L’Aigle Triomphant: A Napoleonic Victory TL

Returning Hanover isn't a bad move for Napoleon, it's more like a hostage than a beachhead.
Britain acts up? troops move back into Hanover, an increased garrison becomes more men to lose.
 
what's the situation with French navy?
Napoleon’s post-Trafalgar rebuilding program is still underway (30 ships of the line I believe from my brief research) and not having to fight Spain/Austria in 1808-09 has helped divert resources to that

Still not ready to face off with the RN yet, though
 
Returning Hanover isn't a bad move for Napoleon, it's more like a hostage than a beachhead.
Britain acts up? troops move back into Hanover, an increased garrison becomes more men to lose.
While this is true, Napoleon has already made too many smart, gracious and forward-thinking geopolitical moves in this TL so a rebalancing with one of his rash, personal pique head scratchers was overdue
 
While this is true, Napoleon has already made too many smart, gracious and forward-thinking geopolitical moves in this TL so a rebalancing with one of his rash, personal pique head scratchers was overdue
But look at this from a different perspective (aka one of the contemporaries caught between the two sides (*) ): Napoleon made the 1st step proposing the negotiations. The Brits answered with an offer which is plain unreasonable because it gives them pretty much everything in return for very little. When they received a counter-offer which, understandably, also was was unbalanced, they stopped negotiations. Looks like the Brits did not want to negotiate seriously. Of course, it could be argued that Napoleon may not react to the British step as fast as he did but if the other side refuses to negotiate then what can be achieved by inaction?

Now, what Nappy could do realistically was to abolish the existing limitations on the 3rd party ships (if Jefferson’s embargo is already in place this would hit it really hard) by allowing them to carry whatever cargo they want (in OTL those carrying the British goods could be confiscated). This would achieve few goals:
(a) The Brits are being excluded from the transit trade, which was a big part of their business activities. Of course, it does not directly hurt its manufacturing but, with the limitations which Britain imposed, the British-produced goods became more costly and can be sold in the lesser volume. The same goes for the imports: the raw materials became more costly.
(b) Continental Europe is getting their imports-exports even if in a lower volume, which keeps growing.
(c) There is in avoidable British-American conflict because the Americans are picking up the British business (both trade and manufacturing) and are hiring the British seamen

_______
(*) And mine as not being sympathetic to either Nappy or Brits, which presumably qualifies me a “objective” (well….. 😜).
 
But look at this from a different perspective (aka one of the contemporaries caught between the two sides (*) ): Napoleon made the 1st step proposing the negotiations. The Brits answered with an offer which is plain unreasonable because it gives them pretty much everything in return for very little. When they received a counter-offer which, understandably, also was was unbalanced, they stopped negotiations. Looks like the Brits did not want to negotiate seriously. Of course, it could be argued that Napoleon may not react to the British step as fast as he did but if the other side refuses to negotiate then what can be achieved by inaction?

Now, what Nappy could do realistically was to abolish the existing limitations on the 3rd party ships (if Jefferson’s embargo is already in place this would hit it really hard) by allowing them to carry whatever cargo they want (in OTL those carrying the British goods could be confiscated). This would achieve few goals:
(a) The Brits are being excluded from the transit trade, which was a big part of their business activities. Of course, it does not directly hurt its manufacturing but, with the limitations which Britain imposed, the British-produced goods became more costly and can be sold in the lesser volume. The same goes for the imports: the raw materials became more costly.
(b) Continental Europe is getting their imports-exports even if in a lower volume, which keeps growing.
(c) There is in avoidable British-American conflict because the Americans are picking up the British business (both trade and manufacturing) and are hiring the British seamen

_______
(*) And mine as not being sympathetic to either Nappy or Brits, which presumably qualifies me a “objective” (well….. 😜).
Certainly true - the Wager of Wismar certainly has plenty of upside to Nappy once Canning showed that the British request was unserious.

My thinking was more that Napoleon isn’t going to look at Hanover as a chip to be bargained or taken hostage - he just doesn’t want to give Britain a potential landing site to link up with Continental allies. In that sense, it’s coldly rational, even if his choice is made in a moment of pique
 
Returning Hanover isn't a bad move for Napoleon, it's more like a hostage than a beachhead.
Britain acts up? troops move back into Hanover, an increased garrison becomes more men to lose.
That’s true but:
(a) The Brits wanted it in exchange for pretty much nothing (not even limiting naval presence in the Channel).
(b) With the potential future war elsewhere, why provide the Brits with a big “beachhead” which they are going to use at the most inconvenient moment?
(c) With the peace talks not going anywhere, wouldn’t it be better to use this territory as a reward to the loyal or at least useful personages?
 
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Certainly true - the Wager of Wismar certainly has plenty of upside to Nappy once Canning showed that the British request was unserious.

And Nappy, as initiator of the peace talks, is getting at least some credit for trying. The Brits look unwilling to negotiate and arrogant much more than their situation warrants.

Of course, if the domestic pressure in Britain mountains (with Nappy being more creative with the neutral shipping this can easily be the case), the talks can be resumed but Hanover as a bargaining item is not on the table (and at least up to some degree Alexander has to be pleased with Oldenburg part; in the case of the future negotiations it can be left to his discretion creating an “interesting” situation for the Brits).
My thinking was more that Napoleon isn’t going to look at Hanover as a chip to be bargained or taken hostage - he just doesn’t want to give Britain a potential landing site to link up with Continental allies. In that sense, it’s coldly rational, even if his choice is made in a moment of pique
The great minds (yours, mine and Napoleon’s) are thinking alike. Notice that while Nappy may make his choice out of irritation, the two of us had been, as you so eloquently put it, “coldly rational”. 😂
 
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Napoleon’s post-Trafalgar rebuilding program is still underway (30 ships of the line I believe from my brief research) and not having to fight Spain/Austria in 1808-09 has helped divert resources to that

Still not ready to face off with the RN yet, though
IIRC, they played some limited role during Walchern campaign but definitely not ready for a major action. The main problem would be experience which is hard to get without going to the open. Then, again, what was their strategic role? Nappy was rebuilding the navy but was he ever clear on how he is planning to use it?
 
IIRC, they played some limited role during Walchern campaign but definitely not ready for a major action. The main problem would be experience which is hard to get without going to the open. Then, again, what was their strategic role? Nappy was rebuilding the navy but was he ever clear on how he is planning to use it?
I think he WANTED to perform a 19th century Sea Mammal (hence the large army kept on the shores of the Channel); such a campaign would have been virtually impossible, of course.

Breaking/diminishing British sea hegemony was probably the more realistic goal
 
Napoleon’s post-Trafalgar rebuilding program is still underway (30 ships of the line I believe from my brief research) and not having to fight Spain/Austria in 1808-09 has helped divert resources to that

Still not ready to face off with the RN yet, though
Or ever really.
 
I think he WANTED to perform a 19th century Sea Mammal (hence the large army kept on the shores of the Channel); such a campaign would have been virtually impossible, of course.

Breaking/diminishing British sea hegemony was probably the more realistic goal
Indeed. The pre-Trafalgar invasion plan had been abandoned even before Trafalgar and even by that time it was clear that the French navy can’t stand up to the Brits in a major battle. The whole move was a mistake and, IIRC, the Spanish admiral proposed to stay in Cadiz where the Spanish-French fleet would have a better chance.

But intensive privateering and raiding could bother the Brits enough to start reallocating at least some resources and add to their attrition. If France has some fast heavy frigates (like USS Constitution) then they potentially cause enough trouble where it matters (British Caribbean islands with their plantations) for the Brits start getting concerned with the losses (landing and burning plantations would be bad enough and intercepting the British merchants sailing across the Atlantic would hurt as well) and perhaps soften their position. Of course, these frigates would need at least some reliable local bases to keep them in a good condition.

If these operations are successful enough and, combined with the Baltic League of Neutrality, care causing enough financial losses (to those who do matter in Britain) then the British physical hegemony on the seas becomes less valuable then expected.

In such a scenario the main French fleet is important mostly by the fact of its presence, forcing the Brits to keep a bigger force guarding the Channel, just in case.

BTW, with the flax, hemp (and related products) coming mostly from Russia, a big part of iron from Russia and Sweden and a lot of timber from Russia, how “neutrality” thing may impact Britain in the long term? Carrying timber from Canada would be more costly (and the lumber industry has to be set up) and creating the brand new flax and hemp producing agriculture across the Atlantic also could not happen overnight. HMS Victory was built in 1765 Royal Sovereign - in 1786 and as I understand many other ships also had been quite old. The British frigates engaged against the US coast were, AFAIK, in a rather bad shape because they had to stay in the open sea for the long periods while their counterparts, besides being generally heavier and better build, had been operating from the nearby ports. So, with a considerable attrition and shrinking abilities to replace the losses and “tear and wear”, the British government may be more eager to look for a realistic peace.
 
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Indeed. The pre-Trafalgar invasion plan had been abandoned even before Trafalgar and even by that time it was clear that the French navy can’t stand up to the Brits in a major battle. The whole move was a mistake and, IIRC, the Spanish admiral proposed to stay in Cadiz where the Spanish-French fleet would have a better chance.

But intensive privateering and raiding could bother the Brits enough to start reallocating at least some resources and add to their attrition. If France has some fast heavy frigates (like USS Constitution) then they potentially cause enough trouble where it matters (British Caribbean islands with their plantations) for the Brits start getting concerned with the losses (landing and burning plantations would be bad enough and intercepting the British merchants sailing across the Atlantic would hurt as well) and perhaps soften their position. Of course, these frigates would need at least some reliable local bases to keep them in a good condition.

If these operations are successful enough and, combined with the Baltic League of Neutrality, care causing enough financial losses (to those who do matter in Britain) then the British physical hegemony on the seas becomes less valuable then expected.

In such a scenario the main French fleet is important mostly by the fact of its presence, forcing the Brits to keep a bigger force guarding the Channel, just in case.

BTW, with the flax, hemp (and related products) coming mostly from Russia, a big part of iron from Russia and Sweden and a lot of timber from Russia, how “neutrality” thing may impact Britain in the long term? Carrying timber from Canada would be more costly (and the lumber industry has to be set up) and creating the brand new flax and hemp producing agriculture across the Atlantic also could not happen overnight. HMS Victory was built in 1765 Royal Sovereign - in 1786 and as I understand many other ships also had been quite old. The British frigates engaged against the US coast were, AFAIK, in a rather bad shape because they had to stay in the open sea for the long periods while their counterparts, besides being generally heavier and better build, had been operating from the nearby ports. So, with a considerable attrition and shrinking abilities to replace the losses and “tear and wear”, the British government may be more eager to look for a realistic peace.
You’re reading my mind 😉
 
Or ever really.
But it does not have to go into head to head confrontation. Damaging the British trade on a scale serious enough to be felt would suffice. And if Napoleon introduces more intelligent tariff war than CS (combined with the British own excessively severe measures) and gets a willing cooperation of the European states (and the US), then the Brits with their mighty fleet are in a big trouble.
 
The Fernandine Gambit
The Fernandine Gambit

"...it matters little what Spanish law actually says or suggests; our sea power determines practically what Spanish law is."

- Lord Liverpool


Britain's "Wismar Insult" was taken as an affront in France and when the terms of Canning's initial offer - with its robust list of demands and sparse number of compromises in turn - were distributed to other European capitals by Napoleon's agents, most other monarchs and their courts were surprised that Britain was not willing to settle for a white peace to end the seemingly endless wars against Napoleon. But so long as Russia was content, and she was indeed content for now, there was no chance of revanchist Prussia or cunning Austria joining another Coalition. Paris's gamble that Britain would refuse to compromise on their counter-terms, and the perception on the Continent that it was now Britain being unreasonable and choking European commerce, gave Napoleon an opening - the reform of the Continental System and its replacement with a more lenient policy. In Toulon, he revoked the Berlin and Milan decrees and replaced it with a new one, namely stating that "neutrally flagged" transshipment would now be permissible, a move that simultaneously continued to twist the screws to Britain while giving "neutral" states such as Holland, Russia, Austria and Portugal the ability to move transit goods [1]. The early 1810s, then, saw an explosion in commerce in European, with Russia once again redounding the most as it formally formed the Baltic League, a successor to the League of Armed Neutrality, now dominating the Baltic and its ports with its navy and merchant marine. By 1815, indeed, St. Petersburg was one of the busiest ports in Europe.

"We must not starve just because we are strangling Britain," Napoleon remarked, and indeed he was not wrong; the Toulon Decree would do as intended, giving the rest of Europe a sigh of relief, improving the continent's economy and allowing relations with the skeptical United States to flourish once more, with Britain now viewed definitively as the villain in Washington. Of course, the move was not a total masterstroke - the other side always gets a say, after all.

Effectively denied any foothold on the Continent or European partner besides Bourbon Sicily and Savoyard Sardinia, hardly allies who could help defeat Napoleon's vast (and now well-rested) armies, Britain's focus since 1808 had been on a series of campaigns to probe Spanish America. The Wellington expedition to the Orinoco that year had helped create a substantial republican rebellion in Venezuela that threatened the whole of New Granada; Fireland in the Southern Cone had been occupied by the Royal Navy, as had the Chiloe Archipelago, in order to completely command trans-oceanic trade. But after the debacle in Buenos Aires in 1807, Cabinet was leery of a full invasion of Spanish America, and was beginning to doubt their ability to sustain control there in a society that was densely populated, with its own traditions and ways, and which would have been nakedly hostile to an Anglican government seizing control of a fervently devout Catholic polity.

Liverpool had a solution, what he called a "gambit," and spies paid out of his own pocket had journey to Rome - where the locals were not huge fans of Napoleon to begin with - to feel out its intended target. Infante Ferdinand of Spain had been in self-exile there since he was denied at Bayonne and replaced by his father; under Spanish law, Napoleon's re-imposition of Charles IV, effectively negating his abdication as void, was dubious. Though the pro-Ferdinand segment in Spain was not insubstantial, and was particularly concentrated in Madrid, the exile of the hated Godoy to France had tempered many of the passions, and the shrinking bloc opposed to Charles had simply resigned themselves to waiting for the old, unpopular King to die and then have one of his sons take power. That Ferdinand had attempted to overthrow his father twice and been humiliated was of little import to them, especially as his rigidly dutiful and traditional younger brother, Infante Carlos, would have refused any attempted usurpation out of order for the throne out of hand.

The reality on the ground in New Spain was murkier, though. The Spanish Navy had been effectively eliminated as a global force after Trafalgar and her armies were trapped in Iberia by the Royal Navy effectively cutting the lines of communication, with Spanish ports a particular focus of the British blockades after Charles was placed back on the throne. Without peninsular authority, local juntas had been formed in the absence of Spanish control. This arrangement, ad hoc at first, had actually worked rather well; and though New Spain and New Granada would never have deigned to revolt in the name of liberty the way the United States had, the elite criollos of Mexico and Bogota were beginning to wonder if this arrangement perhaps did not work better than staying forever under Madrid's control. The seed of an opportunity had been planted.

Britain's plan, then, was to smuggle Ferdinand out of Rome and sail him to Mexico via Barbados (Havana was still fairly loyal to Spain), where he would declare his father an illegitimate puppet of the French, the Bayonne Abdication an illegal usurpation, and that he was the rightful King of Spain, in the same sense/legal fiction that the Braganza court in Rio de Janeiro was the rightful court of Portugal. Liverpool, Canning and Perceval saw no particular downside to this gambit; there were a number of ways to measure success, all of which damaged Spain to their benefit. "We have identified the weak underbelly of Napoleon's continental network of despots," Liverpool announced to the Cabinet. "It is in Iberia, and that is where pressure shall be applied. It matters little what Spanish law actually says or suggests; our sea power practically determines what Spanish law is."

Ferdinand was smuggled out of Rome in early December, 1810. Stopovers in Gibraltar, the Canaries, Barbados and Jamaica preceded his arrival in Veracruz, where he made his anticipated declaration as Ferdinand VII, the rightful king of Spain, setting up an exile court in Mexico, and endorsing the juntas in his name...

[1] Credit to @alexmilman for this suggestion
 
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