Less British arms in North Africa = No Fall of Malaya and Singapore?

[CalBear]

It wasn't the lack of armor or even a few Spitfires that doomed Malaya and Singapore. The Commonwealth forces were outfought, partly due to inadequate training (especially evident in the Indian Army units), poor leadership on the part of the Commonwealth (starting with the top and working down to the battalion levels), but mainly due to the superior tactics of the Japanese. Yamashita used the elite, often combat veteran forces under his command brilliantly, including the use of amphibious jumps to outflank defensive strongpoints, to maintain unrelenting pressure on inexperienced colonial forces.

Even if the proposal that the lack of equipment was the key to defeat, the question then becomes where that equipment was most needed for the British war effort. Clearly defending the British Isles had to be priority # 1, maintaining control of Suez was more important to the fight against the main enemy, Hitler's Reich, than providing additional assets to a position that was already considered to be impregnable. The British of late 1941 were not the U.S. of late 1945, with so many aircraft and ships coming off the assembly lines that storage of them was a significant issue, they were a largely blockaded country fighting a Continental power that outgunned them and had equal production capability.

 

[Redbeard]

It wasn't the lack of armor or even a few Spitfires that doomed Malaya and Singapore. The Commonwealth forces were outfought, partly due to inadequate training (especially evident in the Indian Army units), poor leadership on the part of the Commonwealth (starting with the top and working down to the battalion levels), but mainly due to the superior tactics of the Japanese. Yamashita used the elite, often combat veteran forces under his command brilliantly, including the use of amphibious jumps to outflank defensive strongpoints, to maintain unrelenting pressure on inexperienced colonial forces.

Even if the proposal that the lack of equipment was the key to defeat, the question then becomes where that equipment was most needed for the British war effort. Clearly defending the British Isles had to be priority # 1, maintaining control of Suez was more important to the fight against the main enemy, Hitler's Reich, than providing additional assets to a position that was already considered to be impregnable. The British of late 1941 were not the U.S. of late 1945, with so many aircraft and ships coming off the assembly lines that storage of them was a significant issue, they were a largely blockaded country fighting a Continental power that outgunned them and had equal production capability.

If the British had been on a cautious and defensive strategy in Europe and NA in 1941/42 I could follow you 100%, but my point is that the British aggressiveness did not match their actual ability to be so successfully. A more cautious strategy in Europe and NA in 1941/42 would have needed far less resources, in men and materiel, than was wasted futilely in Battleaxe, Crusader, Tobruk and not at least the Greek adventure. A fraction of the resources so wasted could very well have made a difference in Malaya - even if they were up against the best troops of the Japanese Empire. Even Imperial Stormtroopers only die once and the campaign was run a Japanese shoestring.

BTW I do not quite agree that the British were that desperately short on materiel or men. In 1941 they actually outproduced the combined Axis in all important aspects, but they were still up against Churchill refusing to divert anything away from his obsessions. It is indeed true that tactically and not at least operationally the British (and Commonwealth and US) were still far behind, but even mediocre armies defeat superb armies if they are big enough. Which is basically how WWII was won.

 

[CalBear]

If the British had been on a cautious and defensive strategy in Europe and NA in 1941/42 I could follow you 100%, but my point is that the British aggressiveness did not match their actual ability to be so successfully. A more cautious strategy in Europe and NA in 1941/42 would have needed far less resources, in men and materiel, than was wasted futilely in Battleaxe, Crusader, Tobruk and not at least the Greek adventure. A fraction of the resources so wasted could very well have made a difference in Malaya - even if they were up against the best troops of the Japanese Empire. Even Imperial Stormtroopers only die once and the campaign was run a Japanese shoestring.

BTW I do not quite agree that the British were that desperately short on materiel or men. In 1941 they actually outproduced the combined Axis in all important aspects, but they were still up against Churchill refusing to divert anything away from his obsessions. It is indeed true that tactically and not at least operationally the British (and Commonwealth and US) were still far behind, but even mediocre armies defeat superb armies if they are big enough. Which is basically how WWII was won.

There is the important distinction between the "possible" and the actually happening.

It was possible that the Japanese would attack, although that wasn't seen as a real possibility until the early fall of 1941, even then it wasn't clear. One of the things that can ben overlooked is that the Japanese didn't seem to have the capability to make the move (as you note, even the most critical thrusts into the Malay Peninsula and the Philippines were done on shoestrings, with SNLF & IJA units moved from one location to another without even having time to refit, literally coming out of the line, embarking, and moving to the next invasion site without pause). It was not how a Western military would operate, and the forces dedicated were, on paper, inferior to the raw figures of the opposition.

The American troops in the PI were, on paper, stronger than the attackers (albeit main strength was Philippine militia divisions), as were the British forces in Malaya, where Commonwealth forces were larger both in bayonet strength and fighting on the defensive. The Japanese would also have to deal with Singapore, a position that the British legitimately considered to be nearly impregnable.

Against this potential threat the British had to face the very real existence of the war in the Western Desert, the twin disaster of Greece and Crete which cost the British close to a division and a half of trained troops and four divisions worth of equipment, along with the continued threat of resumption of the Blitz and, of course, the Battle of the Atlantic. Barbarrosa removed the threat of invasion, but the rapid collapse of Soviet formation in the early months of the invasion also indicated that the British might well be fighting alone. By the time the weather had begun to impact the Heer's offensive it was too late to even consider any sort of redeployment for a "just in case" scenario.

There is also the reality that the presence of additional equipment would have done little to improve the deficiencies demonstrated by the Commonwealth formations, in training leadership, or morale.

As you note, the Japanese were nearly at the end of their tether when Singapore fell. The difference between the British command the Japanese is crystalized in the moment when syamashita, fully aware of his forces conditions, demanded the Commonwealth forces surrender. Rather than speak from defiance or stubbornness (something that British officers generally had in spades) Percival folded rather than call the bluff.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

There is the important distinction between the "possible" and the actually happening.

It was possible that the Japanese would attack, although that wasn't seen as a real possibility until the early fall of 1941, even then it wasn't clear. One of the things that can ben overlooked is that the Japanese didn't seem to have the capability to make the move (as you note, even the most critical thrusts into the Malay Peninsula and the Philippines were done on shoestrings, with SNLF & IJA units moved from one location to another without even having time to refit, literally coming out of the line, embarking, and moving to the next invasion site without pause). It was not how a Western military would operate, and the forces dedicated were, on paper, inferior to the raw figures of the opposition.

The American troops in the PI were, on paper, stronger than the attackers (albeit main strength was Philippine militia divisions), as were the British forces in Malaya, where Commonwealth forces were larger both in bayonet strength and fighting on the defensive. The Japanese would also have to deal with Singapore, a position that the British legitimately considered to be nearly impregnable.

Against this potential threat the British had to face the very real existence of the war in the Western Desert, the twin disaster of Greece and Crete which cost the British close to a division and a half of trained troops and four divisions worth of equipment, along with the continued threat of resumption of the Blitz and, of course, the Battle of the Atlantic. Barbarrosa removed the threat of invasion, but the rapid collapse of Soviet formation in the early months of the invasion also indicated that the British might well be fighting alone. By the time the weather had begun to impact the Heer's offensive it was too late to even consider any sort of redeployment for a "just in case" scenario.

There is also the reality that the presence of additional equipment would have done little to improve the deficiencies demonstrated by the Commonwealth formations, in training leadership, or morale.

As you note, the Japanese were nearly at the end of their tether when Singapore fell. The difference between the British command the Japanese is crystalized in the moment when syamashita, fully aware of his forces conditions, demanded the Commonwealth forces surrender. Rather than speak from defiance or stubbornness (something that British officers generally had in spades) Percival folded rather than call the bluff.

I would add to this that before the Japanese occupied northern French Indo China in Sept 1940 any invasion of Malaya by the Japanese would have had much further to travel and be far more logistically difficult - to the point that it would be virtually impossible for the Japanese to pull off and not likely to have been on the British list of things to be 'really worried about'.

It was not until July 41 that the Southern half of the French Colony was invaded and large numbers of troops flooded into the country when the Japanese are suddenly within realistic invasion distance of Malaya.

So the British have a year at most - more likely 5 months (from when the Japanese start to massively reinforce southern FIC) to massively reinforce Malaya in case of attack from Japan - while actually fighting in North Africa, East Africa, Iraq, Central Med, Syria, Battle of the Atlantic and the Defence of Britain against Italy, Germany and Vichi France while attempting to support Russia from July 1941 with as much as it could (and more than it could spare)

Now (deep breath) maybe if the British had been more ambitious with Op Judgement (i.e. used 2 carriers and more aircraft - inflicting more damage on the Italian fleet) and done more to reinforce Malta earlier while not getting involved in Greece - resulting in far better equipped desert force in North Africa during the post Op Compass periods and subsequent better British and Commonwealth performance in the Op Sonnonblume periods and not wasted hundreds of Spitfires and their pilots over France for little effect - then may-be more heavy RN units and a couple of first tier Commonwealth Divisions, as well as more modern squadrons could have been sent to Malaya during this period along with some of the better commanders.

Maybe then.....the defence of Malaya could have been a success.

And breathe.....

 

[BobTheBarbarian]

Now (deep breath) maybe if the British had been more ambitious with Op Judgement (i.e. used 2 carriers and more aircraft - inflicting more damage on the Italian fleet) and done more to reinforce Malta earlier while not getting involved in Greece - resulting in far better equipped desert force in North Africa during the post Op Compass periods and subsequent better British and Commonwealth performance in the Op Sonnonblume periods and not wasted hundreds of Spitfires and their pilots over France for little effect - then may-be more heavy RN units and a couple of first tier Commonwealth Divisions, as well as more modern squadrons could have been sent to Malaya during this period along with some of the better commanders.

Maybe then.....the defence of Malaya could have been a success.

And breathe.....

Depends on how long their supplies could have held out. As long as the Japanese had sea and air control they were doomed, plus the fact that as long as the British/Commonwealth had extra men and materiel on their hands it would have in all likelihood still have stayed in Europe and the Med.

 

[hipper]

If the British had been on a cautious and defensive strategy in Europe and NA in 1941/42 I could follow you 100%, but my point is that the British aggressiveness did not match their actual ability to be so successfully. A more cautious strategy in Europe and NA in 1941/42 would have needed far less resources, in men and materiel, than was wasted futilely in Battleaxe, Crusader, Tobruk and not at least the Greek adventure. A fraction of the resources so wasted could very well have made a difference in Malaya - even if they were up against the best troops of the Japanese Empire. Even Imperial Stormtroopers only die once and the campaign was run a Japanese shoestring.

BTW I do not quite agree that the British were that desperately short on materiel or men. In 1941 they actually outproduced the combined Axis in all important aspects, but they were still up against Churchill refusing to divert anything away from his obsessions. It is indeed true that tactically and not at least operationally the British (and Commonwealth and US) were still far behind, but even mediocre armies defeat superb armies if they are big enough. Which is basically how WWII was won.

The main Diversion of forces the British suffered from wad the supply of equipment to the Soviet Union. I've seen estimates that 20% of the armoured forces fighting in front of Moscow was supplied by the UK mostly Valentines I believe.

You can argue that these tanks was not required but it was a very difficult decision. If the Soviets had collapsed in 1941 the consequences for the UK would have been much worse than the fall of Singapore.

practically the defence of Singapore would have required a modern air defence system in Malaysia and the concentration of a carrier force in the Indian Ocean capable of Facing the Japanese Fleet

The modern Torpedo bombers the RAF were sending to the Far East were being held up on Malta.

While indeed the Fighter Sweeps in France were wasteful of men and Equipment

Regards

Hipper