Less bad Vietnam.

Typo

Banned
And the Hanoi regime was not a brutal dictatorship with major ties to foreign powers? The problem was that the USA *did* offer humanitarian and economic aid.....after having spent years trying to force the unwinnable military solution. It needs to do the non-violent methods first and use propaganda to depict the NLF and NVA as attempting to subvert humanitarian aid.

If the USA decides to fight that war it can't win. It has to give aid and avoid the military engagement.
Except Hanoi was not a puppet of Beijing or Moscow, and the Hanoi regime actually had a goal of national reunification which was accepted by the Vietnamese people. Again, you are basically giving a really abstract idea (giving aid) and asserting it will solve the problem, never mind it was tried OTL since before the US even had large number of ground troops in the country, and which did not work out. What exactly are you proposing being done differently?
 
Except Hanoi was not a puppet of Beijing or Moscow, and the Hanoi regime actually had a goal of national reunification which was accepted by the Vietnamese people. Again, you are basically giving a really abstract idea (giving aid) and asserting it will solve the problem, never mind it was tried OTL since before the US even had large number of ground troops in the country, and which did not work out. What exactly are you proposing being done differently?

As I understand it the USA was involved militarily long before it took the idea of humanitarian aid in any meaningful sense seriously. My concept is that the USA avoids the whole idea of a Diem-style dictatorship and starts from the assumption of strengthening the local villages' autonomy and playing up the North Vietnamese ties to Moscow/Beijing. Particularly the latter, as fear of a pro-Chinese regime would have quite a bit of resonance in Vietnam.

This, however, requires butterflies going back to the 1950s.
 
Giving no military aid means the Saigon regime falls even sooner. Again, it is a misconception that the North won due to use of propaganda and by having all the southern people join them. The US was trying to depict the NVA as subverting human aid (and they were) and I really don't think southerners saw the North as some wishy-washy happy land trying to liberate them. Again, making the general public like you a little more does nothing about heavily armed and well-trained divisions of professional soldiers invading. The entire war was a Catch-22 for the US. By involving themselves militarily they turned public opinion all over the world against them and made it impossible to sustain such a war, but if they didn't involve themselves military Saigon would have been crushed sooner. The RVN was doomed.
 
Giving no military aid means the Saigon regime falls even sooner. Again, it is a misconception that the North won due to use of propaganda and by having all the southern people join them. The US was trying to depict the NVA as subverting human aid (and they were) and I really don't think southerners saw the North as some wishy-washy happy land trying to liberate them. Again, making the general public like you a little more does nothing about heavily armed and well-trained divisions of professional soldiers invading. The entire war was a Catch-22 for the US. By involving themselves militarily they turned public opinion all over the world against them and made it impossible to sustain such a war, but if they didn't involve themselves military Saigon would have been crushed sooner. The RVN was doomed.

I'm not so sure. When the ARVN did fight the NVA it did not do entirely awfully. I mean they *did* defeat the *first* North Vietnamese offensive and in the rare occasion the militaries of the two Vietnams fought the ARVN gave as good as it got. The USA took over the war and excluded the ARVN from meaningful participation in what was theoretically its war, and fought a war suited for the USA, not the ARVN.

You're right that the USA can't win the war if it gets involved militarily. I'm saying that it could actually equip South Vietnam without this impairing South Vietnam's ability to fight the war any more than Israel's dependence on US arms crippled it in the 1967 and 1973 wars, fought around the same timeframe.
 
Less Bad 'Nam?

The best case scenario was for the US to accept and promote the Viet Minh as the legitimate post-colonial government of Vietnam in 1948, work out some sort of economic arrangement for French business owners to sell or continue operations, repatriation for all French and Vietnamese that felt unwelcome in post-colonial Vietnam. A caveat for American alliance would be toleration for religious groups.
Next best was let the plebiscite in 1954 stand which HCM legitimately won and work out the above. Nam's united, the US & others don't have to pick up the idiot ball where the French dropped it , dribbling troops in and trying to prop up a bunch of corrupt religiously intolerant Catholic mandarins bleeding the countryside dry.
Letting the coup against Diem go ahead was insanely stupid and flushed whatever legitimacy the RVN had as an independent government and should have been our cue to grab our hats and leave, but LBJ doubled down our bet and let the Tonkin Gulf blunder be our fig leaf to take the war to absurdity and beyond.
We love to talk weapons and generals and tactics on this site and I'm such a geek about these things too, but IMNSHO politics on the ground determined the field of battle even more than the terrain in Nam.
We didn't want to listen to the Brits' lessons from Malaya, which weren't applicable to Nam anyway. We didn't want to listen to current or previous WWII jungle fighters about what worked (grunts on the ground, working autonomously with guns that worked in the mud, like M3 grease guns, or dare I say it, AK-47's or a variety of other weapons, fighting LRRP-style who lived locally and worked intensively with local militias), without much need for airstrikes or artillery barrages chasing Charlie but we went cuckoo for Puff the Magic Dragon, Napalm, Agent Orange, that didn't shift the political realities one iota.
Ignore that angle and the US did from start to finish, and you've got a lot of dead and maimed people, flushed money, prestige, etc to answer for.
I heartily recommend Stanley Karnow's Vietnam: A History and Loren C Baritz's Backfire regarding the political angles to the war.
As to the military side of Nam, the conscript model was disastrous because it provided the US a ready supply of troops ISO a mission to justify drafting them. Defending against Ivan on the Fulda Gap and the NKPA on the 38th parallel made some political sense to have big divisions and armies. Counterinsurgency in the jungle, not so much.
You needed small units of highly skilled and autonomous operators staying and covering an intimately familiar piece of ground. The US eventually got wise and adopted the SOF, LRRP and CAP concepts (it'd be better for the Marines to listen to locals' pointers about local flora, fauna, ethnic and religious issues, IOW what locals value and exploit those cultural pressure points than teach them American-style warfare, but hey, I digress...)
Even better would be a functional RVN police and army that handled all that and only needed occasional technical pointers on how to use and maintain some American gear. The less Americans involved in planning and doing the fighting, the better.
 
Besides the occasional sabotages of the supply rout, I agree for the most part with you on that point; to further explain on the sabotages, the Chinese were aggravated that Hanoi refused to toe their line rather than Moscow's and so would simply take supplies as they were transited through China to Northern Vietnam. It was never enough to actually effect the war effort, but it was enough that it was noticeable, and thus strained relations further while making a point.

Everyone has been making excellent observations here. I
dont have a lot of time today, but Ariosto has a clear idea here. It would have been difficult, but if PRC could have been encouraged to go further, especially after Ho Chi Minh's death (he balanced the two forces to keep both PRC and Soviets guessing) then a powerful force would have been focused to send North Vietnam to the table.

All wars are able to be won, hypothetically, but some are nearly impossible, like the war U.K. and Zanzibar, circa 1870, over in 30 minutes with a bombardment.

Wars are really easy to end, too. Just lose.

Losing may well have been more truamatic, but it is not certain if that would have been so. It goes against the grain and would have had nearly certain serious overtones to the geopolitical balance, yet so did 1975.

About less tramatic Vietnam scenarios, anything that lessens the pain, like military competence in a guerilla war setting would help. Looking like fools was part of the pain, and well oiled guerrilla wars have been making idiots of generals for thousands of years.

The point of the futility to prop up the South's feeble regime rings especially true as we did it. You know of the Angolan African adventure? It is apt. There existed three 1975 factions. One the Soviets/Chinese supported. The other the US. The third, UNITA, no one did. The Communist one won and acted like overlords.

This and the fact that they were aided by huge numbers of Cuban troops (outsiders/interloping invaders) alienated the Angolans so much that UNITA grew til owning 80 percent of the country at some times of the 25 year conflict I recall, in part due to tacit and not so tacit CIA/South African help years afterward, but initially all on their own.

Stranger still was that an American oil company (Marathon?) drilling especially in the Cabinda enclave, guarded by large numbers of Cuban troops against forces who are assisted by the CIA. And the oil company lobbying in the US Congress, but I digress.

The point is for Vietnam, the locals had an expression why the US was there. "Either a group of fools or wanting a colony over of Vietnam." And it quickly was sure Americans were no fools. This assessment greatly push and tilt the large majority of the population to be neutral if not hostile to the US and the South Vietnam government.

Compare this to when Singapore wanted its military to make the island more indigestable to Indonesian, Malay, or other trouble makers. They asked the Israelis to come in and modernize their forces. These foreign troops suggested and did so by only 7 members, because if they were listened too, any more are counter productive it was felt by the Israelis.

Yes. They were listened to, and no more were needed.

The modernization was considered effective by the potential opponents. Although the situation was in no way similar to that of Vietnam, the point is clear on how much is possible to achieve.
 
Uh oh, the UK/Zanzibar war lasted 38 to 40 minutes, and was in 1896. It is commonly referred as the world's shortest known war, and certainly a great example of one of the most imbalanced ones.
 

Typo

Banned
Besides the occasional sabotages of the supply rout, I agree for the most part with you on that point; to further explain on the sabotages, the Chinese were aggravated that Hanoi refused to toe their line rather than Moscow's and so would simply take supplies as they were transited through China to Northern Vietnam. It was never enough to actually effect the war effort, but it was enough that it was noticeable, and thus strained relations further while making a point.​
Yes, and the point is that at no point were the Vietnamese actually willing to break with China against the Americans, simply because whatever potential threat China was, America was an active obstacle to the immediate goal of Vietnam.
 
The problem is that the South Vietnamese state was ultimately illegitimate, it was just another brutal dictatorship which at its core had the goal of keeping Vietnam separate against the forces of ethnic nationalism. And was more or less a puppet of the US. At the end of the day...what exactly are you going to do that wasn't done OTL for Saigon to counter that? Offering economic aid? Done that. Humanitarian assistance? Tried that.

I disagree with the contention that the South Vietnamese government was illegitimate and wished to keep the Vietnamese people apart. After the peace talks in 1954, Vietnam was divided into two with a western regime in the South and a communist regime in the North. If your contention was true regarding the South preventing the Vietnamese people from uniting, why did Catholics, small business owners leave the North instead of staying to enjoy the fruits of communist rule? Because they could see a greater future in South Vietnam and were under no illusion of their future under Uncle Ho. Remember prior to the French there were three separate entities of Co chin china, Annam and Tonkin. America and Canada have a shared history, language and culture yet are separate states - same principle here.

Ideally the Americans if they intervene in this timeline would listen to Colonel Serong's suggestion of expanding the National Police (gendarme) to combat the counter surgency within the provinces - similar to the Jungle Squad of the Royal Malaysian Police during the Malaya emergency. ARVN soldiers would be utilised on the borders to secure them from the NVA infiltration. US support would be confined to organising their logistical support, providing training packages (so they do not need to withdraw their best and brightest to teach) and utilising advisers in the field (Keeping Barry Petersen in the highlands). This ties in with ARVN bearing the brunt of the fighting from day one.

Politically President Diem must stay in power, one of the problems that the RVN faced was that their military leaders did not have the sophistication / political skills to run the country effectively. Alternatively if Diem is unpalatable another civilian must be found to run the government (I wrote a list of these a while back), ensuring the separation of the military and the civilian government. Another factor would be to introduce a political party similar to Golkar in Indonesia or the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan to unify the political elite, rather then cultivating personality cults.

In this case utilising the ROC experience i.e. transfer of land to tenant farmers, encouraging meritocracy within the officer ranks and potential implementation of political officers.

Economically, utilise advisers from ROC, Japan and ROK (depending upon timeframe) to assist with the formation of companies that are efficient. If the economy can become stronger, then the issues that plagued the RVN in the 70's inflation, unemployment can be averted. Another problem that occurred was that the university students that received government grants did not return to RVN with their skills but remained overseas - this needs to be addressed.

Can't think of anymore atm.
 
Another problem that occurred was that the university students that received government grants did not return to RVN with their skills but remained overseas - this needs to be addressed.

Good point, yet this was common though out Asia. Taiwan only had something like 10% return in those years, but the ones that did come back revitalized the country.

One way would be to have scholarships to farmer's kids, plus a sizable land bonus to the farmer if the son comes back for 5 years and starts a family (families are hard to get visas and passports to immigrate in those days, much less to emmigrate). In essense, he is stuck, but life is not so bad. Do not underestimate the power of farmer families' patriarchy.

Some would remain overseas, and those that returned would have the ties that bind loosened. So warned the family of one Hong Kong construction tycoon whose name escapes me at present. In that case it was true, but he did return because there was and is no income tax in Hong Kong.

Another stranger possibility would be to take all deserters and force them into the army for 10 years, if caught. The catch? Life would not be so bad at 7 years rotation of that is overseas in US/Korean/Australian/Malaysian or where ever on a 2 year overseas, one fighting in Vietnam, with the last stretch at 2 years partly in the Highlands or DMZ.

Example 2 years basic training and schooling in Korea, one
year near Vung Tao or similar easier location. Two more years in Korea training and in joint excercises war games [Vietnamese and Koreans taking turns being the NVA], another year in Vietnam in the middle areas. Two more years in Korea, with excercises with Korean recruits about to Vietnam duty and occasionally special services, and a final two years stretch in Vietnam, first in the worse middle areas and one year at the front regions.

It costs a lot less than having US or allies send their troops over, and these Vietamese are committed for longer. (The Catholic South Vietnamese, as posted above, were pretty committed, so the government in OTL drafted those recruits at 8 years opposed to 2 years for other South Vietnamese. Because the had no choice but to fight.) Pay is low, but training is good and the pace is relaxed while overseas. Besides, they were pretty poor choices to begin with and there is little to lose in the experiment.

Properly done, it would have worked with a core of well trained troops, although the real rich kids would weasel out of it somehow to the detriment of morale. So many dentists who never even touched a patients teeth, etc. and were really deserters/dodgers. To have any chance at success, periodic oversight by the US (and allies) would be necessary, as we are dealing with the South Vietnam government. The ten year maximum would also have to be carefully observed, or there would be a potential coup issue as happened with 1975 Lisbon.
 
The best case scenario was for the US to accept and promote the Viet Minh as the legitimate post-colonial government of Vietnam in 1948
Why? Presuming FDR (or Truman) isn't stupid, why couldn't they listen to the OSS teams in country in '44, pick a Viet patriot who's neither a fascist nor Communist, & see the country unified after the Japanese are booted in '45, before the French & Brits get a chance to fuck things up? Bingo, no war. Even ally Vietnam with the U.S.:cool:
 
Recognising a communist organisation as the legitimate leader of the country amounts to a fundamental change in US policy. The OP is for a 'less bad' Vietnam, it will still be bad but is it possible that it doesn't divide the US so badly, kill quite so many people and lead to many of the the problems of the 70s.
 
Recognising a communist organisation as the legitimate leader of the country amounts to a fundamental change in US policy. The OP is for a 'less bad' Vietnam, it will still be bad but is it possible that it doesn't divide the US so badly, kill quite so many people and lead to many of the the problems of the 70s.

So basically as OTL but less so.

I'm not sure how that can work. It was as bad as it was precisely because US policy inevitably went in that direction with the kind of decisions made.
 
Maybe have the Tet Offensive somehow fail even more spectacularily, or at least more visibly. It wouldn't have much effect on the war, but it could at least rally American spirits. After Tet, the VC is dead; it's the USA vs. the NVA.
 
Maybe have the Tet Offensive somehow fail even more spectacularily, or at least more visibly. It wouldn't have much effect on the war, but it could at least rally American spirits. After Tet, the VC is dead; it's the USA vs. the NVA.
That's what happened IRL. It's just that the American public didn't perceive that, but after Tet, while the VC were still around for propaganda purposes, they received NVA troops filling their ranks as replacements for the losses, to the point where a VC division might still be officially VC and all, but 90% of the soldiers would be trained NVA recruits.
 
the goal is to make the war 'less bad' for the USA, not to win the war. The best way to do that is to have the USA not take such an interest in the place from the start. For no good reason whatsoever, the USA put a lot of it's prestige and money on the line to keep SV, a really insignificant place, out of commie hands. So maybe the best scenario is to have the USA put a lot less importance on the region... limit it's forces to a handful of advisers. Once it's realized that the leadership of SV is corrupt and useless, the USA could decide to cut it's losses, pull all advisers and aid from the place and never look back. Not sure what it would take to get all that, but it would certainly make the war nothing but a blip in US history, instead of the rather shattering experience it was in OTL...
 
Yes, surely there's a middle path between what occured IOTL and the utopia of total victory.

Its not so much "OTL or total victory" as that the only way to change OTL's results does require some significantly different policies.

Maybe more reliance on building up the Republic of South Vietnam won't win the war, but it will change how failure feels - but you seem to think that's too extreme a change to policy for purposes of the challenge.
 
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