It could have been debated to death, but...
Looking at beginning of 1943, it did not look good for Germany but not yet totally hopeless.
Manstein's efforts after Stalingrad were spectacular and managed to stabilise the front.
Now, Manstein wanted a continued offensive after the spring thaw. Kursk was the obvious place.
Model was not so sure.
Guderian claimed that the tanks were just not there or ready.
Jodl was not so hot on the idea
Zeitzler was all for it (of course, it was "his" campaign)
Stalin was not sure whether it was going to be Kursk and feared a renewed drive on Moscow
Zhukov was clear on the aim - nearly the only one
Could these have been the scenarios:
1) Leaving Kursk salient to SU to enhance, spending a lot of time and effort and resources on and then not attacking?
2) Attack in the North?
3) Renew the attack in the South and then try for Moscow?
4) Just go for Moscow in July/August?
The thing is that Zhukov and Stalin were perfectly clear on: Germany had not lost a campaign during summer/autumn up until this time. The SU winter offensive were clear winners, but not during the typical "campaign season".
Zhukov in particular feared the german tank armies roaming the country side and was aware that German strategy was not to let taks go head-on into fortified positions as he was building at Kursk.
So, loads of doubts and uncertainty.
BUT if clever people like Zhukov, Stalin, Manstein, et al could see other possibilities for the German armies in 1943, what were those then and how realistic were they?
How much would the situation in the Med have impacted on a more hectic German campaign oputside of Kursk?
What if the Med had stabilised a bit (as it could have)? Then more German divisions would have been available in Russia.
Any takers?
Ivan
Looking at beginning of 1943, it did not look good for Germany but not yet totally hopeless.
Manstein's efforts after Stalingrad were spectacular and managed to stabilise the front.
Now, Manstein wanted a continued offensive after the spring thaw. Kursk was the obvious place.
Model was not so sure.
Guderian claimed that the tanks were just not there or ready.
Jodl was not so hot on the idea
Zeitzler was all for it (of course, it was "his" campaign)
Stalin was not sure whether it was going to be Kursk and feared a renewed drive on Moscow
Zhukov was clear on the aim - nearly the only one
Could these have been the scenarios:
1) Leaving Kursk salient to SU to enhance, spending a lot of time and effort and resources on and then not attacking?
2) Attack in the North?
3) Renew the attack in the South and then try for Moscow?
4) Just go for Moscow in July/August?
The thing is that Zhukov and Stalin were perfectly clear on: Germany had not lost a campaign during summer/autumn up until this time. The SU winter offensive were clear winners, but not during the typical "campaign season".
Zhukov in particular feared the german tank armies roaming the country side and was aware that German strategy was not to let taks go head-on into fortified positions as he was building at Kursk.
So, loads of doubts and uncertainty.
BUT if clever people like Zhukov, Stalin, Manstein, et al could see other possibilities for the German armies in 1943, what were those then and how realistic were they?
How much would the situation in the Med have impacted on a more hectic German campaign oputside of Kursk?
What if the Med had stabilised a bit (as it could have)? Then more German divisions would have been available in Russia.
Any takers?
Ivan