Lee listens to Longstreet and interposes ANV between Meade and Washington

After reading several accounts of the battle of Gettysburg, I'm curious what everyone's thoughts are on the outcome of Lee's second offensive into Federal held territory IF he had accepted Longstreet's suggestion on the first day of Gettysburg and moved the Army of Northern Virginia around Meade's left flank, interposing himself between Meade and the Federal capital?

I don't know all of the dispositions of the Army of the Potomac on Day 1 of the battle but I seem to recall that there were at least 2 Corps still marching to Gettyburg and would've been blocking Lee's direct approach to Washington?
 
Well, a lot goes into what happens and the great butterfly is always around to make life interesting. Newt Gingrich's book Gettysburg is about this very POD and seems plausible IMHO, although luck does play a large role. I greatly suggest reading it.

On the second point, all but the Union VI Corps were around on the second day, although only two fought the first day. When the other four arrived I'm not sure of though. Also depends on what makes Lee change his mind as Lee was very stubborn OTL.

For a POD maybe Lee manages to stay in contact with Stewart's Cavalry (or uses the two brigades of cavalry that he had, but seemingly forgot about) and thus knows the dispositions of the Army of the Potomac by late on the first day or so. Seeing an open flank, he then may consider a flanking march. I just got done writing a ten-page English page so I'm tad bit braindead as of the moment and I've used up what I know off the top of my head :eek:. Hopefully a veteran member can be more helpful
 
one thing that i could see happening would be this:

on the night of July 1st, say about 8pm, Lee begins to withdraw his forces back toward Chamberburg. he leaves a small rear guard, perhaps one of Andersen's brigades.

at this time the only union forces near Gettysburg were the remnants of the I and XI corps and some of the III and II under the command of W.S. Hancock.

by chance perhaps, by the time Meade arrives, i believe it was around midnight, the Union is aware that Lee was moving out. now here is where it gets tricky; either Meade decides to peruse Lee and catches him near Chambersburg

OR

Meade decides to pull back to the Pip Creek Line (http://www.civilwarhome.com/pcl.htm), in which case Lee would almost have to attack him there. the only realistic way to get to attack Lee in this campaign would be for Lee to slip between Meade and Washington somehow. he would then run the risk of being attacked from the rear by either the Army of the Potomac or the garrison in Washington.

*in regards to the change in Lee's mind:

its plausible that he has a meeting with Longstreet, Ewell and Hill, and after some very careful diliberation after wards with Longstreet, Lee decides that perhaps moving south and getting between Meade and Washington might, after all be a good idea. this mind chage could come about as a result of realizing the strength of the federal line on the night of July 1, and the own disposition of the Army of Northern Virginia. the POD is probably going to be almost insignificant at the time.
 
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One thing that I could see happening would be this:

On the night of July 1st, say about 8pm, Lee begins to withdraw his forces back toward Chamberburg. he leaves a small rear guard, perhaps one of Andersen's brigades.

At this time the only union forces near Gettysburg were the remnants of the I and XI corps and some of the III and II under the command of W.S. Hancock.

By chance perhaps, by the time Meade arrives, I believe it was around midnight, the Union is aware that Lee was moving out. Now here is where it gets tricky; either Meade decides to persue Lee and catches him near Chambersburg

OR

Meade decides to pull back to the Pipe Creek Line (http://www.civilwarhome.com/pcl.htm), in which case Lee would almost have to attack him there. The only realistic way to get to attack Lee in this campaign would be for Lee to slip between Meade and Washington somehow. He would then run the risk of being attacked from the rear by either the Army of the Potomac or the garrison in Washington.

*In regards to the change in Lee's mind:

It's plausible that he has a meeting with Longstreet, Ewell, and Hill, and after some very careful deliberation afterwards with Longstreet, Lee decides that perhaps moving south and getting between Meade and Washington might, after all, be a good idea. This mind change could come about as a result of realizing the strength of the federal line on the night of July 1, and their own disposition of the Army of Northern Virginia. The POD is probably going to be almost insignificant at the time.

The POD cannot include Stuart staying with Lee. It's not the Gettysburg campaign if Stuart is there. I and XI Union Corps don't even try to deploy, much less stand, if Stuart is there. It was Lee's blindness that determined all his decisions on Days 1 & 2. Stuart did not intend to be 60 hours late, but he was planning to "ride around" the enemy. Instead he found himself running THROUGH the AotP, not so easily accomplished, even for his cavalry. As to the cavalry Lee DID have? They were lesser stars, lacking the competence of Stuarts' best subordinates, who he took with him. They could give Lee general information, but not the precise tactical data he had come to rely on from Stuart for Lee's own battlefield decision making.

The Union XII Corps had also arrived by nightfall, and if Slocum had not been his usual "Slow-Cow" self, he could have been in time to save much of XI and I Corps.:(

One of the problems with the POD is that Lee has reached the point where he believes he and his army had become invincible (following Chancellorsville). Simply showing his men in the open, complete with battleflags flying, was enough to terrify "those people" sufficiently into breaking and running away.

Even if Lee initially heeded Longstreet's advice to maneuver around Meade, it would mean yielding the initiative to the enemy on their own home ground, while allowing Lee to cut himself off from his own supply lines. His men had plentiful food supplies at this point, but ammunition (especially artillery) was another matter. All Meade had to do was lay a light siege against Lee whereever Lee chose to hold his ground (Pipe Creek was not an option for him). With the AotP as the hammer, and the fortifications of Washington as the anvil. Plus the militia of General Couch (20,000 men) arriving, and the 1st division, US VIII Corps also available. If nothing else, Meade could eventually run Lee out of ordnance, while Meade could fight a pitched battle indefinitely.

To make matters worse for Lee, if he HAD chosen to attack Meade at the Pipe Creek Line, it represented a much stronger defense even than the lines at Gettysburg, which was the strongest position the army held as a whole in the war up to that point. No flanking opportunities at all, just headon assaults. And Pipe Creek had an active rail line running directly behind the Union lines, allowing constant resupply and reinforcement.

While Longstreet's criticisms of Lee's attack plans on the 2nd and 3rd Days of Gettysburg were certainly accurate, his own idea for redeployment was actually worse (Assuming Meade chose to hold at Gettysburg). He would have been bringing his divisions of Hood's and McLaws' directly into the teeth of Sedgwick's Union VI Corps (the largest in the AotP). Also, Ewell and his divisional commanders were dead set against a move to the south. As it turns out, they were right. But then, any attack by either side was the worst thing they could have done. Meade and Longstreet knew this. Lee did not.

BTW, ignore Newt's "Gettysburg" trilogy. The first two books are written solely to set up the final novel. The same tired phrase is used in both of the first two books to explain away easy Confederate victory after easy Confederate victory: "HE'S DONE WHAT!?":eek: In short, one Union general after another defies orders and charges their armies into destruction. Including, of all people, the cautious Major General George Meade.:rolleyes: Nice fiction, but borderline ASB considering some of the personalities involved.

In sum, Lee follows Longstreet's advice and the're not getting home again. Longstreet was too much the tactician to recognize this. Lee understood the greater strategic ramifications of cutting himself loose from his base of supply. Lee was not Sherman, and Pennsylvania/Maryland was not Georgia.
 
BTW, ignore Newt's "Gettysburg" trilogy. The first two books are written solely to set up the final novel. The same tired phrase is used in both of the first two books to explain away easy Confederate victory after easy Confederate victory: "HE'S DONE WHAT!?":eek: In short, one Union general after another defies orders and charges their armies into destruction. Including, of all people, the cautious Major General George Meade.:rolleyes: Nice fiction, but borderline ASB considering some of the personalities involved.

In sum, Lee follows Longstreet's advice and the're not getting home again. Longstreet was too much the tactician to recognize this. Lee understood the greater strategic ramifications of cutting himself loose from his base of supply. Lee was not Sherman, and Pennsylvania/Maryland was not Georgia.

Was Lee cutting himself from his supply base? What was his supply base - the just-captured town of Gettysburg? I might be missing something, but I'd think wagons could come up from the south just as easily to anywhere his army was.

As for Gingrich's trilogy, I think it seems plausible enough if you accept their characterization of the generals and if you assume Lincoln would appoint Grant at that time. I can't comment on the first, except that only two generals charge into destruction - Meade, who's only just been appointed to command and is supposedly quite nervous about being cut off from Washington; and Sickles, who's been kept in the dark about the grand strategy, distracted by dreams of glory and hints from Stanton, and falls into a trap Lee's set up specifically for him. I think it's a bit unlikely that the Sickles campaign goes exactly as Lee intended, but quite reasonable that Lee wins. Those are the only two easy victories Lee gets - he's defeated at the fortifications of Washington, and he marches into Baltimore without opposition. How do you think these are implausible? Do you disagree with Meade's characterization, even though he's only just been appointed to overall command by surprise?
 
BTW, ignore Newt's "Gettysburg" trilogy. The first two books are written solely to set up the final novel. The same tired phrase is used in both of the first two books to explain away easy Confederate victory after easy Confederate victory: "HE'S DONE WHAT!?":eek: In short, one Union general after another defies orders and charges their armies into destruction. Including, of all people, the cautious Major General George Meade.:rolleyes: Nice fiction, but borderline ASB considering some of the personalities involved.
i read the second book, Grant Comes East, last summer. i found it ok at best. i didnt like how some people were portrayed like Sickles or Longstreet
 
Meade simply maneuvers again and makes Lee attack him in an even worse logistical situation than OTL, with the reality that now that Meade's gotten around Lee and interposed himself between Lee and Washington Lee's either got to go all out or concede without a battle. Lee loved fighting too much to do that. Gettysburg would be a better scenario for him.

Meade wasn't incompetent like McClellan, he had more than ability to maneuver and curbstomp Lee.
 
Meade, who's only just been appointed to command and is supposedly quite nervous about being cut off from Washington

That sounds like Gingrichian wishful thinking, like his belief that the Belgian Congo was good for the Congolese in his thesis.

Meade doubtless was more than a tad nervous. But, WTF should he be SO on edge about being separated from DC when it was deeply well-defended, and he had an excellent supply situation within Union turf - one Lee could only envy.


The problem with buying Gingrich books is that it supports an evil man - remember, he served divorce papers to his former wife while she was in the hospital - financially and he's deeply unreliable in his ideas of reality.
 
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Wishful Thinking

Was Lee cutting himself from his supply base? What was his supply base - the just-captured town of Gettysburg? I might be missing something, but I'd think wagons could come up from the south just as easily to anywhere his army was.

The START of Lee's supply base was the rail head at Staunton, Virginia. From there you go 85 miles through the Shenandoah Valley to Winchester, Virginia. 40 miles from Winchester to crossing the Potomac River at Williamsport, Maryland. Oops! The bridge built by Lee over the Potomac at Falling Waters was destroyed by Union forces just as his men were falling back from Pickett's Charge. {25 miles from Williamsport, MD to Hagerstown MD, then 58 miles to Fairfield, PA.} OR {56 miles from Williamsport, MD to Chambersburg, PA, then 41 miles from Chambersburg to Cashtown, PA}.

This means a supply line of between 208 to 222 miles from the Staunton rail head to Lee's Army's rear echelon outside Gettysburg. With a destroyed pontoon bridge over the Potomac and starting on July fourth rapidly rising flood waters that obliterated all the fords across the Potomac.

BTW, the Union still held Harper's Ferry, so sending the supply columns further south would have been impossible even if the bridges at Williamsport were still standing. The Potomac runs almost due east leaving Harpers Ferry, so it's a very tight squeeze were Lee to try to go that (southerly-easterly) route. Mind, I think Meade would happily let him do so. During Lee's retreat IOTL, that was Meade's chosen line of advance.

The new ordnance supply finally replenished Lee's guns when they reached the Virginia side of the Potomac.

Evan said:
As for Gingrich's trilogy, I think it seems plausible enough if you accept their characterization of the generals and if you assume Lincoln would appoint Grant at that time. I can't comment on the first, except that only two generals charge into destruction - Meade, who's only just been appointed to command and is supposedly quite nervous about being cut off from Washington; and Sickles, who's been kept in the dark about the grand strategy, distracted by dreams of glory and hints from Stanton, and falls into a trap Lee's set up specifically for him. I think it's a bit unlikely that the Sickles campaign goes exactly as Lee intended, but quite reasonable that Lee wins. Those are the only two easy victories Lee gets - he's defeated at the fortifications of Washington, and he marches into Baltimore without opposition. How do you think these are implausible? Do you disagree with Meade's characterization, even though he's only just been appointed to overall command by surprise?

Meade was nervous? Perhaps. But he was in command of an army he knew. And defending his own home soil. He was cautious, but tenacious. Under Grant, he had the freedom of action to do what was right, but he didn't launch banzai charges (By his own admission, Cold Harbor was Grant's fault). Being new to command encourages caution, not recklessness. Especially against Lee.

Gingrich was, as jkay said, engaged in Neo-Confederate wishful thinking.
 
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Arrowman - welcome to the Board! You're already getting responses from some of the ACW devotees.

Gingrich/Forstchen write an interesting book, but the PoD is never practical. There is only one road by which Lee could move the ANV for this maneuver (the road leading south and west to Emmitsburg), and that's not enough road. To march the entire ANV from Gettysburg to the area of Union Bridge, Maryland (30-35 miles) via that single road (after they take a cross-country march to access the road south of Gettysburg) would string them out nearly that entire length. The lead units, if they started fresh, would arrive no earlier than fifteen hours after departure, but completely disorganized and exhausted. The "tail" units, even if unmolested, would arrive at least 24 hours (probably more, but it's too late at night for a better guess) after that. Stonewall Jackson, on his best day, could not have pulled this off even with his Valley command.

However, Lee would have to lead this march with Hill's corps, which was blunted in the fighting on July 1. Ewell's is in slightly better shape, but it is north and east of Hill. Longstreet's corps didn't even make the field on the 1st, and would therefore have to join the tail end of the parade after arriving on the 2nd. The ANV supply train needs to reorient to a more difficult and more vulnerable line of communication through Thurmont, which can be interdicted either from the north (Meade) or from the south (French).

Meade, having over half his army in Gettysburg by dawn on the 2nd, would be free to distupt this march as his positions are within artillery range of the Emmitsburg Road. He could also direct his largest unit (VI Corps) to a blocking position while he pulls back to the Pipe Creek line. Meade would win this race because he has the shorter line of march, and he already has VI Corps near the destination to secure the position.

I know they also made a point of including this discussion in the movie, but in reality it wasn't happening.
 
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