Leslie McNair dies during the Influenza Pandemic

General Devers would be driving Armor policy after Chaffee dies.

No separate Tank destroyer branch, with heavier tanks and larger cannons sooner
 
The McNair reorganization of the Army was one of the great success stories of WWII. Besides the well-known tank destroyer doctrine, the McNair divisions had very few flaws identified in the postwar review. Immediately after the war, permanent association of tank and antiaircraft battalions with infantry divisions, as well as reinforcement of division MP and engineer assets was recommended, as well as reinforcement of cavalry formations and the conversion of the cavalry groups to a permanent tactical headquarters.

I'll admit to not being well-informed enough of what alternative reorganizations might have been possible with no McNair, but the flexibility of American tactical organizations would almost certainly be compromised to some degree.
 
Really depends on who else Marshal appoints as head of AGF in early 1942. He wanted a leader who would not compromise on the goals for AGF, so its liable to be a strong personality like McNair who would imprint his preferences when executing Marshals policies.
 
No McNair? Probably result in worse US armoured formations in WW2.

Its quite 'funny' when some one who was the main driver of a successful organization is instead only remembered for a perceived fault.

In this case the perceived fault is the TD Doctrine and the lack of 76mm armed shermans which no one in the US Army of any note wanted anyway before June 44!

And the TD Doctrine while only being actually used once in North Africa - did give every Infantry Division a battalion of 30 odd heavily armed very mobile self propelled 3" guns firing a useful HE shell (which was used in a ratio of 11 HE shells fired to 1 AP shell fired in ETO)

Without McNair kicking arse and building up the US Army's armoured formations from sweet frak all then some one else is going to have to do it

And that some one else is going to be presented with the same problems that McNair was in 1940/41 - in this case how to stop Blitzkrieg - and that person is likely to still come to the same answer - Tank Destroyers!
 
in this case how to stop Blitzkrieg - and that person is likely to still come to the same answer - Tank Destroyers!

Actually, it was M3 Stuart for Scouting, M3 till the M4 was ready, and M6 heavy

Don't forget it was McNairs Idea after North Africa to increase the number of Towed AT guns, than mobile SPG
 
No McNair? Probably result in worse US armoured formations in WW2.

Its quite 'funny' when some one who was the main driver of a successful organization is instead only remembered for a perceived fault.

In this case the perceived fault is the TD Doctrine and the lack of 76mm armed shermans which no one in the US Army of any note wanted anyway before June 44!

And the TD Doctrine while only being actually used once in North Africa - did give every Infantry Division a battalion of 30 odd heavily armed very mobile self propelled 3" guns firing a useful HE shell (which was used in a ratio of 11 HE shells fired to 1 AP shell fired in ETO)

Without McNair kicking arse and building up the US Army's armoured formations from sweet frak all then some one else is going to have to do it

And that some one else is going to be presented with the same problems that McNair was in 1940/41 - in this case how to stop Blitzkrieg - and that person is likely to still come to the same answer - Tank Destroyers!

That’s a really good point. While the TD doctrine may not have been the most efficient use of resources, it wasn’t a failure. Those guns got used as infantry assault guns regardless. Meanwhile, the Combat Command oriented US Armored Division was one of the most efficient formations of the war when it came to employing limited armored assets.
 
That’s a really good point. While the TD doctrine may not have been the most efficient use of resources, it wasn’t a failure. Those guns got used as infantry assault guns regardless. Meanwhile, the Combat Command oriented US Armored Division was one of the most efficient formations of the war when it came to employing limited armored assets.

From the wiki
Devers reported directly to Marshall. He was responsible for inspecting, organizing and training the Army's armored divisions and separate non-divisional tank battalions, including all non-tank personnel assigned. McNair's Army General Headquarters (GHQ) was in tactical charge of all U.S. ground forces, but GHQ specifically did not control the semi-autonomous Armored Force ...The Armored Force had complete control of its own training, doctrine and organization. In a major reorganization of the War Department in March 1942, McNair was named Commander of a new component, Army Ground Forces (AGF), which replaced GHQ. Relations between GHQ/AGF and the Armored Force were distant and lines of authority and responsibility were often unclear. McNair seemed to prefer leaving Devers alone.

...
Devers was an articulate proponent of the Army's now-emerging tactical doctrine of combined arms: infantry-artillery-armor-close air support. He carried a translation of a German manual on the components of the panzer division. Devers was neither the first nor the only general to embrace combined arms as the doctrinal solution to the problem of how best to employ tanks, but he was well-placed to act upon it. At his direction an updated, comprehensive (460 pages) Armed Force Field Manual: Tactics and Technique FM 17–10 was written, published and distributed in March 1942. A German manual on tank platoon tactics, with a foreword by Heinz Guderian, was translated into English and issued as an Armored Force publication. March 1942 saw a reorganization of the armored divisions in the wake of the 1941 maneuvers. Devers added an artillery headquarters to the armored division, and reorganized the artillery component into three battalions, each of three batteries of six M7 Priest self-propelled guns. A division trains headquarters was added to coordinate logistical activities. In a first, at Devers' insistence, a flight of light aircraft to be used for artillery spotting and reconnaissance were included in the new Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) for each division
 
.. Devers was an articulate proponent of the Army's now-emerging tactical doctrine of combined arms: infantry-artillery-armor-close air support. ...

In that Devers reflected US Army doctrine since the 1920s. The debate was in the details, the basic concept of a corps of light triangular divisions supported by a pool of tanks, heavy artillery, and other combat support units had been the goal from as far back as Pershings tenure as CoS. The addition of larger specialized division, like the armored and airborne, or the separation of the tactical airforces from the ground command were ideas around as far back as the 1920s, but were not completely accepted until Marshals ideas were inserted in the 1940 mobilization.
 
...
And the TD Doctrine while only being actually used once in North Africa - did give every Infantry Division a battalion of 30 odd heavily armed very mobile self propelled 3" guns firing a useful HE shell (which was used in a ratio of 11 HE shells fired to 1 AP shell fired in ETO)
...

That’s a really good point. While the TD doctrine may not have been the most efficient use of resources, it wasn’t a failure. Those guns got used as infantry assault guns regardless. Meanwhile, the Combat Command oriented US Armored Division was one of the most efficient formations of the war when it came to employing limited armored assets.

I suspect that lacking a TD Corps/Branch the result would have been a stronger AT component in the infantry divisions, more independent tank battalions in each corps, and better AT capability for the tanks. OTL each Inf Div in Europe usually ad both a TD battalion & a tank battalion attached. That usually gave the US ID more armor than the average German armored division.
 
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