Korean war - plenty of What if's..

[ivanotter]

All,

It seems as though all decisions - on all sides - were ill-informed. It seems hard to popint at something going right and was actually planned.

1) Could anyone else but MacArthur have been appointed? Was it totally impossible to overlook him? after all, he was in 70's

2) Was it possible to stop at 38 line in 1950 and somehow get to talk to China about this?

3) Was it possible (prior to 1950) to get red of Syngman Rhe? To somehow work with what was possible in the entire Korea?

4) Was it inevitable to have China getting involved? Could it have been possible to invade like half of North Korea and maker a deal with China where everybody avoids loosing face (kick out Kim Il-Sung and Syngman?)

Really going back to 1945 - What about NOT rely on Japanese forces to the extent US did? would it have made a major difference?

It is a fascinating piece of history, but still remains a bit of an enigma

Ivan

 

[Winestu]

What do yo mean “rely on Japanese forces?”

 

[Kaze]

1.
Matthew Ridgeway - could be appointed. He was there, he was running the war - and he might be more level headed (I am being conservative about "Old Iron Tits").
2.
It could happen. The problem would be WHICH China? There were two China's at the time and taking to either would bog down the discourse. You might have to pull a Nixon goes to China early ... and that might be a political problem back home with the lunatic called McCarthy in Washington obsessed with "finding enemies"
3.
Getting China involved... (See #2)

 

[Deleted member 1487]

1) Could anyone else but MacArthur have been appointed? Was it totally impossible to overlook him? after all, he was in 70's

Seems like no, as the Joint Chiefs all recommended MacArthur, so it would be tough not to given his experience as THE army commander in the Pacific and that he was the supreme commander of allied forces in Japan already.

3) Was it possible (prior to 1950) to get red of Syngman Rhe? To somehow work with what was possible in the entire Korea?

Again no unless Rhee died. The US wanted a puppet leader who would do as told, be anti-communist, and be a known quantity untainted by the years of Japanese occupation. Prior to returning to Korea he had lived in the US for over 20 years and was well connected to Korean independence groups and was president of a provisional government in Shanghai in the 1920s until impeached for misuse of power, but still somehow claimed the position. The clincher though was his work to convince the US government to recognize a provisional government including him during WW2 and worked with the OSS against Japan and then acted as the Korean provisional government's representative to the UN in 1945. It also didn't hurt he spoke fluent English and understood American culture after having lived there for decades while very few Americans understood Korean or Korea and he could be 'their man' on the ground. Plus he was also a bulwark against popular movements within the country who weren't particularly interested in being dominated by yet another outside power after having the opportunity to get Japan out and China not being able to dominate them either.

 

[ivanotter]

Apparently, when the US forces arrived, the only group they recognized as reasonable organized to keep 'order' was the Japanese forces still in country. Even after the Japanese had been sent home, the Korean collaborators were put in charge of police and army. It ranks right up there with asking SS to keep order in Poland after May 1945.

Syngman was probably also seen as 'un-tainted' and a pleasant person due to his mastery of English. He was not 'alien' as the in-country Korean politicians.

However, insofar as Mao was just starting to consolidate 'his' China and Stalin was not interested in Korea, there seems to me that a golden opportunity to create a unified Korea went away pretty fast. It would have required US occupation forces to recognize that the socialist/communist factions (not yet tied to China/USSR) were legitimate representations of Korean aspirations.

Was that even possible? MacArthur was not overly aligned to communism.

I have this notion that MacArthur could have been 'side-lined' being in 'overall command' from Tokyo and somebody else being 'supreme' in Korea - keeping MacArthur out of it.

… But then would Inchon have happened? Nobody wanted it, except MacArthur and his court. Was Inchon genius or gamble?

Ivan

 

[Sam R.]

Three Korean “revolutionary” factions were tied to existing Stalinoid operations: Moscow line, Mao-line and Kim-line. Then you’ve got the indigenous stay behind CP, eventually divided north and south, and the revolutionary working class itself.

The fantasy of a Tito or Minh as a nationalist is belied by the very Leninism of their nationalism. Now expecting US backwater operators who fucked up Korea historically to have a complex awareness of intra Leninist organisational conflict and the role of nationalist nomenklatura running under socialist cover in betraying the revolution is as ridiculous as expecting the US to use the PSI to control the Italian working class. (The PSI of course did that for their own reasons).

 

[Admiral Fischer]

Again no unless Rhee died. The US wanted a puppet leader who would do as told, be anti-communist, and be a known quantity untainted by the years of Japanese occupation. Prior to returning to Korea he had lived in the US for over 20 years and was well connected to Korean independence groups and was president of a provisional government in Shanghai in the 1920s until impeached for misuse of power, but still somehow claimed the position. The clincher though was his work to convince the US government to recognize a provisional government including him during WW2 and worked with the OSS against Japan and then acted as the Korean provisional government's representative to the UN in 1945. It also didn't hurt he spoke fluent English and understood American culture after having lived there for decades while very few Americans understood Korean or Korea and he could be 'their man' on the ground. Plus he was also a bulwark against popular movements within the country who weren't particularly interested in being dominated by yet another outside power after having the opportunity to get Japan out and China not being able to dominate them either.

Though the US military government initially backed Rhee, soon it became crystal clear that Rhee's nationalist politics weren't necessarily working for American interests, as his crusade against the proposed Soviet-American trusteeship in Korea showed. By 1946 the military government was promoting a coalition headed by Lyuh Woon-hyung and Kim Kyu-sik over Rhee's nationalists for their conciliatory approach to the trusteeship and moderate politics. But Rhee survived the military government's active disempowerment tactics within the Interim Legislative Assembly such as voiding the election results to force a re-election, while Lyuh was assassinated before the efforts for a progressive-moderate coalition could bear any fruit. Even though the efforts to build such a coalition continued after his death, it ultimately died off as the Cold War left no room for the left-wing politics, and the Americans saw the writing on the wall and came to accept Rhee.

 

[ric350]

I’ve mentioned these ideas in other posts, but here are my two takes on the Korean War:

Good outcome - After Inchon, allies forces spread west, blocking the North Korean armies escape, while the Pusan forces drive north. The North Korean army is destroyed. At the same time, the South Korean army is tasked with liberating Seoul. Allied forces then move north, capture Pyongyang and establish a new fortified demarcation border north of the city. China is contacted via back channels that the remaining North Korean territories can become a “Chinese protectorate” if desired.

Bad Outcome - The North waits two additional years before attacking, and in that period, the US Navy ceases to exist as a global surface force (also the nuclear Nautilus never happens, so that massive butterfly takes flight).

ric350

 

[ivanotter]

Ric: That is indeed a very bleak outcome.

IF USN had been run down faster, would it totally have negated any Korean involvement? I believe the rationale was that the air force would drop nuclear bombs on any country if need be, wherefore USN was not needed at all.

The British carrier force at that time was still substantial? (enough?)

Were the lessons learned projected into Vietnam? Which I doubt very much. Starting with propping up a corrupt and unpopular dictator.

Was Chinese intervention inevitable?

 

[NORGCO]

Ric: That is indeed a very bleak outcome.

IF USN had been run down faster, would it totally have negated any Korean involvement? I believe the rationale was that the air force would drop nuclear bombs on any country if need be, wherefore USN was not needed at all.

The British carrier force at that time was still substantial? (enough?)

Were the lessons learned projected into Vietnam? Which I doubt very much. Starting with propping up a corrupt and unpopular dictator.

Was Chinese intervention inevitable?

No Korean war in 1950 means no sudden American revelation that the war in Indochina was a valient stand against international communism, rather than one more post-WWII attempt to reimpose colonial rule. Therefore no flood of American aid to the French Union Forces but also no flow of captured American arms to the VietMinh. French accounts - see Bernard Falls books such as Street without Joy and Hell in a Very Small Place - are bitter about that, with comments that they got WWII leftover American arms but the VietMinh got brand new straight off the production line American weapons captured during the retreat from the Yalu. It might not be true but they seem(ed) to believe it.

Therefore a much weaker French military, and a different set of French complaints about its US Allie. Instead of 'they should have sent B-29's/Nukes to save us at Dien Bien Phu' it would be 'we would have won with more American Aid'. How much of a difference that would make to US/French relations, and for that matter the whole way the Indochina war went would be the subject of a good alt hist/debate thread.

If a weaker French army loses a year or two earlier from the more straightforward lack of equipment and not having draftee troops available for a colonial war, would they be more or less desperate to win in Algeria in the late fifties, which was NOT a colonial war from the French Governments perspective, Algeria being France in the same way that Alaska is America?

Also there is the mentioned issue of the North Koreans invading a few years later meaning the US has run down it's military so far it has nothing to respond with except Nukes. How badly would the embarrassment of that influence the country?

 

[DougM]

I think you could easily skip Mac. If the president does not want him he is skipped. If you want an excuse to skip him. He is acting as the emperor I mean Governor of Japan. And the president does not want to short change either Japan or Korea buy combining the two jobs. As they are both full time jobs.

 

[rick007]

I heard that there was a chance for peace in late 1950. How? Well it seems that Mao's favorite son, Mao Anying, was killed during an American air raid on November 25 of that year. Had the raid not happened, or if the younger Mao had lived, peace might have come sooner and, maybe with different terms.

 

[phx1138]

Could anyone else but MacArthur have been appointed?

As others have said, it seems unlikely. Somebody, like Ridgway, in local control might have worked, with benefits to outcomes... Frex, he probably wouldn't have allowed the division of Korea in effectively two theatres, with mountains between

Was it possible to stop at 38 line in 1950 and somehow get to talk to China about this?

Unquestionably--without MacArthur in charge. His move north provoked the PRC into invading...

There's an argument to be made for moving further north, to the "neck", & allowing a "rump" DRK as a buffer for PRC; chances are good said *DRK doesn't last 50+yr...

Was it inevitable to have China getting involved?

Without question (see above).

Could it have been possible to invade like half of North Korea and maker a deal with China where everybody avoids loosing face?

That seems possible, tho you'd need better diplomacy than the U.S. displayed OTL; not least, you'd need to give PRC flat guarantees you'll stop at (say) 40 North--& keep them, even if it means throwing MacArthur under the nearest Jeep. (I suppose a standing order to his aide to do so is illegal; is a promise of a pardon if he does? )

It would have required US occupation forces to recognize that the socialist/communist factions (not yet tied to China/USSR) were legitimate representations of Korean aspirations.

It requires the U.S. government to recognize it. That seems unlikely, all considered.

would Inchon have happened?

Never happens, because, without MacArthur's screwup bringing in the PLA, the UN forces aren't driven back & no evac is ever required.

. Was Inchon genius or gamble?

I take option 3: bungle. MacArthur got away with it. Credit should go to the USCG sailors who manned the LC; they're the ones who made it work.

Let me offer one back to you: WI the U.S. doesn't ask for Sov aid against Japan in the first place? That requires Nimitz & English/Lockwood to be a trifle smarter about sub dispositions, to end the war a bit sooner, & maybe a bit of creative use of CV air against bridges & tunnels in Japan, to cut her internal LOCs. (Throwing MacArthur under a Jeep in '42 or '43 would be good, too. )

That avoids Sov material being used by CCP to win the Civil War, & avoids a Sov occupation zone, splitting Korea, in the first place.

No Korean War at all means Japan's recovery is a lot slower, since now, AFUS doesn't need her manufacturing to supply trucks & such. A weaker Japan makes SU stronger in Asia. OTOH, if ROC controls the mainland instead of PRC...

Slower Japanese recovery benefits the U.S. car industry, which can go on building junk a few more years--but means it's likely to crash harder when Japan finally catches up. It also means VW is a bit better off, without Japanese competition, & the Type 1 may last a trifle longer, while the *Golf/Rabbit is delayed.

 

[Defeatisnotanoption]

IRL 20 minutes before MacArthur put down at a South Korean Airfield (If i recall right, this was June 26-27th), North Korean Air Force Yak-9 fighters bombed it and shot up several cargo planes on the tarmac. I've always wondered what would have happened had his time table been moved up, having his plane shot down as it came in for landing by a Communist Pilot. I think if the war goes much the same, that the U.N is forced to rely on a breakout from Pusan sometime in mid September '50', with a landing at Inchon having been written off by the Joint Chiefs (As they tried to IRL)