Latest POD to save Nationalist China?

The defeat of Nationalist China was not inevitable and there are numerous POD’s that could see it survive, or even win, the Chinese Civil War. But what is the latest point Nationalist China on the mainland could be rescued?

Would a President Dewey have enough time to save China if he had won election? Is it even possible at that point?

By ‘survived’ I mean had a sizeable chunk of territory on the mainland still under its control.
 
In all likelihood Chiang made a fatal mistake getting his forces tied down in Manchuria, and he should instead have followed Wedemeyer's advice to institute reforms and consolidate his position south of the Great Wall. But in fairness to Chiang, Marshall actually encouraged him (initially) to send troops to Manchuria. See Jay Taylor's discussion of this in his biography of Chiang Kai-shek, The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China:

"The State Department’s White Paper, issued in 1949, declared that Chiang’s government “in occupying Manchuria took steps contrary to the advice of competent United States military observers who were aware that the Government could not reoccupy Manchuria and pacify the rest of China.” This claim is one of the most important unexamined, and incorrect, assumptions of the Chinese civil war. Wedemeyer did tell Chiang and the Pentagon in November 1945 that the Nationalists could not win in Manchuria and probably not in North China, but policymakers in Washington did not adopt this point of view. In addition, earlier that year Wedemeyer himself had been optimistic about the Nationalist Army’s prospects for dealing successfully with the Communists in the postwar period, including in Manchuria. Beginning with the negotiations on the Sino-Soviet treaty in the summer of 1945 in Moscow, the United States had made clear it wanted Chiang to take a tough stand in asserting Nationalist China’s sovereignty in Manchuria. After Japan’s surrender, America stood ready to transport almost a quarter million Nationalist soldiers to the region for this purpose and it completed the task during the Marshall Mission. At the beginning of the mission, the firmly, albeit privately, stated policy objective of Truman and Marshall was to support Chiang’s takeover of all of Manchuria while trying to prevent a civil war. To accomplish this goal, the United States sought to promote a coalition government, but did not make such a coalition a quid pro quo of U.S. assistance to Chiang. Marshall at first clearly encouraged Chiang to continue to try to assert his authority throughout the Northeast. Marshall’s original peace plan provided for a huge 14–1 advantage in government troop presence in Manchuria, and gave the Nationalist government the right to deploy its military anywhere in the region in order to establish its authority. Marshall even promised to find surplus winter clothing for the Nationalist troops heading north. As noted earlier, as far back as mid-November 1945, Chiang had decided tentatively to withdraw from Manchuria, but positive Soviet moves and Marshall’s initial steps and statements changed his mind.

"It was not until the spring of 1946 that Marshall began to tell Chiang he could not defeat the Communists in Manchuria, but even then, still believing a genuine coalition was possible, he did not urge Nationalist withdrawal from the region. Prior to Marshall’s arrival, Chiang had ranged from less to more pessimistic about Soviet cooperation in Manchuria and thus about his own prospects in the Northeast, and probably he would have withdrawn if Marshall, during their first meetings, had strongly echoed Wedemeyer’s advice.

"If Marshall had given this counsel, however, and Chiang had agreed, it would have saddled the United States with the responsibility for helping the Nationalists assert and maintain control along a line somewhere south of the Great Wall. America would have been caught up in the enormous civil war over whether there was to be one China under the Communists or two Chinas, and if two, where the lines between them would be drawn. Almost certainly, neither Marshall nor Truman had thought this through; they simply wanted the best of both worlds—to avoid getting caught up in the civil conflict while maintaining a united, non-Communist, non-Soviet, allied China that included Manchuria. Thus they pursued the chimera of the optimal solution: Mao’s abandonment of not only his revolutionary ideology, powerful army, and large territorial and population base, but also his support from China’s superpower neighbor, all in order to serve as junior partner in a democratic government and a truly amalgamated army under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek.

"Within weeks of Marshall’s arrival, Chiang began to fear that the Americans were headed down the path of appeasing the Communists, and he could have easily abandoned the struggle for Manchuria. It was primarily the Nationalist military victories in 1946 that misled Chiang into thinking he could hold the southern half of Manchuria, and he proceeded to pour in more and more troops for another almost two years, even when, beginning in early 1947, he again recognized that it was highly unlikely he could succeed. During the final and decisive 1948 Manchurian campaign from September to late October, Chiang, as usual, sent detailed instructions to the field commanders and often made it difficult for his senior commanders to give their subordinate generals tactical as well as strategic orders. But according to General Barr, “in spite of this unorthodox procedure,” the plans Chiang made and the orders he gave in the decisive battles for Manchuria in the fall of 1948 “were sound.” Had they been obeyed, the American general concluded, “the results probably would have been favorable.” Barr’s assessment seems highly doubtful given the powerful position the Chinese Communists with Soviet help had established in the region and the financial and moral decay within the Nationalist regime. But it does give some weight to the argument that had Chiang pulled out of Manchuria even as late as the spring of 1948, he might have had enough military strength to hold the line at either the Yellow River or the Yangtze, albeit only with large-scale U.S. military and economic aid."

http://www.thegeneralissimo.net/excerpts.htm

Incidentally, although the Nationalists' chances of holding Manchuria were always problematic given Soviet aid to the CCP, the GMD might have had a better chance if Chiang had released the "Young Marshal" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zhang_Xueliang from house arrest and given him a major role in Manchuria. According to Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China, p. 315, "Bai Chongxi and others" did so recommend, but Chiang rejected their advice. Likewise, Brian Crozier writes in The Man Who Lost China, (p. 276) "...there was general agreement that the Young Marshal should be released and appointed overlord of Manchuria. For them the key argument was that nobody else could command as much support in Manchuria as as Chang Hsueh-liang [Zhang Xueliang]. But they had counted without Chiang Kai-shek's life-long vindictiveness towards the man who had 'rebelled' against him and--worse--kidnapped and humiliated him." It should be remembered that Chiang was not always so vindictive toward former enemies. People like Feng Yuxiang (the "Christian General"), Yan Xishan (the "Model Governor"), the "New Guangxi Clique" http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Guangxi_clique and Wang Jingwei--who had joined forces against Chiang in the "Central Plains War" of 1930--"reappeared over the years in his camp, sometimes only to fall out again" as Jonathan Fenby notes in Chiang Kai-shek: China's Generalissimo and the Nation He Lost, p. 193. But apparently to Chiang, the Xi'an Incident was different, much worse than a mere "rebellion." (Anyway, in the 1930's Chiang's political base was too shaky to permit him to be vindictive against former enemies; in 1945, he felt more confident...)
 
In all likelihood Chiang made a fatal mistake getting his forces tied down in Manchuria, and he should instead have followed Wedemeyer's advice to institute reforms and consolidate his position south of the Great Wall. But in fairness to Chiang, Marshall actually encouraged him (initially) to send troops to Manchuria. See Jay Taylor's discussion of this in his biography of Chiang Kai-shek, The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China:

"The State Department’s White Paper, issued in 1949, declared that Chiang’s government “in occupying Manchuria took steps contrary to the advice of competent United States military observers who were aware that the Government could not reoccupy Manchuria and pacify the rest of China.” This claim is one of the most important unexamined, and incorrect, assumptions of the Chinese civil war. Wedemeyer did tell Chiang and the Pentagon in November 1945 that the Nationalists could not win in Manchuria and probably not in North China, but policymakers in Washington did not adopt this point of view. In addition, earlier that year Wedemeyer himself had been optimistic about the Nationalist Army’s prospects for dealing successfully with the Communists in the postwar period, including in Manchuria. Beginning with the negotiations on the Sino-Soviet treaty in the summer of 1945 in Moscow, the United States had made clear it wanted Chiang to take a tough stand in asserting Nationalist China’s sovereignty in Manchuria. After Japan’s surrender, America stood ready to transport almost a quarter million Nationalist soldiers to the region for this purpose and it completed the task during the Marshall Mission. At the beginning of the mission, the firmly, albeit privately, stated policy objective of Truman and Marshall was to support Chiang’s takeover of all of Manchuria while trying to prevent a civil war. To accomplish this goal, the United States sought to promote a coalition government, but did not make such a coalition a quid pro quo of U.S. assistance to Chiang. Marshall at first clearly encouraged Chiang to continue to try to assert his authority throughout the Northeast. Marshall’s original peace plan provided for a huge 14–1 advantage in government troop presence in Manchuria, and gave the Nationalist government the right to deploy its military anywhere in the region in order to establish its authority. Marshall even promised to find surplus winter clothing for the Nationalist troops heading north. As noted earlier, as far back as mid-November 1945, Chiang had decided tentatively to withdraw from Manchuria, but positive Soviet moves and Marshall’s initial steps and statements changed his mind.

"It was not until the spring of 1946 that Marshall began to tell Chiang he could not defeat the Communists in Manchuria, but even then, still believing a genuine coalition was possible, he did not urge Nationalist withdrawal from the region. Prior to Marshall’s arrival, Chiang had ranged from less to more pessimistic about Soviet cooperation in Manchuria and thus about his own prospects in the Northeast, and probably he would have withdrawn if Marshall, during their first meetings, had strongly echoed Wedemeyer’s advice.

"If Marshall had given this counsel, however, and Chiang had agreed, it would have saddled the United States with the responsibility for helping the Nationalists assert and maintain control along a line somewhere south of the Great Wall. America would have been caught up in the enormous civil war over whether there was to be one China under the Communists or two Chinas, and if two, where the lines between them would be drawn. Almost certainly, neither Marshall nor Truman had thought this through; they simply wanted the best of both worlds—to avoid getting caught up in the civil conflict while maintaining a united, non-Communist, non-Soviet, allied China that included Manchuria. Thus they pursued the chimera of the optimal solution: Mao’s abandonment of not only his revolutionary ideology, powerful army, and large territorial and population base, but also his support from China’s superpower neighbor, all in order to serve as junior partner in a democratic government and a truly amalgamated army under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek.

"Within weeks of Marshall’s arrival, Chiang began to fear that the Americans were headed down the path of appeasing the Communists, and he could have easily abandoned the struggle for Manchuria. It was primarily the Nationalist military victories in 1946 that misled Chiang into thinking he could hold the southern half of Manchuria, and he proceeded to pour in more and more troops for another almost two years, even when, beginning in early 1947, he again recognized that it was highly unlikely he could succeed. During the final and decisive 1948 Manchurian campaign from September to late October, Chiang, as usual, sent detailed instructions to the field commanders and often made it difficult for his senior commanders to give their subordinate generals tactical as well as strategic orders. But according to General Barr, “in spite of this unorthodox procedure,” the plans Chiang made and the orders he gave in the decisive battles for Manchuria in the fall of 1948 “were sound.” Had they been obeyed, the American general concluded, “the results probably would have been favorable.” Barr’s assessment seems highly doubtful given the powerful position the Chinese Communists with Soviet help had established in the region and the financial and moral decay within the Nationalist regime. But it does give some weight to the argument that had Chiang pulled out of Manchuria even as late as the spring of 1948, he might have had enough military strength to hold the line at either the Yellow River or the Yangtze, albeit only with large-scale U.S. military and economic aid."

http://www.thegeneralissimo.net/excerpts.htm

Incidentally, although the Nationalists' chances of holding Manchuria were always problematic given Soviet aid to the CCP, the GMD might have had a better chance if Chiang had released the "Young Marshal" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zhang_Xueliang from house arrest and given him a major role in Manchuria. According to Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China, p. 315, "Bai Chongxi and others" did so recommend, but Chiang rejected their advice. Likewise, Brian Crozier writes in The Man Who Lost China, (p. 276) "...there was general agreement that the Young Marshal should be released and appointed overlord of Manchuria. For them the key argument was that nobody else could command as much support in Manchuria as as Chang Hsueh-liang [Zhang Xueliang]. But they had counted without Chiang Kai-shek's life-long vindictiveness towards the man who had 'rebelled' against him and--worse--kidnapped and humiliated him." It should be remembered that Chiang was not always so vindictive toward former enemies. People like Feng Yuxiang (the "Christian General"), Yan Xishan (the "Model Governor"), the "New Guangxi Clique" http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Guangxi_clique and Wang Jingwei--who had joined forces against Chiang in the "Central Plains War" of 1930--"reappeared over the years in his camp, sometimes only to fall out again" as Jonathan Fenby notes in Chiang Kai-shek: China's Generalissimo and the Nation He Lost, p. 193. But apparently to Chiang, the Xi'an Incident was different, much worse than a mere "rebellion." (Anyway, in the 1930's Chiang's political base was too shaky to permit him to be vindictive against former enemies; in 1945, he felt more confident...)
Thank you for this detailed reply. Do you think the change has to be as early as Manchuria, or could a later POD save the Nationalists? Would more US support after the fall of Beijing have saved the regime?
 
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