Latest PoD Preventing WWI

How about something a little different? Edward VII lives longer, and tells the boys not to play silly bollocks. Could he be seen as more of an 'uncle', and more or less control them. He went down very well in France, the same in Germany and Russia?
 
Probably. A change of heart for the German Emperor - a realization of just how much was at stake and that he would most definitely be going up against the British Empire - should also have been enough to avert war up until a week or so before outbreak of hostilities.
 
Then let me put it another way -- when did the underlying causes of WWI (define how you like) grow to such an extent that a "Great War" in the early 20th Century become probable?

It can be argued that French participation was made inevitable by the bone headed German decision to annex Alsace and Lorraine in 1871. The French never forgave the Germans. It was Bismarck’s biggest mistake (I think that he bowed to some Prussian generals) and I think that towards the end of his life he realised it.
 
I wouldn't call that inevitable or unforgivable, though. Territories change hands all the time and the area was majority German, not a French core territory. Nations have accepted worse losses and were able to move on.
While the annexation of course was a major factor for the tensions between the two nations, I'd more blame the failed diplomacy of both sides, or rather the complete lack of interest in the mere notion of diplomacy, for the 'inevitability' of the rematch.
 
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If Germany keeps out of Belgium then the war is likely to be purely continental. Britain was far from committed to war and the cabinet was deeply divided. The German march into Belgium and the threat to the channel ports fired up the public and the politicians.

This is not to say that Germany is to blame for WWI, some sort of European conflict was probably inevitable at some point given French revanchism, Germany feeling surrounded and political instability in the Austro-Hungarian Empire but it didn't have to be the massive all-encompassing conflict it became.
 
I wouldn't call that inevitable or unforgivable, though. Territories change hands all the time and the area was majority German, not a French core territory. Nations have accepted worse losses and were able to move on.
While the annexation of course was a major factor for the tensions between the two nations, I'd more blame the failed diplomacy of both sides, or rather the complete lack of interest in the mere notion of diplomacy, for the 'inevitability' of the rematch.

The point is that the Alsatian saw themselves as French and the French saw them as French. While 'only' 8% of the population left Alsace at the time of the annexion, overall 1/3 of the population left during the whole 1871-1914 period. A lot of them went to France where they constitued what was called 'The Alsatian Diaspora' (the reference was voluntary). In addition, the mandate of the Alsace and Moselle parliament representative was made permanent to ensure the voice of the people of Alsace and Moselle was represented in the French Parliament and the statues representing the lost area in the French parliament main chamber were hidden behind a black veil as a permanent reminder.

So, in effect, just as Versailles ensured WWII, Frankfuhrt ensured WWI (in either case, it could have gone otherwise, but the most plausible was war)
 
This is not to say that Germany is to blame for WWI, some sort of European conflict was probably inevitable at some point given French revanchism, Germany feeling surrounded and political instability in the Austro-Hungarian Empire but it didn't have to be the massive all-encompassing conflict it became.

To reiterate, the OP requires not only that WWI be averted, but that Europe doesn't see any war with a million or more casualties in the 20th Century. Actually, this gives me an idea for the term -- "factors of inevitability" -- meaning underlying causes (of WWI) that made a large war (> 1 million dead) of some kind inevitable.

The tensions mentioned here would still, more likely than not, breed such a conflict as at some point, unless there was a major change of attitudes, that OTL only came about as a result of the world wars. So the question is, when did they coalesce to make war inevitable? Germany took Lorraine in 1871, and the alliance between Germany, AH, and Russia collapsed 1878, so that's a start.
 
I think that there is far too much of a tendency to take what happened IOTL and presume it to be inevitable, e.g. lots and lots of TLs have precisely two major wars in the first half of the twentieth century and a Cold War-equivalent afterwards. Several points to make:

  1. The idea that the British government was terrified by German naval rearmament and that this was a major contributing factor to WW1 is, at best, exaggerated. The newspapers and the public were afraid (hardly exceptional; British naval scares happened periodically, there was a big one about France not very long before then and it amounted to nothing) but there are plenty of quotes from British ministers and officers dismissing Germany's navy as a major threat to British interests, in comparison to Russia (which was why Russia had to be kept on side), which was grossly overestimated at the time. Britain didn't just have a lead on Germany in 1914, that lead was constantly increasing. In fact, a few years before the war, Germany and Britain held a conference wherein the Germans offered to stop building so many ships and concede British naval superiority in exchange for nothing except a British guarantee of neutrality in case of an aggressive war waged against Germany by the Franco-Russian Alliance (a very weak guarantee, as any diplomat at the time would have known, since in any complicated crisis a country can simply declare who it thinks is being aggressive); Britain refused, on the basis that they already had naval superiority regardless of Germany's actions, so such a bargain would be conceding something for nothing.
  2. French enmity to Germany was indeed inevitable. French war against Germany was not. That can only happen if both France and Germany are willing to go to war. If the French are less confident of British support, they might not go to war; if Russia has developed further, the Germans might not go to war.
  3. The Triple Entente and the Austro-German alliance were far more fragile than is generally thought. Britain and Russia, in particular, really didn't trust each other, especially over Persia. The Anglo-Russian Convention was due to be reconfirmed in 1915, and it probably would have been allowed to lapse; shortly before the war began, even Sir Arthur Nicolson, who was the most devotedly pro-Russian of the high-ranking officials of the British government, said, "I think it is extremely probable that before long we shall witness fresh developments and new groupings in the European situation" (emphasis mine). I'd go so far as to say that a war with the precise arrangement of great powers as happened IOTL was unlikely, and that if a crisis had occurred at a different time there could easily have been different alliances at war. Simply because of the sheer number of potential powder-kegs, I'm inclined to believe that war is likelier than peace, but if none of them happen, peace is quite possible.
As for the precise time when some kind of major war (even if not necessarily including Britain) was inevitable…? I'd say the time when the Austro-Hungarians caught almost all of the group that killed Franz Ferdinand. By then, the following factors were well-established:

  1. Austria-Hungary's belief (through experience) that Serbia would ignore pressure short of an ultimatum.
  2. Austria-Hungary's mistrust of Serbia to actually follow any terms.
  3. Russia's determination to protect Serbia
  4. France's determination to side with Russia against Austria-Hungary regardless of the Serbian government's guilt or innocence
  5. Germany's fear of Russia and unwillingness to leave Austria-Hungary to fight Russia without German aid
 
The tensions mentioned here would still, more likely than not, breed such a conflict as at some point, unless there was a major change of attitudes, that OTL only came about as a result of the world wars. So the question is, when did they coalesce to make war inevitable? Germany took Lorraine in 1871, and the alliance between Germany, AH, and Russia collapsed 1878, so that's a start.

The Russians complete their military improvments programs by 1917 at that point German foreign policy has to become far more conservative. So the though of using an "incident" to provoke a war with Russia, before Russia is to strong to defeat is no longer workable.

So if the Kaiser and Bethman Holleweg can figure out a day or two earlier than the July 1914 OTL that Britain will participate and so back out of the potential conflict and take a "Stop at Belgrade" compromise and an international conference. Then you only need two more years of no incidents (likely) before peace could really be permament.

Only the Germans were pushing for war like this, I can't see any other country inviting a world war.

If the Germans and Britain split the Portugese colonies as they were trending torwards OTL, the Germans might find themselves busy maintaining a much larger and expensive "place in the sun" in Africa which would keep them busy for a while, the excessive costs of which would probably dampen any enthusiasm for further expansion.
 
So if the Kaiser and Bethman Holleweg can figure out a day or two earlier than the July 1914 OTL that Britain will participate and so back out of the potential conflict and take a "Stop at Belgrade" compromise and an international conference.

Isn't the problem that even Britain wasn't completely sure what Britain was going to do (despite the promises to France and Belgium) until events overtook them?
 
e8, are you actually saying that Franz Ferdinand not getting shot is an early enough PoD to keep a general European War from flaring up for the next century? Does anyone agree with this? Disagree?

I'm saying it would be early enought to prevent something comparable to WWI. There's only gonna be so long where the crushing stalemate of trench warfare is gonna last.
 
The Russians complete their military improvments programs by 1917 at that point German foreign policy has to become far more conservative. So the thought of using an "incident" to provoke a war with Russia, before Russia is too strong to defeat is no longer workable.

So if the outbreak of a "Great War" can be delayed until 1918, then it won't happen? Just so we're clear, that means that a European conflict with more than a million deaths will only become less and less likely with a fairly late PoD of, say, Franz Ferdinand avoiding assassination?

I'm saying it would be early enought to prevent something comparable to WWI.

The thing I think needs to be clarified is that "comparable to WWI" doesn't necessarily mean "as large as WWI" (which had 16 million deaths OTL), considering that no conflict in the continent between the Napoleonic and World Wars had even half a million deaths, or any conflicts after WWII for that matter.
 
Isn't the problem that even Britain wasn't completely sure what Britain was going to do (despite the promises to France and Belgium) until events overtook them?

Pretty much. It was the horror stories coming out of Belgium and the strategic threat to the channel ports that crystallized opinion and made up their minds.
 

katchen

Banned
It can be argued that French participation was made inevitable by the bone headed German decision to annex Alsace and Lorraine in 1871. The French never forgave the Germans. It was Bismarck’s biggest mistake (I think that he bowed to some Prussian generals) and I think that towards the end of his life he realised it.
Bismarck believed that Alsace was needed as a buffer against France. Lorraine too. Lorraine, though, was more French than German. So it might have made a lot more sense for France to be forced to cede Lorraine to Belgium if Belgium could be persuaded to take it. Germany maybe takes Alsace, which is more German. Or Alsace goes to Switzerland (since Mulhouse (or Mulhausen) was at one time Swiss).
Bismarck did not realize the value of a neutral buffer state that would force a potential enemy (France) to aggress against a neutral before even getting to Germany. Not having a common border with France at all would have been the best way to protect Germany in that direction.
 
It can be argued that French participation was made inevitable by the bone headed German decision to annex Alsace and Lorraine in 1871. The French never forgave the Germans. It was Bismarck’s biggest mistake (I think that he bowed to some Prussian generals) and I think that towards the end of his life he realised it.

It was the annexation that caused France to approach Russia? Because wouldn't military common sense say that it was the result of the war on the battlefield that demanded a new alliance for France?
 
. So the question is, when did they coalesce to make war inevitable? Germany took Lorraine in 1871, and the alliance between Germany, AH, and Russia collapsed 1878, so that's a start.

Nothing is inevitable. But things got very dicey after the Triple Entente expanded its obligations into the Balkans after 1911. This essentially handed the match to the magazine to revisionist Serbia.

A better approach would have been for Britain to have signed a treaty with Austria in about 1912 that in any Austro-Serbian war in which Belgian neutrality was not violated by Germany, Britain would remain neutral towards Austria.
 
Then, to revisit the flipped question, does that mean (1) that if the outbreak of a Great War can be delayed for three years, then a conflict meeting OP parameters would become unlikely and only less likely as time went on; and (2) that avoiding the Franz Ferdinand assassination would be enough of a PoD to do this?
 
Then, to revisit the flipped question, does that mean (1) that if the outbreak of a Great War can be delayed for three years, then a conflict meeting OP parameters would become unlikely and only less likely as time went on; and (2) that avoiding the Franz Ferdinand assassination would be enough of a PoD to do this?

The continental nations' pigheadedness are the ignition points, Ferdinand's death just got the ball rolling. Had they believed that Britain would be willing step in then I don't think the war would have happened at all. In my opinion the real cause of WWI was that everyone expected someone else to back down when it came to supporting their allies. What was expected to be similar in scale to the Franco-Prussian war turned into a nightmare.

But if Ferdinand isn't assassinated I do believe that the war will be delayed for a time if it happens at all. Austria was still unstable and likely to break apart eventually giving Germany the opportunity to snatch up pieces and satisfy their expansionism. That would reshuffle the alliances and reduce the chance of war.
 
I suppose the assumption I always made about WWI was that the kind of pinheadedness that brought it about would always threaten some kind of large scale war, and that it was only until the experience of such a war OTL that they learned the cost of that kind of thinking. (Sort of how I feel about the Great Depression, FWIW.) But it sounds like this isn't how the rest of the board feels, who it seems would by and large take little issue w a late PoD leading to a (long term) "peaceful Europe" TL. Am I right?
 
Nothing is inevitable. But things got very dicey after the Triple Entente expanded its obligations into the Balkans after 1911. This essentially handed the match to the magazine to revisionist Serbia.

Agreed. None of the great powers wanted a "European war"; even Germany was confident that the war would be localised for quite a while. But Russia, convinced that Austria-Hungary was being aggressive in the Balkans, gave Serbia what amounted to a guarantee of support against Austria-Hungary in any circumstances, and even though Pašić (the Serbian head of government) was a cautious man he was politically unable to restrain the pan-Serb nationalists who did because of public support for those nationalists. By giving Serbia this guarantee, the Russian government (perhaps inadvertently) made Serbia far bolder than they would have dared to be otherwise, and thus placed the trigger for a European war in the hands of a country whose head of government couldn't control what its government was doing; the fact that the Russian ambassador to Serbia openly backed the pan-Serb nationalists as a matter of ideological principle didn't help in this regard either.

I'm not sure of this point, but simply having there be a different Russian ambassador in Serbia might well have prevented WW1 occurring as we know it.

The continental nations' pigheadedness are the ignition points, Ferdinand's death just got the ball rolling. Had they believed that Britain would be willing step in then I don't think the war would have happened at all. In my opinion the real cause of WWI was that everyone expected someone else to back down when it came to supporting their allies. What was expected to be similar in scale to the Franco-Prussian war turned into a nightmare.

Agreed. Bethmann Hollweg, the German Chancellor, genuinely believed that the United Kingdom was going to remain neutral until such a time when it was too late for Germany to back down because the crisis had heated up to the point that any concessions at all would be seen as a shameful surrender.

Austria was still unstable and likely to break apart eventually giving Germany the opportunity to snatch up pieces and satisfy their expansionism.

The tendency of Austro-Hungarian instability is exaggerated, mostly due to post-war Entente justifications for why they broke up the Habsburg empire. Austria-Hungary was enjoying lots of economic growth, and it was actually developing much more successfully than the various nationalist, unstable nation-states that were hailed by the likes of Woodrow Wilson. It was less stable than, say, Britain or Germany but arguably more stable than the Russian Empire; hatred of the Austro-Hungarian authorities mostly came from nationalists from outside the Habsburg empire, not within. As for Germany, turning on the only great power that was friendly to them, in a situation where France and Russia are deeply hostile and Britain is leaning towards hostility, would be too stupid for any sane politician. (The category of 'sane politicians' does not, of course, include the extreme pan-Germanists, but they weren't in power and weren't likely to get there under the Kaiserreich.)

Then, to revisit the flipped question, does that mean (1) that if the outbreak of a Great War can be delayed for three years, then a conflict meeting OP parameters would become unlikely and only less likely as time went on; and (2) that avoiding the Franz Ferdinand assassination would be enough of a PoD to do this?

This depends on your PoD. If it's just that the assassination attempt on Franz Ferdinand fails, no; the pan-Serb nationalists will try again and sometime they'll get caught, even if it's when they've (e.g.) distributed literature inciting rebellion rather than something as grand-scale as killing the crown prince. If it's the PoD I mentioned above, where Russia doesn't encourage Serbia as much, then yes.

If the Serbian pan-Serb nationalists aren't encouraged with Russian support for their expansionist ambitions, Russia and the United Kingdom will likely dissolve the Anglo-Russian Convention when it comes to be renewed in 1915. True, Russian power is increasing, but give it enough time (especially as the German naval threat becomes less worrying, as the British Empire's naval lead over Germany was constantly increasing at this time) and the British will be quietly searching for how to take the Russians down a peg.

But Austro-Russian disagreements over the Balkans are inevitable unless you have a PoD several decades earlier; I can talk about the reasons why at more length but that would derail this thread. So it's very difficult to imagine any great power conflict in which Austria-Hungary and Russia aren't on opposite sides.
 
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