Wasn't that to avoid him being a King in the HRE, where Brandenburg was a subject of the King of Germany? That won't help here, as Piedmont is still theoretically in the HRE under the Iron Crown.
King Theodore's Corsica
- Thread starter Carp
- Start date
Wasn't that to avoid him being a King in the HRE, where Brandenburg was a subject of the King of Germany? That won't help here, as Piedmont is still theoretically in the HRE under the Iron Crown.
Just a thought, but is there any particular reason why Felipe can't be given Guastalla to settle the issue of what lands and title to give him? After all, there's no legitimate ruler left and the Austrians don't seem to be that enthusiastic about taking it (they can probably barely find it on a map). Granted it'd probably be seen as insultingly small but it could be argued (by the Austrians at least) that Felipe, who did not distinguish himself on the field of battle and is currently languishing in a (presumably comfortable) Austrian cell, hasn't earned anything more lavish.
Give Felipe Sardinia and make Savoy a kingdom (it's IIRC de jure part of the Kingdom of Germany at this point, and had been since the 14th century- this because it was de jure part of the Burgundian kingdom before that but by then the French were making inroads so the Empire wanted to reassert control) seems like a good deal, and would be a nice parallel with Corsica.
Reshuffling titles to grant a boy who won no glories and got himself captured in a war that everyone wants to end by now a kingdom is likely not worth the headache of playing musical chairs with titles. Parma was at the least the ancestral home of his obnoxious mother, so there is some logic in granting that specific title to the prince. It's certainly the cleanest possible result. I am a little surprised that Maria Theresa would be so petty as to be willing to cede land to a foe rather than an ally she disliked.
ITTL, with Felipe's poorer showing, it may be that he gets just Parma, with Piacenza to Savoy as per Worms and maybe Guastalla to Austria, just to sweeten the deal for Maria Theresa. It's only a part of his mother's Duchy, but hey, he's a prisoner now.
OTOH, the Austrian approach IOTL made sense. They were going to lose Piacenza anyway, so why to award it to a remarkably unreliable ally that could potentially threaten their position in Italy by allying with the other side (the House of Savoy, in hindsight, would do exactly that in a century, even without Piacenza), when there's the alternative to give it to a generally harmless statelet, if this placates their main foes?
This would be the diplomatic equivalent of a slap in the face, and is unlikely to lead to peace. Seeing as Spain already occupies Savoy, a much grander principality than Guastalla, they have no reason to give up the former for the latter. They will simply stay put in Savoy until the allies make them an offer that's not a joke.
Yeah, it’s hard to argue with that logic. Bourbon Savoy/Sardinia are tempting from an authorial standpoint because they’re new and different, which is why I brought them up, but the more I think about it the more likely it seems that Britain’s favored solution will be basically the same as OTL with some alterations around the edges, Guastalla and Finale being the most likely subjects.
As for Maria Theresa, she definitely was that petty, and expressed a complete willingness to give Parma to Don Felipe if she could annul the Worms concessions to Sardinia. Her preference for her "enemy" over her "ally" makes more sense when you consider that she only made the concessions in the first place because Carlo Emanuele coerced her (and threatened to join the Bourbons if she held out). As far as she was concerned he was just another plunderer of her patrimony.
Although it might seem counter-intuitive, keeping Parma and Piacenza together might actually be preferable from Britain’s perspective, because it allows them to claim that concessions are not being made exclusively by Austria (since Sardinia considered Piacenza to be theirs by the Treaty of Worms). The British definitely favored the Sardinians, but even Newcastle might hesitate before proposing a treaty in which only Austria loses territory while the Sardinians get everything they wanted.
What about give Parma to Felipe and Piacenza to Sardinia, but keep Savoy to France? Maybe a crazy suggestion: declare queen Maria Leczinska as the sovereign Duchess of Lorraine, and transfer her father Stanislaw (the former king of Poland) from Lorraine to Savoy. Or the same swap, but make the Dauphin the Duke of Lorraine or of Savoy (it remembers me the plans involving giving Naples to the Dauphin in the agreements before the War of the Spanish Succession). It would give Sardinia something they wanted, but also make them lose territory (the original lands of their dynasty). Felipe gets a Duchy. And France gets a conquered land under the farce that officially they didn't get any territory (just as it was done with Lorraine before).
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Louis XV expressly did not want any new territory, and since he's even worse off strategically than OTL I don't think French expansionism is in the cards here.
Some territorial concession on the part of the Duke of Modena might be possible (although I'm not sure what that would be exactly), but to completely dethrone the House of Este is too radical a move to be considered. Moreover, the Duchess of Modena is a French princess of the blood; France would never consent to ousting her and her husband for the sake of Don Felipe.
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A Peace of Betrayal
A Peace of Betrayal
Fireworks over the River Thames celebrating the end of the war
Fireworks over the River Thames celebrating the end of the war
The dilemma which France faced entering the conference at Aix-la-Chapelle was that neither Austria nor Britain offered them the full realization of their most important goals. The Austrians offered a favorable peace in Italy which was mainly achieved by stabbing the Sardinians in the back: Don Felipe would be given the Duchy of Savoy, Austria would repudiate all concessions granted to Sardinia in the Treaty of Worms, and Genoa would retain Finale. This all suited France quite well, as Versailles had not been a party to the Treaty of Worms and the French were happy to watch their enemies betray each other. But Austria was incapable of returning Cape Breton Island and would not offer a guarantee of Prussia’s conquest of Silesia, which France still sought despite having been betrayed by Prussia twice during the war. The British, in turn, had folded on the matter of Cape Breton Island and were willing to make the Silesian guarantee, but resisted the establishment of Don Felipe.
Since London’s primary aim in entering the war - to preserve the balance of power by saving the Austrian empire - had been fulfilled, they considered a return to the status quo ante bellum to be an acceptable outcome given the circumstances. The British were prepared to allow France to regain occupied Provence and Cape Breton island in exchange for the reciprocal return of the Netherlands and Madras to Austria and Britain, respectively. But France refused a return to pre-war borders in Italy. Versailles was effectively demanding a return to the status quo where their allies were concerned - the restitution of all occupied Genoese and Modenese territory - while simultaneously demanding new cessions to the infante which by necessity would come at the expense of Britain’s allies.
As a consequence of learning of the true extent of Dutch decrepitude and mounting fears that Austria was moving towards a separate peace, Thomas Pelham-Holles, Duke of Newcastle instructed the British minister at the congress, John Montagu, Earl of Sandwich, to consider an accomodation for Felipe so long as it was not wholly at the expense of Britain’s allies. Accordingly, Sandwich proposed that the infante receive the Duchy of Parma and Piacenza - formerly held by his brother Don Carlos before his conquest of Naples in the War of Polish Succession - which would revert to Austria if the infante either died without male heirs or succeeded his brother in Naples. That provision would anger Carlo Emanuele III, who had been promised Piacenza in the Treaty of Worms, but to placate him France would permit the enforced “sale” of the Marquisate of Finale from the Republic of Genoa.
This placed the French in a bind. This offer put them in a position where they could either betray the Spanish by failing to establish Don Felipe, or betray the Genoese by allowing the cession of Finale. Neither was appealing, and initially France’s minister Alphonse Marie Louis, comte de Saint-Séverin rejected any talk of the cession of Finale. The King of France, however, had demanded peace and since the Austrians remained obstinate on the issue of Silesia and incapable on the issue of Cape Breton Island, London remained the only plausible partner for that peace. Eventually the French conceded the logic that in a war without victors the peace could not uniformly favor one side, and preserving the Bourbon family alliance proved more important than maintaining Genoa’s gratitude.
Only one issue remained: Corsica. Newcastle was sympathetic to the Corsicans (to say nothing of English public opinion), and to abandon them to Genoese tyranny was distasteful. Yet since Genoa was already being forced to relinquish Finale over tremendous French reluctance, a cession of Corsica on top of this would be impossible for France to accept. Attempting to strike a middle path, Sandwich offered to recognize Genoese sovereignty over the island, but added that the British withdrawal would be delayed until the satisfaction of Corsican grievances and the restoration of peace. But Saint-Séverin perceived this open-ended commitment as problematic. The French knew better than most that satisfying the Corsicans and bringing peace to the island was not a simple task, nor was it likely to be a short one. To Saint-Séverin, the proposal looked like a stealth annexation, and he refused it as unworkable.
Ultimately neither Sandwich nor Saint-Séverin wanted to explode the peace conference over a matter as relatively minor as Corsica, and a temporary expedient was adopted: the preliminary peace agreement simply omitted any mention of Corsican sovereignty altogether, stating only that Genoese territory as it existed before the war (save Finale) was to be vacated by the belligerent powers. But Sandwich and Saint-Séverin concluded a separate and secret agreement that until the “Corsican question” could be resolved in subsequent negotiations, the two governments would adopt a hands-off policy to avoid a new conflict. They pledged that neither of their governments would maintain forces on the island after the treaty’s final signature, provide auxiliaries to the Genoese Republic to be used on Corsica, or suffer Corsica to be annexed to another state without the agreement of both parties (that is, Britain and France).
The announcement of the preliminary agreement in late February pleased nobody, as it represented a betrayal of almost all the treaties of alliance signed over the course of the war. France reneged on the Treaty of Fontainebleau, which had promised Parma, Piacenza, and Milan to Don Felipe; the Treaty of Aranjuez, which had promised not only the protection but the expansion of Genoese territory; and a previous Treaty of Aranjuez by which Modena had been promised the Duchy of Guastalla. Britain had betrayed the Treaty of Worms by relegating Piacenza to Don Felipe even though the Worms treaty had promised it to Sardinia, and defaulted upon a whole series of promises to Austria involving the defense of her territory and the conquest of Naples. But although the non-preliminary powers raged against the injustice and faithlessness of it all, they nevertheless subscribed to the preliminaries one by one, for no other power could carry on the war alone. There was still more debate and horse-trading to come until the final treaty was made with all its particulars - a process which would take months - but the basic framework of the peace had been established.
Don Luigi Giafferi, the unrecognized envoy extraordinary of Corsica, was deeply dismayed. Unaware of the secret accord between Sandwich and Saint-Séverin, Giafferi presumed from the preliminary articles that Corsica had been entirely forgotten and betrayed by the British. His opportunities to make any impression at the congress were limited because there really wasn’t much of a congress to speak of; the major powers had always intended for the “congress” to be merely a stage upon which the terms of peace would be handed down to the lesser states. The delegates of the nations seldom actually met together in groups save at theaters and balls. Giafferi, a sober and serious man who had come to Aix-la-Chapelle to be a diplomat, not to dance and watch opera, felt terribly let down by the whole affair.
Dismayed by the lack of consideration shown to him and his subjects, Theodore decided to toss out a wild proposal: He instructed Giafferi to approach the French and suggest that Corsica itself serve as the infante’s seat, explaining that all Corsicans would welcome deliverance from Genoese tyranny by such a “noble Spanish prince” and that Theodore himself would gladly abdicate if it would mean the freedom of his people and their eternal friendship with France and Spain.
Of course this was wholly unconstitutional, and Giafferi knew it. Theodore assured him, however, that he would make no such grant on his own; if the congress accepted such a solution the consulta would be called to ratify it. Giafferi, an admirer of the Spanish, expressed some reluctance to make the proposal but thought it a bold plan (and praised the king for his Cincinnatus-like willingness to set aside his own crown in the service of Corsica). But Theodore probably knew that this proposal had little chance of being accepted. Aside from the fact that the preliminaries had already been announced, he guessed that the British would not allow the island to pass into Bourbon hands. As Theodore had several times offered the crown to another power in the hopes of gaining some general or viceroyal office, the seriousness of his offer cannot be completely discounted, but it seems most likely to have been a last-ditch effort to prove his friendship and fidelity to France, which he suspected was the main impediment to Corsican liberation. The proposal was indeed rejected, although it was intriguing enough for Saint-Séverin to pass it on to foreign minister Louis Philogène Brûlart, vicomte de Puisieulx, who described it as “baffling and extraordinary.” Puisieulx would not act upon it, but he would remember it.
The final treaty would be signed by the belligerent nations over the course of August. In the end, after eight years of war, the only inarguable victor was King Friedrich II of Prussia, who seemed to have gotten away clean with the territories he sought, albeit at the price of his international reputation. Sardinia and Spain were also victors, although their victories had been imperfect. Sardinia had gained everything demanded at Worms except Piacenza; Spain had acquired a principality for Don Felipe, but not nearly so grand a state as had been hoped. Some of these acquisitions would prove durable, but others would swiftly be abandoned or challenged, for the “perpetual peace” guaranteed in the treaty’s preamble proved somewhat optimistic. It would not even last a decade.
Italy in late 1748 following the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (Click to expand)
Genoa’s only concessions had been financial - payment for Finale, the cancellation of the Austrian debt, and the restitution of the monies and properties of the Genoese nobility which had been confiscated. Yet the windfall from Finale was a “mere” £300,000, while the Genoese state debt even after the cancellation of the remaining Austrian indemnities exceeded 13 million pounds sterling.[A] Even the Bank of San Giorgio had been shuttered when the Senate had plundered the deposits to pay off the Austrians. Genoa, once the great bank of Europe, was now well and truly bankrupt.
The war had also seen the complete evaporation of the Genoese hold on Corsica. Royalist forces had destroyed or expelled Genoese garrisons everywhere on the island except Bonifacio, which was desperate for supplies and money. Capraia had fallen as well, and the republic’s attempt to recapture it had collapsed before Genoese soldiers could even set foot on the island. If the Genoese government assumed that the treaty’s promise to restore all the republic’s territory (save Finale) would lead to any recovery on Corsica, they were to be disappointed; the British made no attempt whatsoever to coordinate their withdrawal with the Genoese, and as soon as they left their posts Corsican royalist soldiers replaced them.
The Genoese government had assumed that once the war was over they would be able to subdue the Corsicans with foreign soldiers, but in the event they found nobody willing to assist them. Historically, only the French and Austrians had been both capable and willing. Austrian help, however, was unthinkable; the Empress openly favored the Corsicans over the Genoese. The French, meanwhile, were constrained by their secret agreement with Britain to abstain from intervention, and they had problems of their own. The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle was wildly unpopular in France, and the combination of the dire economic situation and anger over what was seen as a useless and foolish war were giving rise to an unprecedented outpouring of popular discontent. With trouble at home, the economy circling the drain, and their navy in a shambles, it was hardly the time to be seeking a new confrontation with Britain. The unsolicited offer of Marshal Maurice de Saxe to personally lead an invasion of the island and annex it to France was not seriously entertained.[B]
With little hope of foreign military aid - and serious doubts as to whether they could afford such aid even if it were available - the Genoese government resolved to sell the island to the highest bidder. They found no takers. The French and British were bound by their agreement to oppose a sale, Spain was simply uninterested, and the emperor demurred, perhaps believing that there was no point in paying money for something he might yet acquire for free. In any case, as soon as the British consul John Birtles heard of these discussions he reminded the Genoese that his government would not abide the sale of the island to any power and was prepared to back that resolution with force.
The Genoese found that they could neither regain the island nor dispose of it. Nevertheless, no move was made towards making peace with the “Corsican government.” However nominal it was by 1748, the Doge of Genoa held (as far as most of Europe was concerned) the legal title to Corsica, and the Genoese would not give up such an asset - and the doge’s royal crown - for free. Had Theodore been able to buy it from them, the Senate might have grudgingly accepted it; but the King of Corsica did not have that kind of money, and there was nobody willing to fork over a kingdom’s ransom on his behalf.
Thus as 1748 dragged on, Corsica enjoyed “peace without a treaty.” Fighting had not completely stopped; some skirmishing continued in the south, although the back of the anti-royalist resistance in La Rocca had been broken by the capture of Sartena by Don Giovan, Principe di Morosaglia in May. Nevertheless, the Genoese made no attempt to regain any part of Corsica and Theodore made no move against Bonifacio, hoping that diplomatic activity would yield fruit. But as 1749 approached with no progress towards a resolution, Theodore and his ministers determined that they would have to exert their own pressure on the intransigent republic. Europe, having witnessed a long and bloody war of great armies raging across the continent, now played spectator to a lilliputian conflict between Corsica and Genoa which in short order threatened to explode into a major international crisis. It was to be the last and briefest stage of the 20 year Corsican Revolution.[C]
Timeline Notes
[A] Actually this is about 2 million pounds less than their OTL debt in 1748. Despite Genoa's apparent woes, the OTL war was worse for them, because the Genoese Revolution and the subsequent allied campaigns to retake the city were extraordinarily destructive to Liguria and costly to the state. Genoa has been squeezed dry by the Austrians, but at least they haven't utterly brutalized the region. On the other hand, they managed to hold on to Finale IOTL, so their tax base has been somewhat reduced.
[B]A real proposal. He also proposed to ship a bunch of Jews to the New World to make a Jewish state in South America over which he, notable gentile Maurice de Saxe, would rule as king. Saxe was a genius, but like many geniuses he was a bit eccentric.
[C] I bet you thought it was over, didn't you? Sorry, one more update.
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So I decided to go the boring-but-probably-the-most-plausible route. That said, there are a few alterations in this treaty reflecting the marginally improved outcome for the allies:
- Guastalla and Sabbioneta have been annexed by Austria; IOTL they were granted to Felipe along with Parma and Piacenza.
- Finale has been annexed by Sardinia; IOTL Genoa managed to hang on to it.
- The Duke of Modena's fiefs in Hungary have been seized; IOTL, these fiefs were seized during the war but returned to him in the final treaty. Thus ITTL the duchy itself is not diminished, but the duke's revenues are.
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The lack of reference to the succession of the Kingdom of Ireland was OTL too right?
I have no idea, but you are right that it seems odd that they allow jacobite threat to the Irish crown. Did they spend 100 years saying Kingdom of Ireland and Kingdom of Great Britain?
Was Napoleon the first person to seriously contemplate territorial aggrandizement at the expense of Venice? It seems like they're pretty moribund and there's a ton of land up for the taking there, either for Felipe or in exchange for more land for him. Would it just upset the balance of power too much?