ideas about deep battle are still in vogue and that the Red Army is in general more capable and operationally flexible. The Finns might not be steamrolled but certainly the Red Army would not give the impression of being in shambles, which, in turn, might advise Herr Adolph to behave differently with Soviet Union.
 
Possibly, on the other hand they might just think Finland as a tiny country compared to USSR didn't stood a chance anyway.

One argument i've red previously was that Finland was going to be a tough campaign for USSR anyway because of weather and landscape. So perhaps a better prepared and led RKKA would take say 6 to 8 weeks instead of four months to achieve their objective.
 
Here is a metric I appy to this question. Assume a reduced purge increases the ability of the Red Army to inflict German losses in 1941 by 22%. Or Assume reduced purge and a better organized mobilization & training improves killing power by 35%. Third assume all that plus a proper alert & defense deployment in June 1941 pushed efficiency to 45%.

OTL the Wehrmacht suffered a little under 400,000 losses by the end of August 1941, and 800,000 by 1 November 1941. So…

………..OTL Loss…….+ 20%…….+35%……...+45%

Aug……400,000…..480,000…..540,000…...580,000

Nov…..800,00…….960,000…1,060,000….1,160,000

What this suggests is the Wehrmacht will have lost most of its offensive capability before December. Losses in tanks, artillery ammunition, & other material are liable to similar to men. The ability to make any major offensive in 1942 become problematic.
 

Deleted member 1487

Here is a metric I appy to this question. Assume a reduced purge increases the ability of the Red Army to inflict German losses in 1941 by 22%. Or Assume reduced purge and a better organized mobilization & training improves killing power by 35%. Third assume all that plus a proper alert & defense deployment in June 1941 pushed efficiency to 45%.

OTL the Wehrmacht suffered a little under 400,000 losses by the end of August 1941, and 800,000 by 1 November 1941. So…

………..OTL Loss…….+ 20%…….+35%……...+45%

Aug……400,000…..480,000…..540,000…...580,000

Nov…..800,00…….960,000…1,060,000….1,160,000

What this suggests is the Wehrmacht will have lost most of its offensive capability before December. Losses in tanks, artillery ammunition, & other material are liable to similar to men. The ability to make any major offensive in 1942 become problematic.

Per Guderian's memoir the German army suffered about 700k casualties up to November 30th and peaked out about 830k by December 5-8th. By the end of the year they were around 870k IIRC.

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=50&t=157416
 
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Some very interesting figures, thanks. Crickey, it appears the germans lost more men in just two months in USSR (June-August) than in all other previous battles combined from 1939-1941, is that correct? Can also translate those percentages into territory occupied, so the german advance could be stopped after occupying anywhere from 20% to 45% less soviet territory compared to OTL.
 

Deleted member 1487

Some very interesting figures, thanks. Crickey, it appears the germans lost more men in just two months in USSR (June-August) than in all other previous battles combined from 1939-1941, is that correct? Can also translate those percentages into territory occupied, so the german advance could be stopped after occupying anywhere from 20% to 45% less soviet territory compared to OTL.

Yes and that was anticipated and accepted; though to be fair the loss rates were roughly similar to the high intensity periods of Poland and France.
 
A less intensive purge e.g. might mean that Tukhachevsky's ideas about deep battle are still in vogue and that the Red Army is in general more capable and operationally flexible. The Finns might not be steamrolled but certainly the Red Army would not give the impression of being in shambles, which, in turn, might advise Herr Adolph to behave differently with Soviet Union.

Tukhachevsky's doctrine was still in vogue with the Red Army in the period as it was. Just look at Khalkin Gol.

Really all softer purges are going to do is keep the Soviet Officer corps intact, and up to the expected skill level necessary for Deep Battle to work, which is admittedly a hell of an improvement at every level from OTL. And with that, it would probably only take a week or so for an effective defense to emerge after the start of an invasion, if the Red Army is somehow caught completely unawares.

TBH, it'd probably shorten the war in Europe by eight months to a year assuming everything else in the run-up to *Barbarossa is the same, with the German Army being mostly on the defensive from 1942 on.
 
The biggest Problem here is Joseph Stalin
not only Paranoid, he was ruthless brutal in obtaining his goals, even this was devastating for USSR !
He ended the democratic centralism and establish Dictatorship in USSR and killed every one who oppose him.
Or those he suspected to oppose him.
 
The biggest Problem here is Joseph Stalin
not only Paranoid, he was ruthless brutal in obtaining his goals, even this was devastating for USSR !
He ended the democratic centralism and establish Dictatorship in USSR and killed every one who oppose him.
Or those he suspected to oppose him.

Maybe the PoD to make this work is that Stalin had a little accident a few months before the purges start.
 
Possibly, on the other hand they might just think Finland as a tiny country compared to USSR didn't stood a chance anyway.

One argument i've red previously was that Finland was going to be a tough campaign for USSR anyway because of weather and landscape. So perhaps a better prepared and led RKKA would take say 6 to 8 weeks instead of four months to achieve their objective.

This is all assuming the Soviet leadership, even without purges, decides to take Finland seriously as an opponent. The pretty much Arctic winter weather and the terrain (and natural obstacles) on the Karelian isthmus and north of Lake Ladoga notwithstanding, the biggest single OTL mistake the Soviets made was not to see that the Finnish military is a serious, well-led and well-trained force.

The OTL idea for the conquest of Finland was to "kick in the door" with a show of force (massive artillery barrages on the front, large-scale aerial bombings against Finnish towns, etc) and then parade march into Helsinki as the Finns inevitably folded in the face of superior power. After all, Stalin thought the Finnish intransigence over the territorial demands in the fall of 1939 was essentially bluff. Which it was, as even Mannerheim never expected the Finnish troops to last more than two or three weeks against a concerted, determined, well-planned Red Army attack. It was quite a boon for the Finns that this kind of an attack never materialized in the first weeks of the Winter War, and it would take two months before the Soviets got their act together.

So for a less purged Red Army to take Finland in a month or so, we need both the initial decision to treat Finland as a serious opponent that might require a campaign of, say, two months to achieve, and some of the more able Soviet commanders to lead the campaign from the preparations to the end in a skilled and measured way. Even ITTL, Stalin would be the biggest problem for both of these requirements. If he did not see Finland as a serious opponent IOTL, why would he allow the campaign the resources it requires ITTL either? And if a capable commander leads the campaign from the get-go, why would Stalin give him the resources he says he needs if the Soviet leader thinks it would be excessive to commit as much force against a mere ramshackle White militia?

That the war was fought in the dead of winter (and a very cold winter at that) was also essentially a political decision. The Red Army's own planning papers had since the 1920s warned about the dangers of fighting in Finland in the winter. A really capable commander put in charge of the attack might tell Stalin that he refuses to attack Finland in the winter, especially if he is not given the resources he needs - if he has the guts for this, of course. And for this, of course, for going against his orders, Stalin could well have him removed and sent to the gulag anyway, putting someone who can follow his orders in charge of conquering Finland.

So to get the Red Army to Helsinki in under, say, four or six weeks in 1939, the ideal situation is Stalin giving the order to conquer Finland and then actually handing out a blank cheque to the USSR's most capable military commanders on how and when to do it, and how much troops to use in it. Knowing Stalin, this would be a pretty tall order. It might essentially have to mean he gives the order in the summer of 1939 and instantly falls into a coma for six months or more.;) But then, of course, there would be the problem of the other Soviet politicos meddling in military affairs - in Stalin's name.
 
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