KiwiTL: A Very Substantial Opportunity

Chapter Four: A Match Made In Heaven

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After the 1993 election, I’m afraid I spent rather less time on politics and rather more time establishing some sort of career and romantic life. In the May of 1995, for instance, I was simultaneously engaged in showing bored tourists around the Auckland Museum and figuring out ways of proposing to a girl I was seeing who, in the end, told me to fuck off. I was not involved at all in the King Country by-election, but since I’m getting quite into this thing, I’ll tell you about it.


Since the departure of Winston from the National Party, the dominant position within that caucus had been held by Ruth Richardson - even more so once the Class of 1990 was thinned out by the Labour resurgence in 1993. Almost all of the National MPs who had been approached to join the Liberals had lost their seats anyway, and most of the ones left in caucus had been mollified by positions in Cabinet or other perks. For the second time in less than ten years, a Prime Minister would be the only person capable of restraining an over-mighty ultra-right-wing Finance Minister. But Jim Bolger was no David Lange. He arrived at the caucus meeting in which he intended to announce the shuffling of Richardson to Education to find a confidence motion in himself already under way, and despite an impassioned speech or two, he was defeated 41-10. Richardson was immediately elected National Party Leader (and, therefore, PM) on 21 May 1994.


To his credit, Bolger stayed on in Parliament for several months, always plotting in the internal anti-Richardson opposition, but when the Government announced that the Ministry of Works was to be sold off to a company owned by the People’s Republic of China in February 1995, he resigned his seat in protest - although never a man for grand gestures, he acted out a symbolic dust-shaking from his feet on the steps of Parliament House and never visited again.


Despite the flak he got for egotism and a lack of dedication to seeing the fight through (none of which was really deserved), the gesture did produce something concrete: a by-election in King Country. King Country is probably the most rural, dispersed general electorate in the North Island, and had been a National stronghold since the year dot. The largest settlement is probably Te Kuiti, a town of around 5,000 souls and even fewer people. It is hard to campaign there.


That didn’t stop a few parties trying. There were the standard Natural Law and Christian Heritage candidates, the smallest of the minnows, whose members must have been singularly dedicated - I couldn’t understand why they bothered, and I’d been a member of two minor parties. There was also a curiously humourless McGillicuddy Serious Party candidate, whose candidature in many ways foretold the slow death of whatever fun was to be had in their one ‘joke’. NewLabour, who evidently had no organisation here (which was a change from when I had been a member: at that point, the standard boast was that the NLP had a branch in every electorate) had stood Kevin Campbell, who I had known when I lived in Christchurch. The Greens were evidently similarly weak, as their candidate was Rod Donald, another South Islander and, until a couple of years beforehand, the National Spokesman of the last remnants of the Electoral Reform Coalition. Since the failure of the 1990 referendum, they had shrunk down to a few dozen True Believers and Constitutional bores, and Donald had presumably felt the need to feel the Politics blowing through his hair.


Slightly more surprising was Labour’s decision to stand a Wellingtonian rugby player, Chris Laidlaw, who had entered Parliament in the 1992 by-election for Wellington Central and been defeated the next year on new boundaries. This by-election had been back when I was in NewLabour: our candidate got 6% in the by-election while the Greens got 15%, which was grimly predictable at that point. Anyway, Laidlaw tried to it all again in King Country, and did a decent job, despite himself: he was actually very close to winning the seat in the end, although this was not in any way down to his own qualities. As I understand it, he only won Wellington Central because New Zealanders always vote for a sportsman.


National presented for the approval of the electorate a dairy man by the name of Owen Jennings, who had until recently been President of Federated Farmers. He made no bones about being a supporter of Ruth Richardson, and this was not a welcome position in King Country, which had been loyal to Bolger ever since the 1970s.


This naturally played into our hands. Despite the rumours in 1994 of Bolger joining Winston Peters, nothing had come of it, and it was felt in the Liberal Party that after a rebrand, we could have a serious stab at presenting ourselves as the true heirs of the National Party. To do this, we made an attempt to simultaneously reduce the amount of centrist vote-splitting and also take in some competent campaigners: we merged with the Democrats.


The Democrats, a 1985 rebrand of the Social Credit Party, had been in a parlous state for the last few years. Their earlier right-populist image had been shed, perhaps unwisely, to attempt to take votes from the left of Labour - the rebrand had only served to split the party and abandon their protest-vote brand. And now they had no clear direction. Their last respectable performance had been a surprise second place in the Tamaki by-election, and they often polled in double figures or less.


They had attempted form an electoral alliance with NewLabour while I was a member, but had been rebuffed due to the fact that we had literally nothing in common with them apart from a certain lack of success. But in 1995, we Liberals were in a position of needing their entrenched organisation and they were in a position of needing the relative popularity and wealth of the Liberals - although we all viewed the Social Credit pyramid scheme with a mixture of suspicion and contempt, we found when we talked to them for five minutes that, well - so did they. It was a match made in heaven. Now we needed to take full advantage of the honeymoon period.


The candidate for King Country was John Wright, who despite being from Rangiora and not hugely overwhelming in person, insisted on standing. He had been the leader of the Democrats, and we thought that his reduction in status from Leader to Deputy Leader was payment enough for a Parliamentary candidacy. The Democrats had garnered around 10% of the vote in 1993, which made it one of their strongest electorates - we hoped that it would go forward as a strong electorate for the new-found ‘Liberal Democrats’. Despite some mockery in the media for the awkward name, it sounded decent, and we were confident that our 310 roadside signs across King Country would be sufficient to advertise the rebrand.


The Democrats who turned up to campaign were phenomenal - I went down to Otorohanga for election day, and these relatively elderly folk had done one pass already and got the kettle on by the time I arrived at 9 AM. Our orange signs, blazoned with the face of John Wright and the slogan ‘Working for King Country’, looked the business compared to the 1993 vintage ones, as I noticed on the way down.


As far as King Country can ever buzz, it was buzzing on that cold May day. Activists from three parties could be seen pounding the streets of provincial towns, and were engaging in largely harmless banter with one another when they came into contact. Some of the locals were even induced to leave their homes and get involved in this niche spectator sport - by, for instance, voting.


The result was not one which put any minds to rest on election night itself: from the perspective of the left, Labour actually lost votes, which was against the grain of the polls, but the worst thing from their perspective was that, if the Greens and NewLabour had not stood, they probably would have won despite their best efforts. The micro-parties themselves were spectacularly unsuccessful - barely worth mentioning.


The main story, though, was the winner. It was John Wright, of the Liberal Democrats, by a margin of eight votes. Somehow, we - and I use the word ‘we’ in the widest possible sense - had done it by opposing Ruthanasia, and proposing something better. In my mind, that was perhaps the high point of minor party success in the 1990s, at least - it was the first time in a long time that someone had won a seat without previously holding it as a member of a larger party, and the Liberal Democrats jumped to 37% in the polls in the immediate aftermath. The feeling in those heady days was one of energetic optimism: we were sure that Winston Peters would be Prime Minister next year, surer than we had been since the foundation of the Liberal Party. At that point, even a fundamental realignment of New Zealand politics was possible. The elation, even in my own Electorate Committee, when all the votes had been counted and verified, was palpable.


I think back to that day sometimes, and wonder if it would have felt different if electoral reform had passed in 1990. Of course, it might not have happened at all, but if it had, I feel that it would have been less of a victory. For one thing, Parliament would have been full of minor parties after the 1993 election, so it would have been less of a watershed, and for another, the main focus of political campaigning would be for the Proportional section, so the possession of each individual electorate would be irrelevant to the shape of Parliament. It would have been a meaningless victory in a changed game. The sport of politics would be different: much less bloody and much less exciting, and I don’t think it would be enjoyed by nearly as many people if the rules were fair. Whether that’s a good thing or a bad thing depends on your perspective, I suppose.

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This is beautiful. To make sure I am getting this right, the Muldoonites and merging with the SoCreds?
 
This is beautiful. To make sure I am getting this right, the Muldoonites and merging with the SoCreds?
Well, the portion of the Muldoonites who left with Winston, which is by no means all of them, yes. And along the way, the Liberals have picked up the soggy right wing of NewLabour. But yes, that's right.
 
Chapter Five: The Green Party, 1990-2002

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People often - well, sometimes - ask me why the NewLabour Party was so much more successful than the Green Party, in contrast to the situation in almost every other country with a Green Party. The answer, of course, is that we weren’t. But it would be fair to say that the Greens owe most of their Parliamentary success to the NLP.


The Greens beat the NLP in the popular vote in every general election in the 1990s, despite the fact that they only stood a full slate of candidates in ‘96 and ‘99. If you take into account the shortage of candidates, their national vote-share was consistently around 9-10% in that period, which is pretty good for an FPP electoral system. In 1998, there was even a fact-finding group from the Green Party of England and Wales sniffing around.


They had an inherent base - a base of middle-class hippies, anti-nuclear campaigners, a section of the Maori Rights vote after Mana Motuhake declined, and of course all the dope-smokers and Blue-Green environmentalists. It was a base which had never really been served by a political party before - a base which hadn’t really existed before the 1960s - and they were able to branch out from that into the left-of-Roger vote which the other minor parties largely focused on, to create a decent few results. By contrast, the NLP’s claimed base of working-class men and women was, for starters, not very big (the urban proletariat, as political scientists call it, has never been more than a minority in New Zealand, and the boom and crash of the mid-80s effectively ended it as a meaningful political force). It was also not exclusive to the NLP, since the Labour brand still had a hold on them and Winston Peters’ charisma had an appeal as well. This was why the NLP was never going to reach 10%.


But the NLP had a few strengths: it had a passionate activist base of ex-Labour members, which the Greens did not have. The Green idea of campaigning was to stand in town centres holding homemade cardboard signs about how buying things was murder or whatever. Even at their height, the Greens couldn’t muster a thousand members, and these members were largely your rudderless hippies and other unreliable sorts, so even getting four or five of them together was an exercise in exhaustion and futility. Their organisation was very nearly non-existent.


The NLP’s other strength was that its voters were concentrated in high numbers in one or two electorates - chiefly Sydenham, in which Jim Anderton had the status of a God-Emperor. The Greens did not lack for personalities, but they did lack for personalities as locally popular as Jim. The closest they ever really got was the locally notorious, like Mike Ward in Nelson. The NLP, for better or worse, focused in every election on keeping Sydenham, with maybe a couple of other targets to which activists poured. The Greens, although lacking activists, copied this strategy, and it was one which brought them the only success they had in the 1990s.


They had beaten us in many electorates in 1990, when they were only a few months old as a Party, and had even exceeded 10% of the vote in half a dozen of them. The piece de resistance, though, was Coromandel, where Jeanette Fitzsimons hauled in 20%. I met her briefly when she was campaigning in the Tauranga by-election in 1992, and she seemed like one of the more grounded Greens. I didn’t think of her again until she increased her vote to 24% in Hauraki (the renamed Coromandel electorate) in 1993. In 1996, she won it from National.


This flew in the face of what Greeny-hippy-turned-political-scientist Steven Rainbow predicted in 1991: that the Greens would be dead as a party as soon as they stopped being flavour of the month, probably before 1993. Somehow, they had gone from strength to strength, and it was Fitzsimons’ determination (not to mention her ability to herd cats and send them to Thames with instructions to take their rosettes off before they lit up) which won them the seat on a bare plurality. The incumbent, National’s Graeme Lee, was an extremely right-wing Christian man from the Western corner of the electorate, dozens of kilometres from the brightly-painted townships and off-grid communes of the Coromandel Peninsula. Meanwhile, Fitzsimons calmly and serenely listened to long-time Tory residents’ worries about the strange mussel blight which had plagued the Gulf in recent years, and saw off the National aristocracy who piled into town as soon as it became clear that there was going to be a stiff contest.


This was a bit of a watershed. Two hundred thousand votes had turned into a Green seat for the first time. A few of my friends joked that I was about to defect to the next big thing, but that was, of course, ridiculous. It did feel good, though, to have three minor party MPs elected to Parliament on the same day (John Wright, unfortunately, lost his King Country seat by a small margin to Owen Jennings of National). Again, the feeling would have been much different if the Greens had had 10 Proportional seats for the previous term.


It wasn’t just Coromandel in which they performed well. In fact, considering how little effort they put into electioneering, the Greens in those days had the Midas touch. They reached 15% in a good few electorates, which is no mean feat - we in the Liberal Democrats generally got similar results in different areas, but we generally worked for our votes, Winston not being the sure-fire winner he had seemed to be several years previously.


Very rarely did Green and Liberal Democrat targets align, since we were mainly popular among superannuitants, blue-collar workers, and Maori. The Maori support was largely down to the fact that we had a Maori leader, not down to any particular superiority in policy. But the Greens did have a large Maori Rights campaigner cohort, and the eight new Maori electorates were often places where we came into serious contact.


It would probably be helpful at this point to explain the odd process by which the number of seats in the New Zealand Parliament is calculated: you take the combined number of people on the general roll in the South Island and divide it by 25, giving you the target size of all the electorates. Then you divide the number of people on the Maori roll by that quota, and do the same with the North Island general roll. So there are always 25 electorates on the South Island - but if there is, for instance, a flood of immigrants to Auckland which don’t even consider going to Christchurch (as happened in the 2000s) you end up with more and more North Island electorates to satisfy the quota. So there’s no actual limit on how many seats you can have, let alone a provision for making extra seats scale with population growth: the system is that the larger the population imbalance between North and South, the larger the Parliament. Which seems crazy.


Now, between 1993 and 1996, the number of Maori electors choosing to go on the Maori roll expanded considerably, as a sort of lagged effect of Maori activism going mainstream in the 70s and 80s. This meant that where there had previously been four Maori electorates, named after cardinal directions, there were now eight, and nobody seriously wanted to have electorates called ‘North-Central Maori’ or anything like that, so they got fanciful names in Te Reo Maori - Te Puku O Te Whenua, or ‘The Belly of the Land’, was wisely retired after just one election.


Anyway, the new Maori names made the strength of Maori advocacy ideas even more evident, and Maori-roll voters became keener and keener on parties which promised such things (provided they presented candidates with enough mana, of course). Labour, the traditional home of the Maori vote since the Ratana Church had endorsed it - or rather, had been co-opted by Labour, since most Maori MPs were Ratana leaders since 1938 - was no longer radical enough, and lost votes. Mana Motuhake, now a shadow of its admittedly-unimpressive former self, could not take advantage of this sudden weakness, but the Greens could. The Greens had only previously stood in Southern Maori due to lack of candidates, but now they had the zeitgeist, and in 1996, they took 20% or more in every Maori electorate.


The problem was, so did we in the Liberal Democrats, which meant that anti-Labour vote-splitting between us handed all of the seats to the Labour candidates and incumbents with less than 50% of the vote in each seat. By taking advantage of our strengths, we had merely got in each other's way. Perhaps an electoral alliance in the Maori seats would have been enough to deny Labour their long stay of execution.


The next six years saw the slow decline of the Green Party. As the original generation of hippies settled down and tried to make their pottery pay, and as neoliberalism became a fact of life to the new generation of voters, their relevance declined and, although they remained relatively steady in 1999, they were, as Steven Rainbow predicted, no longer flavour of the month. Jeanette Fitzsimons held Hauraki in 1999, but her Parliamentary career was not the watershed it had seemed to be. The rigours of electoral politics meant that she had to focus all of her energies on matters involving her own voters, and wider Green issues did not achieve a high profile in her speeches. The Party claimed that she had sold out, and all but refused to campaign for her in 2002, when she lost her seat back to National.


The Green Party slumped below the waterline in 2002, but it had achieved a moderate amount of success - it had certainly captured the attention and imagination of a wider sector of the population than the NLP had over the same period, and perhaps that’s a better measure of success for a minor party than any other.

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Now, between 1993 and 1996, the number of Maori electors choosing to go on the Maori roll expanded considerably, as a sort of lagged effect of Maori activism going mainstream in the 70s and 80s. This meant that where there had previously been four Maori electorates, named after cardinal directions, there were now eight, and nobody seriously wanted to have electorates called ‘North-Central Maori’ or anything like that, so they got fanciful names in Te Reo Maori - Te Puku O Te Whenua, or ‘The Belly of the Land’, was wisely retired after just one election.

THE BELLY OF THE LAND

THAT IS ACTUALLY REAL
 
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