As Charles XIII put it after his first personal meeting with Bernadotte (whom he was more or less forced to endorse), “I gambled and I won!”.After losing Finland and having its king couped out only to be replaced by an indigent, it certainly did!
As Charles XIII put it after his first personal meeting with Bernadotte (whom he was more or less forced to endorse), “I gambled and I won!”.After losing Finland and having its king couped out only to be replaced by an indigent, it certainly did!
People back then had such a concise way of putting thingsAs Charles XIII put it after his first personal meeting with Bernadotte (whom he was more or less forced to endorse), “I gambled and I won!”.
Good questions with no good answers unless there is either serious shift on the continent (as in OTL) or a serious change of the British attitudes.Rule of the Seas"...what I would give instead to have my feet on the Continent, helping drive the Corsican from every conquered capital, than here, to do what?"
- Arthur Wellesley
The successful defeat of Sweden in the Finnish War - which ceded all of Finland to Russia as a grand duchy, left Sweden with an invalid, childless and weak new King inheriting a political crisis, earned France and Denmark substantial indemnities in turn that would bankrupt the poor Scandinavian kingdom for decades and forced it into the Continental System - also included a rare naval defeat for the Royal Navy at the Oresund. Though no Trafalgar or Copenhagen, not even close, the battle and the subsequent exit of Sweden from the war left Britain outside the Baltic and suddenly bereft of formal allies anywhere in Europe, but otherwise in command of both the North Sea and the Mediterranean and thus able to continue to enforce its will regarding a blockade of French ports and defending the expansion of British trade worldwide in the absence of competition. It was a strange stalemate, that France utterly dominated Europe now as 1809 dawned but Britain dominated beyond, each desiring what the other had, with Britain lacking an army or alliance to challenge Paris and France lacking a navy to challenge London.
Though the incomes from Europe had been somewhat augmented by overseas trade (and smuggling), hard power was still the backbone of British naval policy and Britannia took advantage of her dominance at sea to consolidate her position even as Napoleon used the broad peace ushered in with the Treaty of Stockholm to allow Europe to breathe and settle under the Napoleonic Codes and Continental System. Spain was wholly cut off from her New World; in 1808 a British force was dispatched to Tobago under Arthur Wellesley to intervene in Venezuela alongside Francisco de Miranda, a patriot seeking to fight for independence, a sharp departure from their policy in their own Thirteen Colonies thirty years prior but in line with their attempts to seize Buenos Aires a year before. The British shelled Havana and seized St. Augustine later that autumn, and continued to harass formally neutral American vessels, making the outgoing Jefferson administration's Embargo Act even more unpopular in the United States.
Despite their dominance at sea, though, talk in London by early 1809 began to swirl around the long term. The Continental System was ineffective at keeping British commerce fully locked out of Europe, but the blockade was not succeeding in economically starving Napoleon, either. Feelers to the Austrians continued quietly but after the Third Coalition had ended in failure and humiliation for the Habsburgs at Pressburg, Francis I was reluctant to stick his neck out again, at least until he had rebuilt his forces sufficiently. In all, the British position was mixed, despite some positive reports from Wellesley regarding the Venezuelan Expedition, suggesting to Lord Portland's Cabinet that operations in the New World to try to force Spain to exit French hegemony could bear fruit. The question in London for those skeptical of further war was this: how long was Britain willing to go on against Napoleon alone? At what cost, to what end? How would victory be achieved? What was such a victory worth...?
Yes, and also very effective in psychological “charm assaults”. Look at post-Walchern interaction between Napoleon and Bernadotte. Nappy (who was one more time pissed off with B’s address to the troops) started with “indirect assault” accusing him in being too nice to the Swedes and Poles. To which B answered “But they are the only people in Europe who are truly devoted to you” - “But what about the French?” - “They are just admiring you and your successes”. After which Nappy laughs, jokingly slaps B on a forehead exclaiming “What a head!” and they are back to the good terms. 😜People back then had such a concise way of putting things
This is a great post and much to digest… I still have much to ponder on how to handle LA revolts in a case where there is no Peninsular War to act as catalyst. Good points on the Russian implications of the CS… I have some ideas on a “split the baby” approach with the alt-Finnish War but I don’t know that Alexander would have been pragmatic enough to pursue itGood questions with no good answers unless there is either serious shift on the continent (as in OTL) or a serious change of the British attitudes.
Theoretically, Nappy’s CS was going to benefit the continental Europe by removing the British imports as the main obstacle to the local manufacturing. The main problem was Nappy’s absolute inability and unwillingness to run a proper PR campaign supporting this program. 😜
[Sorry for the following lengthy deviation from the main line but I think that it may be useful for the better assessment of the situation
Take the worst case scenario among the big states, Russia (besides it being the worst case scenario by definition, I have much more data on it 😂 ).
“Traditional” view is that Russia was heavily suffering from the CS. As most of the “everybody knows” cases, this view is highly questionable.
The few years of the CS resulted in a sharp increase of the local production of all types of the fabrics (no British imports) with a resulting grows of the state’s revenues and lowering bread costs (no Russian exports, all grain goes into the domestic markets). The Dowager Empress complained to Alexander that CS is hurting the poor people, which on a comparative scale is very close to Marie-Antoinette statement about the cake: the poor people in Russia were not consumers of coffee and other “colonial goods” supplied by Britain but surely were benefitting from a cheaper bread.
The next part of the “everybody knows” narrative is that the land-owning nobility suffered from the lack of exports and, because the officers corps was 100% nobility, it reflected this unhappiness. In a reality, by 1812 Russian army had approximately 15,000 officers out of which only 500 had been from the land-owning families. 11,180 were from the families that did not have serfs (category which includes Barclay, by that time a full general, army commander and Minister of War), 1,140 had been born before their fathers got officer rank and nobility and 800 were children of the soldiers who themselves got promotion and noble status. The rest were officers promoted from various not-noble categories. So the landed nobility was not too well represented in the officers corps outside the Guards and top ranks.
Now, how about the landed nobility? Yes, it was hit by cutting the exports but (a) a growing domestic manufacturing would be consuming many of their products (flax, wool, timber, etc.) with many estate owners had been also the manufacturers and benefitting on both sides and (b) in OTL in 1809 - 1813 more than 860,000 had been conscripted into the Russian army, predominantly the serfs. Which means that the landed nobility lost at least 800,000 able-bodied male workers. A rather serious hit. Plus general hike in the taxes needed to finance a huge military buildup during 1810-12.
So, basically, we have the same issue as elsewhere in Europe: the government reflected immediate interests of a land-owning minority without any attempt of promoting the potential benefits of the system.
One more “everybody knows” thing is that government (aka Tsar) was scared of the potential unhappiness of a landed nobility and basically depended upon it. Which is one more BS because most of the landed nobility had their estates pawned in the State Lending Bank and the top aristocracy additionally depended on individual government’s handouts to pay their huge debts (a standard practice was for government to buy the palaces and/or provide pensions or lump sums to the widows to pay family debts; or just direct payment of the debts). In other words, the landed nobility seriously depended upon state’s good graces and not other way around (NI used this to the hilt).
So we are talking mostly about unwillingness rather than impossibility.
]
If in your scenario most of the Continental Europe is reasonably willing to accept the CS (Nappy has to provide some carrots, whatever they could be) than the stalemate can go on forever if Britain can substitute the lost benefits of the European trade with those of the colonial trade. But was this the case at that time? The revenue was not only in the direct imports/exports but also in carrying the third party goods and a big part of it is being lost. Could the revolting Latin America and newly conquered India compensate?
Alexander was, as you already noticed, a very critical figure in the terms of making both rational and irrational decisions and s positions shifting. At least some modern Russian historians seemingly hold an opinion that most if not all of the Russian-French confrontation was a byproduct of his personal hate of Napoleon. I’m not sure about validity of such a position but at least to a considerable degree the facts are seemingly support it at least partially (the said authors tend to whitewash Nappy).This is a great post and much to digest… I still have much to ponder on how to handle LA revolts in a case where there is no Peninsular War to act as catalyst. Good points on the Russian implications of the CS… I have some ideas on a “split the baby” approach with the alt-Finnish War but I don’t know that Alexander would have been pragmatic enough to pursue it
No no, food for thought is good in areas I’m not super familiar with.Alexander was, as you already noticed, a very critical figure in the terms of making both rational and irrational decisions and s positions shifting. At least some modern Russian historians seemingly hold an opinion that most if not all of the Russian-French confrontation was a byproduct of his personal hate of Napoleon. I’m not sure about validity of such a position but at least to a considerable degree the facts are seemingly support it at least partially (the said authors tend to whitewash Nappy).
This is why I offered to “off” him and Constantine as well to make situation more manageable and logical. Nicholas is on the throne and he is still too young to do something truly drastic in the immediate future. 😂
The Finnish War was, of course, a byproduct of an attempt to force Gustav IV Adolf to join the CS but it was also a byproduct of Alexander’s need to improve his image after the loss of the 4th Coalition War (which, as the 3rd Coalition, was a byproduct of his personal attitudes and had nothing to do with the Russian interests as a state).
Not sure what do you have in mind regarding the alt. approach to the Finnish War but, IMO, while in OTL Alexander may blame Napoleon for not actively participating, he could be even more pissed off if the French did participate because domestically this could deprive him of a big part of a glory (something along the lines of “Yes, our soldiers and generals acted heroically and successfully but it was Napoleon who forced Swedish capitulation and agreement to cede Finland”). As was demonstrated in OTL the French direct help was not needed and it would be much more beneficial if Napoleon stopped encouraging the Ottomans to continue the war, which would allow to move some troops from South to North (major Russian military buildup did not yet took place and Barclay was just going to be promoted and assigned Minister of War).
Rather unrelated, the main Russian OTL problem in the Finnish war was an attitude. During the 1st stage of a war the Russian commanding officers belonged to “Suvorov’s school”, which stressed aggressive tactics over everything else including logistics and numeric odds. As a result, they tended to over-extend their forces and to issue the orders that pretty much ignored the enemy as a military factor. After the resulting offsets the attitude changed to its opposite, a fear of the risky actions. To Alexander’s credit he made two correct decisions: (a) put the new people in charge and (b) sent Arakcheev (a rather obnoxious but not single-dimensional figure) to deliver a strong message about conducting the aggressive war.
But my considerations aside, this TL is strictly yours to develop as you see fit. I’m just providing a food for your thoughts.
No no, food for thought is good in areas I’m not super familiar with.
Though I will say, offing Alex and not Constantine is the kind of butterfly-shaped hand grenade I like to lob into the midst of my TLs… 😏
Thank you! Hope you’re still enjoying CdM, that is still happening even as this one gets fleshed out moreNice stuff! Watched.
Era of a Majority of things going well for Napoleon, written by KingSweden=good TLThank you! Hope you’re still enjoying CdM, that is still happening even as this one gets fleshed out more
no he need themCould Napoleon focus on the Ottomans next?
Authorial Interlude/Breaking the Fourth Wall:
I'm hedging a bit on Italy. I can't find much in the way of resources explaining why it was in 1809 that Napoleon decided to annex half of the Boot to France, arrest the Pope and cause all kinds of political complications for himself. High on his own supply? The same Continental System frustrations that made him kick his own brother out of Holland and annex the entire North Sea coast? Trying to ward off Austria after the War of the Fifth Coalition started?
Hmm interesting. More or less what I suspected.He had annexed Holland because his brother was supporting Dutch, not French interests; as well as somewhat ignoring the Continental System. Then you have Hannover, which by the time it was annexed, had no purpose left as Britain wasn't negotiating. Thus, to strengthen France, impose the Continental System and scare Austria he just annexed more and more land from other countries as the Napoleonic wars progressed. For example, there was almost no need to annex Etruria in 1807 other than that a child was its King. But at least they were compensated with Portugal in TTL.
This actually predates the formal creation of the CS. During the Consulate he argued (you can guess with whom 😜) that the offensive strategy is actually a form of the defensive one because moving the borders further away from France proper is going to defend it from a foreign aggression. The CS was just a further development of the idea and its adoption to the changed circumstances.Hmm interesting. More or less what I suspected.
At least here the circumstances of needing to desperately ratchet up the Continental System aren’t quite there… yet
Lemme guess… our buddy Jean Baptiste!This actually predates the formal creation of the CS. During the Consulate he argued (you can guess with whom 😜) that the offensive strategy is actually a form of the defensive one because moving the borders further away from France proper is going to defend it from a foreign aggression. The CS was just a further development of the idea and its adoption to the changed circumstances.