You can't eat cotton. If the US cuts off food exports to the UK the UK either pays much more for food or has food riots.
OK, time to recycle another of my old soc.history.what-if posts:
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/soc.history.what-if/zLZg6EzfPps/W5SwgLfuUKkJ
***
From what I have read, most historians have for decades rejected the "King
Wheat defeated King Cotton" thesis and have minimized the role of wheat in
preventing British intervention.
Essentially, evaluating the "King Wheat" thesis depends on two questions.
The first is what one might call the objective question: Was Britain in
fact heavily dependent on imports of wheat from the US? The second is the
subjective question: Did the makers of British policy rightly or wrongly
*think* that Britain was dependent on American wheat, and did this
conclusion affect their decision not to intervene?
The "King Wheat" thesis became popular during the early twentieth century,
when the economic interpretation of history was all the rage, and the
earlier explanation of non-intervention in terms of British anti-slavery
sentiment seemed to be too sentimental and unrealistic. Curiously, even
when the thesis was at its most influential, in the 1920s and 1930s (when
it became commonplace in textbooks) it was rejected by the two authorities
who had made the closest study of ACW diplomacy--E.D. Adams in *Great
Britain and the American Civil War* (1924) and Frank Owsley in *King
Cotton Diplomacy* (1931). They both focused on the second ("subjective")
question, and concluded that British statesmen had not given much
consideration to US wheat imports in deciding against intervention.
However, what seems to me to be the definitive refutation was Eli
Ginzberg's "The Economics of British Neutrality during the American Civil
War," originally published in *Agricultural History* in 1936 and reprinted
in Carl Degler (ed), *Pivotal Interpretations of American History,* Volume
I. As Degler notes, the merit of Ginzberg's article is that unlike Adams
and Owsley he dealt with *both* the objective and subjective questions,
and answered both of them unfavorably. Britain was not dependent on
American wheat (it could have made up for any US shortfall by increasing
its imports from other countries) nor was she motivated by perceptions of
such dependence. Here are the most relevant parts of Ginzberg's article:
***
"In discussing 'the influence of wheat in keeping John Bull on his good
behavior with the United States' Professor Frank Lawrence Owsley, in his
book on King Cotton Diplomacy, places himself at the forefront of the
critics of the thesis. He holds, however, that the "complete silence on
the subject...in the cabinet circles...would not be conclusive were there
not other evidence of a more positive character which corroborates this
negative evidence." His position may be summarized thus: 1, The 'wheat
famine' idea can be traced from John Bright arid William E. Forster back
to Charles Francis Adams and thence back to William H. Seward and Abraham
Lincoln; in shod, it was a piece of Federal propaganda 2, The British
press commented on the idea from time to time, but almost without
exception sneered at it. The large importations from the United States
were a matter of price, not of necessity. 3, 'Most important of
all...England took this wheat in payment for the countless millions of
dollars' worth of rifles, cannon, powder, and other munitions of war which
she was selling the United States. In 1864 and 1865, after the United
States became practically self-sufficient in the production of war
supplies and no longer made large purchases from England, the latter
country turned abruptly away from America to Russia and East Europe for
her wheat supply.' Professor Owsley concludes that all the evidence tends
'to demonstrate that wheat had little if anything to do with preventing
English intervention in the American Civil War.'
"The famine bogy may have been Federal propaganda, and the wheat exports
from the North probably helped to pay for much-needed imports of
munitions; yet, if England were truly dependent on American wheat and if
informed and influential groups really believed in this dependence, the
arguments relating to propaganda and balance of trade are beside the
point. The wheat thesis, as originally presented, includes a careful
review of the relevant statistics and an analysis of the allusions to
dependence on American wheat in the press and the debates in Parliament.
Professors Adams and Owsley have contributed greatly to our understanding
of the economics of British neutrality, but neither reviewed the basic
data offered in support of the wheat thesis. To these we now turn.
"At the time of the American Civil War, Great Britain imported from 25 to
50 percent of its annual supply of wheat, and the United States
contributed from 30 to 45 percent of this importation. Yet, these figures
do not in themselves establish the strategic importance of American wheat.
It was strategic only if other countries could not meet the demand, and
only if the states [I assume he means "statesmen"--DT] of Britain were
cognizant of this fact and acted accordingly.
"The crop failures of the early sixties affected not only England but also
France which in normal years was an important source of supply for English
imports. For the years 1858 and 1859, France supplied England with over
1.5 million quarters of wheat and flour, or 35 percent of the total
imported. During the crucial years, 1860-1862, French exports dropped to
an average of less than 600,000 quarters. These data show that France
failed John Bull at a crucial time.
"What of the other sources of wheat? In 1858 and 1859, England annually
received approximately 700,000 and 750,000 quarters from Prussia and
Russia respectively. The corresponding figure for the three following
years is an average annual import of over 1.2 million quarters for each of
these countries, The supply from these countries was assuredly elastic; it
increased 70 percent within three years. The statistical data relating to
imports from 'Other Countries' show an annual average of slightly less
than one million quarters for 1858 and 1859--an increase of 100 percent
for the following three years. The data relating to the wheat exported
from the United States are much more erratic: 1,099,000 quarters in 1858;
99,000 in 1859; 2,143,000 in 1860; 3,602,000 in 1861; and 5,022,000 in
1862,--the annual average for the last three years being 3.6 million.
When England needed to increase substantially its imports, all of its
major sources of supply, with the exception of France, were able to
respond, and the United States most easily. To understand the significance
of the American response, the question must be asked: What would have been
the predicament of Great Britain if Northern wheat had been withheld?
"In 1858-60 there was available annually 5.0 bushels of wheat per capita
for the population of the United Kingdom, and the average price was 5s.
lOd. The corresponding average for 1860, 1861, and 1862 was 5.7 bushels,
and the price approximately 6s. 9d. If Great Britain had not imported a
single quarter of wheat from the United States during the critical years,
the supply would have permitted the per capita consumption to remain at
the same level as in 1858-60. That the price would have risen is beyond
dispute, but it probably would not have approached the high level of 1854
when wheat sold for more than 10s. per bushel. In this connection, it is
important to recall that the exportation of wheat from the Continent
depended "on the temptation to sell. A sudden rise on our markets has a
singular effect in wringing wheat out of poor countries." [citing an 1869
article in the Royal Agricultural Society *Journal*] As we have already
seen, there was wheat to be wrung.
"The analysis of the statistical data casts the most serious doubt on the
contention that Northern wheat was of strategic importance for Great
Britain during the early 1860s. It suggests that the comparatively low
price of wheat and flour was the result of ample stocks available in the
United States. The wheat thesis would, therefore, retain part of its
validity if it could be proven that English statesmen emphasized the
significance of American exports. Despite the statistics, it would remain
practically intact if it could be proven that this overemphasis helped to
shape the policy of British neutrality. Such a claim was originally made
by Professor Schmidt and denials were entered by Professor Adams and
Professor Owsley. What is the evidence?
"The original statement of the wheat thesis frequently cited the
*Economist* and the Parliamentary Debates to substantiate the claim that
informed opinion was fully cognizant of the importance of Northern wheat
for the British Isles and that the responsible members of the Government
acted in the light of this consciousness. Throughout the two or more
years when British intervention was a live issue, the *Economist*, though
opposed to any overt recognition of the Confederacy, failed to advance the
wheat argument, although so doing would doubtless have strengthened its
advocacy of non-interference. In fact, it devoted remarkably little space
to the grain trade in any of its manifold aspects,--a truly unusual fact
when we recall the poor harvests of 1860 and 1861. Early in 1862, it
included a series of letters that discussed whether or not the grain
shortage was acute. Toward the end of the year, it printed a long and
informed article on important phases of the contemporary wheat trade,
especially its relation to the English corn grower, the merchant importer,
the money market, aud the welfare of the masses. The author made no
reference to Northern wheat, nor did he express anxiety over Britain's
dependence on imports. In short, this well-informed journal did not
comprehend the strategic importance of Northern wheat.
"A review of the Parliamentary Debates is not quite so barren of results.
On July 18, 1862, William S. Lindsay, in urging his motion for British
mediation, read a letter from America which contained the following:
"'Is she [England] afraid for her Northern supplies of bread stuffs? Let
her consider that her demand for them is the lifeblood of our agricultural
States. They must sell to her. The probable loss of her custom alone
would secure her from any danger on our part.'
"Speaking on the same motion, W. E. Forster pointed out; 'We had a cotton
famine now; but if we did that [intervened], we should stand in danger of
a corn famine.' In the course of the same debate, Seymour Fitzgerald
contrasted these two famines:
"'A cotton famine was not like a corn famine. When the potato crop
failed one year in Ireland or the wheat crop in England, there was
always the prospect and the hope that in the year following the kindly
fruits of the earth would he enjoyed in due season. But it was not so
with the cotton crop.'
"Lindsay was an avowed agitator for the South, and Forster for the North.
The wheat argument as presented by the former was expounded in a letter
from a Northerner propagandizing for the cessation of hostilities.
Forster, an equally rabid partisan for the Union, placed little emphasis
on wheat. Fitzgerald refused to be impressed, though he considered it
worthwhile to point out the grounds for his skepticism. Viscount
Palmerston spoke for the Government, and though his speech was in accord
with the best tradition of English diplomacy--platitudinous, sonorous, and
obscure--it did not contain the slightest reference to wheat.
"About a year later when the Roebuck Resolution was before the House of
Commons, Lord Robert Montagu referred to the wheat argument while speaking
against mediation. He held that the distress in England would doubtless be
aggravated if the Northern States ceased to export grain. What is more
important, he asserted that such a cessation would lead to a substantial
impairment of the economic and political relations then existing between
the Middle West and Canada, as Northern grain frequently, and in large
quantity, passed through Canada. In the course of the debate, Forster
returned to the wheat argument: '...unless the harvest were better than
it promised, the sufferings of the countrymen of the hon. Member [Mr.
Maguire] would be great indeed if they were deprived of the American corn
crop of this year.' Montagu emphasized the lucrativeness of Canadian
trade and pointed out that war with the North might lead to the loss of
those important colonies. Even Forster was not eschatological, and John
Bright, who also joined in the debate, failed to mention the wheat
argument.
"The members of Parliament were not completely ignorant of the role that
Northern wheat was playing, and more important, might play if Britain
failed to remain neutral. It is, however, extremely doubtful that a small
minority, not to mention a responsible majority, considered this role
important, much less strategic. The argument was most respected by
agitators, but even they failed to consider it worthy of more than passing
comment.
"The review of the statistical data suggests that the figures by
themselves do little to support the wheat thesis. Likewise, the literary
data do not withstand careful scrutiny and therefore fail to supply the
necessary substantiation. Thus ends a cycle. A historical factor
'consistently overlooked by all students' is finally discovered; then
others acknowledge it, although a few remain skeptical. Slowly their
skepticism is transformed into criticism, and eventually the discovery
must give way."
***
According to Degler (p. 225), Ginzberg's analysis "has been sustained by
subsequent examinations of British neutrality." True, Degler was writing
in 1966, but I am not aware of any subsequent research drastically
altering this conclusion.
Interestingly, Owsley, despite his rejection of the wheat thesis, shared
the economic determinism of his time (the original edition of *King Cotton
Diplomacy* was published in 1931). (He rejected the notion that anti-
slavery sentiment among the British working classes was responsible for
non-intervention, arguing that they were far from unanimous on the war,
and that in any event they mostly could not vote, nor was there much
danger of insurrection.) He wrote that "One must admit the correctness of
the principle laid down by the economic interpretation group of
historians, namely that in order to counteract one economic impulse
another stronger economic motive is necessary. But it is difficult to see
that wheat was a strong element in the economic impulse which counteracted
the King Cotton impulse. It is proposed to substitute a much more
sinister term for wheat--'war profits.'" Here, obviously, Owsley had the
experience of the Great War in mind (and indeed says so). Anyway, he
ticks off (pp. 549-57 of the second, 1959, edition) a list of economic
interests that profited by a continuation of the war:
"Perhaps the most surprising of the war profits was in the cotton industry
itself. [Prior to the war] the warehouses of India, China, and of
England...had a surplus... The mills were already beginning to slow down
before the war...Then the Civil War came as if in answer to a prayer and
cut off the supply of cheap cotton. The price of raw cotton rose from
fourteen cents to sixty, and as time passed the surplus manufactured goods
followed...In the meantime, the larger and well-financed mills continued
to manufacture goods and hold against the rising markets. These larger
mills...not merely made a profit out of this vast surplus of cheap pre-war
goods, but managed a neat profit on their output over the four years of
war. The only people who went down were the small mill-owners and the
cotton operatives. They lost all they had. But the industry was saved
from one of the worst panics in history, and impending ruin turned into
undreamt-of profits....There is another phase of the cotton profits which
must not be overlooked, namely the development of India as a rival source
of raw cotton...The next great sources of profits are closely related to
the cotton industry--the profits which were reaped from the linen and
woolen industries, the old rivals of cotton...Another business which
prospered mightily during war conditions was the munitions industry...Nor
does [this figure] include the sale of ships and steamers to the
Confederacy or the building of steamers for English blockade-runners.
This last item is of great importance, for it stimulated very greatly the
shipbuilding industry...But the greatest profit of all, one which was so
enormous it cannot be measured in dollars and cents, was made possible by
the complete destruction of the American merchant marine directly or
indirectly by the Confederate privateers and cruisers...We see, therefore,
that England far from being hag-ridden by poverty during the American
Civil War made enormous material profits." Owsley quotes *The Times*
(January 7, 1864) as saying:
"Outside of Lancashire it would not be known that anything had occurred to
injure the national trade. That is the most extraordinary and surprising
incident of the story. An industry which we conceived to be essential to
our commercial greatness has been utterly prostrated, without affecting
the greatness in any perceptible degree. We are as busy, as rich, and as
fortunate in our trade as if the American war had never broken out, and
our trade with the states had never been disturbed. Cotton was no king,
notwithstanding the prerogatives which had been loudly claimed for him."