Leningrad Falls July 1941, Moscow Falls?

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Deleted member 1487

If Army Group North were successfully able to drive to Leningrad by the end of July and take the city by coup de main, would the resulting disruption of Soviet forces and freeing up of German armor for operations against Moscow, plus of course opening up Leningrad as a supply hub, have resulted in the fall of Moscow in December?

Manstein's corps languished on the Dvina for a week without action, which allowed Soviet defenses to get organized and dramatically hinder the advance beyond the river; had he exploited immediately with the XLI Panzer corps following upon resolving their armor battle, rather than heading to Jakobstadt and attempting to cross the river there. Assuming that does happen and result in the quick capture of Pskov and collapse of Soviet CiC in the Baltic area as a result and that results in the capture of Leningrad by the end of July, what does that mean for Moscow when Typhoon starts?
 
If Army Group North were successfully able to drive to Leningrad by the end of July and take the city by coup de main,

It runs into all the same problems taking Moscow by the end of July does: too many Soviet forces, too logistical assets and infrastructure, too large distances. On top of this, the terrain is vastly worse then it is on the Moscow axis. Indeed, even at the pace of advance IOTL Manstein outpaced German forces and as a result spent three days encircled before being liberated. If he moves faster, then he runs the risk of getting cut-off for even longer and annihilated.

The idea of catching the city undefended is a complete pipedream. In addition to the already extant 38 divisions, the Soviets deployed 35 new divisions and 5 brigades on the Leningrad axis in July. Many of these formations spent July filling out in the city's vicinity and would be quite prepared for a fight. Should Manstein try and rush forward, he'll find himself all alone with just his three divisions, stuck in the giant swamps south of Leningrad, low on supplies, and with significant Soviet forces all around him. It just is not going to happen.

plus of course opening up Leningrad as a supply hub,
Even assuming, by some quirk of fate, the Soviets did not demolish Leningrad's port facilities, the city is still pretty useless as a supply hub. It's just too far from anywhere else.
 
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Deleted member 1487

It runs into all the same problems taking Moscow by the end of July does: too many Soviet forces, too logistical assets and infrastructure, too large distances. On top of this, the terrain is vastly worse then it is on the Moscow axis. Indeed, even at the pace of advance IOTL Manstein outpaced German forces and as a result spent three days encircled before being liberated. If he moves faster, then he runs the risk of getting cut-off for even longer and annihilated.
Being cut off IOTL was a function of the two panzer corps being dispersed and unsupported, plus it was also a function of the advance having been paused for a week that allowed resistance to coalesce and get its bearings; had it pushed on quickly it could have taken Pskov and decapitated the defense of the Baltics, preventing something like the counterattack at Soltsy from even taking place due to disorder and lack of CiC. Having XLI Panzer Corps follow on after their battle resolved rather than routing to Jakobstadt would have cleared their rear area and allowed them to continue on while focusing on advancing first and foremost.

The idea of catching the city undefended is a complete pipedream. In addition to the already extant 38 divisions, the Soviets deployed 35 new divisions and 5 brigades on the Leningrad axis in July. Many of these formations spent July filling out in the city's vicinity and would be quite prepared for a fight. Should Manstein try and rush forward, he'll find himself all alone, stuck in the giant swamps south of Leningrad, low on supplies, and with significant Soviet forces all around him. It just is not going to happen.
Through the disruption of Soviet CiC in the North by quick capture of Pskov, where Soviet command was located and organized resistance, including the order to prepare defenses at Leningrad, the confusing and disruption would prevent resistance from even knowing what was going on or that defenses should be prepared. It disrupts even moving reinforcements into place in a coherent manner to stop the German advance. Just as the quick advance to the Dvina happened in the same environment the move quickly before resistance even could understand it was facing an enemy would keep counterattacks from even mounting.


Even assuming, by some quirk of fate, the Soviets did not demolish Leningrad's port facilities, the city is still pretty useless as a supply hub. It's just too far from anywhere else.
It takes AG-North's supply burden off of the routes and rolling stock moving from Germany's border, which enhances the ability to supply AG-Center and South to a degree, especially from 1942 on.
 
Being cut off IOTL was a function of the two panzer corps being dispersed and unsupported,

A function of the massive amounts of terrain that they had seized and the inability of the foot infantry to keep up. Had they tried to concentrate and move-up on a narrow front, they would have quickly been cut-off.

plus it was also a function of the advance having been paused for a week that allowed resistance to coalesce and get its bearings;
This is not in evidence. The pattern of Soviet resistance indicates they had already gotten their bearings by the start of July.

had it pushed on quickly it could have taken Pskov and decapitated the defense of the Baltics,
How would taking Pskov decapitate the defense of the Baltics? The Northwest Front's headquarters was already commanding pretty much on the move (it was originally located at Riga) and would relocate to the northeast in response to the German's approach, as it did IOTL given that Pskov fell on July 9th. More to the point, how does it decapitate the defense of Leningrad? That is coordinated by the Northern/Leningrad Front's headquarters, which are inside Leningrad itself.

Having XLI Panzer Corps follow on after their battle resolved rather than routing to Jakobstadt would have cleared their rear area and allowed them to continue on while focusing on advancing first and foremost.
You are talking about 4th Panzer Group, entirely by itself, dsecuring an area ~94,500 square kilometers just to move from the D'vina to Pskov. That works out to less then 2 men per square kilometer. A German staff officer would ask you what you are smoking to think that is possible.

It takes AG-North's supply burden off of the routes and rolling stock moving from Germany's border, which enhances the ability to supply AG-Center and South to a degree, especially from 1942 on.
The limitation there is the railways. The Germans were pushing as much rolling stock as they physically could up those rail lines. Any more, and the trains start crashing into each other.
 
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Deleted member 1487

A function of the massive amounts of terrain that they had seized and the inability of the foot infantry to keep up. Had they tried to concentrate and move-up on a narrow front, they would have quickly been cut-off.
Which wasn't a problem if they could be supported by Ju52 supply, which they were historically. Part of pushing a concentrated, echeloned Panzer Group up a narrow route of advance is that the are covering a long area and the tail can stay in contact with the infantry advance or at least near to it while the shove whatever is in front of them out of the way. Past the Dvina the Soviets weren't putting much organized resistance in the way of the Germans and passed Pskov they were facing reservists and militias with hastily built defenses; by July 9 the order was given to man the newly constructed Luga Line with militia and training units, while Leningrad was not yet manned. The further they get early on means the pretty much face little organized resistance, the only issue is keeping up the air supply. As it was the 23rd army formed on Leningrad in June and none others until August. Moving full tilt to Leningrad in July from Pskov would see virtually no organized resistance in their way.


This is not in evidence. The pattern of Soviet resistance indicates they had already gotten their bearings by the start of July.
By the start of July Manstein had already been sitting still for at least 4 days. Had he taken a couple days to rest and move out with air supply, leaving his infantry division to hold the crossing until the rest of the infantry caught up he could have rushed to Pskov without organized resistance in his way.

How would taking Pskov decapitate the defense of the Baltics? The Northwest Front's headquarters was already commanding pretty much on the move (it was originally located at Riga) and would relocate to the northeast in response to the German's approach, as it did IOTL given that Pskov fell on July 9th. More to the point, how does it decapitate the defense of Leningrad? That is coordinated by the Northern/Leningrad Front's headquarters, which are inside Leningrad itself.
I misread the bits of Manstein's book on the subject. Still, taking Pskov by July 3rd or before if they move out from Dunaberg on the 28th-29th of June would breach the unmanned Stalin Line and put Manstein on an open road to the Luga river and to the river defenses no later than the 10th, pretty much as militia were just starting to move into the defenses. They could easily bounce the line and move on straight at Leningrad where defenses were not yet set up and militia just forming.

You are talking about 4th Panzer Group, entirely by itself, dsecuring an area ~94,500 square kilometers just to move from the D'vina to Pskov. That works out to less then 2 men per square kilometer. A German staff officer would ask you what you are smoking to think that is possible.
They don't have to secure that at all, just move to the river lines; they could and did subsist on aerial resupply the whole campaign and could have relied on it to keep moving before resistance coalesced. As it was the only counterattack that hit Manstein at the Dvina was smashed without much effort by the Luftwaffe and his Panzer division. With that the road was open and he could have pushed on while Reinhardt moved up behind him to secure the crossing and clear out any remaining resistance before the infantry got there. The point of deep mechanized movements wasn't to hold ground it was to strike deep and fast to disrupt your enemy before he could organize resistance; IOTL we saw what happened to AG-North once the Soviets were allowed time to organize: they put of very tough defenses and fought bitterly, keeping the Germans away from Leningrad long enough for defenses to be set up and manned.

The limitation there is the railways. The Germans were pushing as much rolling stock as they physically could up those rail lines. Any more, and the trains start crashing into each other.
Which is why historically they relied heavily on Ju52 supply for their Panzer Corps, they can do that as deep as necessary.
 
Which wasn't a problem if they could be supported by Ju52 supply, which they were historically.

Luftflotte 1's OOB has two Ju-52 gruppen for a total of 69 aircraft, of which 17 were operational on June 22nd, with no reinforcements apparent through the date of October. Given that the carrying capacity of the Ju-52 was 3,309 pounds (1.65 short tons), this amounts to a maximum transport capacity of 110-115 tons. The daily demand for a single panzer division is ~350 tons of supply, a motorized division ~300 tons, and grenadier division ~200 tons. This gives 4th Panzer Group (3 panzer divisions, 3 motorized divisions, and 2 grenadier divisions) a daily demand of ~2,350 tons.

Army Group North does not have enough aircraft to sustain even a single grenadier division at a high operational tempo for a single day, much less the entirety of 4th Panzer Group.

Part of pushing a concentrated, echeloned Panzer Group up a narrow route of advance is that the are covering a long area and the tail can stay in contact with the infantry advance or at least near to it while the shove whatever is in front of them out of the way.
And this is impossible given the sheer distance between where the infantry are and where Leningrad is. In order to maintain contact with the infantry by the time the panzers reach Ps'kov, they would have to stretch themselves out so thinly that they would be incapable of holding their ground, much less continuing the advance.

Past the Dvina the Soviets weren't putting much organized resistance in the way of the Germans and passed Pskov they were facing reservists and militias with hastily built defenses;
And this was more then adequate to not only slow the panzers, but also encircle them at several points. Fortunately, German infantry was close at hand to relieve them before this became an issue.

ITTL, you have advanced too far ahead of the infantry for them to come to their aid.

by July 9 the order was given to man the newly constructed Luga Line with militia and training units, while Leningrad was not yet manned.
The forces used to man the Luga line were raised and outfitted within Leningrad. They consisted of 9 rifle divisions , the 10th mechanized corps, and 7 militia divisions (which were using the rifle divisions TOE).

The further they get early on means the pretty much face little organized resistance, the only issue is keeping up the air supply. As it was the 23rd army formed on Leningrad in June and none others until August.
Incorrect. The 29th and 31st armies were formed during the end of June and start of July. The 34th army was formed mid-July.

Moving full tilt to Leningrad in July from Pskov would see virtually no organized resistance in their way.

By the start of July Manstein had already been sitting still for at least 4 days. Had he taken a couple days to rest and move out with air supply, leaving his infantry division to hold the crossing until the rest of the infantry caught up he could have rushed to Pskov without organized resistance in his way.
So in other words, if Manstein did what he did IOTL he'll somehow do better then ITTL? What? :confused:

Still, taking Pskov by July 3rd or before if they move out from Dunaberg on the 28th-29th of June would breach the unmanned Stalin Line and put Manstein on an open road to the Luga river and to the river defenses no later than the 10th, pretty much as militia were just starting to move into the defenses. They could easily bounce the line and move on straight at Leningrad where defenses were not yet set up and militia just forming.
Given that at this point they would be exhausted, low on supplies, pretty much hout of gas, and practically sinking into the regions swamps (which IOTL the Germans only traversed with mechanized formations by using their infantry formations to build corduroy roads), the Soviet forces will certainly be able to stop and then promptly encircle them. Actually, given the position and late-arrival of the Soviet 10th Army, they would probably be encircled shortly after taking Pskov. With their infantry now a few weeks behind instead of several days, there is a very real chance they could be overrun and wiped out. Even if they do successfully hold their positions until German infantry fight their way too them (or alternatively successfully breakout) then the formations would have been run ragged and would require extensive rest.

They don't have to secure that at all, just move to the river lines; they could and did subsist on aerial resupply the whole campaign and could have relied on it to keep moving before resistance coalesced.
They clearly did not, given that supply woes were constant and the number of aircraft totally inadequate.

As it was the only counterattack that hit Manstein at the Dvina was smashed without much effort by the Luftwaffe and his Panzer division. With that the road was open and he could have pushed on while Reinhardt moved up behind him to secure the crossing and clear out any remaining resistance before the infantry got there.
The point of deep mechanized movements wasn't to hold ground it was to strike deep and fast to disrupt your enemy before he could organize resistance;
And the distances in the East are so vast that this will not happen before the Soviets can get their bearings. If you have not secured the territory behind you by then,

IOTL we saw what happened to AG-North once the Soviets were allowed time to organize: they put of very tough defenses and fought bitterly, keeping the Germans away from Leningrad long enough for defenses to be set up and manned.
And ITTL, the Germans will at best only get the siege of Leningrad going a month later then IOTL. At worst, it never happens at all.

Which is why historically they relied heavily on Ju52 supply for their Panzer Corps, they can do that as deep as necessary.
If this was true, then the Germans would not have continuously suffered the advance-crippling supply issues that rapidly set in after they had advanced past the D'vina-Minsk-Zhitomir line. This is a repeated pattern throughout World War II in fact: the Germans, Soviets, and Western Allies all found themselves in during rapid advances once they had moved at least two-three hundred miles beyond a major supply hub. Air resupply was always inadequate unless the enemy had already completely collapsed.

IOTL, the Germans struck the proper balance between advancing fast enough to keep the Soviets suitably off-balance and slow enough that they did not outrun the supply train and infantry they needed in the dust. You are proposing that they completely destroy that balance and then expecting this too work. In reality, such a move is as reckless and dangerous as the Moscow option in August/September. I have seen precisely the scenario you describe attempted in War in the East, with the results being pretty much as I described...

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The only thing that saved the Germans from losing 6 mobile formations in this case was that the Soviet player thought the German infantry was further forward then they actually were and did not try to properly secure a pocket. The IOTL Soviets, being more aggressive, would likely not make this mistake. This happened in the week of July 3-10.
 
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Don't bother with Pskov-Luga/Novgorod in the first place. Instead, advance along the left bank of Lake Peipus (this also has the benefit of securing your right flank) towards Narva, with maybe a smaller force towards Tallinn. There is a major road in both directions, which IIRC, was better than the one taken OTL towards Luga. Once you've reached Narva (and Tallinn is neutralized), you can use ships to resupply the forward units, clearing the way for an advance on Leningrad (of whose success chances in taking the city however I'm quite skeptical).

You can also do a naval and air landing at Narva in advance of the Panzers
 
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Taking Leningrad means that the Baltic fleet will cease to exist and the Baltic sea is a German lake and supplyline from Germany to Riga/Helsinki/Leningrad(if harbor not destroyed) are secure. AG north gets a shorter line to defend
 

Deleted member 1487

Luftflotte 1's OOB has two Ju-52 gruppen for a total of 69 aircraft, of which 17 were operational on June 22nd, with no reinforcements apparent through the date of October. Given that the carrying capacity of the Ju-52 was 3,309 pounds (1.65 short tons), this amounts to a maximum transport capacity of 110-115 tons. The daily demand for a single panzer division is ~350 tons of supply, a motorized division ~300 tons, and grenadier division ~200 tons. This gives 4th Panzer Group (3 panzer divisions, 3 motorized divisions, and 2 grenadier divisions) a daily demand of ~2,350 tons.
http://www.operationbarbarossa.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Luftwaffe-OOB-sample.pdf
http://www.century-of-flight.net/Aviation%20history/photo_albums/timeline/ww2/Junkers%20Ju52.htm
I've got 28 Ju52's operational and 1845kg for supply transport. Your numbers only anticipate one mission per day. The distances were short enough that they could and historically did make multiple trips per day. I've never seen where it says a Panzer division need 350 tons per day; in fact the Demyansk AND Kholm pockets required less than 300 tons per day and it had over 100k men with 10s of thousands more brought in and many evacuated.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demyansk_Pocket

If you're going by DAK requirements those are heavily thrown off because of the need to bring up huge amounts of water and extra supplies due to the environment that would not exist in a European environment.

Granted its probably not that far off given the weight of ammunition.


And this is impossible given the sheer distance between where the infantry are and where Leningrad is. In order to maintain contact with the infantry by the time the panzers reach Ps'kov, they would have to stretch themselves out so thinly that they would be incapable of holding their ground, much less continuing the advance.
After the 27 army is attacked, what forces were the Soviets attacking with? They were pulling back to the Stalin Line.


And this was more then adequate to not only slow the panzers, but also encircle them at several points. Fortunately, German infantry was close at hand to relieve them before this became an issue.
If they have enough air supply to hold until relieved its not that big an issue provided they don't get too far ahead.

ITTL, you have advanced too far ahead of the infantry for them to come to their aid.
Which wouldn't be necessary given that the Soviets were not organized and able to counter attack even if some units move into the rear areas before the infantry get there, as supply is not following them.


The forces used to man the Luga line were raised and outfitted within Leningrad. They consisted of 9 rifle divisions , the 10th mechanized corps, and 7 militia divisions (which were using the rifle divisions TOE).
Most of those rifle divisions were scratch raised from reservists and on the 9th were equal to about 3 divisions according to Glantz and did not include the 10th MC.


Incorrect. The 29th and 31st armies were formed during the end of June and start of July. The 34th army was formed mid-July.
Not according to Glantz, he has them formed in August. His Barbarossa book is the source.



So in other words, if Manstein did what he did IOTL he'll somehow do better then ITTL? What? :confused:
No, he sat still for 7 days IOTL.


Given that at this point they would be exhausted, low on supplies, pretty much hout of gas, and practically sinking into the regions swamps (which IOTL the Germans only traversed with mechanized formations by using their infantry formations to build corduroy roads), the Soviet forces will certainly be able to stop and then promptly encircle them. Actually, given the position and late-arrival of the Soviet 10th Army, they would probably be encircled shortly after taking Pskov. With their infantry now a few weeks behind instead of several days, there is a very real chance they could be overrun and wiped out. Even if they do successfully hold their positions until German infantry fight their way too them (or alternatively successfully breakout) then the formations would have been run ragged and would require extensive rest.
When did the Soviet 10th army show up, I don't have them on any map of the fighting ever in the North; I have the mauled 8th and 11th, the 22nd caught between AGs north and south and pulling its flank back in front of Manstein and the 16th army, and the 27 army, which was shoved back and would be dealt with by the 16th army, if the Reinhardts follow on force.


They clearly did not, given that supply woes were constant and the number of aircraft totally inadequate.
When did the others get operational?


And the distances in the East are so vast that this will not happen before the Soviets can get their bearings. If you have not secured the territory behind you by then,

And ITTL, the Germans will at best only get the siege of Leningrad going a month later then IOTL. At worst, it never happens at all.
Based on what?


If this was true, then the Germans would not have continuously suffered the advance-crippling supply issues that rapidly set in after they had advanced past the D'vina-Minsk-Zhitomir line. This is a repeated pattern throughout World War II in fact: the Germans, Soviets, and Western Allies all found themselves in during rapid advances once they had moved at least two-three hundred miles beyond a major supply hub. Air resupply was always inadequate unless the enemy had already completely collapsed.
Given the fact that they operated well beyond their rail heads from July on they had enough supply to fight to the Luga and beyond despite rail lagging well over 100 miles to the rear.

IOTL, the Germans struck the proper balance between advancing fast enough to keep the Soviets suitably off-balance and slow enough that they did not outrun the supply train and infantry they needed in the dust. You are proposing that they completely destroy that balance and then expecting this too work. In reality, such a move is as reckless and dangerous as the Moscow option in August/September. I have seen precisely the scenario you describe attempted in War in the East, with the results being pretty much as I described...
Which doesn't matter because the Soviet units moving into the rear aren't interdicting operational rail lines and would be pushed out by the follow up infantry if not Rheinhardt's follow on corps. Plus given the fast move the Soviets weren't exactly in much of a position to respond effectively.

Of course you make the classic mistake of assuming that a game is exactly the same as real life.


The only thing that saved the Germans from losing 6 mobile formations in this case was that the Soviet player thought the German infantry was further forward then they actually were and did not try to properly secure a pocket. The IOTL Soviets, being more aggressive, would likely not make this mistake. This happened in the week of July 3-10.
Again a game is not real life.

Don't bother with Pskov-Luga/Novgorod in the first place. Instead, advance along the left bank of Lake Peipus (this also has the benefit of securing your right flank) towards Narva, with maybe a smaller force towards Tallinn. There is a major road in both directions, which IIRC, was better than the one taken OTL towards Luga. Once you've reached Narva (and Tallinn is neutralized), you can use ships to resupply the forward units, clearing the way for an advance on Leningrad (of whose success chances in taking the city however I'm quite skeptical).
Its a longer distance, doesn't have a major rail line, you cannot use ships there until the Baltic Islands are cleared, and Narwa is a highly compressed area, with horrible panzer terrain, and easily defended.

You can also do a naval and air landing at Narva in advance of the Panzers
I don't think they could get around the mines and Soviet naval forces at Kronstadt to make that a viable option quickly enough.
 

Deleted member 1487

Taking Leningrad means that the Baltic fleet will cease to exist and the Baltic sea is a German lake and supplyline from Germany to Riga/Helsinki/Leningrad(if harbor not destroyed) are secure. AG north gets a shorter line to defend
That would be the big benefit, plus any captured Soviet shipping can be used, any captures Soviet naval ships can be scrapped for metal, and it shuts off the Soviet sub threat, which was a significant issue for the Germans trying to get Swedish iron ore via convoy for the entire war.
 

- 91 extra km's - not exactly the end of the world
- apparently there was a rail line running through that direction
CommentsOnRussianRailroadsSketch3Lg.jpg

had they worked on that one at the same rate they worked on the one towards Pskov, they would have had it converted all the way to the northern tip of Lake Peipus by July 31st

- the Baltic Islands don't have to be cleared as super-late as they were OTL (first landing on September 8th); you can do the initial landing on day 1, with the added benefit of drawing the Soviet Fleet to battle; if it's successful, land at Narva and clear a bridgehead - if it somehow fails, it's still early enough to have the Panzers take the route taken OTL

- AFAIK, the mines protecting Kronstadt are to the east of Narva

- a determined commitment by the KM and Finnish Navy (especially if the Bismark return to Norway instead of going south) would see them outnumber and outgun Soviet naval forces
 
Taking Leningrad means that the Baltic fleet will cease to exist and the Baltic sea is a German lake and supplyline from Germany to Riga/Helsinki/Leningrad(if harbor not destroyed) are secure. AG north gets a shorter line to defend

That would be the big benefit, plus any captured Soviet shipping can be used, any captures Soviet naval ships can be scrapped for metal, and it shuts off the Soviet sub threat, which was a significant issue for the Germans trying to get Swedish iron ore via convoy for the entire war.

biggest missed opportunity was not destroying more of Soviet fleet https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_evacuation_of_Tallinn

not sure whether it was caution on part of KM not having more ships engaged?

certainly would have benefited from having purpose built minelayers http://german-navy.de/kriegsmarine/ships/minelayer/minelayer/index.html

early destruction of Soviet fleet and thorough bottling up of remaining subs allow Germans to operate across Baltic without actually taking Leningrad?
 
Would their be any advantage to having the Finns continue their advance into Soviet territory? I'm not sue if taking the 30KM stretch of land that was left between the Finnish front and Leningrad in the Karelian Isthmus, and having them push deeper into East Karelia would change anything (I'm not very knowledgeable about the details)
 
I've got 28 Ju52's operational and 1845kg for supply transport.

1,845 kg = 4,067 pounds, or ~2 short tons which works out to 138 short tons. Not a significant change.

Your numbers only anticipate one mission per day. The distances were short enough that they could and historically did make multiple trips per day
Not ITTL. Because you have had them madly rush forward with complete disregard to their logistics and infantry support, the airbases have had no time to displace forward and would still be down around Koenigsberg.

. I've never seen where it says a Panzer division need 350 tons per day; in fact the Demyansk AND Kholm pockets required less than 300 tons per day and it had over 100k men with 10s of thousands more brought in and many evacuated.
The Demyansk pocket also lacked any panzer formations, was manned by vastly shrunken forces in static positions, and not attempting a major advance against enemy resistance.

If you're going by DAK requirements those are heavily thrown off because of the need to bring up huge amounts of water and extra supplies due to the environment that would not exist in a European environment.

Granted its probably not that far off given the weight of ammunition.
Does not matter. Even if we cut the number down to 1/3rd (783 tons) that still far outstrips the delivery capacity available.

After the 27 army is attacked, what forces were the Soviets attacking with? They were pulling back to the Stalin Line.
To the west of Pskov, there would be 4 rifle divisions, a rifle brigade, and more NKVD regiments then I care to count. On the right flank, there is the 22nd and 10th armies with 9 rifle divisions between them. Then there are the host of formations that would have been bypassed yet the Germans have not decided to contain. These could make quite a nuisance of themselves.

If they have enough air supply to hold until relieved its not that big an issue provided they don't get too far ahead.
You have had them move too far ahead. By this point they would be 220 miles from the D'vina river, where the nearest infantry division was. Ignoring the time it will take, that is a solid two weeks distance.

Which wouldn't be necessary given that the Soviets were not organized and able to counter attack
Not supported by the fact that the Soviets were clearly organized and counter-attacking from very early on in the campaign.

even if some units move into the rear areas before the infantry get there, as supply is not following them.
Supply clearly was following, given that air supply alone would be inadequate. Oh, and the host of German reports indicating supply columns following the advance.

Most of those rifle divisions were scratch raised from reservists and on the 9th were equal to about 3 divisions according to Glantz
And that would be enough.

and did not include the 10th MC.
10th Mechanized Corps was initially located just north of Leningrad and clearly was part of the Luga defense line...

The 10th Mechanized Corps was not involved in the first battles of Operation Barbarossa, being brought out of reserve on 10 July 1941. From that date it formed part of the Luga Operational Group under the command of Lieutenant General K. P. Piadyshev, defending the 'Luga Line'. The Luga Line defences were constructed by 55,000 civilians & which and extended from Narva to Shimsk on Lake Ilmen. It first engaged 8th Panzer Division on 13 July 1941 along with the 177th Rifle Division isolating it from its neighbouring divisions for several days around Dno & costing it 70 of its 150 tanks destroyed or damaged.
Not according to Glantz, he has them formed in August. His Barbarossa book is the source.
Maybe they were not committed to the front until August. In any case,

No, he sat still for 7 days IOTL.
Probably for the perfectly good reason of making sure he didn't get too far ahead of the infantry and supply columns.

When did the Soviet 10th army show up, I don't have them on any map of the fighting ever in the North;
I fucked up in identification. I was talking about the 24th Army, which was around Rzhev on the . Probably got it confused with the 10th Mechanized Corps.

the 22nd caught between AGs north and south and pulling its flank back in front of Manstein
ITTL, with Manstein moving well to the west and north it will likely stop pulling its flank back and just march into the giant gap between 6th Panzer Group and the follow on infantry.

When did the others get operational?
Doesn't matter. When I said the number of aircraft were inadequate, I meant the total number.

Based on what?
On getting encircled for a solid two weeks with all that entails.

Given the fact that they operated well beyond their rail heads from July on they had enough supply to fight to the Luga and beyond despite rail lagging well over 100 miles to the rear.
The Germans had these things called "trucks" which were found to be a vastly more efficient way then aircraft to bring supplies from the railheads to the mechanized forces at the front...

Assuming no Soviet forces got in the way of course.

Which doesn't matter because the Soviet units moving into the rear aren't interdicting operational rail lines
Without any infantry to protect said rail lines, they will be.

and would be pushed out by the follow up infantry if not Rheinhardt's follow on corps.
Infantry are two weeks away. You have had Reinhardts corps join Manstein's as a purely spearhead force. This means that for the Soviets, encircling 6th Panzer Group is just a matter of marching, not combat.

Plus given the fast move the Soviets weren't exactly in much of a position to respond effectively.
Given the distances involved, they have plenty of time.

Of course you make the classic mistake of assuming that a game is exactly the same as real life.

Again a game is not real life.
In the specific case of War in the East, it is a reasonable approximation of real life warfare on the Eastern Front at the operational-strategic level. Of course it does have it's unrealistic elements but the consequences of rushing too far ahead of your nfantry and supplies with your armored spearheads is not one of them. Maybe you don't like that... that's okay: neither did the Germans in real life. But they still had to deal with it.
 
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