Lee's army surrenders 1862

I'm English, just so you know, and I live in England so I have limited knowledge on the American Civil war, despite how interesting I find I. Naturally I was drawn to the more high profile eastern theatre than the West so I dont know as much about the western theatre so whether Grant was totally engrossed in his war or not I wouldn't know but I do know that Bragg invaded the north around this time so I assumed that Grant would at least be slowed by Braggs counter attack.


Well I too aren't American but Australian, yet like you I've taken a great interest in the ACW. I've also taken a great interest in the western theatre as well. In fact the western theatre is more important for Union victory than the eastern theatre (i.e. see my AH in the Timelines Section).

Grant & Bragg never actually fought each other as amry commanders until later at Chattanooga in November 1863. Prior to that it was basically Bragg v Roscrans (among a few other Union generals) during this period in question.



I remember reading that at one point in the war Grant and Thomas were pitted against each other by a senior officer so they didn't have the best of relationships however Thomas was a able commander and has been very under-rated by the history books being overshadowed by Grant and Sherman.


I agree. Thomas is much better than many realise. His victory at Nashville certainly proves this as he is about the only Union general to achieve such a victory of annihilation (unless you include Sheridan's victory over Early later in the War).


If there is no-one capable in the eastern theatre to take on Lee then that leaves the western theatre and out of the highest ranking officers in the west Thomas was the only one Grant would be prepared to lose. That therefore is a General of good ability who was not really wanted where he was and could have given Lee and challenge given the opportunity to do so.


Actually at this point in time, Thomas is under the command of Roscrans AFAIK, not Grant. So Grant wouldn't have a say in it. Whether Roscrans is willing to let his best general leave is another question...



Lee was a better mediator than Jackson but I do agree that Stonewall was a pheonominal commander however would he have been able to organise and deploy the ANV as well as Lee or better than Lee? And if he did would his death at Chancellorville cause the ANV to collapse from having no capable commanders after Jacksons death?


Very true about Lee. Mind you Jackson did manage the Valley Campaign superbly & Jackson was completely independent from Lee during this time. Of course if Jackson was GOC ANV at Chancellorsville, he probably wouldn't be with his troops on the left, but in a centre command position. So he probably wouldn't be killed as against the OTL.

There other also other worthy CSA commanders who, although maybe not as good, were highly competent nevertheless. Longstreet immediately comes to mind, & given the general defensive nature of CSA stratergy in the east, Longstreet would have been ideal (importantly there would be no Gettysburg campaign). Then again Joe Johnston wasn't too bad either. Of course Lee could always make his appearance albeit a tad later if he isn't already dead.
 
the suggestion of Thomas, though, could very well make a difference but is he senior enough in the food chain?
I think I can answer this. Between April (The battle of Shiloh) and June (The fall of Corinth Miss.) Thomas was the commander of the Army of Tenn., while Grant is second in command of all western forces at the request of General Henry Halleck. After this point and throughout most of the Bragg's Kentucky Campaign, Thomas serves General DC Buell as his senior Corps Commander, and when Lincoln felt that Buell had allowed Bragg to advance too far, Thomas was offered command of the Army of the Ohio, which he declined because battle was imminent.
 
Thanks. Agreed, I'd have little faith in Burnside et al, against Lee and company under most conditions, but all the Union needed at Antietam for complete victory was one more push, which I think just about any general other than McClellan would have ordered. Also, Mac wasn't just overcautious, he made no atempt whatsoever to coordinate his army during a major attack (similar to Lee at Gettysburg on the second day). Add that on to the screw ups of Sumner and Burnside, and the Union still managed to pull out a draw. My opinion is that no one could have managed Antietam worse than Mac did, even a fool like Burnside. If Burn had followed his Fredricksburg strategy of repeated frontal assaults, he would have driven Lee into the Potomac.


Now that is actually an interesting observation about Burnside, but he would probably have to attack along the entire line simultaneously in order to overwhelm the defenders. Yet judging from Fredricksburg, he'll probably olny attack the centre with any vigour. And guess what's waiting for the Union troops? Not really a wall, this time, but the sunken road. A perfect trench in other words. So the Union troops once again get slaughtered, & even if they eventually manage to take the sunken road akin to the OTL, Lee will have reserves to counterattack because whatever happens on the flanks will be nothing more than a demonstration (again judging on what Burnside did at Fredricksburg). Consequentially, although Antietam is fought differently, the outcome is pretty much the same.
 
I think I can answer this. Between April (The battle of Shiloh) and June (The fall of Corinth Miss.) Thomas was the commander of the Army of Tenn., while Grant is second in command of all western forces at the request of General Henry Halleck. After this point and throughout most of the Bragg's Kentucky Campaign, Thomas serves General DC Buell as his senior Corps Commander, and when Lincoln felt that Buell had allowed Bragg to advance too far, Thomas was offered command of the Army of the Ohio, which he declined because battle was imminent.


Thanks for the info. Alas for Thomas, that seems to make him too junior to become GOC AOP. Maybe a POD is needed prior to the outbreak of the War where Thomas is more senior or is in the east & does a Rock of Chickamauga at First Manassas.
 
Thanks for the info. Alas for Thomas, that seems to make him too junior to become GOC AOP. Maybe a POD is needed prior to the outbreak of the War where Thomas is more senior or is in the east & does a Rock of Chickamauga at First Manassas.

That might be fairly easy to accomplish. I just took at look at Thomas' page on Wikipedia, and according to them, he was in command of a brigade under Patterson during the Manassas campaign. Maybe if Patterson had actually done something useful, instead of just sitting in the Valley, Thomas would have earned some laurels.
An interesting side note, by the way William T. Sherman, was at First Manassas, commanding a brigade in Tyler's Division.
 
Well I too aren't American but Australian, yet like you I've taken a great interest in the ACW. I've also taken a great interest in the western theatre as well. In fact the western theatre is more important for Union victory than the eastern theatre (i.e. see my AH in the Timelines Section).

I agree, the War was won and lost in the west. I am of the opinnion that had A.S. Johnston survived Shiloh then Grant wouldn't have had such an easy job of the western theatre as he did, though it wasn't a walk in the park. But I also know that one man cannot win a war but A.S. Johnston was a great leader of men so the western theatre probably would have been drastically changed had Johnston lived.

Grant & Bragg never actually fought each other as amry commanders until later at Chattanooga in November 1863. Prior to that it was basically Bragg v Roscrans (among a few other Union generals) during this period in question.

I agree. Thomas is much better than many realise. His victory at Nashville certainly proves this as he is about the only Union general to achieve such a victory of annihilation (unless you include Sheridan's victory over Early later in the War).

Actually at this point in time, Thomas is under the command of Roscrans AFAIK, not Grant. So Grant wouldn't have a say in it. Whether Roscrans is willing to let his best general leave is another question....

Ah..well...Bragg was still a threat that had to be dealt at the with and Rosencrans was more than capable of dealing with the hesitating North Carolina born General. The only reason he lost Chickamauga was because of Longstreets arrival.

I think that Rosencrans could have survived and even defeated Bragg had Thomas gone to command the AOTP but would Rosencrans, a known pessimist, be willing to part with his most able general? Probably not. He had Sheridan I suppose but Thomas was quite clearly the best in his army. The only reason the Union saved face after Chickamauga was because of Thomas refusing to retreat in the centre and subsequently allowing the Union army to retreat.

Very true about Lee. Mind you Jackson did manage the Valley Campaign superbly & Jackson was completely independent from Lee during this time. Of course if Jackson was GOC ANV at Chancellorsville, he probably wouldn't be with his troops on the left, but in a centre command position. So he probably wouldn't be killed as against the OTL.

There other also other worthy CSA commanders who, although maybe not as good, were highly competent nevertheless. Longstreet immediately comes to mind, & given the general defensive nature of CSA stratergy in the east, Longstreet would have been ideal (importantly there would be no Gettysburg campaign). Then again Joe Johnston wasn't too bad either. Of course Lee could always make his appearance albeit a tad later if he isn't already dead.

I know that Old Pete Longstreet was a very good general in defensive positions and when stirred for an attack was perhaps more vicious than Jackson himself but he suffered from terrible moodswing where every once in a while he didn't want to do anything. "He's so slow" Lee said of Longstreet at Gettysburg, the only time he ever publically criticized a confederate officer.

Joe Johnston never really got any continuity going. He had the chance to prove how good a general he was against Grant but his arguements with Davis tended to have priority with his life.

The thing is that Longstreet and Jackson didn't get along. They were rivals and almost alway argueing about something or other. If Jackson had been commander of the ANV then Longstreet would not have been in the ANV.

Jackson tended to keep his own council and not inform his subordinates about what he was doing and Lee, far from being perfect, couldn't bring himself to dicipline lower ranking officers.
 
Originally Posted by DMA
Now that is actually an interesting observation about Burnside, but he would probably have to attack along the entire line simultaneously in order to overwhelm the defenders. Yet judging from Fredricksburg, he'll probably olny attack the centre with any vigour. And guess what's waiting for the Union troops? Not really a wall, this time, but the sunken road. A perfect trench in other words. So the Union troops once again get slaughtered, & even if they eventually manage to take the sunken road akin to the OTL, Lee will have reserves to counterattack because whatever happens on the flanks will be nothing more than a demonstration (again judging on what Burnside did at Fredricksburg). Consequentially, although Antietam is fought differently, the outcome is pretty much the same.

As I recall, the sunken road faced north, and while it continued south, I'm not sure how much ground it covered. At Fredericksburg Burnside attacked more than just the center, but where at F-burg the southern thrust (I corps) sputtered out partly due to Rebel artillery, the reverse is true at Antietam. The Union had complete artillery dominance of the center of the Confederate line at Antietam. Any CSA counterattack would have to come over open ground under the federal guns. Two of the three bridges over the Antietam were under union control, plus the fords, which makes it a much more favorable situation for deploying troops than F-burg. I think that if Burnside (or any other federal commander) wanted to make a huge frontal assault all along the line, he would have been able to. Also, the sunken road isn't quite a perfect trench, many portions of it are set lower than the ground ahead of it, allowing any attacking troops that get close enough can pour fire right into it, as the Union troops historically did.

Also, if Burnside is in command and attacking frontally, and not sending the I and XII corps on their flanking manuever, he can attack on Sept. 16 instead of the 17th, when the divisions of McLaws, Anderson, and A.P. Hill would not be available for Lee (if I remember correctly, the first two divisions arrived just after midnight on the 17th, and Hill of course late in the day).
 
As I recall, the sunken road faced north, and while it continued south, I'm not sure how much ground it covered. At Fredericksburg Burnside attacked more than just the center

That's true, but remember, at F-Burg, Burnside's attacks were poorly coordinated, with his attack on Jackson's line going in hours before the one of Longstreet's lines. In addition, Burnside held most of Hooker's Grand Division in reserve.
As you well know, this is very much the same fighting style that McClellan employed at Antietam, with the various separate battles at the Sunken Road, the Dunker Church and Burnside bridge. Judging from Burnside's fighting style at F-burg, at is more than likely that he would have duplicated McClellan's mistakes at Antietam, even if he does attack when Lee's Army is at its weakest.
 
That might be fairly easy to accomplish. I just took at look at Thomas' page on Wikipedia, and according to them, he was in command of a brigade under Patterson during the Manassas campaign. Maybe if Patterson had actually done something useful, instead of just sitting in the Valley, Thomas would have earned some laurels.
An interesting side note, by the way William T. Sherman, was at First Manassas, commanding a brigade in Tyler's Division.


Well there's a good chance for a POD in the case of Thomas then. After First Manassas he becomes a division commander by Fair Oaks. Then a Corps Commander during the latter Peninsular Campaign. Then he gets the nod after Pope's disasterous Second Manassas debacle. But I'd say all this will only happen should he do his Rock of Chickamauga thing at First Manassas.

As for Sherman - I'd rather have him out West as per OTL. Afterall no-one could have done the March to the Sea better than Sherman IMHO.
 
I am of the opinnion that had A.S. Johnston survived Shiloh then Grant wouldn't have had such an easy job of the western theatre as he did, though it wasn't a walk in the park. But I also know that one man cannot win a war but A.S. Johnston was a great leader of men so the western theatre probably would have been drastically changed had Johnston lived.


Nytram01,

I, for one, have never understood the hagiography surrounding A.S. Johnston. People continually refer to him as a great commander yet he commanded in all of one campaign; a campaign forced on him by the loss of forts he hadn't properly supported, a campaign that failed to stop the Union movement into Tennessee, a campaign in which his enemy's armies easily reinforced each other, a campaign that ended in the defeat of his own army, and a campaign that ended in his own death.

That's a great commander? He'd completely failed to meet his one aim in the battle; driving the Union forces into the river and defeating them, even before he was shot.

Johnston's post-war reputation rests on the fact that Johnston was 'lucky' enough to die early in the war. Because he wasn't around long enough to show whether he was any kind of a commander, he is automatically thought of as a great commander instead. Granted, his movement to Shiloh was impressive, he was able to bring a mostly untrained, mish-mashed collection of disparate forces into contact with his opponents without much difficulty. However, much of his success there was due to the fact that his opponents were also a mostly untrained, mish-mished collection of disparate forces.

Strip away the hagiography and look at Johnston and his campaign dispassionately. He didn't really accomplish much, aside from being 'lucky' enough to die early.


... Thomas was quite clearly the best in his army.

Thomas was much better than the press, his fellow officers, and the post-war authors made him out to be. He didn't play at the political and popularity games the others did, so his accomplishments were either overlooked or awarded to someone else.

Thomas' campaign against Hood, for example, was a masterpiece. Unlike nearly every other Civil War general up to that time, Thomas actually took care and made plans to pursue Hood's army after defeating it so as to ensure it's destruction. While the theory taught in the academy included post-battle pursuits, the practice during the war usually had the victors squatting on the battlefield while the losers left virtually unmolested.

"He's so slow" Lee said of Longstreet at Gettysburg, the only time he ever publically criticized a confederate officer.

Longstreet was slow at Gettysburg because Longstreet, and everyone else who bothered to think about the situation the ANV had got itself into there, knew that Longstreet was right.

Jackson wasn't perfect either. At the time of Chancellorville, he had a officers' mutiny brewing under him due to various court martials and arrests he'd ordered on slight and mistaken pretexts. Lee was already having a devil of a time dealing with the trouble brewing in Jackson's command until Stonewall's death made it all go away.

Jackson got the 'slows' too. Take a look at his performance in the Seven Days battles for the best examples.


Bill
 
I agree, the War was won and lost in the west. I am of the opinnion that had A.S. Johnston survived Shiloh then Grant wouldn't have had such an easy job of the western theatre as he did, though it wasn't a walk in the park. But I also know that one man cannot win a war but A.S. Johnston was a great leader of men so the western theatre probably would have been drastically changed had Johnston lived.


Agreed



Ah..well...Bragg was still a threat that had to be dealt at the with and Rosencrans was more than capable of dealing with the hesitating North Carolina born General. The only reason he lost Chickamauga was because of Longstreets arrival.


Yes, Bragg was useless. He was the Union's secret weapon out West. Chickamauga clearly demonstrated this.


I think that Rosencrans could have survived and even defeated Bragg had Thomas gone to command the AOTP but would Rosencrans, a known pessimist, be willing to part with his most able general? Probably not. He had Sheridan I suppose but Thomas was quite clearly the best in his army. The only reason the Union saved face after Chickamauga was because of Thomas refusing to retreat in the centre and subsequently allowing the Union army to retreat.


But what if Thomas remained East akin to the scenario I've mentioned to violadog? Then Rosecrans wouldn't have to worry about losing Thomas in the first place. In fact the CSA victory at Chickamauga may have been even greater leading to Union setbacks in the mid-west theatre which is an interesting AH scenario in itself.



I know that Old Pete Longstreet was a very good general in defensive positions and when stirred for an attack was perhaps more vicious than Jackson himself but he suffered from terrible moodswing where every once in a while he didn't want to do anything. "He's so slow" Lee said of Longstreet at Gettysburg, the only time he ever publically criticized a confederate officer.


Old Pete was too slow at Gettysburg because he had impossible terrain to attack. It is no wonder the Union was able to defend Little Round Top when they decided to offer a strong defence. And look what happened to Pickett's charge. If anything it was Lee would made a dreadful error, one Longstreet tried to point out, but Lee more or less ignored him. Nevertheless, Longstreet was right.


Joe Johnston never really got any continuity going. He had the chance to prove how good a general he was against Grant but his arguements with Davis tended to have priority with his life.


Well that was because Johnston was always outnumbered - especially out West. This was also partly Lee's fault because he pretty well ignored everywhere else apart from Virginia. And Davis wouldn't order Lee to depart with any troops for elsewhere until it became so obvious, especially in the aftermath of Gettysburg, that something had to be done about the western theatre were defeat after defeat had occured for the CSA.


The thing is that Longstreet and Jackson didn't get along. They were rivals and almost alway argueing about something or other. If Jackson had been commander of the ANV then Longstreet would not have been in the ANV.


Well oddly enough this wouldn't be a bad thing as one of them, more likely Longstreet, could have been sent out West. And Longstreet's defensive skills would soon have stopped the rot in the Western Theatre to the point of stalemate. He may have even conducted the occasional offensive action which, if Chickamauga is anything to judge by, could have meant that the Union could have faced setbacks akin to the OTL for the CSA.


Jackson tended to keep his own council and not inform his subordinates about what he was doing and Lee, far from being perfect, couldn't bring himself to dicipline lower ranking officers.


Yes, this was a fault at times, yet his strategic offensive abilities & skills were without equal in the War IMHO. Furthermore, if Jackson was GOC ANV, I'd doubt you'd see a battle like Antietam or even Gettysburg for that matter.
 
As I recall, the sunken road faced north, and while it continued south, I'm not sure how much ground it covered. At Fredericksburg Burnside attacked more than just the center, but where at F-burg the southern thrust (I corps) sputtered out partly due to Rebel artillery, the reverse is true at Antietam. The Union had complete artillery dominance of the center of the Confederate line at Antietam. Any CSA counterattack would have to come over open ground under the federal guns. Two of the three bridges over the Antietam were under union control, plus the fords, which makes it a much more favorable situation for deploying troops than F-burg. I think that if Burnside (or any other federal commander) wanted to make a huge frontal assault all along the line, he would have been able to. Also, the sunken road isn't quite a perfect trench, many portions of it are set lower than the ground ahead of it, allowing any attacking troops that get close enough can pour fire right into it, as the Union troops historically did.

Also, if Burnside is in command and attacking frontally, and not sending the I and XII corps on their flanking manuever, he can attack on Sept. 16 instead of the 17th, when the divisions of McLaws, Anderson, and A.P. Hill would not be available for Lee (if I remember correctly, the first two divisions arrived just after midnight on the 17th, and Hill of course late in the day).


Whilst it's true the sunken road may have favoured a northerly direction, don't forget the right flank of the ANV pretty well rested on Antietam Creek. This makes it difficult to conduct any flanking manoeuvrer in order to get around the sunken road & attack from the east. I'd dare say, thus, Burnside would be forced to attack akin to McClellan meaning the centre becomes the Sunken Road & that the Union will have to come from a northerly direction. Whether Burnside also tried something towards Dunkard Church is possible, but I suspect that this will merely be a demonstration.

Burnside will probably place little importance on repeating his OTL effort & force "Burnside Bridge". And, if he does try this, well as the OTL demonstrated, it can be easily defended by a small force, delaying such an outflanking manoeuvrer until reinforcements arrive akin to the OTL.

Also one must remember that, even if Burnside attacks on the first day in a significant way, he won't have his full force with him either. Consequentially the number ratio won't be overly different from the OTL clash, whilst you can forget any flanking moves let alone a well co-ordinated multi-front assault.
 
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Originally Posted by violadog
That's true, but remember, at F-Burg, Burnside's attacks were poorly coordinated, with his attack on Jackson's line going in hours before the one of Longstreet's lines. In addition, Burnside held most of Hooker's Grand Division in reserve.

I wouldn't expect Burnside to coordinate Antietam any better than F-burg, but the situation is much more favorable for the Union at the former. And Burnside did commit most of the V corps for a late afternoon assault despite zero progress being made against Marye's heights. Unlike at F-burg, the Union attacks at Antietam did make progress, and if reserves had been commited, Lee would have been overwhelmed. Let's assume for arguments sake, that Burn is commanding and the battle goes exactly it did historically, he still has two mostly unused corps in reserve. Even if he doesn't finish the job on the 17th, he can attack the next day and finish Lee. All the federals have to do is be one smidge more aggressive than McClellan.
 
Originally Posted by DMA
Whilst it's true the sunken road may have favoured a northerly direction, don't forget the right flank of the ANV pretty well rested on Antietam Creek. This makes it difficult to conduct any flanking manoeuvrer in order to get around the sunken road & attack from the east. I'd dare say, thus, Burnside would be forced to attack akin to McClellan meaning the centre becomes the Sunken Road & that the Union will have to come from a northerly direction. Whether Burnside also tried something towards Dunkard Church is possible, but I suspect that this will merely be a demonstration.

Burnside will probably place little importance on repeating his OTL effort & force "Burnside Bridge". And, if he does try this, well as the OTL demonstrated, it can be easily defended by a small force, deplying such an outflanking manoeuvrer until reinforcements arrive akin to the OTL.

Also one must remember that, even if Burnside attacks on the first day in a significant way, he won't have his full force with him either. Consequentially the number ratio won't be overly different from the OTL clash, whilst you can forget any flanking moves let alone a well co-ordinated multi-front assault.

If the federals attack in the center, it would be concentrated at the area just to the west of Sharpsburg directly in front of the middle bridge, and I don't think the sunken road ran that far south. Also, if the feds ignore Burnsides' bridge and go for the fords south of it instead, they can threaten Lee's right, at least drawing off troops he can send to the center.

As to attacking on the 16th, I think almost all of the AOTP had arrived (I could be wrong, I'll have to go back into my books and check), with the exception of parts of the V corps and Couch's division of the IV, while Lee is missing a full third of the ANV, which increases the ratio greatly in favor of the feds. In such a situation, Lee would no reserves at all, assuming Jackson's corps moves from the left to reinforce the center.

I think I'm going to have to fire up my old computer and play some of Sid Meirer's Antietam. Man, is this discussion bringing back memories of great wasted hours.
 
If the federals attack in the center, it would be concentrated at the area just to the west of Sharpsburg directly in front of the middle bridge, and I don't think the sunken road ran that far south. Also, if the feds ignore Burnsides' bridge and go for the fords south of it instead, they can threaten Lee's right, at least drawing off troops he can send to the center.


Except they didn't do that in the OTL. Furthermore they would have to cross the middle bridge right in front of the main body of the ANV. That's courting disaster as the AoP won't be able to deploy in full line whilst the ANV can hit them with pretty much everything they've got.

Also trying to figure out all the options involved with Burnside's Bridge means a loss in time. So forget any attack on the 16th.

As to attacking on the 16th, I think almost all of the AOTP had arrived (I could be wrong, I'll have to go back into my books and check), with the exception of parts of the V corps and Couch's division of the IV, while Lee is missing a full third of the ANV, which increases the ratio greatly in favor of the feds. In such a situation, Lee would no reserves at all, assuming Jackson's corps moves from the left to reinforce the center.


I'd doubt it. They'd be stretched out over the roads akin to the build up to Gettysburg. It would take them a day to deploy especially if there's a complicated plan of attack. And the more you rush it the less co-ordinated it will be.


I think I'm going to have to fire up my old computer and play some of Sid Meirer's Antietam. Man, is this discussion bringing back memories of great wasted hours.


LOL. Sounds like a normal day at AH.Com actually... :D
 
Nytram01,

I, for one, have never understood the hagiography surrounding A.S. Johnston. People continually refer to him as a great commander yet he commanded in all of one campaign; a campaign forced on him by the loss of forts he hadn't properly supported, a campaign that failed to stop the Union movement into Tennessee, a campaign in which his enemy's armies easily reinforced each other, a campaign that ended in the defeat of his own army, and a campaign that ended in his own death.

That's a great commander? He'd completely failed to meet his one aim in the battle; driving the Union forces into the river and defeating them, even before he was shot.

Johnston's post-war reputation rests on the fact that Johnston was 'lucky' enough to die early in the war. Because he wasn't around long enough to show whether he was any kind of a commander, he is automatically thought of as a great commander instead. Granted, his movement to Shiloh was impressive, he was able to bring a mostly untrained, mish-mashed collection of disparate forces into contact with his opponents without much difficulty. However, much of his success there was due to the fact that his opponents were also a mostly untrained, mish-mished collection of disparate forces.

Strip away the hagiography and look at Johnston and his campaign dispassionately. He didn't really accomplish much, aside from being 'lucky' enough to die early.

I didn't say that he was a great commander. I said he was a great leader of men. A.S.Johnston lead from the front and rallied his men to attack like no other general in the western theatre of the time. One of the main things the western theatre lacked was a general prepared to do that. In contrast Grant faced a number of generals who's main concern was protecting land and cities from Grant rather than trying to remove his threat completely. That is why I believe that A.S. Johnston would have changed the western theatre completely had he survived, he may not have won but it would have been a far more agressive confederate compaign.

Thomas was much better than the press, his fellow officers, and the post-war authors made him out to be. He didn't play at the political and popularity games the others did, so his accomplishments were either overlooked or awarded to someone else.

Thomas' campaign against Hood, for example, was a masterpiece. Unlike nearly every other Civil War general up to that time, Thomas actually took care and made plans to pursue Hood's army after defeating it so as to ensure it's destruction. While the theory taught in the academy included post-battle pursuits, the practice during the war usually had the victors squatting on the battlefield while the losers left virtually unmolested.

Agreed

Longstreet was slow at Gettysburg because Longstreet, and everyone else who bothered to think about the situation the ANV had got itself into there, knew that Longstreet was right.

Longstreet may have been correct in hindsight after the battle of Gettysburg but his conduct during the battle was one of the factors that lead to the Confederate defeat. Dont get me wrong I am a great admirer of Longstreet anyway and he proved his worth enough times to have survived his poor Gettysburg performance with no mark on his record, only Ewell and Early forced his reputation to be dragged through the mud.

Gettysburg could have turned out totally differently. At Gettysburg Lee faced a problem where his two lieutenants didn't want to do what he wanted to and he didn't do anything about it because he couldn't bring himself to dicipline lower ranking officers.

Had Ewell pushed on after his victory on the first day as Lee urged him to then he probably would have secured the heights and given Lee a more favorable position.

Had Longstreet not taken one look at Gettysburg and decided he didn't want to fight there and not sulked after Lee chose to continue the battle he might have had a more sucessful campaign.

Lee at Gettysbrug showed his great flaw of, as stated before, not being able to dicipline, he also lost control of both Longstreets and Ewell corps because of it. Despite Lee's faulty intelligence there is no reason to assume that the ANV wouldn't have gained some ground on the second day of battle had Ewell and Longstreet co-ordinated their attack instead of the time gap between that allowed Meade to redeploy his troups.

Lee's plans could have gained victory but his own inability and Longstreet poor mood added to Ewells dawdling and Stuarts absence led to the defeat at Gettysburg.

Also Lee's comment of "he's so slow" was not only directed to Longstreet at Gettysburg but also was a sign of Lee's growing frustration with his 'old war horse' who had spoken out against invading the north and wanted to wage a more defensive war after chancellorsville, which Lee was not in favor of.

Jackson wasn't perfect either. At the time of Chancellorville, he had a officers' mutiny brewing under him due to various court martials and arrests he'd ordered on slight and mistaken pretexts. Lee was already having a devil of a time dealing with the trouble brewing in Jackson's command until Stonewall's death made it all go away.

Jackson got the 'slows' too. Take a look at his performance in the Seven Days battles for the best examples.Bill

Not denying that. Longstreets moodswings are perhaps more famous but Jackson did get them as well. The difference perhaps is that Jackson didn't get them during battles that became Confederate loses and he was a far more offensive general than 'old pete'.
 
But what if Thomas remained East akin to the scenario I've mentioned to violadog? Then Rosecrans wouldn't have to worry about losing Thomas in the first place. In fact the CSA victory at Chickamauga may have been even greater leading to Union setbacks in the mid-west theatre which is an interesting AH scenario in itself.

I imagine that Thomas would have gotten frustrated with McClellans dawdling and complained to someone, probably other officers, and that would have led to his leaving the AOTP. Alternatively it could lead to McClellan losing his position earlier than the aftermath of Antietam and being replaced.

Chickamauga could have turned out differently without Thomas and the CSA may have destroyed the US Army of the Cumberland and as a result Rosencrans and his generals including Sheridan could have all been removed from their command. However I imagine that Sherman would march in and destroy Bragg and his army anyway.


Old Pete was too slow at Gettysburg because he had impossible terrain to attack. It is no wonder the Union was able to defend Little Round Top when they decided to offer a strong defence. And look what happened to Pickett's charge. If anything it was Lee would made a dreadful error, one Longstreet tried to point out, but Lee more or less ignored him. Nevertheless, Longstreet was right.


See my previous post.


Well that was because Johnston was always outnumbered - especially out West. This was also partly Lee's fault because he pretty well ignored everywhere else apart from Virginia. And Davis wouldn't order Lee to depart with any troops for elsewhere until it became so obvious, especially in the aftermath of Gettysburg, that something had to be done about the western theatre were defeat after defeat had occured for the CSA.

However that does not excuse Joe Johnstons decisions to send letter after letter to Davis argueing with him when he should have been focusing on Grant. The CSA were outnumber in almost every theatre in the American Civil War and most generals gave their opponants priority, even the pessimistic and somewhat hesitant PGT Beuaregard. Johnston should have focused on Grant more than Davis but he was unhappy with being removed from Virginia after his injury and then being moved out west.


Well oddly enough this wouldn't be a bad thing as one of them, more likely Longstreet, could have been sent out West. And Longstreet's defensive skills would soon have stopped the rot in the Western Theatre to the point of stalemate. He may have even conducted the occasional offensive action which, if Chickamauga is anything to judge by, could have meant that the Union could have faced setbacks akin to the OTL for the CSA.

There is an interesting scenario in the book 'Dixie Victorious' in which Longstreet gains overall command of the Army of Tennessee after Braxton Bragg is injured at Chickamauga. He is pitted against Grant and, being old friends with U.S.Grant he manages to predict Grants movements and counteract them before Grant even makess them.

Perhaps he could have been able to halt Grant or even defeat him after all Grant and Longstreet were old friends and perhaps 'Old Pete' would know how best to combat him.

Yes, this was a fault at times, yet his strategic offensive abilities & skills were without equal in the War IMHO. Furthermore, if Jackson was GOC ANV, I'd doubt you'd see a battle like Antietam or even Gettysburg for that matter.

Actually I would say that Lee was a better strategist than Jackson however Jackson was better at putting strategies into effect than Lee was. It was not for nothing that Jackson and Lee combined rarely knew defeat. Adding then to that combination the defensive minded yet viscious Longstreet and there would be no combination of Union generals in the war that could gain overall victory over the three of them but Grant and Sherman would be the ones to get closest to victory.

That is to say that with their superior numbers, finances, transport and supplies Grant and Sherman could beat Lee and Longstreet combined but if Jackson was there as well they couldn't, similarly Grant and Sherman could beat Jackson and Longstreet combined but not if Lee was with them.
 
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I imagine that Thomas would have gotten frustrated with McClellans dawdling and complained to someone, probably other officers, and that would have led to his leaving the AOTP. Alternatively it could lead to McClellan losing his position earlier than the aftermath of Antietam and being replaced.

While Thomas didn't have the patience of Job, he must have had something close to it. He spent the first three years under the command of the three of the slowest of the slow. Those were Henry Halleck, who took something like three months to march his army twenty miles from Shiloh to Corinth. Then he moved on to serving under DC Buell, who was very much of the McClellan school of warfare, or the "the slower I move, the less likely it is I will fight a bloody battle". And if these two weren't bad enough, Thomas got stuck fighting under William Rosecans. Somehow I doubt that if Thomas could put up with these three that George McClellan himself would cause

Thomas to either request a transfer, or stick his foot in his mouth.
Unfortunately, Thomas probably also wouldn't say anything that would insprie Lincoln to remove McClellan any earlier either. If however Thomas earns a reputation in the East, and does his whole rock thing at one of the Manassases(what is the correct plural of Manassas anyway?) its likely that instead of restoring McClellan, Thomas might get the command just before Antietam.

Which is an interesting prospect, as Lee and Thomas had served together before the war.
 
I didn't say that he was a great commander. I said he was a great leader of men. A.S.Johnston lead from the front and rallied his men to attack like no other general in the western theatre of the time. One of the main things the western theatre lacked was a general prepared to do that.


Nytram1,

Three words: John Bell Hood. The CSA did have a great leader of men in the western theatre and all he did was destroy the last CSA army in the theatre. If A.S. Johnston survived to lead men into more attacks like those at Shiloh the CSA would simply lose the western theatre all the more rapidly.

The South's only chance was to employ a Fabian strategy that inflicted as many casulties on Union forces as possible and the best way to do that was to coax and/or lure the Union into attacking entrenched/fortified positions.

An aggressive/offensive strategic plan could do that; CSA armies manuevering into positions that the Union could not ignore. However, an aggressive/offensive operational or tactical plan would only add to CSA casulty lists and casulties were one of the many things the CSA could not afford.

That is why I believe that A.S. Johnston would have changed the western theatre completely had he survived, he may not have won but it would have been a far more agressive confederate compaign.

I agree, he would have changed it. He would have changed it by conducting an aggressive campaign that lost more men sooner than in the OTL and thus lost the theatre sooner than in the OTL.


Bill
 
Albert Sidney Johnston had absolutely no intention of being aggressive until such time as he had some semblence of proper supplies. He even once stated that there would be absolutely no combat which he could plausibly avoid, on the basis that "I have no (gun) powder".
 
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