The people of Ajaccio seem set to start warming to the Jews given the common enemy, although the Greeks will probably be in trouble due to their French connection in the .

What is most confusing regarding the diplomatic revolution is that Britain is willing to trust Frederick despite him gleefully breaking any treaty he signed if he feels that he'd gain an advantage from doing so. This trait, moreso than any other, should make a ruler lack any trust, especially from the point of view of a former enemy.
 
Is 'John Green' a made up character, or is there possibly an easteregg in there?

It's made up, although several Corsican authors who wrote about independence used pseudonyms. Giulio Natali, for instance, wrote his Disinganno intorno alla guerra di Corsica under the name of "Curzio Tulliano Corso" (Curtius Tullius of Corsica). The anonymous author of the "Verde pamphlets" is a little more unassuming - his writing is intended to stir up the locals, not to convince foreigners of the righteousness of the cause, so he portrays himself as an ordinary Corsican patriot rather than taking some fancy Latin name.

What is most confusing regarding the diplomatic revolution is that Britain is willing to trust Frederick despite him gleefully breaking any treaty he signed if he feels that he'd gain an advantage from doing so. This trait, moreso than any other, should make a ruler lack any trust, especially from the point of view of a former enemy.

George II neither liked nor trusted Frederick, and Frederick's OTL surprise invasion of Saxony was not well-received in Britain either. Britain allied with Prussia not because they trusted Prussia, but because they had no other options. The British had counted on Austria and Russia to help them defend Hanover against France, but the Austrians defected and the Russians followed suit shortly thereafter, because both countries were more interested in crushing Prussia than serving as Britain's auxiliaries in Germany. This left Prussia as the only power which was both able and willing to assist in Hanover's defense.

The British did not want to have to defend Hanover alone. Their German "army of observation" was not going to be sufficient on its own, and thus the British would have to send their own forces to the continent. Not only was this extremely unpopular and opposed by Pitt and his ilk, but its success was doubtful; even with their minor German allies (Hanover, Brunswick, Hesse-Kassel, etc.) the British odds against the whole French army were not great. So, given the choice of trying to defend Hanover by themselves or allying with Frederick and giving him a subsidy to gain his support, they chose the latter, as they felt it was really the only thing they could do.
 
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I see that, but surely the cost-benefit balance of allying with Frederick meant that there was both the threat Fred reneging on his deals if he felt like it as well as that of being pulled into a war with Austria when, rather than if, Maria Theresa tried to get Silesia back. Austria might not be able to hurt Britain much by herself, but could leverage plenty of her allies and vassals in Italy to cause problems for the British, as well as grant France free passage and support through the low countries.

Getting Austria to remain a committed neutral seems like a more practical bet, as France would without free access have to play the aggressor to get to Hanover, potentially angering Austria enough to pull her into being a British ally again. This would probably be against French interests, as they would have few things they could take off the Austrians that they want even in the case of victory and occupying Hanover is not game over for Britian, merely a major blow to George's royal prestige.
 
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I see that, but surely the cost-benefit balance of allying with Frederick meant that there was both the threat Fred reneging on his deals if he felt like it as well as that of being pulled into a war with Austria when, rather than if, Maria Theresa tried to get Silesia back. Austria might not be able to hurt Britain much by herself, but could leverage plenty of her allies and vassals in Italy to cause problems for the British, as well as grant France free passage and support through the low countries.

Getting Austria to remain a committed neutral seems like a more practical bet, as France would without free access have to play the aggressor to get to Hanover, potentially angering Austria enough to pull her into being a British ally again. This would probably be against French interests, as they would have few things they could take off the Austrians that they want even in the case of victory and occupying Hanover is not game over for Britian, merely a major blow to George's royal prestige.

Remember that the Convention of Westminster, which started this whole thing off in 1756, was not an Anglo-Prussian alliance. It was a British attempt to obtain Prussian neutrality and to get Frederick's support for keeping the French out of Germany, since as a French ally and a powerful electoral prince of the HRE he had some clout in this matter. Austria and Russia perceived Westminster as a betrayal, but the British did not intend it that way; they were merely trying to keep Prussia out of the ongoing Anglo-French war. They did not foresee that Westminster would cause the collapse of the old Anglo-Austrian alliance, because they failed to appreciate how badly the Austrians wanted Silesia back and how far Kaunitz was willing to go to get it (including making nice with Austria's age-old enemy). With Austria as their ally, Russia on their payroll, and Prussia neutral, they believed that peace in Europe was now assured and that Hanover had been taken off the table as a possible French target. That Frederick was not trustworthy did not really matter because Westminster was not just a scrap of paper, but a treaty with teeth; the implied threat was that if Frederick broke his neutrality, Britain would unleash their Russian allies on him, which he definitely did not want.

The British failure, in other words, was not that they trusted Frederick; indeed, the whole reason for Westminster is that they feared Frederick and thought he might strike at Hanover with his French allies. Their failure was that they misread their allies and failed to understand the consequences of their actions. Only after the whole thing blew up in their faces, leaving Britain totally without allies, did the British turn to Frederick and say "hey, maybe we should team up."
 
Extra: The Mystery of the Corsican Hat
The Mystery of the Corsican Hat

I know, I’ve got an update to do. But right now I’d rather post about hats.

I’ve referred to Corsican dress a few times, and for the most part it’s pretty unremarkable - there’s a lot of wool and a lot of brown. The pilone, the characteristically Corsican hooded cloak, has been mentioned a few times. But if there’s one thing that really stands out whenever you see a picture of 18th century Corsicans, it’s the hat.

The Corsicans (specifically, Corsican men) were universally said to wear a peaked cloth cap. How exactly this looked, however, is a little bit unclear. The classic Corsican berettu of the 19th and 20th centuries is a soft felt cap, as modeled by this fine turn of the century gentleman:


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"Get off my lawn"

That’s a rather common style of cap, and hardly unique. Earlier writings and depictions usually describe the Corsican cap as being a “Phrygian” cap. Sometimes that appears to be depicted in the manner of the French Revolutionary Phrygian cap, which is basically just a shorter version of the above berettu.


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Okay, so far so good. But if you spend any time finding pictures of 18th century Corsicans, you will pretty quickly come across a different kind of cap altogether, something that frankly looks like a jester might have worn it:


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I’m not sure what the practical value of this sort of “cone hat” was, but it’s certainly distinctive. Did Corsican hats really look like this or was this a rather fanciful re-imagining of Corsican headgear by people who had not seen it firsthand?

And then there’s the really weird stuff. Ready?


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Seriously, what are those cheek things for?


What on earth is this? Is that a… ribbed hat? With little cheek-cloth things? What the hell is going on?

I suspect this hat did not actually exist. It’s just too silly, and it appears in art very rarely. But it does remind me of something real: an ancient Greek phrygian helmet, which often had similar cheek-guards attached (albeit ones made out of metal, because obviously):


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It makes me wonder if some artist heard “Phrygian cap” and thought “oh, so you mean like a Phrygian helmet” and made a cloth version of a Greek bronze helmet. That would certainly explain those cloth cheek coverings. It might also explain why this portrait of Napoleon in “Corsican costume” shows him wearing a helmet with a similar design:


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100% Authentic Corsican


Just to add a little bit more confusion, Austrian light troops in the 19th century wore a "Corsican hat" (Korsehut) which was a predecessor of the slouch hat, and has, as far as I can tell, absolutely nothing to do with Corsica.

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Not Corsican.
 
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Particularly liked the way the "Type Corse" in the first photograph was apparently "presented at the Bastia International Expo". Come look at the prime exhibit of our island's manhood!
 

Md139115

Banned
I wouldn’t be surprised if it started out as the high-peaked “jester” style one, then the fashion came to be to let the tip droop, then it was cut back so it wouldn’t dangle in the face to become the berettu.
 
Well. Huh.

The jester hat seems so impractical and overcomplicated, it should by all rights be absurd. However, I would not be surprised if the truth were something like a more pointy Phrygian cap than most later French sources might assume.
 
The jester hat seems so impractical and overcomplicated, it should by all rights be absurd. However, I would not be surprised if the truth were something like a more pointy Phrygian cap than most later French sources might assume.

Could be. I have occasionally come across saner depictions of the "jester cap," like this one:

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It's still got that scalloped/zig-zag fringe on the bottom and the pompon on the top like the "jester" caps above, but it's more sensibly sized. Indeed, if you took off the fringe and the pompon it would just be a normal Phyrgian cap.

Actually, what this hat reminds me of the most - if it were a little floppier - is the French "bonnet a la dragon," originally introduced as a forage cap for cavalry but commonly adopted by the French Troupes de la marine in the American theater of the SYW as informal campaign dress. These were reportedly sometimes made from the sleeves of old uniform coats.

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They look like cold weather gear, keep your head warm type of thing, I would have expected something with more of a brim to keep the sun off.
 
So I decided to go the boring-but-probably-the-most-plausible route. That said, there are a few alterations in this treaty reflecting the marginally improved outcome for the allies:
  • Guastalla and Sabbioneta have been annexed by Austria; IOTL they were granted to Felipe along with Parma and Piacenza.
  • Finale has been annexed by Sardinia; IOTL Genoa managed to hang on to it.
  • The Duke of Modena's fiefs in Hungary have been seized; IOTL, these fiefs were seized during the war but returned to him in the final treaty. Thus ITTL the duchy itself is not diminished, but the duke's revenues are.
Everything else is OTL.
So reading over the TL again lately, and I got to thinking - what are, or could be, the longer implications (Corsica aside) of the War of Austrian Succcession happening as it did TTL?

One possibility that strikes me is that this could make a hypothetical early unification of Northern Italy, under the Savoyads, far easier. To start, they have Finale; to follow, the Hapsburgs have more Italian land, which makes switching them to another power easier (at least in theory); third, though Felipe of Parma did manage to produce an heir OTL, there’s no guarantee he’ll be successful TTL, in which case, more land for the Hapsburgs; fourth, Genoa and Modena are in worse financial straights, at least in the potential long term; and last, Corsica being independent, and not going to France, means the King of Sardinia doesn’t have to worry as much about a more powerful neighbor causing problems.

Mind you, that’s all in the case of a hypothetical scenario that may or may not happen; @Carp is the only one here who knows what the future holds for TTL’s Northern Italy.
 
Sorry I've been taking a while. I've been rather busy, and what I have of the next chapter is giving me problems. I'll get it sorted eventually.

One possibility that strikes me is that this could make a hypothetical early unification of Northern Italy, under the Savoyads, far easier. To start, they have Finale; to follow, the Hapsburgs have more Italian land, which makes switching them to another power easier (at least in theory); third, though Felipe of Parma did manage to produce an heir OTL, there’s no guarantee he’ll be successful TTL, in which case, more land for the Hapsburgs; fourth, Genoa and Modena are in worse financial straights, at least in the potential long term; and last, Corsica being independent, and not going to France, means the King of Sardinia doesn’t have to worry as much about a more powerful neighbor causing problems.

My impression was that Italian unification under the Savoyards had a great deal to do with both the "awakening" of Italian nationalism in the post-Napoleon era and the disposition of the Great Powers in the 19th century, specifically the willingness of the French to support Italian ambitions and the inability of the Austrians to effectively oppose them. While having Finale is no doubt good for Sardinia, I suspect it will be dwarfed by the presence or absence of the aforementioned political factors. One could certainly imagine, for instance, a TL in which the Austrians win the SYW and continue to dominate the Empire, while an averted or less successful French revolution never overthrows the status quo in Italy which is stronger as a consequence. A marginally more prosperous Sardinia will still find unification a rather uphill battle under such circumstances.
 
Sorry I've been taking a while. I've been rather busy, and what I have of the next chapter is giving me problems. I'll get it sorted eventually.



My impression was that Italian unification under the Savoyards had a great deal to do with both the "awakening" of Italian nationalism in the post-Napoleon era and the disposition of the Great Powers in the 19th century, specifically the willingness of the French to support Italian ambitions and the inability of the Austrians to effectively oppose them. While having Finale is no doubt good for Sardinia, I suspect it will be dwarfed by the presence or absence of the aforementioned political factors. One could certainly imagine, for instance, a TL in which the Austrians win the SYW and continue to dominate the Empire, while an averted or less successful French revolution never overthrows the status quo in Italy which is stronger as a consequence. A marginally more prosperous Sardinia will still find unification a rather uphill battle under such circumstances.

Correct.
The defining factor in the chances for Savoy to do anything at all was the overarching diplomatic relationship between France and Austria (and Spain, till 1745). This did not change until after the Italian Unification and in a sense not even then; in other words, Italy could even hope to play a European Power major role only if Vienna and Paris were not aligned - and for most of the 1861-1914 period, they were not, at least not closely enough to create an existential threat to Italy -.
In this sense, Italian Unification was a diplomatic fluke - a Piedmontese leadership able to exploit a temporary favorable situation where France was willing to support them against Austria; note that France and Austria almost immediately mended things among themselves thereafter and stayed in a decent relationship, though short of actual alliance, for more than another decade - though of course looking at the deeper currents it had a considerable momentum behind; France and Austria DID revert to traditional enmity by the late 1870s and that deepened all the way to WWI, for reasons that had almost nothing to do with Italy (or with the actual relationship between France and Austria as such, to be fair).
However, Italy can unify only if Austria and France are not on the same page about keeping it fractured and/or disagree on how to control it. In the post Napoleonic period, France had been fully shut out of Italy in favor of Austria alone (as opposed to the opposite situation in the Napoleonic phase, the shared control post-Aachen, and the struggle between the two resumed during the Revolutionary Wars).
Momentum for Italian Unification was greatly sped by the Napoleonic interlude, but was rooted in the earlier Italian enlightenment, so that it would likely emerge Napoleon or not, albeit perhaps more slowly.
 
As a counterpoint, absent Napoleon Austria may yet be saddled with the Netherlands.
Additionally if Prussia is dismembered that means that Russia probably fills the power vacuum in northern Europe- Poland is wholly clientized by Russia, and quite possibly has the oder border and may yet hanker after Silesia in turn. In any case a lasting franco Austrian alliance over the corpse of Prussia means that Britain will move hell and high water to find a new continental ally..
 
As a counterpoint, absent Napoleon Austria may yet be saddled with the Netherlands.
Additionally if Prussia is dismembered that means that Russia probably fills the power vacuum in northern Europe- Poland is wholly clientized by Russia, and quite possibly has the oder border and may yet hanker after Silesia in turn. In any case a lasting franco Austrian alliance over the corpse of Prussia means that Britain will move hell and high water to find a new continental ally..

With Russia being the obvious candidate.
 
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