Malta easily could've been absorbed by pretty well any nation on the Mediterranean and very nearly but flukishly didn't become part of the UK. How Luxembourg remained independent is also a bit of a miracle.
Least likely European nations states
- Thread starter Galba Otho Vitelius
- Start date
All of the micro states? I don't know if they fit the criteria, but most of them exist because the ruling family at the time managed to remain in power despite the rise of nation states and decline of monarchies.
Exceptions are San Marino which was kept around as had close ties to France, Vatican City because of an agreement Mussolini made with the Pope to appease catholics, and Andorra due to its complicated history of inheritance of its Bishop.
If the ruling family at some point had a succession crisis or just became assimilated to its surrounding neighbor states for some reason, I guess their identities wouldn't be too different from other regional identities.
Exceptions are San Marino which was kept around as had close ties to France, Vatican City because of an agreement Mussolini made with the Pope to appease catholics, and Andorra due to its complicated history of inheritance of its Bishop.
If the ruling family at some point had a succession crisis or just became assimilated to its surrounding neighbor states for some reason, I guess their identities wouldn't be too different from other regional identities.
The OP is allowing though for such regions to exist within a larger state identity I think. Though most people here seem to argue for subordination and eradication of the strong regional markers after a while, the way Cornish, the distinct Brythonic language related closely to Welsh (Cymric) did eventually vanish completely from Cornwall.
Relatively recently versus how long Cornwall was politically integrated into Wessex-dynasty dominated England, well before the Norman Conquest, whereas I believe the last recorded instance of a person with Cornish as their mother tongue was in the late 18th century, so it took a good long time to fade out. The model with suggestions that Czech/Moravian identity might merge completely into German seems to point to industrial age or its immediate predecessor being the factor that finally wipes out the native dialect--which is still not quite the same thing as totally eradicating regional identity; we can well imagine generations of quite Germanized former Czechs who retain a distinctive "Bohemian" regional identity--and for that matter some later political development splitting up the German state absorbing them into several nations, one of which might be Bohemia.
Thus, under medieval conditions, which pretty closely apply to the long period of Swedish incorporation of Finland, the rustic non-dominant nation dialect lives on robustly in the countryside and presumably among servants and other lowly types drawn into regional cities, as society is still pretty decentralized from the POV of the average person in the average family--lords come and go, speaking their own outlandish tongue everyone becomes more or less familiar with out of necessity, and traders range far and wide tending to merge separate village dialects into one lingua franca to an extent. But society, in its demographic numbers, is rooted to the soil and linguistically diverse.
Modernize though, putting a premium on literacy and on ready communications on a larger scale, and the hegemonic language gains advantages. In Britain this process has many examples, with not only Cornish going extinct but Cymric and Gaelic nearly going into extremis in turn. But aside from nationalistic modern revivalism of both these distinct non-Germanic languages, we also have English being spoken in very distinct dialects in Wales and in Ireland; even if regionalism and political independence or autonomy had been firmly repressed for longer, if at any point this reverses and the locals are in a position to assert their own dignity, they will do so in a distinct fashion; the total extinction of Gaelic as a living language and even a political choice not to try to revive it formally would not logically exclude the possibility of an independent Republic of Ireland (or kingdom, duchy, or what have you). Irish English would be distinct enough for the Westphalian-post-Napoleonic concept of "nationhood."
So the question is, is such linguistic-ethnic identity so inherently strong that one cannot have a lasting multi-regional European nation where several distinct "nations" agree by consensus they are part of an integrated realm or republic properly speaking?
It is arbitrary to exclude Switzerland I think--less so to exclude Belgium because the latter was very much a political construct by other powers based elsewhere to create a neutralized roadblock to their rival territorial ambitions--Belgium would not exist were it not for an accord of France, Britain, Prussia and Austria to artificially decree it into place. But Switzerland's evolution was pretty organic and I don't see a deep argument for saying we should exclude the possibility of some other such confederation forming and maintaining a distinct collective political ideology sustaining it.
Meanwhile I also would think such confederations on different bases than roughly democratic tiny cantons might form and last.
There is a TL in suspension right now exploring the evolution of a unified Dalmatia (POD being Zara repelling the Fourth Crusade sack by the Franco-Venetian crusader alliance in the early 13th century) where at least over the half century or so the author has taken it, Hungary is the hegemonic power which the majority of the Dalmatian federated city-states pay homage to and accept considerable aid from (and render aid to). It suggested to me the possibility of this Hungarian centered system taking on the role of the OTL Austrian empire, and maintaining several distinct nations with partial autonomy and interlacing obligations which tend to demonstrate mutual benefit and are therefore sustained rather than broken by the composing nations, such that when modernization is on the horizon, Magyar might be a common tongue but the state also institutionalizes and supports the various local tongues without any fear this is centrifugal and dangerous.
No doubt many of us can offer examples.
Such multinational, multilinguistic entities with a fused political identity hardly seem impossible to me and perhaps we should consider them instead of arguing one hegemonic language must prevail. Or granting that this might well happen after many generations, still note that the regions remain more than distinct enough to split off into separate nation-states--but would not need to.
Mongolia itself counts? since it survived as a buffer state between the USSR and China, didn't they requested to be annexed into the USSR? also Estonia and Bosnia.
Edit: Forgot that this thread is only about European nations.
Edit: Forgot that this thread is only about European nations.
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Shevek 23 gets my intention and has a good post.
Take Wales as an example. Wales has a distinct identity, which is reflected in English law and government. Welsh remains a distinct language, but spoken by a minority of the Welsh. But Welsh has had no sovereignty of its own since the 14th century. In fact, legally it is not even a kingdom, it is part of the Kingdom of England (actually now Great Britain).
On the opposite scale, Belgium is a sovereign kingdom which, as has been pointed out, was largely created by an international agreement, and consists of a region speaking a Dutch related dialect or language, and a less populated region speaking a French dialect, with the elite until recently speaking French. Switzerland was created by the Swiss, but all but the small Romansch minority of the Swiss (not even a majority in any canon) could just as easily belong in Germany, France, and Italy or in countries based in eastern France, southern Germany, or northern Italy. There is no real distinction between most of the people in Modolva, and the Rumanian region of Moldavia, or in Northern Macedonia as opposed to Bulgaria and Albania, except these are sovereign states due to historical accidents associated with the end of the Cold War.
While small countries could become regions of larger countries, I think there are some large countries such as Turkey, Ukraine, and Spain that if history came out differently, would be divided between neighboring countries and have no identity of their own. This sort of happened to Capetian Burgundy (northern Lotharangia). Turkey would be unlikely to be divided but could have had a very different identity. On the other hand, there will probably almost always be some sort of country centered in northern France, but not necessarily with the same borders as OTL France (maybe not including southern France and maybe including the Low Countries), and not necessarily with Paris as its main city.
Take Wales as an example. Wales has a distinct identity, which is reflected in English law and government. Welsh remains a distinct language, but spoken by a minority of the Welsh. But Welsh has had no sovereignty of its own since the 14th century. In fact, legally it is not even a kingdom, it is part of the Kingdom of England (actually now Great Britain).
On the opposite scale, Belgium is a sovereign kingdom which, as has been pointed out, was largely created by an international agreement, and consists of a region speaking a Dutch related dialect or language, and a less populated region speaking a French dialect, with the elite until recently speaking French. Switzerland was created by the Swiss, but all but the small Romansch minority of the Swiss (not even a majority in any canon) could just as easily belong in Germany, France, and Italy or in countries based in eastern France, southern Germany, or northern Italy. There is no real distinction between most of the people in Modolva, and the Rumanian region of Moldavia, or in Northern Macedonia as opposed to Bulgaria and Albania, except these are sovereign states due to historical accidents associated with the end of the Cold War.
While small countries could become regions of larger countries, I think there are some large countries such as Turkey, Ukraine, and Spain that if history came out differently, would be divided between neighboring countries and have no identity of their own. This sort of happened to Capetian Burgundy (northern Lotharangia). Turkey would be unlikely to be divided but could have had a very different identity. On the other hand, there will probably almost always be some sort of country centered in northern France, but not necessarily with the same borders as OTL France (maybe not including southern France and maybe including the Low Countries), and not necessarily with Paris as its main city.
If the revolutionaries of La Plata had been less fractious and things had gone somewhat better for them, the nations of Paraguay and Uruguay wouldn't exist, since their independence was a consequence of federalist power bases not wanting to suborn themselves to the centralists in Buenos Aires running the show. There's a timeline called "A New World Wreathed In Freedom" which deals with the consequences of the original United Provinces staying together as a coherent political entity which was pretty interesting.
Also, the Republic of China based on an independently controlled Taiwan is a fairly unique situation in my view. The island was previously an integral part of Japan's colonial empire, and before that, a notable European trading colony. Under other circumstances, Taiwan could have been handed back to the Chinese government permanently, perhaps even under a similar "one country, two systems" policy as that which has been applied to the governance of Hong Kong and Macau. Alternatively, the island could've become independent as a totally separate country without a Han-dominated population or any conflicting claims with the Chinese mainland government.
Also, the Republic of China based on an independently controlled Taiwan is a fairly unique situation in my view. The island was previously an integral part of Japan's colonial empire, and before that, a notable European trading colony. Under other circumstances, Taiwan could have been handed back to the Chinese government permanently, perhaps even under a similar "one country, two systems" policy as that which has been applied to the governance of Hong Kong and Macau. Alternatively, the island could've become independent as a totally separate country without a Han-dominated population or any conflicting claims with the Chinese mainland government.
Lithuania? Before it joined with Poland the majority of the grand duchy of Lithuania was inhabited by Orthodox Eastern Slavic people and after it joined with Poland the elites became Polonised and large areas of the country had Polish minorities (or majorities in some cases). And there was the whole "Polish-Lithuanian identity" which survived even after Poland-Lithuania collapsed. If Lithuania stayed united with Poland, then Lithuanian would simply be a regional language spoken in one corner of the area legally known as Lithuania and far outnumbered by Polish speakers.
Austria. The Habsburg Empire was never centered around its original homeland - it was first its Belgian lands, then the Spanish lands, and then its Italian ones. After the Empire lost her lands to budding nation-states (Italy, France, etc.), Habsburg military and industrial power remained not centered in Austria (which, if anything, was a backwater during the time) but in Bohemia, aka modern-day Czechoslovakia. The idea of an "Austrian identity" was almost nonexistent at the time of the end of WW1, and indeed Austrians themselves felt more tied to the German nation-state, but were kept within the Habsburg state through an alliance by Bismarck (who had no desire to absorb lands too large and too Catholic into the Greater Prussia he de facto constructed) and the Hungarian elites (who sought the maintenance of the Habsburg Empire in order to retain their own vision of Greater Hungary).
At the end of World War I, Austria remained largely agrarian and largely, well, a backwater. Austrian leaders separated from the Empire with the assumption they would join Germany eventually (which the Allies would prevent), hoping that German leaders would accept them the way they accepted Bavaria and other Catholic German states. Sentiment for Anschluss remained high throughout the interwar years, even as many Austrian leaders tried to build an identity tie to the Catholic-ness of Austria. The "cultural independence," so to speak, of Austria would only develop in the postwar era.
At the end of World War I, Austria remained largely agrarian and largely, well, a backwater. Austrian leaders separated from the Empire with the assumption they would join Germany eventually (which the Allies would prevent), hoping that German leaders would accept them the way they accepted Bavaria and other Catholic German states. Sentiment for Anschluss remained high throughout the interwar years, even as many Austrian leaders tried to build an identity tie to the Catholic-ness of Austria. The "cultural independence," so to speak, of Austria would only develop in the postwar era.
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Let me speak up for Belgium, because it seems as many people misunderstand or simply are ignorant of its history. Belgium was not created as a buffer state between Germany and France. It was not artificialy created, or at least not in the sense that is often used to describe Belgium.
The history of Belgium is closely connected to the Netherlands. Before the Dutch revolt Belgium and the Netherlands were the same country (or at least same proto-conuntry). Belgium and the Netherlands consisted out of several nearby counties, duchies, etc, on the border of France and the HRE which were inherited, bought or conquered by the Burgundians and later Charles V. Noone cared at that time part of them spoke French and part of the spoke Dutch (or at least French and Dutch dialects). Actualy French speaking Wallonia was part of the HRE, while the Dutch speaking county of Flanders used to be part of France. It was treated as one area and no distinction was made between the French speaking parts and the Dutch speaking parts, or the Belgian parts and Netherlandic parts. This changed when the Dutch revolt started, or more correctly when the Dutch revolt ended. The Dutch territories (including Flanders and Brabant) revolted against Spain for several reasons, including religion, high taces and resistance to closer integration. after 80 years only half ofthe coutry managed to get rid of the Spanish (the Netherlands), while the other half did not (Belgium and Luxemburg). From that on the national identities of the Belgians and the Dutch started to develope seperately, partly ecause of a difference in religion (basicly all Belgian protestant fled north, to disasterous effect for Belgium, especialy Flanders). When Napoleon was defeated 200 years later, it was decided that Belgium would become part of the Netherlands, but after a couple of years the Belgians decided that they were not Dutch and wanted to form their own country.
You could say that the Belgian identity started after the Dutch revolt, although you could also claim that the Belgian identity started even earlier, when the Burgundians and Charles V unified the Netherlands and that the seperate Dutch and Belgian identity started at the end of the revolt. It certainly is not an artificial country crated as abufferstate. The Belgian identity is way older.
The history of Belgium is closely connected to the Netherlands. Before the Dutch revolt Belgium and the Netherlands were the same country (or at least same proto-conuntry). Belgium and the Netherlands consisted out of several nearby counties, duchies, etc, on the border of France and the HRE which were inherited, bought or conquered by the Burgundians and later Charles V. Noone cared at that time part of them spoke French and part of the spoke Dutch (or at least French and Dutch dialects). Actualy French speaking Wallonia was part of the HRE, while the Dutch speaking county of Flanders used to be part of France. It was treated as one area and no distinction was made between the French speaking parts and the Dutch speaking parts, or the Belgian parts and Netherlandic parts. This changed when the Dutch revolt started, or more correctly when the Dutch revolt ended. The Dutch territories (including Flanders and Brabant) revolted against Spain for several reasons, including religion, high taces and resistance to closer integration. after 80 years only half ofthe coutry managed to get rid of the Spanish (the Netherlands), while the other half did not (Belgium and Luxemburg). From that on the national identities of the Belgians and the Dutch started to develope seperately, partly ecause of a difference in religion (basicly all Belgian protestant fled north, to disasterous effect for Belgium, especialy Flanders). When Napoleon was defeated 200 years later, it was decided that Belgium would become part of the Netherlands, but after a couple of years the Belgians decided that they were not Dutch and wanted to form their own country.
You could say that the Belgian identity started after the Dutch revolt, although you could also claim that the Belgian identity started even earlier, when the Burgundians and Charles V unified the Netherlands and that the seperate Dutch and Belgian identity started at the end of the revolt. It certainly is not an artificial country crated as abufferstate. The Belgian identity is way older.
Gonna have to disagree, Belgium only exists today because the French meddled in a revolt in the Netherlands that they otherwise would of been able to handle quite well.
It took some intense depopulation to marginalize Irish. Up until the Famine and Diaspora Irish was spoken by all classes and in legal/educational settings. Making Finland majority Swedish speaking is possible but I imagine it would take a lot of ethnic cleansing and decades of official Swedish policy, and I'm not sure why the Swedish government would want to do that.
I don't know why people haven't mentioned places like Luxemburg, San Marino, and Andorra yet.
Even though you are correct, that does not disaprove my point. Even thoughthe Belgians needed help with the Belgian revolt, they did form their own seperate identity from the Dutch, or else they would not have revolted in the first place.
Perhaps more likely than Magyar, Latin could become the national language- it was always the official language of the Kingdom of Hungary, and in the 18th century Latin language journalism and literature was much more popular than Magyar or German language works. There seems to have been a distinct Latin speaking Hungarian (Hungarus) national identity that identified which was especially strong in regions of the kingdom that were linguistically diverse. It seems to me that had not Joseph II attempted to Germanise the Kingdom of Hungary's administration, the idea that the national language should be a modern language wouldnt have the strength to challenge the weight of traditional usage of Latin. Latin seems like it would be more able to encompass diverse regional languages, as it doesn't claim to be the language of any particular people and is thus more neutral, and would be especially useful in a kingdom of Hungary that's dealing with romance speaking Transylvanians and potential Dalmatian romance speakers.
British persecution was not the only factor though. The Catholic Church in Ireland eventually embraced English as well, seeing it as a language of upward mobility, and this eliminated one of the last remaining public spaces for Irish.
The development of Finnish under Swedish rule would be interesting. There would surely be a Finnish linguistic movement but it is possible that it might not be entirely successful. My guess is that the language would win some governmental recognition but the Swedish language might still become more generalized anyway, because Swedes outside of Finland probably would not be learning it, putting the burden of bilingualism on the Finns.