Kursk

[ManchesterLad]

A programme has just come on on Discovery about the battle of Kursk.
It literally has just started. but anyway, is there anyway that Kursk could have been a victory for the germans? if so, what would have been the repercussions of such a victory? would germany's defeat just have been delayed or could by some miracle could they then go on the defence?​

 

[superkuf]

The attack was doomed to fail - the Soviets had spent months preparing for an attack at just Kursk. Minefields, trenches, artillery positions - the area was filled with preparations.

One problem was that the Germans waited for the new tanks Panter and Tiger, which both delayed the battle and gave them a lot of unproven tanks that often started to burn. An attack in May instead of July would give the Soviets far less time to prepare. On the other hand the German tank corps would be far less capable without the Panters and Tigers.

Even so a "victory" at Kursk wouldn't matter in the long run. The Germans were simply overextended at the beginning of 1943. They could only afford to make an offensive on a local scale (Kursk), while they 1942 could attack on a whole front (Stalingrad and Kaukasus) and 1941 could attack on the whole border. The Soviets outproduced Germany on all levels, the Allies would invade Sicily and later Italy (and even later France) and the air war went on (although it was fairly equal until the "big week" offensive in january 1944 when Luftwaffe was crushed).

Far better for the Germans would be to adapt to a flexible defense. Let the Soviets attack, retreat and then counter-attack. That was what happened during the Soviet offensive after Kursk, and was devastating. Especially with tanks like the Panter. But Hitler was dead set against giving up any territory.

 

[Faralis]

And the soviet reserves at Kursk ...

Just lets say that even Hitler himself was "quite impressed" ( AKA pissed in his pants ) by the superiority in number ( and tanks ) that the Russians had ...

You need a POD quite early ( early enough to butterfly the battle proper ) or Kursk is impossible to win for the Germans ...

 

[The Red]

I read a scenario where the Germans wait and an impatient Stalin orders Zhukov to strike first, the result is a bloody stalemate with heavy German and Soviet casualties and in the Aftermath Stalin agrees to a peace with Germany which reverts to 1941 borders. The German attack however was pretty much doomed to failure.

 

[BlairWitch749]

we had a thread about this by comrade Wiking recently

tidbits: The Germans waiting till July was so that the necessary number of panther tanks could be ready; however these tanks didn't perform well in their debut and could be sacrificed for a may or june attack favorably versus the amount of fortification work done by the Soviet rifle divisions in the sector

Von Manstein was convinced he could win the battle in May, and that it would be a tossup in June. Zeitzler, Kluge and Keitel where in agreement. Although of course Manstein favored a backhand blow

Guderian, Speer and Model where utterly convinced that it was doomed and should be canceled

Short answer, there is no POD after Stalingrad that gives the Germans any serious chance of maintaining the initiative for any significant period of time on the eastern front

Long answer, Zeitzler's plan was unworkable. Even if Army Group Center and South's mobile divisions could drive through and link up... the German army just didn't have the 12-16 fresh infantry divisions in reserve that would be need to crush a pocket of that size, with that many armed men in it. Also Manstein's backhand blow strategy, whilst probably correct given German advantages in long range gunnery and command staffs was inherrantly very risky, not only would the Germans be surrendering areas that had resources that where fueling their war machine, but also there was no garauntee that the Soviets would attack where Manstein wanted them to. The front was over 2000 miles long, and they had already been trapped at Kharkov and Kiev twice, so its safe to assume they learned something about screening their flanks prior to headlong advances

Thats not to say that the Germans couldn't do "better" at Kursk; even to the tune of a tactical victory

several things would have to happen

1. Much more modest objectives have to be set... namely crush the soviet front and second line divisions, then retire back to defensive positions, don't drive for the horizon, those days ended at Stalingrad

2. The attack must be earlier so the soviets don't fortify so much

3. You can't have all the good panzer divisions in Manstein's sector; during the battle the 3 best panzer corps in the german army where all attached to army group south (2nd ss, 3rd germanic, and 48th) naturally army group south broke through and army group center (which had a stupid plan of attack anyway) got hung up. Having the center get hung up early allowed the russians to concentrate all their reserves to draw manstein into a battle of annihilation

4. The Germans have to have more infantry divisions in reserve; ideally by stripping norway and the balkans

5. Hitler has to release the OKH reserves at the height of the battle if the commanders on the ground need them. Hitler refusing to release 5th SS panzer "wiking" and the 17th ss panzer genadier division took the wind out of Von Manstein's sails at a critical moment, and he wasn't able to keep possession of the battlefield which cost him over 300 damaged, but still repairable tanks, including many tigers and panthers which where difficult to replace

6. Hitler can't call off the offensive at its height because of Husky, since troops in country where able to keep the advance pretty managable anyway



There are even small POD's that could change things. Michael Wittman's 13SS heavy panzer company knocked out nearly 100 tanks by themselves during the initial stages of the battle. He veared off the Leibstandarte's line of advance to knock out several batteries of 152mm guns (which he did successfully) and was quickly driving towards the sounds of massive fighting between the 5th guards tank army and the 2nd ss panzer corps

The 181st tank brigade, by accident bumped into Wittman's force and engaged him. Wittman and his company inflicted a blood bath knocking out over 40 tanks, but used up all their fuel and ammo and had to return to the rear to refuel and rearm. Had the 181st not bumped into him... perhaps choosing a different route of advance, or getting misinterpreted orders, Wittman and 14 other tiger tanks would have been on the rear of the 5th guards tank army and possibly been able to panic them at Prokorovka and leave the Germans in possession of the battlefield, and potentially leave the 2nd ss panzer corps (Mansteins most lethal formation) in tact, which would reduce the ability of Zhukov to obliterate the Germans in his counterattack

 

[ManchesterLad]

this was as i thought.
i knew that there was no way the germans to then drive on the moscow again, i just thought any victory, tactical or whatever would cripple the soviet advance. therefore allowing the germans to retreat, as you said and try and defend what little they had.
so in actuall fact, kursk was never really that decisive? with the stratergy that the germans had, win or lose, they were always going to be defeated in the long run.

 

[BlairWitch749]

this was as i thought.
i knew that there was no way the germans to then drive on the moscow again, i just thought any victory, tactical or whatever would cripple the soviet advance. therefore allowing the germans to retreat, as you said and try and defend what little they had.
so in actuall fact, kursk was never really that decisive? with the stratergy that the germans had, win or lose, they were always going to be defeated in the long run.

Yes... the whole idea of Kursk was crazy for the Germans... they where concentrating all of their theater level striking power in a very small section of the front (which is what they did at Stalingrad) whereas the Russians not only outnumbered them considerably at Kursk, but didn't have to weaken other sectors in order to get that superiority. So basically even if the Germans tactically win the battle and chop of Zhukov's front line divisions with a very good kill ratio the Russians can and will attack in other sectors (especially army group centers left flank) and catch the Germans without enough armored support and crush them and collapse the front

Kursk was decisive for the Russians because it eliminated major German tank strength and allowed them advance without the Risk of another 3rd Kharkov or operation mars

 

[Dan Reilly The Great]

wasn't kursk technically a tactical victory for the germans?

 

[Deckhand]

Most battles on the eastern front were tactical victories for the Germans. Didn't really matter.

 

[BlairWitch749]

wasn't kursk technically a tactical victory for the germans?

god no... they suffered roughly one to one losses in tanks which for them given production capacity vs the Russians is a disaster (typical tank battles favored the Germans by more than 3 to 1)

and the creme of Germany's best divisions was torn up against a fortress, leaving them vulnerable to a massive counterattack which obliterated army group south

 

[BlairWitch749]

Most battles on the eastern front were tactical victories for the Germans. Didn't really matter.

Agreed to a degree... even during bagration, there where frequently small battles where the Germans inflicted 3 to 1 blood baths, the problem was that unless the Russians really screwed themselves over and allowed the Germans to inflict 9 to 1 losses (Kiev, 3rd Kharkov, Mars) they couldn't be stopped

 

[Rubicon]

god no... they suffered roughly one to one losses in tanks which for them given production capacity vs the Russians is a disaster (typical tank battles favored the Germans by more than 3 to 1)

and the creme of Germany's best divisions was torn up against a fortress, leaving them vulnerable to a massive counterattack which obliterated army group south

Are you using the claims made by the Soviet propaganda ministry?

Every modern estimation I've seen gives a kill ration of betwen 7-8:1 in favour of the Germans for tanks, and a KIA ratio of 10:1 during Zitadelle.

 

[Sol Zagato]

Are you using the claims made by the Soviet propaganda ministry?

Every modern estimation I've seen gives a kill ration of betwen 7-8:1 in favour of the Germans for tanks, and a KIA ratio of 10:1 during Zitadelle.

Rubicon, both things are simultaneously true. According to Glantz (declassified Soviet records ETC) the Soviet tank forces performed really, really badly. This was not out of the ordinary for them- throughout the war they were incompetent tankers most of the time. The thing is, the Germans were forced to retreat and leave behind tanks that were merely damaged or that only suffered mechanical breakdown.

The Soviets had that much of an advantage in numbers of tanks. They could just blow a thousand plus and keep on rolling. Just a month after Kursk, IIRC, they lost another 400+ outside Kharkov in three days. Didn't stop them there either.

During the Soviet counteroffensive, which is sometimes lumped in with Kursk, the Germans didn't have anything left to counter the enormous soviet numerical advantage in everything all along the front.