Kursk launched in May 1943

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Deleted member 1487

This topic has been gone over before from a number of different angles, but this time I wish only to discuss the results of the Germans launching Zitadelle in May 1943 when originally planned. Blairwitch I'm especially looking for your input here.
Assuming that Hitler doesn't delay the operation, nor does any other person or factor, what would happen? This is pretty obvious change, as the Russians have not had months to build up their supplies, defenses or manpower, but still the Kursk bulge is a massive nut to crack. The Germans are weaker too, but their offensive power is stronger in relation to the Russians.
The question then is whether the Germans are strong enough to breakthrough the Russian lines and pincer it off.

Assuming they do, what does this mean for the Russians and their follow up operations? What about Allied operations in Italy and German reserves?
 
The attack fails because insufficient numbers of servicable German panzers are available. Embolded by the German defeat, the Allies invade Sicily on or about July 10th 1943.

For ever afterwards, certain historians argue that if only Germany had waited until larger numbers of the new tanks were available, Germany could have won Kursk, maybe brought a stalemate to the East, and that the Western Allies would not have risked invading Sicily while the campaign in the East was still in the balance.
 
The attack does better. It might even pinch of a corps or two, but this is Germany's last glory. A backhanded blow would have been a better bet.
 
Von Manstein said that in May he was highly confident he could win the battle and that June would be a toss up... Model was far less sure and Guderian and Speer where utterly convinced the entire offensive was doomed no matter what. Kluge and Zeitzler where the ones who pressed Hitler to launch the attack, and even if Manstein thought he could win in the assault, as we all know, he favored trying to repeat his victory at 3rd kharkov by a strategic withdrawl followed by a series of mobile engagements that would make maximum use of German technical and individual advantages

In terms of the Germans having more tanks... the main reason they postponed the offensive besides Hitler's misgivings about it was because the required number of panther tanks where not ready... but given how poorly their initial debut at Kursk went... their impact was something that could be sacrificed at an advantage vs the amount of mines and fortification work the Russians did during the summer whilst the Germans waited for them.

attacking earlier is probably a net positive for the Germans vs otl... even if just somewhat, but there are other POD's that would really help to make the battle more favorable... namely army group center's attack plan being better worked out. Kluge didn't committ enough armor to his initial waves, and due to mines and machine guns his infantry got torn up trying to make a hole for the armor to advance through... Manstein committed his tanks in the breakthrough elements and was far more successful... the problem was Army Group Center was stopped in its tracks by the second day and this gave the Russians the strategic ability to transfer forces to concentrate everything they had against Von Manstein (which they did and inflicted a bloodbath)

in terms of the effect on Italy... it depends on how badly the Germans get torn up in their victory or lessor defeat... in otl Hitler transferred the Leibstandarte to Italy, shut down the offensive and refused to release the OKH reserves to Manstein 5th SS panzer Wiking and 17th Panzer Grenadeir... this took the wind out of his sails at a critical moment and stopped him from being able to maintain possession of the battlefield to recover all of his damaged but still repairable tanks... with sicily still months away Hitler doesn't call off the offensive at its height and deny Manstein 2 first class divisions. I would guess Italy would be the same... the Germans did a good job keeping the allied rate of advance pretty managable with only modest resources, there wouldn't be a need to transfer any more forces than otl
 
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Deleted member 1487

Any idea how much more the Russians were prepared in May vs. July? In this case perhaps Kluge's infantry can tear a hole for his armor. Would the Russian operational reserves get chewed up?
Also, assuming a German victory, would the Russian be able to still launch their follow up offensives? Could this mean no, or an organized retreat to the Dnieper line?
 
Any idea how much more the Russians were prepared in May vs. July? In this case perhaps Kluge's infantry can tear a hole for his armor. Would the Russian operational reserves get chewed up?
Also, assuming a German victory, would the Russian be able to still launch their follow up offensives? Could this mean no, or an organized retreat to the Dnieper line?

I don't really think so... Kluge's strategy about the whole situation was kind of stupid and army group center got dicked over in the allotment of new armored vehicles... the main striking power of the entire German army was concentrated in Manstein's 2nd SS panzer corps and the 48th panzer corps

Even if Kluge was a lot more successful and Manstein was as successful as otl the situation wouldn't honestly be that much better than otl... even if they shredded some of the Soviet divisions holding the line... Mainstein and Kluge where ass short on infantry divisions in reserve to occupy terrain the tanks would seize. The entire German theater reserves after Kursk was going full swing amounted to an understrength armored corps where as the Russian reserve fronts behind Kursk alone had more than a million men and over 1000 tanks

concentrating that much of the total german army in that small of an area mirrored the mistake at stalingrad... bashing your head against an immovable object... it was just bad strategy period... no pod in 1943 really fixes Zeitzler's incompetance

i don't have glantz book with me... but i know that by july the average soviet rifle division had laid about 70k mines to defend its sector... and there where a lot of freaking rifle divisions on line

the backhand blow is a different story... especially if its tied in with some serious line shortening
 
Soviet mobility

The real problem with any sort of attack against a Soviet position in 1943 is that it plays to the Soviet strengths, i.e. fixed defenses and artillery. Given time to dig in and supply themselves, the Red Army was able to substantially attrit any attacking force to the point where it was vulnerable to local counterattacks. Mines and artillery were the tools of choice, and both of these were best deployed in a defensive role. Zitadelle played to these advantages.

Had the Germans pursued a grander version of the backhand blow, the Soviets would have been bereft of any fixed defenses (and damn few field expedients), and much of their artillery (and more importantly, its logistical support) would be far away from the battlefield. Soviets attacks were almost always characterized by a deluge of firepower, followed by short (strategically speaking) advances, followed by a stop as everything caught up. A backhand blow would allow the Germans - assuming that they timed things properly - to catch the Red Army on the hop, away from its primary advantages and at its most vulnerable.

Another interesting aspect of all of this is that the Germans had some serious mobility issues as a result of their overreliance on horse-drawn transport. Wiking, the same fellow who did that excellent Gorlice/Tarnow book (Rich Dinardo) has an even more interesting book on the role of horses in the German Army. You might find it quite useful (here is a link: http://www.amazon.com/Mechanized-Ju...1_fkmr1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1282974356&sr=8-2-fkmr1) and given your taste for detail, I am confident that you will find it intriguing...
 
The attack fails because insufficient numbers of servicable German panzers are available. Embolded by the German defeat, the Allies invade Sicily on or about July 10th 1943.

For ever afterwards, certain historians argue that if only Germany had waited until larger numbers of the new tanks were available, Germany could have won Kursk, maybe brought a stalemate to the East, and that the Western Allies would not have risked invading Sicily while the campaign in the East was still in the balance.

In OTL, the Allies invaded Sicily on July 10th.

My point was that I don't think it would have made any actual difference in Italy either.... but rather it would make a difference about how things were interpreted post war.
 

Deleted member 1487

Thanks for the link, I will check that out.
Assuming the offensive did go forward and the Germans are able to 'win' in that they don't have to abandon the field and leaving their repairable and captured tanks behind. Casualties are lower, they are worse for the Russians, but the pocket isn't lopped off. What do the Russians do now? They have only one rail line running into the pocket and they've just taken massive losses, even comparatively to their overall strength. They have the forces to launch counter offensives, but are they able to recover quick enough to catch the Germans before they realize they have to withdraw?
 
What does it matter? Such a 'victory' is disastrous for Germany, which has gone from sweeping offensives winning vast areas and destroying huge numbers of Soviet troops in 1941-1942 to being unable to force more than a stalemate in one sector at the price of the greatest gathering of panzer divisions in the entire war and the one German offensive of the entire year against the USSR.
 
Thanks for the link, I will check that out.
Assuming the offensive did go forward and the Germans are able to 'win' in that they don't have to abandon the field and leaving their repairable and captured tanks behind. Casualties are lower, they are worse for the Russians, but the pocket isn't lopped off. What do the Russians do now? They have only one rail line running into the pocket and they've just taken massive losses, even comparatively to their overall strength. They have the forces to launch counter offensives, but are they able to recover quick enough to catch the Germans before they realize they have to withdraw?

They are still in a really difficult spot... Grimm is correct... all the panzers are concentrated in a relatively small area... wheras the Russians, despite the mass of reserves and front line divisions they installed at Kursk didn't weaken other sectors... at best Zeitzler's plan for Kursk could have been something of a spoiling offensive... Manstein and Kluge chopping up the front line divisions around the salient then retiring back to their start line

If the Russian's counter attack into German concentrations and their pre kursk defensive line, they would have an ass difficult time even if the Germans didn't do a spoil offensive first. Army Group Center's defensive line was still roughly what it was during operation Mars and we know how strong that was and Army Group South had heavily fortified the area around Kursk during the muddy season... for example Belgorod had 3 well sited defensive lines protecting it from the east... and 7! from the north

However there is not garauntee the Russians will attack where the Germans want them to... this was the inherrant risk in Manstein's backhand blow strategy... the ratio of force to space in Russia was always so low that one could simply mass forces at a single point and break through (save kursk of course)... the russians could easily attack other sectors without actually weaking their kursk forces (which they did in otl) and other sectors where seriously starved for armored support and they would breakthough

honestly no variation of Zeitzler's plan even with pretty generous 1943 POD's is going to improve Germany's strategic situation on the eastern front noticably more than ot (maybe buy the Germans an additional 8-12 weeks of survival if they had the maximum non asb level of success in the operation)
 
Any idea how much more the Russians were prepared in May vs. July? In this case perhaps Kluge's infantry can tear a hole for his armor. Would the Russian operational reserves get chewed up?
Also, assuming a German victory, would the Russian be able to still launch their follow up offensives? Could this mean no, or an organized retreat to the Dnieper line?

Sorry to bring back a thread that has passed, but I owed you an answer to this question

Based on the rate in which the mines where laid and depending on when in May the Germans attacked, the Soviet Kursk defensive positions would have 30-50 percent less mines and also the tank ratio would be MORE favorable to the Germans (since the Russians where outproducing the Germans, every month of delay improved their numerical superiority)
 
Von Manstein said that in May he was highly confident he could win the battle and that June would be a toss up... Model was far less sure and Guderian and Speer where utterly convinced the entire offensive was doomed no matter what. Kluge and Zeitzler where the ones who pressed Hitler to launch the attack, and even if Manstein thought he could win in the assault, as we all know, he favored trying to repeat his victory at 3rd kharkov by a strategic withdrawl followed by a series of mobile engagements that would make maximum use of German technical and individual advantages

In terms of the Germans having more tanks... the main reason they postponed the offensive besides Hitler's misgivings about it was because the required number of panther tanks where not ready... but given how poorly their initial debut at Kursk went... their impact was something that could be sacrificed at an advantage vs the amount of mines and fortification work the Russians did during the summer whilst the Germans waited for them.

attacking earlier is probably a net positive for the Germans vs otl... even if just somewhat, but there are other POD's that would really help to make the battle more favorable... namely army group center's attack plan being better worked out. Kluge didn't committ enough armor to his initial waves, and due to mines and machine guns his infantry got torn up trying to make a hole for the armor to advance through... Manstein committed his tanks in the breakthrough elements and was far more successful... the problem was Army Group Center was stopped in its tracks by the second day and this gave the Russians the strategic ability to transfer forces to concentrate everything they had against Von Manstein (which they did and inflicted a bloodbath)

in terms of the effect on Italy... it depends on how badly the Germans get torn up in their victory or lessor defeat... in otl Hitler transferred the Leibstandarte to Italy, shut down the offensive and refused to release the OKH reserves to Manstein 5th SS panzer Wiking and 17th Panzer Grenadeir... this took the wind out of his sails at a critical moment and stopped him from being able to maintain possession of the battlefield to recover all of his damaged but still repairable tanks... with sicily still months away Hitler doesn't call off the offensive at its height and deny Manstein 2 first class divisions. I would guess Italy would be the same... the Germans did a good job keeping the allied rate of advance pretty managable with only modest resources, there wouldn't be a need to transfer any more forces than otl

OTOH Soviets expected main force to come from the north and strenghtened that sector more. Hence Model faced stronger opposition and wasstopped as a result.

As for backhand blow. People forget that RA was learning and was improving. at Kharkov they made same mistake as in winter 1941-42 when they thought that initial german failure (Moscow offensive and Stalingrad) ment they could go on strategic offensive and destroy large parts of German forces, which they thought were more or less destroyed. After Kharkov Soviets learned to limit their offensives and learned when to stop it.

Kursk counter-offensive was such case. First stop the Germans, then counter attack but set realistic (relatively small) objective then stop when you run out of steam.
 
OTOH Soviets expected main force to come from the north and strenghtened that sector more. Hence Model faced stronger opposition and wasstopped as a result.

As for backhand blow. People forget that RA was learning and was improving. at Kharkov they made same mistake as in winter 1941-42 when they thought that initial german failure (Moscow offensive and Stalingrad) ment they could go on strategic offensive and destroy large parts of German forces, which they thought were more or less destroyed. After Kharkov Soviets learned to limit their offensives and learned when to stop it.

Kursk counter-offensive was such case. First stop the Germans, then counter attack but set realistic (relatively small) objective then stop when you run out of steam.

agreed... operation kutsuov was going to mess up army group center's offensive plain and simple BUT those forces where less organized and had less of a shield in may than they did in july... again the Germans lose but not as badly


agreed on the backhand blow... as Manstein envisioned it then it wouldn't work for a couple of reasons

1. Manstein grossly (although this wasn't his responsibility or fault) underestimated the size and equipment scale of soviet theater forces arrayed against army group south
2. Manstein's plan required the Russians to directly attack into his preplanned kill zones whilst leaving their flanks in the air... thanks to american lend lease the soviets didn't need to advance down bottle necks but instead could advance from unexpected directions (which they did in otl after kursk)
3. Manstein's plan required abandoning vital territory in the donetz basin that was feeding the german war machine
4. Manstein lacked the infantry strength to crush surrounded pockets even if he happened to create them with his armor
 
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