L’Aigle Triomphant: A Napoleonic Victory TL

This hits the nail on the head… what Austria is up to here is more about gamesmanship to make sure A) their interests in Germany are protected and B) to make Francis feel important rather than impotent. And if said gamesmanship chips away at the Franco-Russian detente? All the better.

To quote from the Russian classic of the XIX century “how to turn a losing enterprise into a profitable one without making any changes in it”. Or, as in “An elephant and a pug” (the pug barking at an elephant explains her behavior): “without any fight I can get reputation of being very brave”😂
To say nothing of the fact that the worsening situation in the Spanish Americas for Britain makes landing even a token force in Italy a huge difficulty
I was trying to be nice to the Brits but even in that overly optimistic scenario a practical British help with the troops would be too small and too unreliable to be seriously counted upon by the Austrians (who, after all, are reasonably sane and pragmatic). And a little adventure vs. the Ottomans, especially with the Russian help, is a reasonably low risk war with a distinct possibility to get at least the token but possibly even valuable gains.
 
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Russia getting involved in Germany (Baltic league, Oldenburg getting bigger, Prussia as quasi-protectorate) and Austria seeking to sow discontent there seems a recipe for a French-Russian showdown in Germany/Western Poland. Which is probably much more beneficial to France then a full Russian invasion to which we know the results OTL.
 
Russia getting involved in Germany (Baltic league, Oldenburg getting bigger, Prussia as quasi-protectorate) and Austria seeking to sow discontent there seems a recipe for a French-Russian showdown in Germany/Western Poland.

Well, not necessarily. In OTL the “triggering items” for Alexander were:
(a) Oldenburg - due to the history going back to CII and territorial swap with Denmark Alexander considered Oldenburg as some kind of the Russian protectorate which he has a right to inherit if the current Duke dies without an issue. As a result, Napoleon’s annexation of the Duchy was considered as a direct affront to which he publicly complained (to Napoleon’s irritation). Of course, in OTL the Duchy was completely surrounded by the French territories and the Duke was offered Erfurt as a compensation but this is besides the point. In this TL annexation is not happening and the item is out.
(b) Polish question. At some point an agreement was reached that Napoleon would not allow restoration of “Poland” but at the last moment Napoleon backed off proposing a formula by which he would not help creation of such a state, which did not satisfy Alexander. Second item in OTL was excessive militarization if the Duchy, which is not happening in this TL and the issue of the future Polish state is not being touched along the lines I mentioned.
(c) Prussia - Napoleon promised to remove most of the French troops from Prussia but kept inventing excuses for not doing so. Not happening in this TL.
(d) CS - Alexander’s position was that he is doing enough by abolishing a direct trade with Britain and that Peace if Tilsit does not mention the protocols related to the CS. He also pointed out that Napoleon himself leaves certain loopholes for France. Nappy was insisting … actually, it is not quite clear what exactly he was insisting upon because at the time in question the diplomatic talks had been just a cover-up for the French concentration on Russian border. The issue does not exist in this TL.

Which is probably much more beneficial to France then a full Russian invasion to which we know the results OTL.
Political maneuvering does not necessarily results in a war because the serious reasons are pretty much absent. The Baltic League is a mutually-accepted Russian sphere of interest which is beneficial for Napoleon because it secures generally anti-British status of the region without him spending any resources and the participants are doing this on their free will.

Austria is intriguing to keep itself relevant (as @KingSweden24 stated) but it does not have a carrot to propose as an argument for creation of a new coalition and those, potentially, willing to join are of no big help. Anyway, for prestige sake Austria always can start a war with the Ottomans.
 
Don't get me wrong, I'm all in favor of Napoleon making marginally better decisions overall, but it's still Napoleon in the end and at some point, some less than ideal measures are going to be taken (at least I except it in this TL, maybe I'll be proven wrong).

Regarding your very detailed points (thanks for that by the way):
a) Agreed. It's one point of contention less for Alexander. But it could become one for Napoleon no? If he's prevented from meddling into the affairs of this member of the Confederacy of the Rhine because of the Oldenburg-Russia link, this might become annoying for him. (not enough for a war on its own, but could be part of a combination of factors).

b) Agreed as well. If I understood the TL well, Davout isn't put in charge in the Grand-Duchy but instead it's Poniatowsky right? So we're assuming that the militarization isn't taking place ITTL. Is it just because of the absence of Davout or because Napoleon gave different orders?

c) Why are French troops not occupying Prussia?

d) TTL version of the CS surely is more palatable to Russia so I agree here, it's not an issue that could lead to armed confrontation between France and Russia.
 
Don't get me wrong, I'm all in favor of Napoleon making marginally better decisions overall, but it's still Napoleon in the end and at some point, some less than ideal measures are going to be taken (at least I except it in this TL, maybe I'll be proven wrong).

Regarding your very detailed points (thanks for that by the way):
a) Agreed. It's one point of contention less for Alexander. But it could become one for Napoleon no? If he's prevented from meddling into the affairs of this member of the Confederacy of the Rhine because of the Oldenburg-Russia link, this might become annoying for him. (not enough for a war on its own, but could be part of a combination of factors).

Probably “meddling” would be OK with everybody if Oldenburg is a member of the Confederacy of the Rhine: this is agreed upon French sphere of influence. Alexander was not objecting to the OTL “meddling”, including demand to send troops for campaign against Austria and presence of the French officials on the Duchy territory, until it turned to be an annexation. And annexation, even with the offered compensation, was formally important because of his theoretical rights to Oldenburg territory giving Alexander a good excuse for making international noises based on seemingly solid ground: him being deprived of his legitimate inheritance. Of course, this was just an excuse because Alexander was pissed of with Napoleon and Peace of Tilsit. In this TL A-N relations are much more cordial, Oldenburg is not annexed and some other “items” are absent as well.


b) Agreed as well. If I understood the TL well, Davout isn't put in charge in the Grand-Duchy but instead it's Poniatowsky right? So we're assuming that the militarization isn't taking place ITTL. Is it just because of the absence of Davout or because Napoleon gave different orders?

Probably both. Davout was extremely dedicated to implementing Napoleon’s orders and, being (notwithstanding his unappealing personality) a very capable person, proceed with the task with his usual dedication and absence of criticism. Well, to get fair, pretty much none of the French marshals had been thinking about political implications of their actions on the territories they had been sent to administer. I’m not sure if Napoleon explicitly defined a desired size of the Duchy’s army but we can be sure that Davout had been squeezing as much as he could.

With Poniatowsky in charge of the process, it can be expected that he is going to pay a greater attention to the economic situation in the Duchy with a resulting smaller army which is not going to be a cause of the Russian irritation.

c) Why are French troops not occupying Prussia?

AFAIK, the issue was a degree of the French military presence on the Prussian territory. Alexander did not object against the French garrisons in some strategic places but in OTL Napoleon kept moving more French troops East of the Oder and Alexander objected to this while Napoleon insisted that because Prussia is his ally he has a complete freedom of action on its territory. In this TL situation does not exist.

d) TTL version of the CS surely is more palatable to Russia so I agree here, it's not an issue that could lead to armed confrontation between France and Russia.
Actually, TTL version is more palatable to everybody except the Brits and this provides a generally greater pro-Napoleonic sentiment than one existing in OTL. Which, in turn, makes Napoleon less sensitive to the diplomatic pinpricks lessening a need of a violent reaction. The same goes other way around: Alexander is in a much better position domestically and internationally and does not have to invent reason for confrontation as a way to maintain his prestige.
 
What is the exact status of the CS ITTL?

If I understand it correctly, it's a prohibition of British commerce (British ships are not allowed into ports of CS members) but not of British goods that can still be transported by third countries vessels (like the US).

Are those goods still subject to tarriffs once they arrive? I would suspect they are but I'm not sure at this stage.

I was always wondering what would have happened if the Continental system was or evolved into a "proto-Zollverein", that is a customs union with Common external tarriffs and free-trade between its members (at least gradually on a set of products).
After all, some of the thinkers of the OTL Zollverein are already on the scene and actually on Napoleon's side, like Has Graf von Bülow, finance minister of Westphalia between 1808-1810

On top of being more palatable to everybody except the Brits, a Continental system that would evolved into a Customs union could also have the advantage of increasing economic activity between all CS members , and actually tie them more strongly together (with the exception of Russia that I see leaving the CS anyway).
 
What is the exact status of the CS ITTL?

If I understand it correctly, it's a prohibition of British commerce (British ships are not allowed into ports of CS members) but not of British goods that can still be transported by third countries vessels (like the US).

Are those goods still subject to tarriffs once they arrive? I would suspect they are but I'm not sure at this stage.

I was always wondering what would have happened if the Continental system was or evolved into a "proto-Zollverein", that is a customs union with Common external tarriffs and free-trade between its members (at least gradually on a set of products).
After all, some of the thinkers of the OTL Zollverein are already on the scene and actually on Napoleon's side, like Has Graf von Bülow, finance minister of Westphalia between 1808-1810

On top of being more palatable to everybody except the Brits, a Continental system that would evolved into a Customs union could also have the advantage of increasing economic activity between all CS members , and actually tie them more strongly together (with the exception of Russia that I see leaving the CS anyway).
Popularity of the schema you are talking about would depend upon the balance of imports/exports for each specific country.

In a long term it may benefit most of the countries involved by minimizing British dominance in the area of manufactured goods: high import tariffs on them would make local manufacturing more competitive (of course, long term benefit does not automatically mean immediate popularity). A serious “niche” are the colonial goods because no matter who is transporting them Britain remains the main supplier.

Short term problem is an immediate shortage of the manufactured goods because neither France nor any other members of this union have a developed industry allowing to fill this niche.

Russia was not leaving CS: tariff of 1810 was actually implementation of the schema described in this TL (usage of the neutral ships) with an extra spit into Napoleon’s face: high import tariff on the luxury good carried by land (aka, French imports). But Russia was something of a special case being much more of an exporter than importer. It had a positive trade balance with Britain (consumer of the “strategic materials” needed for the navy) and negative with France (supplier of the “luxury items”). Britain was important mostly as a supplier of the colonial goods (consumed only by the well-off people) and as a carrier of the goods to the third parties (with British imports/exports amounting to approximately 20-30% of a total volume of trade, more than 60% of the volume had been carried by the British ships) and in the second capacity it could be replaced by the 3rd parties (if they have carrying capacities). But as far as state income is involved the custom dues amounted only to 10-13% and could be easily compensated by growing domestic manufacturing (as happened in OTL).

Probably similar considerations has to be applied to other countries to evaluate feasibility of the common market schema. Free trade is a nice slogan when you are selling more than you are buying but otherwise it may ruin your economy.
 
Wouldn't mind to see where this was going... :)
Me neither! Unfortunately, and ironically since this is probably the one of my 3 TLs with the most engagement, it’s also the one I suffer the most writers block on. Perhaps I should just pants it and see where the chips fall
 
Me neither! Unfortunately, and ironically since this is probably the one of my 3 TLs with the most engagement, it’s also the one I suffer the most writers block on. Perhaps I should just pants it and see where the chips fall
To quote, “let’s just get into the fight and we’ll see what will transpire!” 😂

Seriously, you stopped at the point with the many possible divergences so you can make a number of “bifurcations” (sub-timelines) covering various options ( I read once a book written this way (by the end of a chapter there were few questions and based upon the answers author recommended to go to one of the following chapters). Some of them will die from the natural causes but there can be more than one survivor.

This takes care of the “second thoughts” and a need to do the retroactive changes (confusing everybody) or to stick to a line which you’d rather reconsider than continue. Just indicate a bifurcation point and proceed with a new idea.
 
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To quote, “let’s just get into the fight and we’ll see what will transpire!” 😂

Seriously, you stopped at the point with the many possible divergences so you can make a number of “bifurcations” (sub-timelines) covering various options ( I read once a book written this way (by the end of a chapter there were few questions and based upon the answers author recommended to go to one of the following chapters). Some of them will die from the natural causes but there can be more than one survivor.

This takes care of the “second thoughts” and a need to do the retroactive changes (confusing everybody) or to stick to a line which you’d rather reconsider than continue. Just indicate a bifurcation point and proceed with a new idea.
Ha there’s a thought… my style is always more just to throw random twists in to entertain myself and then deal with the repercussions later.

Feels more true to how history itself works, too, and prevents me from getting bogged down by long term planning…
 
Ha there’s a thought… my style is always more just to throw random twists in to entertain myself and then deal with the repercussions later.

Feels more true to how history itself works, too, and prevents me from getting bogged down by long term planning…
I’m just offering an easy way of dealing with the “repercussions” based upon combination of the Incas quipu, Russian notion of “unpredictable past” and MMV (*). You see a problem, just make a change in what you wrote and keep going from there.


________
(*) Most Modern View - based upon the opinion of some modern professional historians that the new versions of a history are correct by the virtue of being recent, the MMV assumes that any crap that you wrote is even more correct by the virtue of being written right now.

😂😂😂
 
I’m just offering an easy way of dealing with the “repercussions” based upon combination of the Incas quipu, Russian notion of “unpredictable past” and MMV (*). You see a problem, just make a change in what you wrote and keep going from there.


________
(*) Most Modern View - based upon the opinion of some modern professional historians that the new versions of a history are correct by the virtue of being recent, the MMV assumes that any crap that you wrote is even more correct by the virtue of being written right now.

😂😂😂
If nothing else it’s a great justification for retcons haha
 
Sunk Cost Fallacy
Sunk Cost Fallacy

"...let it be clear, His Majesty's Government intends to continue to pursue the current policies with regards to affairs both on the Continent as well as in the Spanish Americas, and there are few if any circumstances short of the terms presented at Wismar by myself being accepted by the Corsican and his regime that would reverse such a course by Cabinet..."

- George Canning, maiden speech to the Commons after becoming First Lord of the Treasury


Historians would, for decades, debate the course that Britain pursued in the first half of the 1810s and the direct effect it had on ending what is today known as the "Second British Empire," or the British colonial empire as it was constituted after the Revolution in North America severed the 13 colonies from London. Numerous paths to acknowledge reality - utter defeat by every possible coalition partner in Europe and their subsequent alienation from London through an array of economic and diplomatic missteps, the ascendance of French hegemony in Western Europe in combination with a grand detente achieved with Russia over Central and Eastern Europe, and finally the disastrous and ever-costly interventions in the Spanish Empire - were presented to Britain over the course of several years, and at every opportunity the government refused to see reason and take them.

Part of the reason was the increasing madness of George III, which had rendered the King mostly confined to his various estates and his namesake son the Prince Regent. George, Prince of Wales, could have made for a fine sovereign if the war were going well and Britain was pressing her advantages; as it were, his spendthrift style and many personal and financial scandals alienated him from the populace and made his rule both as regent for his father and later as king hideously unpopular. His presaging over the decline of Britain's influence in Europe over a twenty year period is remembered remarkably poorly. Stubborn as he was, the Prince Regent encouraged his government to press Britain's case on, viewing Napoleon no longer as a nuisance as he had been in the 1790s but now an existential threat to British commerce on the continent. Nevermind that it was Russia that had now blocked British commercial activity from the Baltic almost entirely, nor that Spain was so furious at the British Fernandine Gambit and Portugal so contemptuous of the Braganza court in Rio de Janeiro that every port in Iberia was closed to British ships; France held a unique position in the paranoid British mind.

It further complicated matters that Britain had sunk so much time, treasure and blood into casting off "that damned Corsican," as the Prime Minister Spencer Perceval called him on the floor of the Commons mere days before his assassination by a desperate and angry day-laborer, that now London could not retreat without threatening a full revolution. To admit defeat now, after the sacrifices made, with Britons starving in the streets and debt mounting? No, that would be to invite revolution! And so more men were impressed for the Navy ships that scoured the ocean waves hunting for French vessels, with the possibility of carrying out close blockades on anything but French naval ports all but impossible in the post-Continental System era, and even more men recruited to be dispatched to the slow-rolling disaster on the Spanish Main.

If canny observers of British politics of the time had thought that Perceval's shocking murder would cause a course correction, they were even more stunned that it seemed only to cause a redoubling. This was thanks to Canning, the architect of Britain's foreign policy, taking his place as head of government, narrowly beating out Lord Liverpool for the job but causing a raft of resignations from his Cabinet among prominent statesmen who disliked his person that it nearly brought the whole government down within weeks of his kissing hands with Prince George. The "Two Georges," they were caricatured as, trying desperately to swim against the tide.

The tide, as it were, in the Americas was blood red - the red of actual blood on the red uniforms of British soldiers. Venezuela was lost and the local junta had nearly driven every last British soldier fighting on "behalf" of the "true king Ferdinand" from La Plata. New Spain was the crown jewel, where peasant armies led by the preacher Miguel Hidalgo had marched on the cities and captured much of the countryside in partnership with the local criollo military class; Ferdinand was in power only thanks to a battalion of Spanish loyalists who had voluntarily exiled themselves from Europe and the peninsulare aristocracy that sat in the capital at Mexico. That the Canning government elected to redouble their efforts to prop up their vassal in Ferdinand despite the costs two years of intervention by early 1813 had cost them stands as one of the great foreign policy blunders in history; whatever leverage they thought they may have earned with the court in Madrid was nonexistent, especially as Charles IV of Spain aged and a subset of fiercely Anglophobic advisors emerged who if anything encouraged a harder, more resolute line on the colonial question than their King or his French allies.

The only genuine success, if it can even be called that, of the Canning era was continuing to mollify an instinctively pro-French administration in America's James Madison, who having survived a closer than expected reelection had more wiggle room to cool the rhetoric with Britain and avoid a war, despite a number of small indignities. The United States, unhappy at the ever-growing British presence in New Spain, needed to be kept satisfied and so American shipping through Europe was one of the few to be unrestricted by Britain, creating a new economic boom for ports like Boston, New Haven and New York as the young democracy reintegrated her economy with that of the emerging European capitalist system...
 

Deleted member 143920

Sunk Cost Fallacy

"...let it be clear, His Majesty's Government intends to continue to pursue the current policies with regards to affairs both on the Continent as well as in the Spanish Americas, and there are few if any circumstances short of the terms presented at Wismar by myself being accepted by the Corsican and his regime that would reverse such a course by Cabinet..."

- George Canning, maiden speech to the Commons after becoming First Lord of the Treasury


Historians would, for decades, debate the course that Britain pursued in the first half of the 1810s and the direct effect it had on ending what is today known as the "Second British Empire," or the British colonial empire as it was constituted after the Revolution in North America severed the 13 colonies from London. Numerous paths to acknowledge reality - utter defeat by every possible coalition partner in Europe and their subsequent alienation from London through an array of economic and diplomatic missteps, the ascendance of French hegemony in Western Europe in combination with a grand detente achieved with Russia over Central and Eastern Europe, and finally the disastrous and ever-costly interventions in the Spanish Empire - were presented to Britain over the course of several years, and at every opportunity the government refused to see reason and take them.

Part of the reason was the increasing madness of George III, which had rendered the King mostly confined to his various estates and his namesake son the Prince Regent. George, Prince of Wales, could have made for a fine sovereign if the war were going well and Britain was pressing her advantages; as it were, his spendthrift style and many personal and financial scandals alienated him from the populace and made his rule both as regent for his father and later as king hideously unpopular. His presaging over the decline of Britain's influence in Europe over a twenty year period is remembered remarkably poorly. Stubborn as he was, the Prince Regent encouraged his government to press Britain's case on, viewing Napoleon no longer as a nuisance as he had been in the 1790s but now an existential threat to British commerce on the continent. Nevermind that it was Russia that had now blocked British commercial activity from the Baltic almost entirely, nor that Spain was so furious at the British Fernandine Gambit and Portugal so contemptuous of the Braganza court in Rio de Janeiro that every port in Iberia was closed to British ships; France held a unique position in the paranoid British mind.

It further complicated matters that Britain had sunk so much time, treasure and blood into casting off "that damned Corsican," as the Prime Minister Spencer Perceval called him on the floor of the Commons mere days before his assassination by a desperate and angry day-laborer, that now London could not retreat without threatening a full revolution. To admit defeat now, after the sacrifices made, with Britons starving in the streets and debt mounting? No, that would be to invite revolution! And so more men were impressed for the Navy ships that scoured the ocean waves hunting for French vessels, with the possibility of carrying out close blockades on anything but French naval ports all but impossible in the post-Continental System era, and even more men recruited to be dispatched to the slow-rolling disaster on the Spanish Main.

If canny observers of British politics of the time had thought that Perceval's shocking murder would cause a course correction, they were even more stunned that it seemed only to cause a redoubling. This was thanks to Canning, the architect of Britain's foreign policy, taking his place as head of government, narrowly beating out Lord Liverpool for the job but causing a raft of resignations from his Cabinet among prominent statesmen who disliked his person that it nearly brought the whole government down within weeks of his kissing hands with Prince George. The "Two Georges," they were caricatured as, trying desperately to swim against the tide.

The tide, as it were, in the Americas was blood red - the red of actual blood on the red uniforms of British soldiers. Venezuela was lost and the local junta had nearly driven every last British soldier fighting on "behalf" of the "true king Ferdinand" from La Plata. New Spain was the crown jewel, where peasant armies led by the preacher Miguel Hidalgo had marched on the cities and captured much of the countryside in partnership with the local criollo military class; Ferdinand was in power only thanks to a battalion of Spanish loyalists who had voluntarily exiled themselves from Europe and the peninsulare aristocracy that sat in the capital at Mexico. That the Canning government elected to redouble their efforts to prop up their vassal in Ferdinand despite the costs two years of intervention by early 1813 had cost them stands as one of the great foreign policy blunders in history; whatever leverage they thought they may have earned with the court in Madrid was nonexistent, especially as Charles IV of Spain aged and a subset of fiercely Anglophobic advisors emerged who if anything encouraged a harder, more resolute line on the colonial question than their King or his French allies.

The only genuine success, if it can even be called that, of the Canning era was continuing to mollify an instinctively pro-French administration in America's James Madison, who having survived a closer than expected reelection had more wiggle room to cool the rhetoric with Britain and avoid a war, despite a number of small indignities. The United States, unhappy at the ever-growing British presence in New Spain, needed to be kept satisfied and so American shipping through Europe was one of the few to be unrestricted by Britain, creating a new economic boom for ports like Boston, New Haven and New York as the young democracy reintegrated her economy with that of the emerging European capitalist system...

Great update!

But not much news from nappy... will there be a final coalition war? Or will Britain be compelled to make peace?
 
Just read the whole timeline and all I can say is that I'm in love with it!
Napoleon is a figure that I always held with deep interest because of him having this huge underdog vibe due to his origins and going off against overwhelming odds(although Britain might have been the underdog when, you know, Naps threw the whole continent at her). That's not to say he didnt do his fair share of awful things and mistakes, in fact I might be a direct result of this, it was his invasion of Spain that led to my family coming to my country, which makes me wonder...
Seeing this "smarter" Napoleon, it kinda makes me want to root for him, ya know? Not sure if that's a good thing considering what I just said :p but I like his character very much here, so prompts to the author for that, you're nailing the guy. Though that also makes me question where I would in this world or if he was a OTL Naps, would I be butterflied away? Would I be spanish? Who knows.

All I can say is...TAKE DAT BRITAIN! YO PERFAIT ALBANIAN.

With this said, I have a more serious question about TTL Bonaparte I would like to ask you if that's alright:

Did his change of mindset affects his previous actions?

i
know this might sound stupid considering the POD of this timeline happens long after he became emperor, in Spain, and dont get me wrong I'm aware the guy is still far from a lawful good goody two shoes, however considering Naps here has a few divergent personality traits from his OTL counterpart it makes me question if his ascension went the same way. Did everything go about the same as IOTL? Or did he handle things during his academic life and during the revolution differently due to these small but significative tweaks on his character? Perhaps with more restraint or dealing with things in a more thoughtful manner, I dunno.
I'm aware that even if the later was the case it doesnt change anything you have writen so far about the events post-POD, if anything it probably went about the same up till that point, but I think it's a interesting possibility.
Besides, it's free prequel material!
Ops, inner George Lucas speaking, sorry not sorry. :p
 
Really enjoyed the TL, will be watching it with great interest to see where this goes.

Oh and fun fact, while the Portuguese court was exiled in Brazil, they did a number of conquests like French Guyana and Cisplatina (AKA Uruguay) the fact that the Brazilian elites and population support the royal family there because they opened trade and industrialization and modernization of the colony made it the regional power, now that we see that the Portuguese aren't returning any time soon, could we see them actually holding on to these conquests?
 
Now that we see that the Portuguese aren't returning any time soon, could we see them actually holding on to these conquests?
I mean, Dom João then Pedro I & II with no interruption in the succession line or the treasury being taken to Portugal? I call this a Brazil wank!
 
I mean, Dom João then Pedro I & II with no interruption in the succession line or the treasury being taken to Portugal? I call this a Brazil wank!
Yep, with Spanish America fighting themselves, civil wars and the British Invaders, Brazil can will take areas they feel they could take and now that they have a whole wave of Portuguese fleeing the homeland along with the inteligensia and the treasury, they're bound to do very well in this chaos.
 
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