Lee attacks at Pipe Creek

Saphroneth

Banned
If we assume Lee will beat his head against a wall, then of course he'll take heavy casualties.
Otherwise it's how much attacking convinces him he should stop attacking.
 
Yes, Pipe's Creek was a great defensive position, one that Meade would have destroyed the Confederate army with
 
If we assume Lee will beat his head against a wall, then of course he'll take heavy casualties.
Otherwise it's how much attacking convinces him he should stop attacking.

We are assuming Gettysburg level arrogance here. So what do you think his plan would be?
 

TFSmith121

Banned
At least the equivalent of Malvern Hill

We are assuming Gettysburg level arrogance here. So what do you think his plan would be?


At least the equivalent of Malvern Hill, which was every bit as an reckless decision as those at Gettysburg that led to Pickett's assault.

Fredericksburg in reverse.

Best,
 
Not only that, assuming the same dates but different place, retreating from Pipe Creek will be a disaster with the oncoming rain. Gettysburg was a crossroads town with (for the time) relatively good roads leading in to it and a bit of a net. This allowed Lee to open up enough distance so that the dilatory pursuit never caught up with him before he got across the Potomac. Given that the casualties are more lopsided if Lee attacks at Pipe Creek, Meade may pursue sooner and harder, and with a less optimal line of retreat the ANV gets caught on the way out of Pennsylvania/Maryland. with the ANV pretty much wrecked, the Union may be able to be in Richmond before too long and game over.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
What if Lee attacks Meade at his preferred position at Pipe Creek rather than Gettysburg? :eek: How screwed is Lee?

If Lee attacks at Pipe Creek it would likely be Fredericksburg in reverse. Gettysburg was a near-run thing and the Army of the Potomac was badly bloodied in winning its victory. Pipe Creek would have been a much more clear-cut Union victory. Perhaps more importantly, while the AotP had been so beaten up at Gettysburg IOTL that no corps was really ready to launch a vigorous counter attack or pursuit, this probably would not be the case after a Confederate repulse at Pipe Creek.

This begs the question, though, as to whether Lee would have attacked at Pipe Creek. Yes, he had developed a sense of superiority and believed his troops could do anything (the record certainly was evidence of that). But he wasn't stupid. He was drawn into battle against his will on the first day at Gettysburg, which turned out to be a clear Southern victory in which two Union corps were smashed. He attached what he believed to be a rattled and perhaps unconcentrated foe the second day and came close to achieving victory. It was only on the third day that he succumbed to true hubris and launched his doomed assault.

Of course, Lee had done this before, as at Malvern Hill. He would also do it again after Gettysburg, such as the foolish final assault on the Brock Road position on the second day of the Battle of the Wilderness. There is no doubting that he was a general of overwhelmingly aggressive instincts who often displayed recklessness. Yet he had also demonstrated occasions of caution, as when he decided against launching a counter attack at Fredericksburg out of understandable fear of the Union artillery across the river. And after Malvern Hill, he didn't charge on down the river and attack McClellan at Harrison's Landing, nor did he consider assaulting the defenses of Washington after his victory at Second Manassas.

So, in thinking about whether Lee would have assaulted Meade on ground his enemy had chosen and which afforded great advantages for the defense, we have to weigh the fact that Lee was by nature an extremely aggressive general and had developed a superiority complex against the fact that he was, despite these liabilities, a very able general. I think whether he would have attacked Meade at Pipe Creek is a dubious proposition at best.
 
If Lee attacks at Pipe Creek it would likely be Fredericksburg in reverse. Gettysburg was a near-run thing and the Army of the Potomac was badly bloodied in winning its victory. Pipe Creek would have been a much more clear-cut Union victory. Perhaps more importantly, while the AotP had been so beaten up at Gettysburg IOTL that no corps was really ready to launch a vigorous counter attack or pursuit, this probably would not be the case after a Confederate repulse at Pipe Creek.

This begs the question, though, as to whether Lee would have attacked at Pipe Creek. Yes, he had developed a sense of superiority and believed his troops could do anything (the record certainly was evidence of that). But he wasn't stupid. He was drawn into battle against his will on the first day at Gettysburg, which turned out to be a clear Southern victory in which two Union corps were smashed. He attached what he believed to be a rattled and perhaps unconcentrated foe the second day and came close to achieving victory. It was only on the third day that he succumbed to true hubris and launched his doomed assault.

Of course, Lee had done this before, as at Malvern Hill. He would also do it again after Gettysburg, such as the foolish final assault on the Brock Road position on the second day of the Battle of the Wilderness. There is no doubting that he was a general of overwhelmingly aggressive instincts who often displayed recklessness. Yet he had also demonstrated occasions of caution, as when he decided against launching a counter attack at Fredericksburg out of understandable fear of the Union artillery across the river. And after Malvern Hill, he didn't charge on down the river and attack McClellan at Harrison's Landing, nor did he consider assaulting the defenses of Washington after his victory at Second Manassas.

So, in thinking about whether Lee would have assaulted Meade on ground his enemy had chosen and which afforded great advantages for the defense, we have to weigh the fact that Lee was by nature an extremely aggressive general and had developed a superiority complex against the fact that he was, despite these liabilities, a very able general. I think whether he would have attacked Meade at Pipe Creek is a dubious proposition at best.


The second days wasn't even close to succeeding. It would have taken considerable time to roll canon up and reinforcements would have arrived long before anything was set up on the Round Tops even if lost.

I think it very likely Lee would have attacked Pipe Creek, he thought his troops were invincible which is shown by the fact that he fought at Gettysburg at all.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
And he wasn't alone; even Longstreet, generally known

Exactly. The man had begun to buy into his own myth, which was a fatal mistake.

And he wasn't alone; even Longstreet, generally known as the voice of reason among the senior generals in the Army of Northern Virginia, threw 20,000 men at 12,000 well-dug in men of the Army of the Ohio at Knoxville in November, 1863, more than four months after Gettysburg, in an assault that even the rebels compared to Pickett's Charge.

Losses were heavy, especially in a brigade-sized assault on Fort Sanders, one of the larger fortified points in the US line; the rebels suffered more than 800 casualties (dead/wounded/captured), including the brigade commander and two of the four regimental commanders; a third was seriously wounded, losing an arm.

US losses amounted to 20.

And that's Longstreet - four months after Gettysburg and 16 months after Malvern Hill.

Worth noting is the US commanding general in all this?

Ambrose Burnside.

His immediate subordinates in the Knoxville Campaign were Potter, Manson, and Shackelford; the next level down included Ferrero, Hartranft, White, Hascall, and Sanders; Burnside, Hascall, and Sanders were professionals, all pre-war graduates of West Point, although only Sanders was on active duty when the war began in 1861.

Longstreet's subordinates included McLaws, Jenkins, Johnson, Wheeler, and Martin; Longstreet, McLaws, Johnson, and Wheeler were all West Pointers; Jenkins graduated from the Citadel, but did not serve on active duty with the RA.

The point being, the rebels - until as late as the winter of 1863-64 - kept launching assaults against fortified positions, despite the evidence they were unlikely to succeed.

One would expect Lee and the ANV would try it against Meade, even at Pipe Creek.

Best,
 
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Franklin

Let's not Hood's total screw up at Franklin either. He thought he could win there, than push onto Nashville. Cut Sherman's supply lines then push east to link up with Lee.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
The second days wasn't even close to succeeding. It would have taken considerable time to roll canon up and reinforcements would have arrived long before anything was set up on the Round Tops even if lost.

Oh, absolutely. But the important point is that Lee thought it had been close. The perception of reality is more important than reality, most of the time.

I think it very likely Lee would have attacked Pipe Creek, he thought his troops were invincible which is shown by the fact that he fought at Gettysburg at all.

Perhaps, but it's worth remembering that Lee didn't want to fight at Gettysburg, which was a classic "meeting engagement" on the first day. He didn't want to fight at all until his army was concentrated. This suggests that he might not have fought if he thought the situation wasn't to his liking.
 
And he wasn't alone; even Longstreet, generally known as the voice of reason among the senior generals in the Army of Northern Virginia, threw 20,000 men at 12,000 well-dug in men of the Army of the Ohio at Knoxville in November, 1863, more than four months after Gettysburg, in an assault that even the rebels compared to Pickett's Charge.

Losses were heavy, especially in a brigade-sized assault on Fort Sanders, one of the larger fortified points in the US line; the rebels suffered more than 800 casualties (dead/wounded/captured), including the brigade commander and two of the four regimental commanders; a third was seriously wounded, losing an arm.

US losses amounted to 20.

And that's Longstreet - four months after Gettysburg and 16 months after Malvern Hill.

Worth noting is the US commanding general in all this?

Ambrose Burnside.

Best,

I think Burnside used telegraph wire, around tree stumps and picket posts, as an obstacle - first instance of this?
 
Oh, absolutely. But the important point is that Lee thought it had been close. The perception of reality is more important than reality, most of the time.

Point taken, which is something I bring up from time to time about the importance of the "Stab in the back myth" in the After 1900 main thread.
It didn't matter if it was true or not the Germans based their actions on the assumption that it was true.

Perhaps, but it's worth remembering that Lee didn't want to fight at Gettysburg, which was a classic "meeting engagement" on the first day. He didn't want to fight at all until his army was concentrated. This suggests that he might not have fought if he thought the situation wasn't to his liking

Maybe, but I think it was more a case of trying to get the best odds possible. He may have been supremely arrogant at the time but even so you want your losses to be as small as possible when you do win and you do that by fighting concentrated.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
He did -

I think Burnside used telegraph wire, around tree stumps and picket posts, as an obstacle - first instance of this?

He did, and the efficiency of it is reported as mixed; Orlando Poe, who was Burnside's chief engineer and responsible for the fixed defenses, wrote:

"... owing to its rusty color, nearly that of the pine litter just below it, and the imperfect light of the foggy morning, it doubtless did have some effect in breaking up the coherency of the assaulting column, and may possibly have detained it long enough to permit the defense to deliver a couple of rounds more, a matter of some consequence."

The results of Knoxville certainly indicate that Burnside was not incompetent on the defensive, and - as is suggested by his prewar business activities with the carbine design - was quite capable of thinking through a problem and coming up with a solution that wasn't the same old thing.

Best,
 

TFSmith121

Banned
True, and Hood made his career in the ANV

Let's not Hood's total screw up at Franklin either. He thought he could win there, than push onto Nashville. Cut Sherman's supply lines then push east to link up with Lee.

True, and Hood made his career in the ANV, was in Longstreet's corps, and graduated from West Point when Lee was superintendent.

I think Grady McWhiney's "Attack and Die" concept is incredibly overwrought and simplistic, but there's something to it, at least in terms of organizational culture in the rebel army ... for a revolutionary army mobilized from a population that was outnumbered almost 4-1, and had to simultaneously control some 3 million people by threat of force, the rebels were incredibly profliglate with their manpower - even when it came to policy decisions, for example.

As just one, if they had accepted treating officers and men of the USCTs the same as any other US POW, for example, the prisoner-exchange agreements would not have broken down, and many more rebel personnel would have been exchanged.

In modern analysis of the rebellion, the comparisons to Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, in terms of delusion over policy and strategic decision-making, are not forced, despite the continuing drumbeat from Lost Causers, neo-confederates, and rebel apologists.;)

Best,
 
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