KMT wins Chinese Civil War, effects on Indochina?

The French had three years to wipe out the Viet Minh before the Chinese Communists arrived on the Chinese-Vietnamese border and failed to do so. So I am skeptical of the argument that they could have done so if the Chinese Civil War had turned out otherwise. (Of course failing to wipe out the Vett Minh does not mean necessarily mean actually losing the war.)

The French were actually fairly successful before 1949. They restored their control of southern Vietnam in 1946. By the end of the year, they had retaken Hanoi and Haiphong. By 1947, the Vietnamese Communists were driven into the jungle. They survived, but really lacked any power to drive out the French. While the French weren't successful in wiping them out, the French were adapting their tactics. In a famous incident in October 1947, French paratroopers almost captured Ho Chi Minh and Vo Ngyuen Giap.

In general, France achieved many tactical successes in 1947-1948. They just failed in achieving a strategic success. However, that only meant the Vietnamese Communists could prolong the war. They had no ability to win until China fell to the Communists, and Mao could give them lots of support.

At that point the Communists could begin to put real pressure on the French and build up their forces.

IOTL, stalemate favored the Communists because it meant long term they could build up their forces. ITTL, the same stalemate actually favor the non-Communists because it means they can build up their forces.

Without a patron to support them directly, I don't think the Vietnamese Communists will be any more successful than the Malaysian Communists were. They could very well survive in the jungle and inaccessible parts, but they won't be able to control any sizable territory and certainly nothing important.

France also realized that old style colonialism was no longer possible, and accepted that some form of independence had to be granted. They were willing to work with non-Communist nationalists by 1948 as long as they agreed to work within a French framework and accommodate certain French interests. (that the US was prepared to only provide aid if some form of independence was granted was also a factor).

In a scenario where the Vietnamese Communists lack a patron, then inevitably the Vietnamese nationalists are going to win since they do have patrons (France and later the US) and control of the most economically productive regions. As they establish real independence from the French and built their own army, more of the Vietnamese supporters will defect from the Communists to the government, as they aren't ideologically driven.

Of course, knowing that China would not become Communist probably changes some of the tactics of Ho and Giap. It's entirely possible they will reach some kind of accommodation with the State of Vietnam and emphasize their nationalism.

To win, the French don't need to wipe out the Communists. They just need a stable State of Vietnam that can slowly deprive the Communists of its support in the rural areas.

It is not impossible for the Communists to win ITTL, but highly unlikely.
 
That's a good point. A lot depends on whether the US provides assistance to the French or not. The Truman Administration was against providing support until the North Koreans invaded the south.

If the North Koreans invade South Korea then the US feels it has to stop the advance of Communism in Asia; and it would provide assistance like it did in OTL. If Kim-Il-Sung doesn't get the green light from Stalin; I'd imagine the French would muddle along like they were doing in the 1946-1949 period.
In this case, it would be hard for the Viet-Minh to expand the insurgency and would be unable to field large units like it was in 1950.
 
It is important to note that while the Chinese communists did give aid to the Viet Minh, it wasn't an overwhelming amount. I had lost the document I had about their aid (didn't save PDFs so regularly several years ago) but now re-found it; the Chinese gave the Communists about 1/5 of their weapons, and this was worth 1/9 of the American contribution to the French side by the Americans.

To note concerning the document "The Role of Sanctuary in Insurgency: Communist China's support to the Viet Minh", a paper by the RAND corporation;

"Chinese supplies rose from 10 to 20 tons per month in
1951, to 250 tons per month by the end of 1952, then to between 400 and 600 tons in 1953 and to 1,500 tons when the battle of Dienbienphu began; they reached a peak of 4,000 tons in June 1954. By the time of the cease-fire
in 1954, the Communist Chinese are reported to have trained,
in China, some 40,000 Vietminh military personnel. To Vietnam itself, the Chinese committed limited numbers of
personnel, largely in training and technical capacities, and a few military and political advisors."


This is obviously a large amount by 1954, but it is important to note that in 1950-1951 the Viet Minh were able to launch large, full-scale conventional offensives against the French; from my recollection of the readings I had done, these were very close affairs. The French managed to blunt them through throwing everything they had into the fighting, and they did survive and win that campaign, but that was when the Chinese were only sending the Viet Minh 10-20 tons per month and with training that was still limited. With minimal support from the Chinese, the Viet Minh were thus able to engage in a full conventional war; not as well as the French perhaps, but they were getting better. Chinese support with artillery and additional supplies would be important for victory at Bien Dien Phu, and Chinese training was important in helping the Vietnamese to improve their forces for the 1951 offensive, but the Vietnamese were able to achieve this after only relatively minor assistance from the Chinese, and when their abilities were growing before the Chinese ever entered the fight.

Of course as is noted, the propaganda and morale effect is important; the Chinese communists winning showed the Viet Minh that victory was possible and must have increased their hopes. Still in material terms, the Viet Minh were fighting the French to a draw before the Chinese communists showed up, and generally improving from the 1947 nadir when their situation was at its worst for them. It might be possible that without the Chinese communists in the picture the French are able to not lose; that doesn't say they will win either. The French weren't standing still either, and they steadily improved their propaganda network, local defense units (especially Catholic defensive units), their allied Vietnamese army, the capabilities and legitimacy of their allied states, and political arm, but these were only doing so much. Furthermore, without a Chinese Communist victory, American aid might be reduced or even not arrive; as noted the French received somewhere around 9 times as much aid from the Americans as the Vietnamese did from the Chinese. Thus, a lack of Communist victory might hurt French forces as well.

Whether these would result in a Viet Minh victory is up for debate, but I'm personally unconvinced that victory was really possible for the French after a failure to destroy the rebellion in the starting period of the war or negotiate a political agreement early on. I do admit the great importance of sanctuary for rebels though; there are some claims that every effective guerrilla war has required a sanctuary for their victory. In general I hold a view that the French did militarily as well as they could; they made terrible mistakes in 1954 of course, but they did fight a war in the region for 8 years, which is pretty good considering their post-WW2 military, political, and economic problems, the distance they were fighting at, and the effectiveness of their opposition. Against an admittedly stronger North Vietnam the active involvement of the Americans was the same span of years. A political victory for the Viet Minh might ultimately be a possibility, but it might take longer.
 
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