Le Maréchal est Mort!, Alternate Franco-Prussian War

Who Should Enter Alternate Franco-Prussian War?

  • Austria

    Votes: 49 64.5%
  • Italy

    Votes: 25 32.9%
  • Denmark

    Votes: 38 50.0%
  • Great Britian

    Votes: 17 22.4%
  • Russia

    Votes: 15 19.7%

  • Total voters
    76
While very interesting, there are three problems with this.
One: France is very centralized and losing Paris means losing all governmental institutions. There is no secondary centre from where to govern the rest of the nation and the overseas empire. Unless they manage to evecuate to f.e. Bordeaux, the French are quite fucked.
Two: The industrial and demographic centre lies in the north of France: the parts they stand to loose by retreating to the Loire. THe prussians can just advance to the seine and hold it, the french would need to attack or they will lose the war in the long term/unless someone intervenes.
Three: the route to southern France for Prussia lies open; unless the french manage to fortify Lyon. If the majority french army retreats to the loire....

For the rest: good job! Im going to follow this tl.
 
This could be a good plan stay behind the defensive lines of Orleans and the Lorie while waiting for the smaller German states to loose confidence in Prussian leadership.

Good point. In OTL Napoleon was surprised the south German states like Bavaria joined the war in the first place, he expected them to stay neutral.

Well, I don’t know if there was any, but if there was a dam on the Loire, you could try drastic measures...
Alternatively, you could try to blow up bridge behind the German army and trap them between the Seine and the Loire, breaking their supply line. Using partisans maybe, I remember those sprung up the moment German entered France.

Interesting ideas. With Paris under siege I'm sure Napoleon would consider anything. I'll have to do some research in this regard.

Following this.

Thanks!

While very interesting, there are three problems with this.
One: France is very centralized and losing Paris means losing all governmental institutions. There is no secondary centre from where to govern the rest of the nation and the overseas empire. Unless they manage to evecuate to f.e. Bordeaux, the French are quite fucked.
Two: The industrial and demographic centre lies in the north of France: the parts they stand to loose by retreating to the Loire. THe prussians can just advance to the seine and hold it, the french would need to attack or they will lose the war in the long term/unless someone intervenes.
Three: the route to southern France for Prussia lies open; unless the french manage to fortify Lyon. If the majority french army retreats to the loire....

For the rest: good job! Im going to follow this tl.

You bring up very valid points. I would agree holding Paris is essential. At the moment the goal for the French should be to lock the Prussians in a siege similar to OTL while Army of the Loire attempts to keep the southern supply lines open and attempts to relieve it. I additionally agree with you that losing the Industrial heartland is an issue if the war drags on. I'm thinking Napoleon needs to employ a broader diplomatic strategy to win, bringing Italy and Austria into the war or at least getting them to agree to mobilize and take a position of armed neutrality. Italy nearly did so in otl and this will draw off Prussian attention and make a peace deal easier.
 
Move the French navy to blockade and possibly raid German coast

Interesting idea. France does have the advantage on this front over the Germans. In OTL many French sailors were detached to defend the forts of Paris, in this scenario the regular army will be in place. Another issue is the French navy seemed unprepared to take the offensive at the opening of the war, perhaps come Spring they can put Germany under threat of blockade/raids and entice Denmark to take a belligerent position.
 
It seems like a good defensive plan that would make the prussians unable to beat the french, but at the same time the french are also gonna be in a hard position to win from, especially since theyre essentially giving up the northern half of france which could make them lose their support among the populace. Also northern france will likely be devastated from prussian occupation as they bunker down and try forcing the french out of the Loire, and theres also the possibility the prussians start pillaging france in order to force a confrontation. In short good plan but it has potentially dangerous side effects
 
Get the Austrians or Russians to force Germany to peace table

Getting Austria to pressure Prussia may be easier, Russia is a bit more complicated. Tsar Alexander II mother was Prussian Princess Charlotte and Kaiser Wilhelm I is his uncle. He also had a dislike for the French due to the Crimean War which he blamed for his father's early death. However, he was fearful that a rising German state would threaten Russia. He traveled to Paris in 1867 partly to get Napoleon's support to counter Prussia. This was completely undone though by Polish national Antoni Berezowski shooting at the Tsar who already thought Napoleon harbored Pro Polish sentiments. So possible but issues need to be worked out.

It seems like a good defensive plan that would make the prussians unable to beat the french, but at the same time the french are also gonna be in a hard position to win from, especially since theyre essentially giving up the northern half of france which could make them lose their support among the populace. Also northern france will likely be devastated from prussian occupation as they bunker down and try forcing the french out of the Loire, and theres also the possibility the prussians start pillaging france in order to force a confrontation. In short good plan but it has potentially dangerous side effects

I would agree, very good analysis.
 
So the French army just pushed back against the Prussians near Metz, Sedan did not happen, and the French still have at least two functional armies in the East, plus whatever Faidherbe has around Lille, right?
And the French just won a significant tactical victory which basically stabilizes the Verdun-Metz line and keeps the road to the Moselle open. It is not even possible that, after being beaten at Mars-la-Tour and their rear threatened by the strong Metz garrison (and also facing their first logistical difficulties), the Germans tactically retreat to somewhere along the Moselle (although they probably want to keep footholds on the west bank if possible).

In this situation, the French retreating to Paris is absolutely unthinkable (and to the Loire even more so). Metz is already a perfectly good strong point as far as threatening the Prussian lines of communications go, and it is politically impossible to abandon a huge (and industrially vital) part of France to the enemy. A longer stalemate around the Moselle is likely to favour the French: while the Prussian army is backed by a somewhat stronger economy, its supply system is really bad (the German general staff was notorious for focusing on tactics and operations and disregarding logistics). On the other hand, the French army has the advantage of a supporting population (with the war being fought on French soil, France is definitely going to raise a volunteer army to defend the Patrie, 1792-like — this will be a low-quality army but can still prove useful) whereas the allied German states will start wondering why Bavarians and Hessians are dying in Lorraine (and just as importantly, why they are paying so much) for the Prussian king. On top of this, France has a naval advantage (as already mentioned) and a probable diplomatic advantage if it does not blunder too much : the Prussians were quite adverse to “limited victories” and went to war in 1870 with the idea of decisive victory + total war + dictated peace terms; once it becomes obvious in Europe that the French lost but are still fighting, there will be friendly pressure from UK and eventually even Austria and Germany-minus-Prussia for the Germans to suggest reasonable terms for the French. (This war is currently disrupting the very heartland of continental European economy, and nobody really wants that).
 
There is an interesting alternate history book by Antoine Reverchon on the war of 1870 (La France pouvait-elle gagner en 1870? - Could France win in 1870?), which I read while searching for material for my 1870 TL, with several scenarios over several pods involving breaking the siege of Paris or even avoiding it. Aside of some implausible assumptions on political ground, the author raises very interesting tactical and strategical points.

Though I knew of MacMahon wish to withdraw to Paris through Schnerb biography of Eugène Rouher (Robert Schnerb, Rouher et le Second Empire, Paris, A. Colin, 1949), I wasn't aware of an Orléans plan. Honnestly, I thought of it too while playing the armchair general, but the more I looked, the more I saw the Paris defense is the better option.

The danger of Paris being cut off is overexagerated.
With the Army of the Rhine escaping Metz and getting reinforced by the corps raised at Chalons, plus further mobilized ones through the autumn (French manpower was still able to provide for new armies as the Republicans showed ITTL). Meanwhile, the Germans have to keep at least two armies besieging the fortresses of Lorraine and Alsace and keep the supply lines safe against raids or guerilla by the Corps Francs : Metz and Strasbourg, but also Toul, Nancy, Belfort, Mezières, Bitche... (that last one is real, no joke https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siège_de_Bitche_(1870-1871) ).
If my memory is still correct (it has been a long time), that keep the Ist and IInd armies in Lorraine and Alsace and leave only the IIIrd and IVth armies to pursue the French and attack Paris.
In that situation, the Germans would likely be themselves outnumbered if not in parity with French forces before Paris.
Plus, while the French army is sitting on the biggest rail and supply hub of the country, with plenty of ammo at hand, the IIIrd and IVth German armies have to supply through a long, arduous and threatened supply route through a still contested territory (as long as the fortresses hold and the guerilla keep blowing up bridges and tunnels), not forgetting that French cavalry would have likely torn down every single railroad track and bridges between Verdun and Paris while retreating.

So, when it comes to cutting Paris, the Germans can't really go away from Paris, either north or south towards the Loire, without having the concentrated French army in their back.
Dividing is an option, but not a good one either.
They could keep an army to fix the French army at Paris and send another away to cut the lines to Paris, but that's forgetting the weakness of the German army there.
First, with the whole French army concentrated there, they don't have the numbers to besiege Paris, then, the French army has the benefit of interior lines and extensive railroads, so they can dispatch easily and very quickly corps from a section of the front and the battlefield to another. Moreso, to encircle or cut Paris, the Germans would have to cross the Seine river at some point, which would divide their forces and leave them exposed to being crushed in detail by a defender who has as we said the ability to ferry troops and whole corps quickly across the whole front and including across the Seine river.

Minding that, I don't think the Germans would outright seek to assault or besiege Paris. Before the Ist and IInd armies in Alsace and Lorraine are freed up, they can just try to provoke the French army into battle in hope of destroying it in the field.
But at this point, all the French need to do is waiting and keeping their army concentrated there in such a way, while engaging in peripheral action, launching deep raids from Belfort and Mezières towards Lorraine, harass German lines, make the fortresses resistance the longest possible, and wait for winter to do its work.
At the time, France was maybe outclassed tactically by Prussians on the battlefield, but strategically, it had a way better capacity to sustain attrition than the Germans had. They dominated the sea and had an excellent financial standing.
Meanwhile, the Germans in 1870 as later IOTL showed bad at sustaining attrition, their mentality being built on the idea of quick and decisive victories.
After, my idea of a more successfull French performance in that war was to have Napoléon III successfully lobying London and the European powers (better French performance would have made Austro-Hungarian not refraining from openly supporting France, diplomatically I mind, and after the French withdrawal from Rome ordered by Napoléon III had paved the way for Italian involvement) for mediation and for the Germans, badly affected by attrition, to accept it, and conclude the whole war by a status quo ante bellum.

EDIT: On the interior lines, you have this railroad to speak of: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chemin_de_fer_de_Petite_Ceinture
 
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Hecatee

Donor
After such a victory I do suspect French morale would be better, especially if fueled by the spirit of revanche for Badaine : I could see a fighting retreat along the main rivers before even thinking of a siege of Paris or even Orlean (which I would consider ASB, especially as France has no precedent for such a move except maybe during Charles VII rule in the 100 years war...) : going for Paris would mean abandoning symbolic towns such as Reims (even if Napoleon III was not sacred emperor, the symbol is there).

Meuse, Marne and Aisne would be defensive lignes, with maybe Bar le Duc and Chaumont as a strong points to reinforce the French lines ?
 
Part 5
Part V: The Empress

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Empress Eugenie


As Napoleon III saw to the union of the French armies, Empress Eugenie continued to rule as regent in Paris. Eugenie was a highly capable figure who Napoleon had come to rely upon more and more in recent years as his health declined. From the onset of the war, Eugenie had pushed the emperor into a more militant stance encouraging him to lead the army in person despite his various illnesses.

In her role as regent, Eugenie held daily meetings of the privy council. She also entreated with foreign diplomats such as Austria’s Richard von Metternich and Italy’s Costantino Nigra. Getting these two powers to apply pressure to Prussia would be essential to bringing about peace. Italy, in particular, had taken up a favorable position since Napoleon’s withdrawal of his garrison from Rome in early August.

The situation in Paris was less than stable during the emperor’s absence. The French people and press, though elated by the victory at Mars-la-Tour, were furiously demanding that every inch of French soil be defended. To solidify her hold on power the Empress had taken the step of removing Prime Minister Emile Ollivier and replacing him with General Montauban de Palikao, who was also entrusted with the War Ministry, on August 9th.

Palikao brought the capital into a state of military readiness and set to work organizing some one hundred thousand Garde Mobile. He additionally held discussions with Naval Minister Charles de Genouilly. The two discussed using the superior French navy to blockade the German coast and perhaps even mount an amphibious landing.
 
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Indeed the longer the war last, the higher the risk of additionnal powers entering the war or trying to end the conflict. And yes war of attrition will favor the french if they are better lead. Wouldn't be surprised if the war end with France not losing land but paying reparation.
 
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As of Palikao's capable management, I couldn't say, but of the Regency, I have more to say.

First, Eugénie's removal of Ollivier was practically a constitutional coup. She didn't have the authority to remove a government backed by the parliament, a political settlement dating from the fallout of the elections of 1869 and the constitutional referendum of May 1870.
Eugénie was among those conservative nobles at a time conservative meant in France "parliament rule is not something good for France, let's keep a powerful Emperor".
And she wasn't willing to relinquish the power her husband had given her with the Regency. Though I've not read yet a biography of her, the things I know let me have some idea.
She was from little conservative nobility, a practicing traditional Catholic (again, put it in the context of the time) and so observant to her marital duties, keeping it quiet even though her husband the Emperor was a notorious womanizer and cheated on her, but not perhaps without entertaining some disdain, the more even as Napoléon III grew sicker and sicker through the 1860s and conceded more and more to the opposition, making him look weak. By that time, if Eugénie strictly kept to her marital duties due to her strong Catholic education, she would have been more interested in her son's future and throne, and she was a determined, strong willed mother in that regard.
Coming into 1870, she pushed her husband to accept a war he didn't want and with him away on the frontlines, she practically took over the country, replacing Ollivier with one of her cronies at the first occasion and dictating military planning (her pressure on Napoléon III actually led to the march on Sedan all while MacMahon and the general staff pushed for a retreat on Paris).

On one occasion I read from the biography of Prince Napoléon (Napoléon III's cousin), the Prince met with General Trochu at the camp of Chalons and together, they plotted a move to convince the Emperor, helped by other officers close to him, to order at last the withdrawal to Paris as was pushed for. Napoléon III was to return to Paris, effectively ending the regency, Trochu was appointed military governor of the capital to organize its defense and the army was to march back to it. However, though Trochu was appointed, Napoléon III had a change of mind after consulting with Eugénie who told him something like he would lose honor and go in shame if he were to return defeated. In a conversation with Prince Napoléon, Trochu said he knew only one Napoléon in this camp (implicitly referring to Prince Napoléon being the true spiritual heir to the first Napoléon) and that he had lost faith in the Emperor; Prince Napoléon asked him if he would still be loyal to the regime, and Trochu answered he would do nothing to protect it (and IOTL, he actually did nothing to protect the Parisians from invading Palais Bourbon on September 4th which led to the Republic proclamation).

In my idea of TL, I would have had Napoléon III going back to Paris at last, as there would be no army trapped in Metz to justify further campaigning there.
Effectively, that would mean a return of parliamentarian rule, perhaps not Ollivier who had his share of blame for "going into war with a light heart". At some point, a national union government is not excluded, but headed by who, I don't know.
Rouher was a possible candidate, close to Napoléon III, and a hard-working bureaucrat who carried over the regime most important reforms and works (he was nicknamed the Vice Emperor).
  • Thiers, a prominent conservative from the opposition. After the withdrawal following the coup of 1851, he had made a return to politics was one of the opposition big orators.
  • Gambetta, practically a Republican at this point. IOTL, unlike you said, he was reluctant to proclaim the Empire, since the referendum of May 1870 had provided the regime with a popular vote mandate, and Gambetta would have likely pursued a legalist stance if not for the extraordinary context. What's more, when Ollivier set up his government in late 1869, Gambetta was actually proposed to be part of it, but the price he asked, the Interior Ministry, was too much for either Ollivier or Napoléon III.
  • Ollivier, still a choice possible despite his removal, but his credibility has taken a hard hit. He could still act as a proxy for Prince Napoléon whose influence over war conduct would have been growing since the first defeats and the retreat from Chalons.
  • Prince Napoléon was held in better esteem than the Emperor by some in the Army and had many high ranking friends in the Navy. His command in Crimea was impressive and if not for inertia by the joint Franco-British command, his ideas would have likely shortened the siege of Sevastopol by a year. Politically, he was a marginal, but had influence and friends across liberal opposition circles, Republicans and Socialists alike. Ollivier was in his debt, George Sand was among his close friend, he welcomed Proudhon in his palace and funded the participation of the French delegation to the First International, and none other than Victor Hugo had a life debt to him for his role in freeing his sons who had been jailed after the coup of 1851. Being prime minister is a possibility, but not a likely one outright, as for all his influence, he was still considered a marginal and was despised or distrusted, by the Republicans for being a Bonaparte, by the conservative for being a liberal, by the Catholics for being anti-clerical ...
 
Move the French navy to blockade and possibly raid German coast
Unfortunately whale France dose a far Superior navy there isn't really port of them to base out of, that's way nothing happened in OTL.
Getting Austria to pressure Prussia may be easier, Russia is a bit more complicated. Tsar Alexander II mother was Prussian Princess Charlotte and Kaiser Wilhelm I is his uncle. He also had a dislike for the French due to the Crimean War which he blamed for his father's early death. However, he was fearful that a rising German state would threaten Russia. He traveled to Paris in 1867 partly to get Napoleon's support to counter Prussia. This was completely undone though by Polish national Antoni Berezowski shooting at the Tsar who already thought Napoleon harbored Pro Polish sentiments. So possible but issues need to be worked out.



I would agree, very good analysis.
It very doubtful Russia would support France and not Prussia in this war, napolion supported polish nationalist whale bizmark was well know for is anti-polish sentiments, not to mechen Russia is still sore about the austrea meddling in the cimian war which is very important becuse Russia is using this war to completly reverse the outcome of that war.
 
Eugénie who told him something like he would lose honor and go in shame if he were to return defeated.

Great post! Believe I found the quote in reference:

"Have you reflected on all the consequences which would result from your entrance into Paris under the stigma of two reverses? As for me, I dare not undertake the responsibility of being counseled. If you decide to return, it would at least be necessary to present such a measure to the country as only provisional: the Emperor returning to Paris to reorganize the second army, and temporarily confiding the command-in-chief of the army of the Rhine to Bazaine."
https://archive.org/details/secretdocumentso00unse/page/38

On one occasion I read from the biography of Prince Napoléon (Napoléon III's cousin), the Prince met with General Trochu at the camp of Chalons and together, they plotted a move to convince the Emperor, helped by other officers close to him, to order at last the withdrawal to Paris as was pushed for. Napoléon III was to return to Paris, effectively ending the regency, Trochu was appointed military governor of the capital to organize its defense and the army was to march back to it. However, though Trochu was appointed, Napoléon III had a change of mind after consulting with Eugénie who told him something like he would lose honor and go in shame if he were to return defeated. In a conversation with Prince Napoléon, Trochu said he knew only one Napoléon in this camp (implicitly referring to Prince Napoléon being the true spiritual heir to the first Napoléon) and that he had lost faith in the Emperor; Prince Napoléon asked him if he would still be loyal to the regime, and Trochu answered he would do nothing to protect it (and IOTL, he actually did nothing to protect the Parisians from invading Palais Bourbon on September 4th which led to the Republic proclamation).

Prince Napoléon was held in better esteem than the Emperor by some in the Army and had many high ranking friends in the Navy. His command in Crimea was impressive and if not for inertia by the joint Franco-British command, his ideas would have likely shortened the siege of Sevastopol by a year. Politically, he was a marginal, but had influence and friends across liberal opposition circles, Republicans and Socialists alike. Ollivier was in his debt, George Sand was among his close friend, he welcomed Proudhon in his palace and funded the participation of the French delegation to the First International, and none other than Victor Hugo had a life debt to him for his role in freeing his sons who had been jailed after the coup of 1851. Being prime minister is a possibility, but not a likely one outright, as for all his influence, he was still considered a marginal and was despised or distrusted, by the Republicans for being a Bonaparte, by the conservative for being a liberal, by the Catholics for being anti-clerical ...

Prince Napoleon sounds like a very interesting figure. What you mention about Sevastopol especially. I'm certainly gonna try to read more about him and looking into the book Plon-Plon: The Life of Prince Napoleon by Edgar Holt.
 
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Indeed the longer the war last, the higher the risk of additionnal powers entering the war or trying to end the conflict. And yes war of attrition will favor the french if they are better lead. Wouldn't be surprised if the war end with France not losing land but paying reparation.

Even IOTL, Alsace-Lorraine was close (Bismarck did not want to take it but was quite forced by the Junkers, who wanted to have something concrete to show for their efforts in the war).
 
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