Chapter Three: A Baptism of Fire in Northern Maori
In advance of the 1993 general election, the Liberal Party did its best to maximise its chances of winning more than just Tauranga. We needed a caucus, otherwise Winston would be no better than an Independent - this was the lesson which had been lost on NewLabour after the 1990 election. Tauiwi (i.e. 'non-Maori') campaigners were directed to the electorates of our founding MPs, Gilbert Myles in Roskill and Hamish MacIntyre in the Manawatu - neither had bedded in to any great extent, and both had been hurt by boundary changes which took in more Labour-voting areas, so we didn’t hold out much hope. Especially after Gilbert made some very rude jokes about the Rotary Club in Roskill, right to their very faces.
The polling, such as it was, showed that we could not expect more than about 20%, but our figures for Maori voters were much stronger - for Winston had wisely shut up about his desire to abolish the Treaty of Waitangi, and had subsequently attracted a lot of Maori whose sole reason for supporting him was that he was the only Maori party leader in the country. That counted for a lot, even in those days. So Winston’s big idea for 1993 was to work the Maori electorates, and as I was part-Ngapuhi and my parents were letting me use their bach up in Onerahi, I volunteered to be campaign manager for our candidate in Northern Maori.
My first task in this position was to find a candidate for Northern Maori.
For readers unaccustomed to Maori-roll politics (which is a different kettle of fish from Maori politics as a whole in some ways) it is basically all about mana. Mana is a bit like honour, and a bit like personal power. Tribal and interpersonal relations are all about mana, and in terms of elections, the candidate with the most mana usually wins. Ideology and policy are less relevant than who you are related to and who you owe respect to. As such, I did not need to learn our first Manifesto off by heart, but I did need to learn the whakapapa - genealogy - of our chosen candidate.
For the last three years, the MP in Northern Maori, which covered the whole of Northland, Rodney and most of Waitakere City, right up to the Auckland isthmus, had been Matiu Rata. Matt had first won the seat for Labour in 1963 and risen to Minister of Maori Affairs in the Third Labour Government, but in the late 1970s he became disaffected with Labour’s Maori policies and started his own party, Mana Motuhake. He exited Parliament in 1980 but kept up the good fight, re-entering ten years later after making an electoral pact with NewLabour - the first time a Maori seat had been lost by Labour in decades. But over the latest Parliamentary term, his relations with Jim Anderton, who was retreating more and more into his own social circle of working class Pakeha, suffered, and in mid-1993 the NLP announced that they would put up their own candidate against Matt Rata.
A Ngapuhi named Tau Henare had suddenly decided that he wanted to be an MP, and approached Jim with a proposal to unseat Rata - it was uncertain whether Rata would be able to win the seat a second time, so Henare was determined to pounce at that point. He was the grandson of a Maori MP for the National Party, and the great-nephew of Sir James Henare, commander of the Maori Battalion. He had much ancestral mana and had spent his youth travelling from marae to marae and from hui to hui. In short, he was in no way ideologically aligned to the NewLabour Party - in fact, we stood his brother-in-law Tuku Morgan in Western Maori that year.
National, never particularly popular in Maori electorates, did not want to get into the inevitably messy fight in Northern Maori, which should have made us the most conservative option. But Maori-roll politics is different, and Labour picked Dover Samuels, who like Matt Rata is - or was - a major figure in the Ratana Church and was the most Establishment figure on the ballot paper.
I was actually struggling to find a candidate with sufficiently high status to make a fair game of it, when Titewhai Harawira came into my life. I was attending a hui at the Waitangi marae, and had mentioned to some people how desperate I was to find somebody willing to take advantage of the huge Liberal vote which was as yet untapped, when a wiry lady of indeterminate age came up to me.
“They’re all dickheads” she said.
“Who?”
“Politicians. They come here every year on the 6th of February, and they never do a bloody thing for the tangata whenua. Your Winston is a good man, though.”
As I was getting increasingly desperate a couple of months ahead of election day, I offered her the candidacy there and then. She is to this dsy an important figure in Maoridom, and a tireless campaigner for Maori rights. She is also quite left-wing, which was a problem for us during debates in 1993. I did my best to explain to her that the Liberal Party was a centrist party which wanted to protect local industry, stop the sell-offs of state assets, and generally enable people to get on with life, but when faced with a crowd, she inevitably went on rants about how the Government ought to spend 50% of its budget on Treaty claims and helping Maori, and how anyone who disagreed was a “gutless fish” or a “race traitor”. Her sharp tongue gained her more fans than we would otherwise have had, though, and her speeches gained more and more listeners as the campaign went on.
She had to pay up for libel when she accused Labour’s Dover Samuels of being a rapist, of course, but we won’t go into that.
Campaigning in Maori electorates is very different to what I was used to - you simply can’t canvass door-to-door outside of specific neighbourhoods, because you would be walking for half an hour to find five doors with residents on the Maori roll, even in the provincial towns. You just have to get the community leaders on your side and visit every marae you can find. We didn’t even do any roadside signs, although Samuels did. And even in Northern Maori, where the Maori population was densest, it was nearly a day’s drive from Cape Reinga to Titirangi. As such, there wasn’t a lot I could do, with my quarter-Ngapuhi blood, to help Titewhai. I generally just argued with her and drove her around with our election material in the back seat of the old postie van I’d bought and painted a decal onto with Party funds. As far as electioneering went, though, she was her own boss, and I just let her get on with it. As long as we had two MPs, it didn’t matter who won where.
Election night took place in Terenga Paraoa Marae, where somebody had set up a small television set in the corner and - in what was rapidly becoming Liberal Party custom - rounded up a few locals to fill out the crowd. There were women and children from across the Maori community of Whangarei there, which made the occasion slightly different from the male-dominated election nights I’d been to before.
Nobody knew what the outcome was going to be - National and Labour had made themselves equally unpopular, and the number of votes going to various minor parties could not be modelled on an electorate-by-electorate basis, so there was genuine tension in the air. As it happened, Jim Anderton romped home again in Sydenham, but the NLP performed poorly again on a national level - beaten again by the Greens, who were still rather short of electorates where they stood a genuine chance of winning. The Democrats were once more short of the full 99 candidates, and those that stood shouldn’t have wasted their time. They were beaten by the Christian Heritage Party, who won around 2% of the national vote - which was very good for a party that 99.9% of the population had never heard of.
But we Liberals did not do very well at all. Although we took home a commendable 7%, and stood candidates in every electorate, this was a far cry from the 20% or more that we had been talking about only months before and the 31% that was being bandied about when I joined. It seemed that New Zealanders would love Winston Peters as Prime Minister, as long as they didn’t have to vote for his Party. He still won Tauranga, of course, with 55% of the vote against a full spectrum of opponents, but Myles came third with 18% in Roskill and MacIntyre equalled his position in Manawatu with a creditable 28%. If we had actually existed as an organisation, we would have had a real chance of holding Manawatu against the evenly-split major parties.
But in the Maori electorates, all was disappointment. Although we beat Mana Motuhake in the Western and Southern electorates, and in the Maori roll as a whole, Titewhai came last in a sickeningly close race in Northern Maori. I was, despite myself, glad to see Matt Rata go - he was past it, really, and never hugely co-operative - but Dover Samuels’ victory was not welcomed. It seemed that my talk of mana and whakapapa had been proven wrong, and Maori roll voters had simply returned to their natural home in Labour. As it happened, of course, I was just a decade early.
That 1993 election was the last real flurry of activity in Mana Motuhake - which had never been a particularly active party, truth be told. They stood, that year, not only in the Maori electorates, but also in quite a few of the general seats, winning a respectable number of votes in some. But Matt Rata was an exhausted man by that point, and although he remained Leader for over a decade after that, the momentum he had tried to build in 1990 had been replaced with an ebb tide. Despite the increased attention being given to Maori issues in the late 1990s and the 2000s, Mana Motuhake did not turn out to be the party to shape the narrative, and for the rest of its existence, Mana Motuhake presented little more than paper candidacies.
On a national level, Mike Moore’s Labour Party failed again to beat the Tories, although it did gain 18 seats (including those of Myles and MacIntyre) to reach 46, five fewer than National. They lost the popular vote by less than one percentage point, harmed more by the Greens and the NLP than the National Party was by the Democrats, Liberals, and Christians. And their problem was that the Moore-Clark process of returning to the progressive centre-left was muddled and belied by the fact that so many of the caucus were still in cahoots with Roger Douglas’ Association of Consumers and Taxpayers. Not least Richard Prebble. Nobody was entirely sure that they could trust Labour at that point, and when they did, it was only because National had made themselves even more objectionable.