alternate antietams
De-lurking...
I'm a big ACW buff and Antietam is one of my favorite battles, so let's see if my thoughts can offer any insights. This post may ramble a little bit, so bear with me...
Firstly, Antietam was was the best chance the Union had in the entire war to eliminate a principal Confederate army in a single battle: not only did the AOTP outnumber the ANV by a 2:1 margin, it had the advantages of fighting in relativly open ground, removing the benefits of dense terrain or entrenchments, and giving the always excellent union artillery a dominant position on the east bank of the Antietam. With the ANV having its back to the Potomac with only a single usable ford, and with added benefit of "home field advantage" the federals usually didn't have, one would think a shaved chimp could have gotten a decisive victory out of such a situation, but George McClellan again proved he had absolutley no buisness being anywhere near combat. Antietam was possibly the worst managed battle of the war from the Union side, with Mac excercising no coordination of the battle at all, and with many of his corps commanders doing the same.
So the first of our what ifs: A different AOTP commander
The ideal solution in my mind would be to send Grant or Sherman east. Grant had the seniority, and had experience commanding armies and winning battles, and I believe that the army of the Tennessee was mostly idle at that point of the war. I'd say that with either of these two men in command gives the Union army a win. On the other hand, Lincoln would probably not be likely to bring a western general east so soon after the disaster that was John Pope, and a general from a different theater might very well have problems adjusting to a new, unfamiliar setting.
Among the current generals in the AOTP to replace Mac, its future stars mentioned earlier, Reynolds, Meade, and Hancock are all out, not nearly enough seniority to be given command of an army. Among Corps commanders, Sumner was too old and infirm, and his performance at Antietam was awful (more on this later). Porter would be removed and court-martialed for his conduct at Second Manassass shortly after the battle, so he's out. Mansfield is also too old, and never served with the AOTP to boot, so he's out. That leaves us Hooker, Burnside, and Franklin.
Franklin is somewhat competant, if unremarkable, and historically urged for his VI corps to be put in late in the battle, and might be the best available option. He was a close associate of McClellan though, which might cause the administration to think twice.
As for Burnside, he was the only general at hand who had held a previous independent command, and might prove a tempting choice. There is little reason to think he would manage the battle any better than Mac did, considering his historical performance as corps commander(and at Fredericksburg), although if he is just a bit more aggressive, he could pull out a decisive win.
Hooker is probably the most interesting choice in my mind. His historical performance at Chancellorsville will always sully his reputation, but I think at Antietam he would have done well. His actions at Chancellorsville are popularly attributed to a lack of nerve, but I think that they can be attributed to his experiences at Antietam and Fredericksburg, where attacking frontally resulted in severe casualties, thus making him want to fight on the tactical defense at C-ville. In this scenario, he would have no such inhibitions, and he might take a much more aggressive posture. I think, at the least, he'd fight Antietam with a much more hands on nature than Mac did, which would bode well for the Union.
Moving beyond the commanders, the Union has plenty of tactical errors it can fix if it wants to come away with a decisive win. Most importantly, in my mind, is the use of the II corps. Sumner's mismanagment of this unit, which was the largest and arguably the best corps in the army, wasted all of its potential power. If he had joined on Hooker's flank in the dawn assault, the combined forces would have swept the entire Confederate left flank off of the field, and could have driven the rest into the river. Alternately, when he did attack historically after the I corps had been spent, he could have concentrated his forces rather than having his 3 divisions operate in a scattered and independent manner, which ended up wasting them, with his first division being routed in a rebel counterattack (while under Sumner's personal command no less, marching in close order), while the other two were used up in pointless attacks on the sunken road. If Sumner actually coordinated his corps, he could have supported his initial attack and flanked D.H. Hill's men out the sunken road.
On the federal left, Burnside's forces also wasted a great opportunity. Had the Antietam been scouted properly, the fords south of Burnsides' bridge could have been identified and the IX corps deployed in full early on. (and Mac had two days to prepare for battle, this lapse is inexcusable in my mind) If used aggressivly enough, Burnside would at the least keep Walker's division from being moved the Dunker Church position, and if supported, could capture the Potomac fords and trap Lee's army.
Now, assuming a Union victory, what happens next? Well, if all or almost all of the ANV is destroyed or captured, including its chief commanders, (Lee, Jackson, Longstreet, Stuart) it's a catastrophe for the CSA. There is nothing of significance between the AOTP and Richmond. If the AOTP is commanded by anyone other than Mac, they probably get there before the CSA can organize any kind of defense. The CSA holds Knoxville at this point, and can use the Virginia-Tennessee railroad to reinforce the east at expense of the west, but that would take considerable time as Bragg and Kirby Smith are in Kentucky at the moment, and would have to retreat in the face of an emoldened federal army pursuing them. Mac would delay long enough for some form of defense to put around Richmond, but that just means Mac gets to do the only thing he's good at, siege warfare.
Now what? Politically, Lincoln issues the Emancipation Proclamation, in possibly even a more strengthened form due to Union successes. With a worst case scenario for the CSA, it loses both the ANV and the state of Virginia. This may not end the war immediatly, but it obviously puts the south at a huge disadvantage. Any thought of foreign assistance is gone, and the Davis government would be forced to flee to the deep south. Davis was never an especially popular figure to begin with, and the knives may come out following such a disasater. The EP is going to make the fire-eaters that much more determined to keep on resisting, but following the loss of its principal army and its capital, I'd think that a sizeable peace faction would develop among the CSA government and populace, looking to get whatever deal they could from Lincoln. With defeat staring them in the face and the EP hanging over their heads, they may well throw in the towell. Maybe most of the upper south gives in (especially the pro-union upcountry), with limited resistance continuing in the cotton states.
Now, what effect does an earlier victory have on the Union and its politics? By 1864/65, abolition of slavery and restoration of the Union had become one and the same, but this was absolutely not the case in 1862. The Lincoln government is going to be stuck in a very precarious position between radical republicans and conservative democrats. Assuming the war ends by '64, does he run for reelection? What about the victorious general at Antietam? If it's Mac, then he is the Democratic nominee for sure. After all, he managed to secure it as a failed general, so given his Napolean complex ther's no way he doesn't get, and probably wins the general, the victor of the war. If Hooker is the winning general, he would be ambitious enough to run, for either party I would think, being slippery enough to conform himself to whatever position requried. As for slavery, I think a program of gradual emancipation would follow, over the course of 20 to 30 years. Reconcilliaiton might be a lot easier with an earlier Union victor, without total war and postwar carpetbaggers.