Korean War WI: MacArthur Advances While Preparing for Chinese Entry

As UN forces advanced up the Korean Peninsula, and amid increasing warnings that China may intervene, (along with Chinese statements themselves) suppose MacArthur accepts the possibility and need to prepare, but is still committed to an advance to the Yalu. Much better PR for him that way--can't have people saying he was scared of the commies! So, the advance to the Yalu itself past a certain point is much lighter, with a fall-back line set up with defensive preparations in the event the PRC enters the war directly.

What else would have been done to guard against the possibility of holding Korea against the potential size of a Chinese intervention? Would this precautionary behavior be enough to satisfy Mao and his inner circle that the UN advance would not proceed into China itself? More skeptically, would the risk of attacking into prepared defenses even be a deterrent?

The Korean War was costly enough for the PRC IOTL for it to have been a bit shaken, presumably ITTL the situation would be worse unless there's an earlier cease fire.
 
The question could MacArthur have had a stop line across the narrow waist of Korea so that it would have stabilized there (Pyyongyan and Humnang held by UN) and then perhaps some advance beyond that to a truce line that had a N. Korea perhaps half or less the size as now?
 
At the tactical &operational levels it would slow the advance north. OTL the UN forces achieved speed vs the NKPA remnants by concentrating on the main roads & ignoring the remnants in the flanking hill country. The Chinese took advantage of that & sent light infantry ahead through the hill country to flank & surround the leading UN columns.

To counter the infiltrating forces, which varied by location from battalion to division strength, the UN columns would have to divert strong reconissance elements into the uplands, & then as they met serious resistance follow up with stronger probes or attacks, and start placing strong points and reserves to the flanks. All that would reduce the main columns and slow them in cutting northwards through the NKPA & Chinese delaying positions.

A alternate course would be to pull up short at the end of November or early December. OTL the UN advance was going faster than the Chinese could deploy. Their solution was to commit a portion of their advance force to a series of brief delaying attacks against the heads of the UN columns. That bought the Chinese a few days to get their infiltration flanking forces better positioned. This Thanksgiving battle should have been a giant red warning flag to the US Army. when they secured the assorted battlefields they counted hundreds of dead who were wearing Chinese uniforms & lying with Chinese army weapons. Chinese army documents were picked off the dead by the bag full. Equally important several dozen prisoners were interrogated who spoke neither Japanese nor Korean as a NKPA soldier would have.

Had the US Army interpreted the intel gathered from the Thanksgiving battle better they may have:

The question could MacArthur have had a stop line across the narrow waist of Korea so that it would have stabilized there (Pyyongyan and Humnang held by UN) and then perhaps some advance beyond that to a truce line that had a N. Korea perhaps half or less the size as now?

Having the following forces halt and start organizing a defense zone with reserves & secure flanks, while the leading groups make a more circumspect reconissance in force north. That would have prevented the massive ambush of December & the subsequent rout of 8th Army.
 
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