Kursh, 1943 Germans Win Big

TBH there is no POD after the 6th army was destroyed where the Germans could win (ie destroy all the Soviet divisions in the Kursk bulge) at Kursk...

All right, I found the data I was looking for. Otto Ambros was an employee of IG Farben, and discovered both Sarin Nerve Gas and Soman. At the time of the planning of "Citadel", Hitler was seriously contemplating the use of Tabun and Sarin gas against the salient; Albert Speer then brought up Otto Ambros, who managed to convince Hitler not to use the gas since he thought the Western Allies also had their own stocks of Nerve Gas; they would not develop their own stocks until 1949. Thus, gas warfare was not used.

If you kill off Otto Ambrose, it is very likely that Hitler would proceed with the use of Tabun and Sarin against the Kursk salient, which would be devastating to say the least. At the same time however, you prevent the invention of Soman gas.

Source is the "Crime and Punishment of IG Farben"

Quote:
Speer, who was strongly opposed to the introduction of tabun, flew Otto Ambros, I.G.'s authority on poison gas as well as synthetic rubber, to the meeting. Hitler asked Ambros, "What is the other side doing about poison gas?" Ambros explained that the enemy, because of its greater access to ethylene, probably had a greater capacity to produce mustard gas than Germany did. Hitler interrupted to explain that he was not referring to traditional poison gases: "I understand that the countries with petroleum are in a position to make more [mustard gas], but Germany has a special gas, tabun. In this we have a monopoly in Germany." He specifically wanted to know whether the enemy had access to such a gas and what it was doing in this area. To Hitler's disappointment Ambros replied, "I have justified reasons to assume that tabun, too, is known abroad. I know that tabun was publicized as early as 1902, that Sarin was patented and that these substances appeared in patents. (...) Ambros was informing Hitler of an extraordinary fact about one of Germany's most secret weapons. The essential nature of tabun and sarin had already been disclosed in the technical journals as far back as 1902 and I.G. had patented both products in 1937 and 1938. Ambros then warned Hitler that if Germany used tabun, it must face the possibility that the Allies could produce this gas in much larger quantities. Upon receiving this discouraging report, Hitler abruptly left the meeting. The nerve gases would not be used, for the time being at least, although they would continue to be produced and tested.

This isn't a POD that would bring victory at Kursk? :confused:
 
This isn't a POD that would bring victory at Kursk? :confused:

God no... the abwehr had semi decent intel on the British anthrax experiments and enough of the brass knew about it to the extent that they realized that going WMD would go VERY poorly for them. So whilst the idea was discussed several times, the brass was NEVER going to let Hitler do that... even toadie butt boys like Keitel where utterly opposed


And even if they did launch nerve gas at Kursk, the British would retaliate with weaponized anthrax which would end the war in a matter of weeks even if the nazi's refused to surrender, and could have lead to their entire culture being exterminated

Its the most sure loser strategy there is in 1943
 
Ariosto, first, the premise that without one man meeting Hitler then the Nazi hierarchy would have no awareness of the points Otto Ambrose raised seems rather dubious to me.

Second, Soviet intelligence pretty much raped the German preparations for Kursk to the point that the Red Army had months to prepare for the battle so such a dramatic decision by Hitler would also be known well in advance, which would result in preparations by not only the Soviets but the British and Americans. Perhaps the British 'accidentally' leaked the anthrax results and sorrowfully hope Churchill would never have sufficient excuse to unleash such a horror?
 
God no... the abwehr had semi decent intel on the British anthrax experiments and enough of the brass knew about it to the extent that they realized that going WMD would go VERY poorly for them. So whilst the idea was discussed several times, the brass was NEVER going to let Hitler do that... even toadie butt boys like Keitel where utterly opposed


And even if they did launch nerve gas at Kursk, the British would retaliate with weaponized anthrax which would end the war in a matter of weeks even if the nazi's refused to surrender, and could have lead to their entire culture being exterminated

Its the most sure loser strategy there is in 1943

Ariosto, first, the premise that without one man meeting Hitler then the Nazi hierarchy would have no awareness of the points Otto Ambrose raised seems rather dubious to me.

Second, Soviet intelligence pretty much raped the German preparations for Kursk to the point that the Red Army had months to prepare for the battle so such a dramatic decision by Hitler would also be known well in advance, which would result in preparations by not only the Soviets but the British and Americans. Perhaps the British 'accidentally' leaked the anthrax results and sorrowfully hope Churchill would never have sufficient excuse to unleash such a horror?

Point taken. :eek:
 

Hkelukka

Banned
Okay, I'll bite, win big, I'm defining that as a 2 or 3 on a scale of -4 to +4 0 being draw, -4 utter failure and +4 as absolutely glorious victory.

Only way that could happen short of a meteorite impact smack middle of the salient without large POD's some years earlier is one of three things.

1, Attack earlier (unlikely to actually work)

2, Don't attack at all and focus on defence (best option but not what the author meant)

3, Attack somewhere else and abandon attacking Kursk.

Even a well coordinated attack earlier and outside the main salient into unprepared defenses wouldnt manage to bring in more than maybe 3.5-5:1 losses for the SU-Axis, which while very strongly in Axis favor is still tolerable to the soviets. So lets assume best possible outcome, Kursk salient collapses and Germany somehow manages to eliminate most of the resistance. Germany casualties about 250.000 men, soviets lose about 1.000.000-1.500.000 total. Battle of Berlin ends June 2nd 1945 latest. SU would certainly not sue for peace in late summer 1943 even if Axis manage a major victory at Kursk, too little too late.

By 1943 the whole was was on a wrong footing for the Axis, what you would need to have any chance of Germany surviving a 2 front war is either an allied withdrawal and peace by the end of 43 latest or, more likely:

After Stalingrad encirclement Hitler realises that the best Germany can do is a brest-livotsk type2. Orders a breakout from the pocket for as many as possible and turns the Military on a defensive footing and starts sending out peace feelers. Even that is unlikely since western allies are unlikely to agree to a peace, but its the best shot you have, anyway. Major victory at kursk = one month more of survival, maybe.
 
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This could be an interesting thread if you stick to how, given the force ratios and command staffs available, the Germans could have done better. The Soviets had more (and in many respects better) tanks, a huge edge in artillery and warplanes (their planes being now competitive with those of Germany), and far more troops. Thanks to American lendlease, their armies were already more mobile, using trucks while the Germans used horses. They had much shorter supply lines--and reserve armies for use in an emergency. They also had generals who were smarter than their German counterparts and were armed with superb intel. And they had the advantage of being on the defensive. I don't see how the Germans could possible have won if they started the offensive when they did; however, they could have called off the offensive earlier and pulled back to defensible positions; this might conceivably have prolonged the war by a couple of months.

If the Germans had started the offensive a month or so earlier, they would have done better, and might conceivably have won a Pyrric victory of some kind, but it wouldn't have changed the course of the war.
 
Primarily, Soviet command skills do not improve as much as they did in actuality. The Germans still retain clear advantages at Army, Division, Brigade and Batalion levels. The more the battle requires independent decisions, the bigger the German advantage.

So how exactly does this happen? Particularly to favor the Germans? Soviet command structures were not so much abysmal in 1941 and 1942 as it was that their forces were poorly distributed and unable to be co-ordinated. The Soviets were able to start winning defensive victories in early 1941. By 1943 their mobility and manpower advantages were aided by the problem of Kursk that the attack was obvious enough that even a STAVKA made up of drooling idiots would see it.

Then, German Panthers are delivered with their design flaws solved. The Elephants are dropped in favor of more Tigers and Panthers. The alternative Kursk is still very tough, but the Germans break through and force the Soviets to fight spontaneous armoured battles. In the end, they cant compete.

That is just a description for artistic sake of one Brigade facing an individual German unit. The scenario says that Soviet Armoured units are starting to panic as the battle goes truly mobile.

So how is it that the flaws, which were never resolved IOTL, are immediately resolved in 1943 ITTL, given one thing Hitler really can be blamed for is the mistakes with this one? The idea that the Soviets at this phase were not capable of handling maneuver warfare runs aground on the reality where Belgorod-Orel was starting in the middle of the Kursk battle.....

A decisive German win at Kursk would do more than just eliminate a salient. It would also cost the Soviets many of their best units and also show that Soviet skills at most levels were still far behind German skills.

Except that not even Hitler expected such a decisive win.....:rolleyes:


If the Germans were still capable of decisive victories against the Soviets in 1943, they were also capable of knocking the Soviets out of the war (if German victories were matched by political concessions to the Russiana and Ukrainian peoples)

Equivalent to the Confederacy fielding full CSCT in time for the Battle of Rocky Face Gap. :rolleyes:


I agree, but that is due in part because of the "Unconditional Surrender" doctrine of the allies. In effect, the Wermacht had no choice but to fight with the political Nazis to the end.

Given real choices available in a negotiated cease fire, I think the wermacht would either pressure the political Nazis to enter into negotiations, or launch a coup if they refused to do so.

The minor problem with this is that the coup-backers were a tiny minority of the overall Wehrmacht......
 
Everything remains the same except that somehow Soviet command skills at every level do not improve as much as OTL? Not likely.

Nazi Germany trying to set up alternate Russian and Ukrainian governments also does not work. Had Hitler shown a bare minimum of consideration for the Ukrainians the war might not have been lost, going so far as to establish a credible Ukrainian government followed inevitably by a Ukrainian military is entering ASB territory.


D-Day will not be rushed a year or more ahead of schedule.

Had he done that the war wouldnt have started. Besides the Heer could've spent all it's time handing out candt bars and still not gained widespread support.
 
There is a very interesting book by Robin Cross: "Citadel".

It starts with the maous quote from Guderian's book: "How many people do you thinnk even know where Kursk is? It's a matter of profound indifference to the world whether we hold Kursk or not..Why do we want to attack in the East at all this year? Hitler's reply was""you ar quit right. Whenver I think of thios attack my stomach turns over". I answered: "in that case yuor reaction to the rpoblem is the current one. Leave it alone".

What is amazing is that the Germans could bounce back so fast after Stalingrad. Kharkow obviosuly springs to mind.

Could it have been launched in April 1943 with a better result? Maybe. But would it have had a material impact on the ending of the war? probably not.

If there is a thread on: What if "no citadel" and germany having used the time to construct an "east wall"? (put in a withdrawal from Stalingrad without losing the army there), that could be a more worthy alternative.

Maybe that could have prolonged the war until a stalemate of some sort in the east?


Ivan
 
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