Kursh, 1943 Germans Win Big

Despite the Soviet news black out, it becomes very clear that they have suffered a catastrophic defeat involving their best units. Rumors swirl that the Germans want a negotiated peace with the allies and are setting up an alternative Russian and Ukrainian governments.

What happens next?
1.) Will the defeat and alternative governments push the USSR to collapse?
2.) Will the allies rush D-Day?
3.) Will the allies negotiate with the Germans, or still force a total victory?

Even accepting all of the rest of your proposed POD, this one little tidbit here is almost pure ASB, unless you have Hitler killed off or incapacitated in some way. Of course in that situation you have a strong chance of either a 'civil war' of sorts as the various factions in Berlin make a grab for power, or you get someone like Himmler running the show. In either case, a negotiated peace won't even be on the table because either a.)there won't be a unified leadership to negotiate with, or b.) whoever is running the show would think that victory is assured.
 
Even accepting all of the rest of your proposed POD, this one little tidbit here is almost pure ASB, unless you have Hitler killed off or incapacitated in some way. Of course in that situation you have a strong chance of either a 'civil war' of sorts as the various factions in Berlin make a grab for power, or you get someone like Himmler running the show. In either case, a negotiated peace won't even be on the table because either a.)there won't be a unified leadership to negotiate with, or b.) whoever is running the show would think that victory is assured.

Hitler sent peace feelers in December 1942 AND considered an ost wall (ie permanent positions with no new attacks) in 1943... he had considerably reduced his ambitions by that point
 
source please?

Its (the peace feeler) discussed in Dennis Showalter's Patton and Rommel book Men at War in the 20th century and other sources

The ostwall was a conversation between Hitler and Mussolini (mentioned in Guderian's memoirs) where Hitler agrees with him that the war in the east can no longer be won by offensive means and that in order to bring decisive power to bear against the western allied armies, it would be necessary to construct a fortified zone (or ost wall) to allow the axis to consolidate what they where holding after the debacle at Stalingrad

the wiki on the panther wotan line gives you some idea that he was at least semi serious about the idea of a real ost wall

wiki on the subject
 
All right, I found the data I was looking for. Otto Ambros was an employee of IG Farben, and discovered both Sarin Nerve Gas and Soman. At the time of the planning of "Citadel", Hitler was seriously contemplating the use of Tabun and Sarin gas against the salient; Albert Speer then brought up Otto Ambros, who managed to convince Hitler not to use the gas since he thought the Western Allies also had their own stocks of Nerve Gas; they would not develop their own stocks until 1949. Thus, gas warfare was not used.

If you kill off Otto Ambrose, it is very likely that Hitler would proceed with the use of Tabun and Sarin against the Kursk salient, which would be devastating to say the least. At the same time however, you prevent the invention of Soman gas.

Source is the "Crime and Punishment of IG Farben"

Speer, who was strongly opposed to the introduction of tabun, flew Otto Ambros, I.G.'s authority on poison gas as well as synthetic rubber, to the meeting. Hitler asked Ambros, "What is the other side doing about poison gas?" Ambros explained that the enemy, because of its greater access to ethylene, probably had a greater capacity to produce mustard gas than Germany did. Hitler interrupted to explain that he was not referring to traditional poison gases: "I understand that the countries with petroleum are in a position to make more [mustard gas], but Germany has a special gas, tabun. In this we have a monopoly in Germany." He specifically wanted to know whether the enemy had access to such a gas and what it was doing in this area. To Hitler's disappointment Ambros replied, "I have justified reasons to assume that tabun, too, is known abroad. I know that tabun was publicized as early as 1902, that Sarin was patented and that these substances appeared in patents. (...) Ambros was informing Hitler of an extraordinary fact about one of Germany's most secret weapons. The essential nature of tabun and sarin had already been disclosed in the technical journals as far back as 1902 and I.G. had patented both products in 1937 and 1938. Ambros then warned Hitler that if Germany used tabun, it must face the possibility that the Allies could produce this gas in much larger quantities. Upon receiving this discouraging report, Hitler abruptly left the meeting. The nerve gases would not be used, for the time being at least, although they would continue to be produced and tested.
 
In either case, a negotiated peace won't even be on the table because either a.)there won't be a unified leadership to negotiate with, or b.) whoever is running the show would think that victory is assured.
Not if there was a Wermacht coup against Nazi civilian leadership. German Generals knew full well that a negotiated peace was the only solution. Even many of the Waffen SS commanders would probably go along with the Wemacht lead. By 1943, I could see such a coup if Hitler, Himmler and company refused negotiations that would leave Germany in either direct or indirect control over captured eastern territories.
 

Typo

Banned
Not if there was a Wermacht coup against Nazi civilian leadership. German Generals knew full well that a negotiated peace was the only solution. Even many of the Waffen SS commanders would probably go along with the Wemacht lead. By 1943, I could see such a coup if Hitler, Himmler and company refused negotiations that would leave Germany in either direct or indirect control over captured eastern territories.
The problem is that the Wehrmacht itself only had a very small minority in favour of a coup, especially so in 1943, also the Wehrmacht was terrible at politicking and carrying out coups.
 
A big problem is that even if Germany wins the only intention of Kursk was to eliminate a single salient. And as it was, accomplishing that was rather beyond the capacity of the German army by that point. They literally cannot win Zittadelle, they can at best force a tactical inconclusiveness and even then that's a strategic defeat.
 
A big problem is that even if Germany wins the only intention of Kursk was to eliminate a single salient.
A decisive German win at Kursk would do more than just eliminate a salient. It would also cost the Soviets many of their best units and also show that Soviet skills at most levels were still far behind German skills.

If the Germans were still capable of decisive victories against the Soviets in 1943, they were also capable of knocking the Soviets out of the war (if German victories were matched by political concessions to the Russiana and Ukrainian peoples)

The problem is that the Wehrmacht itself only had a very small minority in favour of a coup, especially so in 1943, also the Wehrmacht was terrible at politicking and carrying out coups.
I agree, but that is due in part because of the "Unconditional Surrender" doctrine of the allies. In effect, the Wermacht had no choice but to fight with the political Nazis to the end.

Given real choices available in a negotiated cease fire, I think the wermacht would either pressure the political Nazis to enter into negotiations, or launch a coup if they refused to do so.
 
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Cryptic, it would do no such thing.

It would show that the Germans, by massing unprecedented force levels of armor, even at the expense of other fronts, had gone from sweeping victories that defeated entire nations in 1939-40 to seizing vast areas of the USSR in 1941-42 to being able to seize a single salient in the front at great cost and only after months of effort and a bloodier slogging match than ever before.

Nothing in that gives the slightest sign that Germany was capable of knocking the USSR out of the war.
 
A decisive German win at Kursk would do more than just eliminate a salient. It would also cost the Soviets many of their best units and also show that Soviet skills at most levels were still far behind German skills.

If the Germans were still capable of decisive victories against the Soviets in 1943, they were also capable of knocking the Soviets out of the war (if German victories were matched by political concessions to the Russiana and Ukrainian peoples)


Decisive victory was impossible in 1943. Even Hitler didn't think so, and he was getting progressively more looney toons... he only saw Kursk as something to improve Germany's position (by shortening the front and eliminating some Soviet reserves) somewhat, and as a propaganda tool to show Germany wasn't beaten after Stalingrad.

Eliminating a small bulge in the line isn't much of a strategic objective for an entire campaigning season
 
Cryptic, it would do no such thing.

It would show that the Germans, by massing unprecedented force levels of armor, even at the expense of other fronts, had gone from sweeping victories that defeated entire nations in 1939-40 to seizing vast areas of the USSR in 1941-42 to being able to seize a single salient in the front at great cost and only after months of effort and a bloodier slogging match than ever before.

Nothing in that gives the slightest sign that Germany was capable of knocking the USSR out of the war.

After Stalingrad, not even the party hatchetmen thought that was still possible (hitler included)
 
Cryptic, it would do no such thing.

It would show that the Germans, by massing unprecedented force levels of armor, even at the expense of other fronts, had gone from sweeping victories that defeated entire nations in 1939-40 to seizing vast areas of the USSR in 1941-42 to being able to seize a single salient in the front at great cost and only after months of effort and a bloodier slogging match than ever before.

Nothing in that gives the slightest sign that Germany was capable of knocking the USSR out of the war.

Grimm Reaper and Blair Witch,

The military victory at Kursk is only half of the German equation. The other half would have to be political and that would involve setting up real Ukrainian and Russian alternative governments. Even after years of German atrocities, there were still plenty of Russians and especially, Ukrainians willing to fight Stalin.

The German rascist doctrine was mellowing slightly. Vlasov was allowed to raise an Army and an SS Division was recruited among Ukrainians. The Germans had to turn away thousands of willing Ukrainians. A German alternative government propaganda at Smolensk in 1943 was met with real enthusiasm.
 
Its (the peace feeler) discussed in Dennis Showalter's Patton and Rommel book Men at War in the 20th century and other sources

The ostwall was a conversation between Hitler and Mussolini (mentioned in Guderian's memoirs) where Hitler agrees with him that the war in the east can no longer be won by offensive means and that in order to bring decisive power to bear against the western allied armies, it would be necessary to construct a fortified zone (or ost wall) to allow the axis to consolidate what they where holding after the debacle at Stalingrad

the wiki on the panther wotan line gives you some idea that he was at least semi serious about the idea of a real ost wall

wiki on the subject


I'm still skeptical of Germany sending out peace feelers after a successful Kursk. As you said, in December of '42 he discussed such a possibility, yet in the very same month he declared war on the US. Also, 1942 Hitler was not as batshit insane as 1943 Hitler, and much of his inner circle seemed perfectly happy to climb aboard the train to crazy town right along side him.

Even so, I'm not sure that the Soviets would be willing to even sit at the table with the Germans even after a loss at Kursk, it would probably take at least another major defeat(see ASB) before they considered such a thing. Nobody trusted hitler to abide by any kind of agreement at that point, and unless threatened with total annihilation, nobody was going to even consider a peace deal with the bastard.
 
I'm still skeptical of Germany sending out peace feelers after a successful Kursk. As you said, in December of '42 he discussed such a possibility, yet in the very same month he declared war on the US. Also, 1942 Hitler was not as batshit insane as 1943 Hitler, and much of his inner circle seemed perfectly happy to climb aboard the train to crazy town right along side him.

Even so, I'm not sure that the Soviets would be willing to even sit at the table with the Germans even after a loss at Kursk, it would probably take at least another major defeat(see ASB) before they considered such a thing. Nobody trusted hitler to abide by any kind of agreement at that point, and unless threatened with total annihilation, nobody was going to even consider a peace deal with the bastard.


The defeat at Stalingrad, broke Hitler deeply... Guderian and Speer's accounts show him as extremely depressed and having moments of war is lost attitude (especially tied in with failure in Africa as well)

TBH there is no POD after the 6th army was destroyed where the Germans could win (ie destroy all the Soviet divisions in the Kursk bulge) at Kursk...

However... the Germans themselves built several excellent defensive lines around the salient (for example belgorad had 3 defensive lines protecting it from the east and 7 from the north)... if the Germans stayed put and waited for the Russians to attack in that sector (which they had also spent the last several months fortifying) its possible they could win a bloody defensive battle (win in the sense that they inflict a high body count whilst keeping their own losses under control)

Couple that with the extremely slow and disapointing progress in Italy, its not impossible that Hitler and or Stalin might try to send feelers again
 
Cryptic, Vlasov's 'army' never amounted to anything militarily and after murdering several million Russians and Ukrainians it is far too late to suddenly discover either an interest or an ability to form puppet Russian or Ukrainian regimes. Nor would a few small units equipped with outdated infantry weapons achieve anything, least of all with Germany's occupation zone in the east continuing to shrink.

The claim that German racist doctrine was mellowing slightly is absolutely false.
 
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