Less British arms in North Africa = No Fall of Malaya and Singapore?

[Cryhavoc101]

Oddly enough I'm reading 'Defeat into Victory' again at the moment by a certain W. Slim. My god, the chance that was wasted by sending him to Syria and Iran rather than Malaya...

Was he senior enough?

Also had he not been wounded in Eastern Africa in 41?

Other than that good choice

Another POD would be sending Gen. Ironsides out there to basically get him out of the way of people in London (OTL I think he was retired) - but what he does is instead start giving people in Malaya a kick up the backside!

 

[Zheng He]

I would have preferred that Slim in command in Burma from the start, saying arriving in November 1941 and going from there.

 

[Ian_W]

Im still confused at how people avoid Singapore turning into a British Guadalcanal, as the IJN and Japanese air force dominate the seas around it.

 

[MattII]

If the British aren't so heavily focussed on North Africa, they can afford to focus on Singapore/Malaya, including with aircraft.

 

[Redbeard]

A PoD just boosting British leadership could indeed be decisive alone, but I think it goes beyond the local commanders (Percival etc.).

Before the invasion Churchill had sternly warned the British commander in the Far East Brooke-Popham not to provoke hostilities with Japan. So much, that when sightings were made of the Japanese invasion fleet Brooke-Popham didn't dare initiate the plan for defence of Malaya/Singapore (Matador). This involved going into Thai territory on the Isthmus of Kra to gain good defensive positions.

Brooke-Popham initiating Matador would not guarantee success, he had too few quality troops for such a guarantee to be issued, but on the isthmus they would have had a fair chance of some initial success - i.e. boosting morale and winning time. That would have been crucially different from OTL.

I very much appreciate Churchill for his contribution to defeating Hitler, but IMHO he bears a big personal responsibility for the failure in Malaya/Singapore and hence for the dissolution of the British Empire. The underestimation of the Japanese was not at least his responsibility; he actually thought the Japanese could be deterred by sending two capital ships to Singapore at a time when Japan possessed ten times that number of capital ships (incl. carriers). CIGS (Chief Imperial General Staff) had proposed a reinforcement of Malaya, incl. a light tank regiment, but Churchill personally refused any diversion from his Mediterranean obsession.

Normally I would value a leader being focused on the main object, but the problem here is that Churchill’s main object of throwing the Axis out of North Africa and gaining a foothold on the European continent was way beyond the reach of the British Empire in 1941-42. So in other words Churchill wasted resources on a hopeless ambition and in the process compromised what had been the core of British foreign politics for centuries – preserving the Empire!

I’m in no way saying that Churchill should have left Hitler alone, but slightly less ambitious plans for 1941/early 42 would not have put the allies in a worse situation by mid-42 compared to OTL. I’m not only thinking of the resources wasted in Battleaxe, Crusader, Tobruk or the Greek adventure, but also the offensive fighter operations over France in 1941-42, which all had little effect but very high cost, a fraction of which could have made a difference in Malaya.

This however does not remove all responsibility from the local leadership; a study into (the absence) of Percival’s leadership is a true horror story - really beyond imagination. In this way I understand Churchill’s shock when he learned about events – like for instance no HE shells being available for the very strong 15” batteries in Singapore.

It seems like Churchill worked best under “control” of a strong CIGS like Alan Brooke. Alan Brooke came into office in December 1941 but too late to change dispositions in Malaya. In his time as CIGS Alanbrooke however was very successful in applying the growing allied strength in the slow transformation from a strategic defence into a strangling strategic offensive, but always cautious enough never to be seriously surprised. That would have been very helpful a year earlier.

 

[spkaca]

(snip)
I’m not only thinking of the resources wasted in Battleaxe, Crusader, Tobruk or the Greek adventure, but also the offensive fighter operations over France in 1941-42, which all had little effect but very high cost, a fraction of which could have made a difference in Malaya.

Italics mine - I think this could have been extremely important. Viewing North Africa/ the Med as a sideshow or distraction is a mistake, I think; in 1941 that was where the war was, and as Churchill might have said you have to fight the war you have. But the fighter sweeps of 1941 were very costly and served no purpose at all. According to Bungay in Most Dangerous Enemy the blame for those sweeps resides mainly with Sholto Douglas and Leigh-Mallory, though, i.e. the RAF brass, rather than Churchill or the Government (though Churchill would probably have seen a defensive policy as a sign of insufficient aggression on the part of the RAF). Even a few extra fighter squadrons could have made a significant difference in Malaya, assuming that the local leadership didn't do something stupid with them, like order them to stop flying because they were frightening the water buffalo...

 

[Redbeard]

Italics mine - I think this could have been extremely important. Viewing North Africa/ the Med as a sideshow or distraction is a mistake, I think; in 1941 that was where the war was, and as Churchill might have said you have to fight the war you have. But the fighter sweeps of 1941 were very costly and served no purpose at all. According to Bungay in Most Dangerous Enemy the blame for those sweeps resides mainly with Sholto Douglas and Leigh-Mallory, though, i.e. the RAF brass, rather than Churchill or the Government (though Churchill would probably have seen a defensive policy as a sign of insufficient aggression on the part of the RAF). Even a few extra fighter squadrons could have made a significant difference in Malaya, assuming that the local leadership didn't do something stupid with them, like order them to stop flying because they were frightening the water buffalo...

I do not in any way advocate to ignoring North Africa or the Med, but instead of putting all resources in a big gamble with poor odds (dislodging the Axis from NA/Med) it would have been more reasonable to take a more cautious approach. With Germany heavily involved in Russia the biggest threat to British presence in North Africa or the Med. would be sticking out your neck too far.

Of course seen from mid-late 1941 you couldn't be sure that Germany would be defeated in Russia or that USA would enter the war, but especially in that situation it would be important for UK to preserve the Empire instead of futilely throwing sticks at the monster.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Normally I would value a leader being focused on the main object, but the problem here is that Churchill’s main object of throwing the Axis out of North Africa and gaining a foothold on the European continent was way beyond the reach of the British Empire in 1941-42. So in other words Churchill wasted resources on a hopeless ambition and in the process compromised what had been the core of British foreign politics for centuries – preserving the Empire!

The empire was gone regardless. Once India is gone, there's no point in the rest. Singapore asked Britain to stay in the 1960s, and they still left.

The British Empire was all about money. Once it stopped making money, there was no point to it. And the empire wasn't that long lived. India, the jewel of the post-American empire was only made a colony in 1858, lasting only 89 years. Malaya was never a colony, but more of a protectorate. And there was nothing of value whatsoever in the African colonies except for Nigerian and Arab oil, most of which was discovered after independence.

Churchill had but one job, to protect the British people, its country, economy, freedom and future. He did that fine enough, IMO.

 

[Julius Vogel]

He had more than that one job. He was also, for want of a better term, the head of government for the Empire and had responsibility for all the nations within it. Yes, the dominions had their own PMs and responsible governments or the like but the PM in London was still in charge of imperial strategy and defence. He had a duty to the defence of those dominions and colonies too.

It all worked out in the wash but other decisions could have been made by him and his predecessor.

 

[vizzer]

The trouble is Malaya is well down the priority list after:

- Home Defence of the UK
- The Battle of the Atlantic
- The African campaigns
- The Greek campaign
- Rebellion in Iraq

And until the occupation of French Indochina the Japanese were a long way off. So Malaya/Burma gets what's left over after the bar rag is wrung out.

 

[MattII]

Home Defence of the UK figures only in fighters, the Battle of the Atlantic not at all, Africa is explicitly much toned down and Greece may or may not even be happening. Really it requires only a couple of PoDs:
1. Mussolini is smart enough to listen to his generals when they tell him they're not ready to launch an invasion of Egypt.
2. Metaxas doesn't fall ill.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Im still confused at how people avoid Singapore turning into a British Guadalcanal, as the IJN and Japanese air force dominate the seas around it.

If the Japanese get all the way to Singapore, the game's up. However, if the IJA can be fought well up Malaya from the south while British forces attack Thailand-Malaya from Burma in the north, then it's hardly Guadalcanal. Trick is how do you get sufficient forces for the above, especially in Burma, where logistics would be tricky.... unless you build a train https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=376531&highlight=train+malaya

Going back to the troops sent in OTL, I think with better preparation starting after Japan's invasion of FIC in Sept 1940 and improved political and military leadership the Brits could have stood a chance. I also wonder if the British and CW forces had understood the fate they could expect upon surrender if many would have fought on.

 

[Redbeard]

The empire was gone regardless. Once India is gone, there's no point in the rest. Singapore asked Britain to stay in the 1960s, and they still left.

The British Empire was all about money. Once it stopped making money, there was no point to it. And the empire wasn't that long lived. India, the jewel of the post-American empire was only made a colony in 1858, lasting only 89 years. Malaya was never a colony, but more of a protectorate. And there was nothing of value whatsoever in the African colonies except for Nigerian and Arab oil, most of which was discovered after independence.

Churchill had but one job, to protect the British people, its country, economy, freedom and future. He did that fine enough, IMO.

Nobody in UK in WWII thought about giving up the Empire - as usual preserving the Empire was what it was all about. He ended up sacrificing the Empire to defeat Hitler, but that was never intentional and only ended up so because the Japanese took it away and the Americans had no intentions to hand it back.

Without the humiliations of WWII the Empire of course wouldn't have lived forever unchanged, nothing does, but it would have had a chance to develop into a global economical, political and cultural co-operation.

Can't help to think how much more happy that would have been compared to an EU which started de facto excluding 3rd World economies and next go into a process of collapsing leaving us with nothing but chaos.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Without the humiliations of WWII the Empire of course wouldn't have lived forever unchanged, nothing does, but it would have had a chance to develop into a global economical, political and cultural co-operation.

What humiliations? With the exception of Malaya and Burma, the former of which was not a colony beyond Singapore, the British Empire collectively fought well and lost no other territory (beyond the channel islands) or any other humiliating defeats. Dunkirk was close, granted, but withdrawing an army so it can fight and win again is not bad.

There was no sense of global economical, political and cultural co-operation between much of the Empire - it was one way exploitation, especially for the non-white colonies. Once the UK applied to join the European Common Market in 1961 the game was up, Britain was looking to Europe for its future; not Canada-Caribbean, Africa-Asia or Australasia. That's not to say the Commonwealth organization hasn't flourished nicely, though how it does in the 2020s under Charles will be interesting.

 

[hg42]

Im still confused at how people avoid Singapore turning into a British Guadalcanal, as the IJN and Japanese air force dominate the seas around it.

It is, I think, a question that people tend to put out of mind because:

- It's much easier from an amateur POV to think along the lines of 'well, if side A just lines up more dudes against side B/has X many of [war-winning secret weapon]/does all the smart things while the other people do all the dumb things...'

- The Japanese put, relatively, a downright negligible amount of effort into pushing back against movement of shipping into/out of Singapore - so it doesn't really come up. No-one seems to have been quite sure why this was at the time, and I'm not sure that an actual answer (vs that-sounds-sensible speculation) to the why has really come up since.

e: this is instructive: "SUMMARY FOR PERIOD 17th January – 15th February" > Pt. 5/6/7/8:

5. It was for this reason that the passage of reinforcements to Singapore was a matter of such paramount importance. We were unexpectedly successful in getting the troop convoys through practically unmolested until the very end. As, however, our forces in Malaya showed no signs of being able to check the enemy advance seriously, I pressed the military authorities for confirmation, in the case of the later convoys for which I was responsible, that the troops should actually proceed to Singapore and not be diverted to N.E.I. It was always possible to divert the convoys at sea in case of a late change in the plan. On every occasion the General Officers Commanding Malaya was in favour of getting troops to Singapore. The wisdom of this seemed doubtful, especially in the case of R.A.F. personnel and A.A. troops, some of whom were in fact immediately back loaded to N.E.I. on their arrival.

6. The last convoy, BM 12, with reinforcements for the 9th and 11th Indian Divisions and Divisional Troops of the 18th Division, was the only one which suffered appreciably from enemy attack, and that was not until it was in the approaches to Singapore.

Though the actual troop casualties in this attack were not heavy, the moral effect was inevitably great and it is doubtful whether any of the troops in this convoy were of much value in the remaining ten days of the defence of Singapore.

7. It is surprising that the enemy did not devote a proportion of this surface forces and long range bomber strength to attack our convoys between Sunda Straits and Singapore.

In the confined waters of the Banka Straits, with an escort inadequately armed again air attack, and with only the slenderest prospect of fighter cover, it would seem that at any time after the middle of January when the enemy had aerodromes available in Southern Malaya and Borneo, convoys could easily been located by daily reconnaissance and a most damaging attack could have been launched, which would in all probability have stopped further reinforcements, and facilitated the Japanese task considerably.

8. During the last fortnight of the defense of Singapore the passage between there and Batavia became more and more hazardous for the ships of the China Force, but they stuck manfully to their task, which culminated in the heavy and continuous Japanese air attacks on 12th – 15th February on the ships and vessels escaping from Singapore.

 

[Zheng He]

Im still confused at how people avoid Singapore turning into a British Guadalcanal, as the IJN and Japanese air force dominate the seas around it.

Part of what we have discussed on a lot these threads is not just Singapore/Malaya being held (very hard, maybe too hard) but also simply making the Japanese victory uglier. This I believe was well within the realm of possibility without a lot of major PODs. That then has butterflies on the rest of the Japanese offensive throughout the region given how much of a shoe string they did all of it on.

 

[naraic]

Part of what we have discussed on a lot these threads is not just Singapore/Malaya being held (very hard, maybe too hard) but also simply making the Japanese victory uglier. This I believe was well within the realm of possibility without a lot of major PODs. That then has butterflies on the rest of the Japanese offensive throughout the region given how much of a shoe string they did all of it on.

Agreed one of my suggestions was that force Z spotted cruiser division 7 when illuminated by Japanese flares. Cruiser division 7 supported 7 landings with shore bombardment and covering them by escorting them in December 41 and early January 42.

7 landings shorn of their escorts and shore bombardment would have put a major break on Japanese landings in Indonesia and secondary landings in Malaya.

 

[BobTheBarbarian]

Extra British men and equipment in SE Asia would have done diddly squat with Japan's control of the sea and air. They might have put up a more stubborn resistance on land resulting in the campaign lasting for a period of time closer to IGHQ's original estimate, but that's about it. No resupply=no victory.

 

[Artaxerxes]

Oddly enough I'm reading 'Defeat into Victory' again at the moment by a certain W. Slim. My god, the chance that was wasted by sending him to Syria and Iran rather than Malaya...

Great book, great commander.

 

[Look More Closely Later]

?

What humiliations? With the exception of Malaya and Burma, the former of which was not a colony beyond Singapore, the British Empire collectively fought well and lost no other territory (beyond the channel islands) or any other humiliating defeats. Dunkirk was close, granted, but withdrawing an army so it can fight and win again is not bad...

Err the Japanese also took over Hong Kong. And Sarawak. And the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and possibly several other places too. Are you telling me that none of those were British territories at the start of the war - or that at least some of them weren't highly valuable (politically, strategically and/or economically) territories?
And (apart from in sinking the Bismarck (Edit: and in not losing the Battle of Britain)) what great military victories did the British have against German (or Japanese) forces before the arrival of Bernard Montgomery in North Africa in 1942? And how was what Rommel (with worse logistics than the British) did to the 8th Army in North Africa before Montogomery arrived not a humiliation (or indeed string of humiliations) for the 8th Army? And (assuming Hamilton's biography of Montgomery is correct) do the plans that the 8th Army top brass were making to abandon the Nile delta, if necessary, if Rommel attacked and broke through again, seem like the actions of a group of military personnel that believed that they were winning the war?