Larger American Army in WW2

[CalBear]

I am not sure where you get your numbers. I guess ration strength includes foreign auxiliaries and POWs. According to the US bureau of census at its WW2 peak the US armed forces had a strength of 11 430 000 (less than 10% of population). At its peak the total workforce was 66 040 000, 29.2% of them women. Moreover the unemployment rate remained constantly over 1%. I realise that some things the Germans did, like relying almost entirely on women and 19th century methods for food production, would work less well under different conditions. But the fact remains that the US was by any standard incredibly wasteful with the use of its resources. There were a number of methods how they could have mobilised considerably more men without economic collapse. For instance the German armed forces rose to more than 10% women even before the collapse in 45 (exact numbers are a bit difficult, as the distinction between various classifications of occupations in statistics overlap), the USA did not even reach 5%. And the German female auxiliaries did have considerably more responsibilities. Some rear echelon staffs were close to 90% female and most of the 39 EK IIs given to women went to "nurses" which at least in that instance acted as combat medics. In the US there was neither the political will nor more important the need to do so, which overrode in Germany ideological preconceptions. Tighter rations is another field where the US had room to save resources and with it work. According to German Pows the combat rations they got from US forces were better than peacetime meals for a German middle class family pre-war. Saying the US had mobilised to the maximum extent practical is simply not true. Why should they do more though?

Actually, U.S. Census data indicates 16.1 million served during the war.

http://www.census.gov/prod/1/gen/95statab/defense.pdf Page 366 Table 569

Not sure why I recalled it at 18 million.

Regarding reducing food production this is one of those "wolf at the door" actions that can be taken in extreme cases. It is, however, worth keeping in mind that the U.S. was not just the Arsenal of Democracy, it was also the pantry with American foodstuffs going across the entire grand coalition opposing the Axis.

The same goes for what effectively is a female draft to free men for combat duty, although the fact is that a significant number of men were simply not physically capable of performing in combat roles at least from the perspective of the U.S. military (the Great Depression had serious effects on nutrition across large segments of society with the expected impact on the size and health of children who grew up in the era). Other combatants, who did not have the luxury of choice, the Red Army being the best example, swept up anyone with a pulse and a majority of their limbs

The U.S. could, by the same token, have increased ration strength by telling the rest of the grand coalition to produce their own goods, materials, and equipment thereby freeing up a considerable number of men for service. Might have lost the war that way, or extended it for a few years, but it was possible.

The bottom line is still the same. Without significant cultural and political changes, far beyond those that actually occurred (and those were revolutionary in scope) and far beyond those sensible and required simply to meet a notional "100 division" goal, the U.S. was at the bottom of the manpower barrel.

 

[historyfool]

Actually, U.S. Census data indicates 16.1 million served during the war.

http://www.census.gov/prod/1/gen/95statab/defense.pdf Page 366 Table 569

Not sure why I recalled it at 18 million.

Regarding reducing food production this is one of those "wolf at the door" actions that can be taken in extreme cases. It is, however, worth keeping in mind that the U.S. was not just the Arsenal of Democracy, it was also the pantry with American foodstuffs going across the entire grand coalition opposing the Axis.

The same goes for what effectively is a female draft to free men for combat duty, although the fact is that a significant number of men were simply not physically capable of performing in combat roles at least from the perspective of the U.S. military (the Great Depression had serious effects on nutrition across large segments of society with the expected impact on the size and health of children who grew up in the era). Other combatants, who did not have the luxury of choice, the Red Army being the best example, swept up anyone with a pulse and a majority of their limbs

The U.S. could, by the same token, have increased ration strength by telling the rest of the grand coalition to produce their own goods, materials, and equipment thereby freeing up a considerable number of men for service. Might have lost the war that way, or extended it for a few years, but it was possible.

The bottom line is still the same. Without significant cultural and political changes, far beyond those that actually occurred (and those were revolutionary in scope) and far beyond those sensible and required simply to meet a notional "100 division" goal, the U.S. was at the bottom of the manpower barrel.

I agree with you that the strategic situation would need to worsen drastically to force the US to go for a full wartime mobilisation. It is extremely unlikely under most imaginable circumstances, but certainly possible without major production loss of war material. In the almost peace conditions of the American homefront otl only actually using the POWs and interned people (altogether about 5-600 000 on US soil) for work is imaginable. Other measures (aside of using more women imaginable is for example drafting urban youth as seasonal harvest labourers, reactivating retirees large scale or ceasing the production of civilian clothing and other non-essentials almost entirely) would be hugely unpopular without feeling the pressure of war firsthand.

Regarding the difference between your numbers and mine: It seems your numbers give the total number of people serving at some time during the war, mine those active at the same time. The US did appearantly keep a lot of soldiers not for the entire duration in the armed forces. I heard it before and thought it was stupid. Never imagined this difference to be in the five million range though. If you want to compare, my numbers are from the Bicentennial Edition Part 1, the table on page 126. The pdf did not work for me, the zip did.

 

[Rich Rostrom]

That is only a rough estimate from incomplete information. Another way to estimate this is from all US combat material and supplies shipped overseas but not used by US Ground Forces. A conservative estimate for late 1944 falls out at about 15 divisions worth of 'stuff'. More is possible depending on how the numbers are interpreted.

Bottom line here is the US was fielding over 130 divisions, which is a lot closer to the 150 goal laid out in 1942 than the 89 official US Army divisions.

Also note that the US forces had many tank, artillery, and AA battalions attached to divisions. Add up all those attached battalions and it makes several more division equivalents.

A final point is US labor use had some large inefficencies through to the end. One of these was racist in nature. The Japanese descended population largely sat out the war in interment camps, contributing far less than they might have.

Only about half of Japanese-Americans were interned, IIRC. Those in Hawaii were not; nor any living east of the Rockies. The number interned was not large enough to affect the overall efficiency much.

African Americans were underused by the military and by industry. Many that could have moved to war related work were discouraged from that by riots, lynchings, and other violence and remained in marginal agricultural work.

Some - again not a large number. The biggest obstacle was white-only unions.

Latin Americans were recruited through some programs for military service and industrial work, but the programs left a large untapped pool both in the US and south of the border.

Hispanics were drafted just like anyone else. As for Mexicans - they weren't citizens and the U.S. didn't see any reason to recruit foreigners who didn't speak English. What use would they be?

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Overlay a map of Okinawa with the relevant area of Berlim, than compare numbers and duration. The island is about the size of the greater urban area of Berlin. If you take Iwo Jima, its about the size of the chancellery neighbourhood in Berlin. But the numbers involved, accelerated tempo of operations, and all the constraints of urban warfare, mean that the conditions the Russians faced in Berlin were way more "brutal" than those on the US island assaults. And remember that a wounded US soldier was rapidly transported to a properly equipped hospital ship. Yes Okinawa was brutal, for the Japanese. For the US it was about the level of action of any WW1 battle, with much better care and support.

The point is that if we had to choose an Army of WW2 to be an infantry man in, the US would be the smart choice, since the average GI was better taken care off and less likely to be asked to face impossible odds than any other army.

In the contest of the posts of BlairWitch749 & myself concerning "infantry" battles your posts make even less sense to me now. You seem to be addressing some other subject.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Rich...

Only about half of Japanese-Americans were interned, IIRC. Those in Hawaii were not; nor any living east of the Rockies. The number interned was not large enough to affect the overall efficiency much.

Not alone - true, the accumulated exclusion of non whites did create a fair number of underused labor/military aged males.

Some - again not a large number. The biggest obstacle was white-only unions.

That was part of the larger culture or racial dynamic. The unions policy reflected the culture they derived from.

Hispanics were drafted just like anyone else. As for Mexicans - they weren't citizens and the U.S. didn't see any reason to recruit foreigners who didn't speak English. What use would they be?

Industrial labor, particularly at the lowest skill levels. Beyond that the US equipped and supplied Brazilian, French, Chinese, Italian & other combat formations whos ranks had little knowledge of English. I dont remember why the proposal for a Mexican expeditionary force was not taken up. Some preparatory work was done, & a few token units were formed.

... it has been some years since I'd read on this subject & dont have much to refer to at hand, so I'm not able debate details. Possibly my reading was drawn from the same original sources as what yours draw from, that is the war time & post war studies of industrial mobilization and the data on males eligible for military service. The precise amount is likely open to interpretation, but I think we agree the US had a significantly larger proportion of underused labor & military aged males than most other nations.

 

[Barry Bull]

If you have data for that I'd like to have the source to compare with others. The US Army Green Book concerning the mobilization of the Ground Forces identifies the manpower problem as one of internal allocation and not of intake into the military, or the population at large.

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-Victory/USA-Victory-5.html

The problem lies in the tooth to tail ratio:

Wedemeyer's estimate of a total of 215 maneuver divisions and related supporting arms and services proved to be overly ambitious for the United States to manage. The nation indeed had sufficient manpower, for the Army eventually put almost exactly the eight million men of Wedemeyer's estimate into uniform. Instead, the problem lay in the division slice figure.

Wedemeyer had divided manpower between combat units and support units on the basis of the G-3 ratio of 1:1, figuring a 30,000-man division slice for each 15,000-man division. While that ratio might have been substantially correct for a World War I army that had approximately half of its total strength in ground combat soldiers, it was completely outmoded by 1941. A 1:1 proportion did not reflect the profound transformation of the battlefield caused by improved military technology that allowed Wedemeyer to plan for fewer, but more powerful, divisions to fight the war

One implication of the mechanization and modernization of warfare between 1919 and 1939 is that the significant growth in the absolute numbers of men under arms resulted in a relatively modest increase in rifle strength. Indeed, the size of the combatant ground force in the United Sates Army in World War II was not much greater than that fielded in World War I, although the total strength of the Army about doubled.

World War II divisions were smaller than their World War I counterparts, so the 89 divisions of 1945 had only 24 percent more manpower than the 58 divisions formed or forming by 1918--and actually fewer men in combat billets.3 Only about one-fourth of the 8-million-man Army in existence in March 1945 was combatant ground soldiers.4 The balance was the combat service and support forces necessary to administer and sustain an increasingly technical and mechanized Army.

 

[Barry Bull]

The bottom line is still the same. Without significant cultural and political changes, far beyond those that actually occurred (and those were revolutionary in scope) and far beyond those sensible and required simply to meet a notional "100 division" goal, the U.S. was at the bottom of the manpower barrel.

And too many people forget that a modern army has a very high tooth to tail ratio. Any attempt to increase combat strength need to solve the question of how to satisfy the corresponding need to increase the combat support strength.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-Victory/USA-Victory-5.html

The problem lies in the tooth to tail ratio:

Good one. HyperWar is one of the few online sources worth citing.

One of the lesser problems with the tooth to tail ratio is counting non divisional combat units as 'tail'. I've seen people set things like the independant tank battalions, tank destroyer battalions, or the corps artillery groups in the tail compartment. This is particularly in error when they were addressing T/T ratios below army level. This has been mentioned along the way in this thread, but I feel it is necessary to keep it in sight. It also connects to a over focus on the 'division' as the sole consideration. Counting the T/T ratio by corps will give a different number, as will counting it by regiment or brigade. To take this briefly to a higher level are air forces combat units counted as tooth, or as tail? Where do you place the men in the air groups, who took substantial casualties? There are probablly better ways to calculate or express this effect than Tooth to Tail but that is a different discussion I am not calling the HyperWar text as in error, but rather am observing I've seen a lot of people make that error.


While a 215 or 200 division army may have been less practical. It is true the US fielded the equipment and supply to sustain somewhere over 120 'divisions', and however you count it there was a unused or unrealized industrial capacity in the US. The 150 division plan remained in effect for some time & seems to have not been considered unrealistic. Its change to 120 divisions & then 100 seems to have more to do with expansion of the USAAF, and increasing naval forces. There was also a matter of lowered expectations. When the V plans were written the US Army had such quaint notions as the Germans used 12,000 tanks to overrun France in 1940, that they would eventually face over 150 German divisions in NW Europe, and the Red Army would require several years to regain its ability to launch large scale offensives. A lot changed by mid 1943 when Marshal decided 90 divisions would be the maximum.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Just for grins here is a question I've never taken the time to pick over, tho it has been on my mind for nearly a decade.

How many USAAF air wings, fighter or bomber, were the equivalent of a 1940s US Army division. That is in terms of some sort of combination of manpower, logistics requirements, and firepower.

 

[Flubber]

How many USAAF air wings, fighter or bomber, were the equivalent of a 1940s US Army division. That is in terms of some sort of combination of manpower, logistics requirements, and firepower.

Would Dupuy's QJM modeling be a place to start?

 

[Alamo]

Industrial labor, particularly at the lowest skill levels.

They did that, it was called the Bracero program. Large numbers of Mexican workers were brought in to free up American manpower.

Beyond that the US equipped and supplied Brazilian, French, Chinese, Italian & other combat formations whos ranks had little knowledge of English. I dont remember why the proposal for a Mexican expeditionary force was not taken up. Some preparatory work was done, & a few token units were formed.

Several factors. First off, beyond immediate concerns of hemisphere defense, the US felt that Mexico's energy could be better put to use developing its resources and factories. Development of railways, oil fields, mines, ect, were seen as being more useful to the Allied war effort, and this was probably the right call. Second, American-Mexican relations, while still immensely superior in 1943 than they had been just a few years before, were still a bit stressed. Defense co-operation was always somewhat problematic for the duration of the war. Third, the Mexican government seems to have been ambivalent to the idea of sending a large army expeditionary force overseas to fight the Axis. Last of all, the US didn't have indefinite military resources - while US planners seem to have viewed the arming of Latin America with modern weapons positively, when dispensing limited stocks of Lend-Lease arms, the Soviets, British, and various Free-Forces won out over Latin America.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Would Dupuy's QJM modeling be a place to start?

Probably, there is copy on my shelf.

Another starting point might be counting heads. If the 2.4 million man peak strength for the USAAF is accurate then using the 60,000 man 'division manpower slice' divides that out to the equivalent of 40 US Army divisions.

What I dont have at hand is a projected or planned size for the USAAF from 1941 to 1944 or beyond. Every source I've read is like the Hyper War text, they refer to ground combat divisions, but hardly mention the Air Force. By December 1941 there were just shy of 70 organized air groups in the USAAF. That more than tripled to 260 in late 1944, which divides out to 6.5 Groups for each 60,000 man increment. So, if these numbers are tolerably accurate the AAF added in equivalent of 30 ground divisions with its new air groups.

You can find a lot of remarks in the books about the planned manpower for ground combat forces being redirected to expand the AAF beyond the earlier plans, but it is harder to find details on what was planned & what the changes were. Was the manpower for five divisions redirected? Ten? Fifteen?

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

..
Several factors. First off, beyond immediate concerns of hemisphere defense, the US felt that Mexico's energy could be better put to use developing its resources and factories. ...
Second, American-Mexican relations, while still immensely superior in 1943 than they had been just a few years before, were still a bit stressed. ...
Third, the Mexican government seems to have been ambivalent to the idea of sending a large army expeditionary force overseas to fight the Axis.

The politics may have been as important here as anything else. Thanks for this. Any books on this subject?

 

[AdA]

In the contest of the posts of BlairWitch749 & myself concerning "infantry" battles your posts make even less sense to me now. You seem to be addressing some other subject.

I was trying to put Blair's comment about the US having had "brutal conditions" in Italy in context. My post was meant as "brutal compared to what?"
US command generally managed, to their credit, to put their soldiers in far less brutal conditions than what other nations soldiers had to face.

 

[fscott]

I was trying to put Blair's comment about the US having had "brutal conditions" in Italy in context. My post was meant as "brutal compared to what?"
US command generally managed, to their credit, to put their soldiers in far less brutal conditions than what other nations soldiers had to face.

After the carnage of the civil war the US has tried to give better conditions to it solders. We preferred to overrun, in both materials and manpower, the enemy when ever possible.

 

[AdA]

After the carnage of the civil war the US has tried to give better conditions to it solders. We preferred to overrun, in both materials and manpower, the enemy when ever possible.

And that was the right choice. What I find puzzling is why most US POV comments avoid bragging about how good the US Army was at fighting battles their way, protecting and caring for their troops, and rather try to ignore that and just prove that the GI were just as macho as any Russian front veteran.
It reminds me of that Monty Phyton gag were a bunch of milionaires complain about how poor they were when young.

 

[Dathi THorfinnsson]

The numbers I saw suggested that the Brits managed a 'tooth to tail' ratio of about 1:1. Why was it possible for them and not the US? Or am I comparing apples and oranges?

 

[katchen]

How many more "braceros" could the US have recruited from Mexico to replace drafted industrial wokers? Could more braceros be recruited from other Latin American countries such as Cuba, the Central American nations, Dominican Republic, Colombia, ect.? Could a more forceful draft enforcement on African Americans in the South freed up more African Americans to fight, lynchings and Klan terror or no? If so, how many?

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

And that was the right choice. What I find puzzling is why most US POV comments avoid bragging about how good the US Army was at fighting battles their way, ....
It reminds me of that Monty Phyton gag were a bunch of milionaires complain about how poor they were when young.

Reminds me of the argument made the German army was better because they suffer higher casualites per capita

 

[AdA]

Reminds me of the argument made the German army was better because they suffer higher casualites per capita

What?
Who would say that?