Less blitz ... more mines

There is one added 'benefit' in this: If harbors are closed for a while (2-3 days), arrivals will have to ride outside the harbor. Would that not be some inviting targets for E-boat raids?

Check a map as the key ports are on the west coast eg Liverpool, Glasgow - not great targets for E-boat raids.
 
Admitted, Liverpool, Avon would not be the best target for E-boats.

Thames estuary, Hull, Portsmouth, Plymouth and Southampton would be on the target list.

If those can be closed down or made unsafe for longer periods of time, I think we have a different situation.
 
Admitted, Liverpool, Avon would not be the best target for E-boats.

Thames estuary, Hull, Portsmouth, Plymouth and Southampton would be on the target list.

If those can be closed down or made unsafe for longer periods of time, I think we have a different situation.

Just cutting down the coastal convoy traffic through Channel would have immense results on UK economy. Would all this win war for Germany? Perhaps not, but with less effective British economy there might be less destruction upon German cities later on and slightly more effective German industry, as well as more bombers for Barbarossa.
 
Finally! I found some numbers. - and forgot to dot down the website!

In 1942, UK imported 80% of oil products from the US. The Iraq oil did not go to the UK in any major way but was consumed in Med and further East.
In 1939, UK imported 55 million tons of food and raw materials

If the mining of Kobe in 1945 cut the amount getting through the harbor with 80%, we may be able to extrapolate somehow.

If a harbor is closed 3 days per week for mine clearance, we may see a reduction of availability (3 divided by 7) = 45% (rounded up).

Let us assume (I need numbers on this!) that 1/3 of all import goes through Western harbors, and the rest via Thames, Southampton, Plymouth, Hull, etc etc

80% of oil @ 2/3 Through eastern Harbors = 53%
53% reduced by 45% = 23% - rounded up = 25%

If the UK oil import got reduced with 25% from 1939 and onwards, what is the impact?

55 million tons of food stuff (same calculation) = reduced with 25% = 41 million tons coming through - what is the impact.

I even think this might be a bit 'nice' to UK. I think it could have been much worse.

We are not even talking sinking of ships, only denial of port facilities.

If we should be more 'harsh' we could perhaps find the ports designed for off-loading of oil products. Those could be mined on a 'daily basis'.

admitted, chucking a mine in a harbor and admiring a great splash - at night - is not iron-cross winning. But it might just be more relevant.

Can these calculations be used to illustrate the thesis?
 

Deleted member 1487

Finally! I found some numbers. - and forgot to dot down the website!

In 1942, UK imported 80% of oil products from the US. The Iraq oil did not go to the UK in any major way but was consumed in Med and further East.
In 1939, UK imported 55 million tons of food and raw materials

If the mining of Kobe in 1945 cut the amount getting through the harbor with 80%, we may be able to extrapolate somehow.

If a harbor is closed 3 days per week for mine clearance, we may see a reduction of availability (3 divided by 7) = 45% (rounded up).

Let us assume (I need numbers on this!) that 1/3 of all import goes through Western harbors, and the rest via Thames, Southampton, Plymouth, Hull, etc etc

80% of oil @ 2/3 Through eastern Harbors = 53%
53% reduced by 45% = 23% - rounded up = 25%

If the UK oil import got reduced with 25% from 1939 and onwards, what is the impact?

55 million tons of food stuff (same calculation) = reduced with 25% = 41 million tons coming through - what is the impact.

I even think this might be a bit 'nice' to UK. I think it could have been much worse.

We are not even talking sinking of ships, only denial of port facilities.

If we should be more 'harsh' we could perhaps find the ports designed for off-loading of oil products. Those could be mined on a 'daily basis'.

admitted, chucking a mine in a harbor and admiring a great splash - at night - is not iron-cross winning. But it might just be more relevant.

Can these calculations be used to illustrate the thesis?
So I splurged and bought a copy of the British official history of merchant shipping in WW2 and things that are important to note is that British pre-war imports were cut heavily due to rationing and rationalizing. In 1940 IIRC they were down to about 40 million tons of imports and got down to 35 million in 1941 as they stopped importing bulk raw materials and started importing finished products (for ex. instead of iron ore they imports steel, instead of oil refined fuel products, instead of raw lumber finished wood products). And yes almost all of British oil products came from across the Atlantic and Middle East oil was used only locally, because the route was 4x as far and it was not economical to use shipping that far. Plus tankers were at a premium due to heavy losses in their tanker fleet; uboats focused on them first if they could be identified.

Even with all that there was a major traffic jam in shipping in 1940 due to the major reorientation of shipping as a result of the Fall of France. Most was crammed into Liverpool/Merseyside, with some spill over going in to the Clyde river area and Glasgow. Coastal shipping was heavily reduced, which put a major strain on the rail system, which was not designed to handle all the traffic it was forced to cope with, plus they had neglected investements in it in the interwar period due to all the debt they racked up from WW1. Plus the port of London was largely closed to trans-Atlantic shipping as a result of the Luftwaffe attacks in the Channel and Eboats besides of course Uboat attacks. That really disrupted the shipping scheme that Britain had had to the point and created huge backlogs of shipping waiting to be cleared around Liverpool. So major attacks focused there (it was the 2nd most bombed area in Britain after London, but was a distant second) in 1940 could really have done a ton of damage, but Luftwaffe navigation at night against that area was difficult at the time due to lack of experience and it being just beyond the effective range of the radio guidance systems of mid-1940. Daylight raids were tough to pull off because it was defended 2nd only to London (not that that was much in 1940, but fighter intercept on the way was a real issue even if they came in sea-side from the west).

This link may help and if you have questions about what is in that book I mentioned above I'll take a look when I get a chance.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liverpool_Blitz#Beginning_of_the_blitz
Liverpool, Bootle and the Wallasey Pool complex were strategically very important locations during the Second World War. The Port of Liverpool had for many years been the United Kingdom's main link with North America, and would prove to be a key part in the British participation in the Battle of the Atlantic. As well as providing anchorage for naval ships from many nations, the port's quays and dockers would handle over 90 per cent of all the war material brought into Britain from abroad with some 75 million tons passing through its 11 miles (18 km) of quays. Liverpool was the eastern end of a Transatlantic chain of supplies from North America, without which Britain could not have pursued the war.

Just cutting down the coastal convoy traffic through Channel would have immense results on UK economy. Would all this win war for Germany? Perhaps not, but with less effective British economy there might be less destruction upon German cities later on and slightly more effective German industry, as well as more bombers for Barbarossa.
They largely did IOTL, which in part was the reason there was so much extra pressure on the rail system and over 1 million people were evacuated from London during 1940-41.
 
During the war 90% of imports came into big western ports like Liverpool, Glasgow, Bristol and Belfast. The main trade of the eastern ports was coal from the Durham and Yorkshire coalfields to London.
 
Thanks for this. I have been trawling google to find some numbers. This makes it indeed worthwhile now.

I know that Churchill was sticking to coal through the channel - just to show Germany that they did not own the channel. When the losses became too much, it got changed. And that stuffed up the rail links.

So, we need to focus on aerial mining of the Eastern ports.

Mining of Mersey on a continuous basis?
 

Deleted member 1487

Thanks for this. I have been trawling google to find some numbers. This makes it indeed worthwhile now.

I know that Churchill was sticking to coal through the channel - just to show Germany that they did not own the channel. When the losses became too much, it got changed. And that stuffed up the rail links.

So, we need to focus on aerial mining of the Eastern ports.

Mining of Mersey on a continuous basis?
Sure, but the question is how hard and dangerous would that be? Mining of the Thames turned out to be quite dangerous and resulted in the capture of a magnetic mine in 1939 and got the Brits the intel they needed to counter the mines.
 
Correct that the 'mud-flats mine' gave away the game to some extent. That probably would have happened anyway.

With a focus on the mine as the strategic war winning element, it would be expected that new mine developments would happen and that countermeasures would be invented. There would be a time window somehow, but that probably goes for any new development.

The thing here is to overwhelm the defenses and whether mine types are known or not, it will still take time to clear a harbor. That is the thesis here.

Flying at night (winter nights from October 1939 and onwards) even across Britain would not be without its moments. That said, night defenses were a bit sketchy at that time I believe.

The thesis might have to be adapted to the new numbers:

Blocking of Eastern ports:
Aerial mining
E-boats
It would also limit the BEF deployment, I should think
It might close the channel for good for channel convoys and channel traffic

Blocking of Western ports (Mersey etc)
Must then be via mine laying subs.

This will entail that Germany is focused on the sea mine as the best offensive weapon.

Could that even happen?

I have this notion that any navy would like to see surface battles, lots of ships, cannon going and 'damn the torpedoes'.

It is not spectacular to wage war by dropping mines at night and release mines from a sub, especially if no ships are sunk really.

But alas, logistics can win a war, rather than glorified tactics.
 
The bridge didn't exist until the 1960s. We're talking about the 1940s and main rail lines for freight not local passenger lines:
DefenseOfUK-1.jpg

The passenger lines were freight lines as well, all large factories and major collieries had rail lines to transport coal out and pit props etc in.
 
Blocking of Western ports (Mersey etc)
Must then be via mine laying subs.

Ok, on one side you have minelaying subs with limited laying capacity having to travel several hundred miles through seas close to the enemy's coastline with strong naval and air antisubmarine forces, and on the other side you have minesweeping small craft operating close to and from a major port carrying out continuous sweeps of the relevant waterway.

My money is on the minesweepers.

Mines are, like all defensive obstacles, only really effective when they are covered by weapons which prevent them being swept.
 
Aber, that probably sums it up very nicely.

Mining as an offensive strategy may not tip the scales, although it can surely cause some disruption.

Probably a better strategy than building capital ships and dropping aerial mines where possible will hamper the cross channel build up of BEF.

… But not win the war, I shall now humbly admit
 
Mining as an offensive strategy may not tip the scales, although it can surely cause some disruption.

Probably a better strategy than building capital ships and dropping aerial mines where possible will hamper the cross channel build up of BEF.

… But not win the war, I shall now humbly admit

Most of leaders during the war were not stupid - there are generally good reasons for what they did, and it is difficult even with hindsight to improve things (although they often had blindspots eg RAF opposition to long range fighters). But asking the questions is a good way to understand better the choices they had to make.
 

SwampTiger

Banned
In hindsight, as we always are, the Type VII D minelaying subs could have been very usefull at the outbreak of war. Should the Kreigsmarine had actually planned for war with UK, they can have one dozen on station off British ports, and two dozen more in port for second wave. Design for modular construction to spam out additional subs upon declaration of war. Possibly concentrate on this type for early war use.
 
It is actually a most horrible truth:

Whatever we think up and how 'clever' we all are - combined - it is hard to change the course of history (discarding bull**).

Obviously we are focusing on war-winning strategies for the losing party, but these all seem to come to naught.

Horrible, really
 

hipper

Banned
It is actually a most horrible truth:

Whatever we think up and how 'clever' we all are - combined - it is hard to change the course of history (discarding bull**).

Obviously we are focusing on war-winning strategies for the losing party, but these all seem to come to naught.

Horrible, really


its something Ive come to realise, most of the strategiez we come up woth were also thought about at the time, and if they were rejected were rejected for good reasons.

the KM did not have the steel to make mines in 1940 to carty out a more extensive mining campaign.
 
I don't think mining alone could do it. ...it wouldn't actually stop as many boats as the u boats did.
Don't be so sure. The Strategic Bombing Survey estimated, against Japan, 1 ship sunk & one damaged for every 26 mines laid (IIRC; might have been as low as 1:52). Either way, mining could be very productive.

Almost as important, the losses to subs & aircraft on mining missions were very low.

Don't forget, too, the Brits (or whoever's the target of mining) can't assume mines aren't present: they have to sweep. That hazard, alone, can tie up traffic, & that's a headache: it effectively means lost shipping, even with no ships actually sunk. (The same applied to convoying.)
Mines are...only really effective when they are covered by weapons which prevent them being swept.
Actually not. Offensive minelaying is a well-accepted practise.

And the 3 day closure IMO is understated quite a bit. There was a famous U.S. case (which, I regret to say, I can't name...:oops::oops: ) in which German U-boat mines closed the harbor for several weeks. I expect RN sweepers would be better--but they'd need lots more ships TTL...& what doesn't get built, in the meantime? How many corvettes get diverted from convoy duty to sweeping? (OTOH, does this encourage construction of new yards or repair facilities in Canada, especially in Newfoundland? Or encourage basing A/S Stirlings in NF, to take up the slack from 'vettes?)
 
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elkarlo

Banned
Don't be so sure. The Strategic Bombing Survey estimated, against Japan, 1 ship sunk & one damaged for every 26 mines laid (IIRC; might have been as low as 1:52). Either way, mining could be very productive.

Almost as important, the losses to subs & aircraft on mining missions were very low.

Don't forget, too, the Brits (or whoever's the target of mining) can't assume mines aren't present: they have to sweep. That hazard, alone, can tie up traffic, & that's a headache: it effectively means lost shipping, even with no ships actually sunk. (The same applied to convoying.)

Actually not. Offensive minelaying is a well-accepted practise.

And the 3 day closure IMO is understated quite a bit. There was a famous U.S. case (which, I regret to say, I can't name...:oops::oops: ) in which German U-boat mines closed the harbor for several weeks. I expect RN sweepers would be better--but they'd need lots more ships TTL...& what doesn't get built, in the meantime? How many corvettes get diverted from convoy duty to sweeping? (OTOH, does this encourage construction of new yards or repair facilities in Canada, especially in Newfoundland? Or encourage basing A/S Stirlings in NF, to take up the slack from 'vettes?)
Word for wht it'd be for the UK . As it was still in the fight and could still effectively sorty against planes and subs. The Japanese really were dead in the water at this point
 
Correct that 1939 was different to Japan 1945.

Several issues:
1) Flying at night was relative safe as night fighter protection of UK was rudimentary at best
2) Accurate bombing was not perfected at all - but hitting a harbor is comparable easy.
3) ASW methods not as effective as later
 
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