Kursk again: Any real alternatives for Germany?

It could have been debated to death, but...

Looking at beginning of 1943, it did not look good for Germany but not yet totally hopeless.

Manstein's efforts after Stalingrad were spectacular and managed to stabilise the front.

Now, Manstein wanted a continued offensive after the spring thaw. Kursk was the obvious place.

Model was not so sure.

Guderian claimed that the tanks were just not there or ready.

Jodl was not so hot on the idea

Zeitzler was all for it (of course, it was "his" campaign)

Stalin was not sure whether it was going to be Kursk and feared a renewed drive on Moscow

Zhukov was clear on the aim - nearly the only one

Could these have been the scenarios:

1) Leaving Kursk salient to SU to enhance, spending a lot of time and effort and resources on and then not attacking?

2) Attack in the North?

3) Renew the attack in the South and then try for Moscow?

4) Just go for Moscow in July/August?

The thing is that Zhukov and Stalin were perfectly clear on: Germany had not lost a campaign during summer/autumn up until this time. The SU winter offensive were clear winners, but not during the typical "campaign season".

Zhukov in particular feared the german tank armies roaming the country side and was aware that German strategy was not to let taks go head-on into fortified positions as he was building at Kursk.

So, loads of doubts and uncertainty.

BUT if clever people like Zhukov, Stalin, Manstein, et al could see other possibilities for the German armies in 1943, what were those then and how realistic were they?

How much would the situation in the Med have impacted on a more hectic German campaign oputside of Kursk?

What if the Med had stabilised a bit (as it could have)? Then more German divisions would have been available in Russia.

Any takers?

Ivan
 
The strategy Guderian, Rommel and Speer were pushing for of a defensive position at Kursk with Rommel pushing that they start mass producing defensive anti tank weapons for the East would be the best option as it would have also allowed them (along with the extra tanks they would have from not attacking Kursk) enough forces to move West to have a real chance to stop the successful WAllied landings in France in 1944. If the Anglo-American invasion of France fails I see both Churchill and FDR being replaced that year with people willing to accept something less then complete unconditional surrender.

Germany can't win the war pre-Kursk, but they could have managed to come away from the war without being divided and occupied. But, it would have required a leader who at that point was willing to settle for a return to 1939 borders and Hitler certainly wasn't willing to do so. IE a successful military coup is needed against the regime pre-Kursk.
 
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Without Kursk and with Germany either standing on the defensive in the summer of '43 or carrying out a successful, limited offensive (best option imho) you probably still see an allied invasion in '44 that will succeed (air superiority plus massive fresh allied armies that Germany can't possibly match) leading to Germany being pushed back to it's 1939 boundaries by mid-'45 whereupon it gets nuked.
 
Without Kursk and with Germany either standing on the defensive in the summer of '43 or carrying out a successful, limited offensive (best option imho) you probably still see an allied invasion in '44 that will succeed (air superiority plus massive fresh allied armies that Germany can't possibly match) leading to Germany being pushed back to it's 1939 boundaries by mid-'45 whereupon it gets nuked.

D-Day would be far less of a certainty then you make it out to be... this is assuming Hitler is overthrown and a non-Nazi government is in place. Which is necessary for Germany to decide to go on the defense in the East IMHO. All the sudden Canaris who knew many agents like the one who convinced Hitler to stop the Panzer attack Rommel ordered on the beachheads were working for the British would be ignored as Canaris would be working on behalf of the German war effort instead of against it. There are even some suggestions that Canaris may have believed the German codes were broken and had any info that implied it shreaded, but we just don't know.

What we would know is that there would be alot more German forces in France and there would not be the utter stupidity that Hitler did of dividing up the command between two men and taking divisional control for himself.

The Allies may still win, but it will be a major bloodbath enough so its quite possible even if the Germans don't manage to drive the Western Allies into the sea the West is willing to offer something like a return to 1937 borders for Germany and the occupation of France, the Low Counties and Poland by Western Allied forces for peace. With a non-Nazi government in place Churchill and FDR could sell that to their populations as a decient outcome which will allow them to focus on fighting Japan and say to the press that the previous unconditional surrender stuff was only meant for a Nazi lead Germany.
 
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Well, Manstein was all for his "back-hand" strategy.

Robin Cross in his book "Citadel" claims that Manstein's back-hand was the only real option after Kharkov. But he also spells out that the chance had passed after April/May.

All of that said, Germany still had teeth in summer 1943.

Hoth had 7th, 19th and 6th Panzer (III Panzer Corps), SS Totenkopf, SS Das Reich, SS LIebstandarte and 11th panzer, Grossdeutschland and 3rd Panzer. That is a lot of fire power.

Detachment Kempf was not far behind either.

SU with 1,2 million men in static defences was not insignificant either, so the scene was set.

But,... if Grmany just left it alone? and employed all of this in Manstein's back-hand? or in the North?

Or smack for Moscow again?

US/UK could stillnot have invaded France in 1943, so that would be out of the question.

Med strategy could (and did) impact Citadel, but if Citadel was launched earlier? or later like in August?

Would SU have launched an offensive in June/July out of the Salient. Zhukov was dead against that and convinced Stalin that it woudl be suicide.

Was Moscow a realistic option in 1943? Stain thought so.

Ivan
 
Sure.
Forget retreating to the 1941 borders. The one thing they had plenty of, if Hitler would let them, was operational depth and the freedom of being in conquered land. Why throw it away?
Forget elastic defence, as made up in Lidell Hart's book "the German generals talk". The Soviets actually did better on the offensive in 43 than on the defensive.
Launch a series of limited offensives in separated areas of the front. This requires a previous work of creating a better logistic/transportation system. Think along the lines of the series of allied offensives in France in 1918. Allways keep the Russians guessing were the next blow will fall. Maximize the tactical advantage of having Tiger tanks before the IS2, T34/85 and SU85 come online, and the last happy days of the LW fighters. Attacks must follow a pattern of initial attack, soviet armoured counter attack, German counter counter move.
Keep this game on from Spring 43 to Fall 43. The goal is exhausting the soviet armoured forces to such an extent that they cannot launch a large scale winter offensive.
 
That's an interesting one: To keep the momentum up to exhaust SU and limit or cancel out a winter offensive.

Could it have been done? in the light of the SU production of equipment which at that stage was far higher than Germany's?

Also LL was coming to the fore in 1943.

If an attack had been carried out in the South, the 1,2 million SU forces in the salient would have to have been used as a defence and would not have been able to attack. Leaving them alone, well, different story. Maybe even Zhukov would have dared something

Ivan
 
That's an interesting one: To keep the momentum up to exhaust SU and limit or cancel out a winter offensive.

Could it have been done? in the light of the SU production of equipment which at that stage was far higher than Germany's?

Also LL was coming to the fore in 1943.

If an attack had been carried out in the South, the 1,2 million SU forces in the salient would have to have been used as a defence and would not have been able to attack. Leaving them alone, well, different story. Maybe even Zhukov would have dared something

Ivan


If the "successive blows" plan is implemented early, there will not be such a massive soviet built up. The soviets will either have to keep moving reserves around to deal with each crises, something that they were not really good at, or try to launch their own offensive while being attacked elsewhere. This will lead to the kind of confused mobile battle of improvisation the Germans were good at, and the soviets were still not good at in 43. (they would learn, but later).
Above all avoid the kind of set up pre planned battle the Soviets liked.
 
Would and could that have been along the entire front?

Stalin also feared for Leningrad again.

What would have been the outcome if Germany had then managed to exhaust SU in this scenario? Would they have eased off going into winter and leaving the initiative to SU?

Would SU have been lacking in manpower or also in equipment? after all, SU was out-producing Germany at that stage.

Ivan
 
Would Stalin potentially be willing to make a separate peace with a post-Hitler military regime, if the Soviet armies are sufficiently bloodied in summer / autumn 1943 (by either a German defensive stance, or the aforementioned "multiple small offensives" strategy)?
 
This is an opinion only, not really backed by references:

I doubt Stalin would have made peace after 1943, regardless of Kursk.

I think Stalin at that time knew that Germany could be conquered and it was only a matter of time.

I am not even sure Stalin counted on "2nd front" to ease the burden of SU.

There is a book: "Stalin's War through the eyes of his commanders" by Albert Axell. It does not get into great detail of this, but leaves me the impression that Stalin was not in the mood for a separate peace at all.

Even if Kursk would have been a loss to SU, I think they all knew that Germany would have exhausted themselves and would not have been able to stand up to SU in the winter offensive and surely not at the time of Bagration.

That is also why I posted this one: Alternatives to Kursk? something that would have put Germany in a better position?

I don't think it was a matter of Hitler or not to Stalin. It was Germany in the broadest sense he was going for.

Not like Churchill: "I don't hate anybody - except Hitler, but that is professional". Lovely quote.

After all, UK also had this one: "Let us not be beastly to the Gremans".

Ivan
 
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