Keynes' Cruisers

[thorr97]

As to the Americans besieged in the Philippines, I don’t think it’s a question so much of how to rescue them or relieve them as it is of why the Japanese are still fighting there in the first place.

In OTL the Japanese needed to take the Philippines in order to secure their conquests to the west. Had they not secured the Philippines then the US would’ve used their position there to immediately and continually threaten the rest of the Japanese lines. This, in particular, to threaten Japan’s hold on the vital Dutch East Indies oil fields.

In this ATL the situation is essentially reversed. The Japanese have largely failed at securing all their other targets and are severely delayed in finishing off the Philippines.

This, to the point that the actual conquest of the Philippines would be a net loss for the Japanese. It will take an even greater expenditure of men and resources to finally secure Bataan and force the surrender of the remaining US forces in the Philippines. And then it would take a relatively massive amount of continual resupply of the multiple division sized IJA units necessary to continue holding on to the Philippines.

In the rest of the Pacific the Japanese strategy was to install small garrisons on their island conquests such that they could be relatively easy to keep supplied once they’d dug them in deeply. The cost of doing that was deemed worthwhile in exchange for the amount of resources and men the Americans would have to expend in grinding the Japanese out of those redoubts.

The Philippines are different. Their sheer size requires a much larger amount of troops to be deployed and that requires a vastly larger amount of material support. When the Japanese held all of the approaches to the Philippines this was not as much of a problem. Yet in this ATL they do not hold those or do not hold them securely. Thus those supply lines to the Philippines are under much more intense threat of interdiction and that intense threat has started much earlier.

While it could be worth it to the Allies to “bleed” the Japanese in their attempt to continue holding on to the Philippines there would be a political cost to doing so for the Americans. The Japanese also have to be aware of the “math” involved here and none of it is good.

The longer the siege goes on the worse it gets for them. Having failed to have conquered the Americans as quickly as they planned and as quickly as they needed to, the Japanese are already “in the hole” as far as their strategic abilities go even had their other offensives gone according to their plans. That those offensives have failed means that even a successful conquering of the American garrison in the Philippines will only make things worse for Japan, not better.

With that in mind, and with the Imperial Japanese Navy’s decreasing ability to support the IJA’s operations in the Philippines even now, it would only make sense for the Japanese to call off their operations in the Philippines and extract what troops and material they can before they’re all entirely lost in that effort.

The defense of the Japanese home islands has to now become a priority. The Japanese have to be running out of oil for any further offensive operations at the least if not soon running out of it for defensive ones as well.

Thus continuing to besiege the Americans in the Philippines is an untenable proposition for the Japanese empire.

 

[Coulsdon Eagle]

With Hurricane Florence aiming to camp out over my house for the next couple of days, I might be taking a break or I could be writing 10,000 words depending on what the combination of power status and kids' boredom will allow.

Stay safe. My sister lives in Florida, which isn't in real danger, but its her birthday tomorrow, and my brother-in-law is taking her on a cruise to celebrate.

Up & down... side to side...

 

[Viper91]

As to the Americans besieged in the Philippines, I don’t think it’s a question so much of how to rescue them or relieve them as it is of why the Japanese are still fighting there in the first place.

In OTL the Japanese needed to take the Philippines in order to secure their conquests to the west. Had they not secured the Philippines then the US would’ve used their position there to immediately and continually threaten the rest of the Japanese lines. This, in particular, to threaten Japan’s hold on the vital Dutch East Indies oil fields.

In this ATL the situation is essentially reversed. The Japanese have largely failed at securing all their other targets and are severely delayed in finishing off the Philippines.

This, to the point that the actual conquest of the Philippines would be a net loss for the Japanese. It will take an even greater expenditure of men and resources to finally secure Bataan and force the surrender of the remaining US forces in the Philippines. And then it would take a relatively massive amount of continual resupply of the multiple division sized IJA units necessary to continue holding on to the Philippines.

In the rest of the Pacific the Japanese strategy was to install small garrisons on their island conquests such that they could be relatively easy to keep supplied once they’d dug them in deeply. The cost of doing that was deemed worthwhile in exchange for the amount of resources and men the Americans would have to expend in grinding the Japanese out of those redoubts.

The Philippines are different. Their sheer size requires a much larger amount of troops to be deployed and that requires a vastly larger amount of material support. When the Japanese held all of the approaches to the Philippines this was not as much of a problem. Yet in this ATL they do not hold those or do not hold them securely. Thus those supply lines to the Philippines are under much more intense threat of interdiction and that intense threat has started much earlier.

While it could be worth it to the Allies to “bleed” the Japanese in their attempt to continue holding on to the Philippines there would be a political cost to doing so for the Americans. The Japanese also have to be aware of the “math” involved here and none of it is good.

The longer the siege goes on the worse it gets for them. Having failed to have conquered the Americans as quickly as they planned and as quickly as they needed to, the Japanese are already “in the hole” as far as their strategic abilities go even had their other offensives gone according to their plans. That those offensives have failed means that even a successful conquering of the American garrison in the Philippines will only make things worse for Japan, not better.

With that in mind, and with the Imperial Japanese Navy’s decreasing ability to support the IJA’s operations in the Philippines even now, it would only make sense for the Japanese to call off their operations in the Philippines and extract what troops and material they can before they’re all entirely lost in that effort.

The defense of the Japanese home islands has to now become a priority. The Japanese have to be running out of oil for any further offensive operations at the least if not soon running out of it for defensive ones as well.

Thus continuing to besiege the Americans in the Philippines is an untenable proposition for the Japanese empire.

Probably a case of since they're already there, they just don't see any reason to leave. Or they're rightfully afraid that if they just pack up and leave, the US can use the region as a staging point for further offensives.

According to a recent post by fester, the lines have stabilized, and there's very little actual fighting going on. As long as the US and Filipino forces don't make a major effort to break out or anything, the general or admiral in charge is probably content to let the Yankees sit there and rot.

That and while a lot of their offensives have failed, having the Philippines as a jumping off point was necessary for them to begin with.

 

[Draconis]

Well folks, we got to figure out a way to supply an adequate amount of food to the soldiers holding the Bataan peninsula. As long as the risk from mines is not too high it looks like ammunition, medical supplies and other vital and fragile items can continue to be sufficiently supplied by submarine transport to Mariveles to deal with the current level of combat activities.

The problem is food. How to prevent the defenders from being weakened by starvation until such time (in TTL remember) that an invasion force begins the retaking of the Philippines, starting in Luzon, possibly landing at Lingayen Gulf in the mid to late 1943 maybe.

So how to supply the 45 tons of food a day that has been calculated to be the minimum needed to sustain the health of these soldiers. In Zheng He's TL we've recently read a very vivid and I think generally realistic description of what happens if transport ships are exposed to uncontested airstrikes.

In festers TL we can assume the Japanese have at least 200 to 300 aircraft of various types deployed at several different airfields in the P.I. Unless the British generously agree to protect the resupply ships with their Far East carrier force or the USN is directed to do likewise the resupply ships are easy pickings as soon as it get's light. The RN has other things to use their carriers for at the moment and so does the USN so no carrier protection. Any resupply run must be done at night. But how?

 

[fester]

Probably a case of since they're already there, they just don't see any reason to leave. Or they're rightfully afraid that if they just pack up and leave, the US can use the region as a staging point for further offensives.

According to a recent post by fester, the lines have stabilized, and there's very little actual fighting going on. As long as the US and Filipino forces don't make a major effort to break out or anything, the general or admiral in charge is probably content to let the Yankees sit there and rot.

That and while a lot of their offensives have failed, having the Philippines as a jumping off point was necessary for them to begin with.

In my mind, the Japanese need the airfields and the secondary ports of the Philippines for two reasons:

1) Secure their intermediate rear area of the fighting theatres in Thailand and the southern DEI.
2) Provide aggressive ASW coverage for the resource exploitation of Borneo and FIC as US, UK and Dutch submarines are both more numerous and far more active in this timeline than our timeline as the journey to productive patrol areas is far shorter. There is no area that is effectively out of range of aggressive Allied sub drivers in TTL October 1942 while there were significant areas where Allied submarines just did not have enough fuel to get to in late 1942 in OTL.

There is very little fighting actually going on. The Japanese need to honor the threat that a counter-offensive out of Bataan could take Clark field (as well as other Northern Luzon strips) if the only security units were distance and 5th rate troops so there are 2 divisions and the shells of a few battered divisions rebuilding on the islands. But they are not getting the half million shells and tens of thousands of tons of refined fuel needed to break the Bataan and Harbor defenses.

 

[sloreck]

Japan can't abandon the PI for the same reason Hitler declared various positions "fortresses" to be defended to the last man. To withdraw would be an obvious victory for the USA, and a defeat/retreat for Japan. The twisted Bushido code running the military won't allow that, even minor tactical retreats were somehow "wrong" although accepted as an occasional necessity. All of the military logic that @fester describes are completely valid. Those would hardly be mentioned - if the concept of retreat is off the table, then discusses the military reasons pro/con for a retreat are irrelevant.

 

[TonyA]

Japan can't abandon the PI for the same reason Hitler declared various positions "fortresses" to be defended to the last man. To withdraw would be an obvious victory for the USA, and a defeat/retreat for Japan. The twisted Bushido code running the military won't allow that, even minor tactical retreats were somehow "wrong" although accepted as an occasional necessity. All of the military logic that @fester describes are completely valid. Those would hardly be mentioned - if the concept of retreat is off the table, then discusses the military reasons pro/con for a retreat are irrelevant.

That does make a sort of perverted sense, doesn't it!

 

[Zheng He]

Japan can't abandon the PI for the same reason Hitler declared various positions "fortresses" to be defended to the last man. To withdraw would be an obvious victory for the USA, and a defeat/retreat for Japan. The twisted Bushido code running the military won't allow that, even minor tactical retreats were somehow "wrong" although accepted as an occasional necessity. All of the military logic that @fester describes are completely valid. Those would hardly be mentioned - if the concept of retreat is off the table, then discusses the military reasons pro/con for a retreat are irrelevant.

The smart play for the Japanese right now would be to let Bataan become a giant POW camp. You can argue they should have done the same thing OTL after they secured the rest of the archipelago, but as stated I don’t think pride permits that.

 

[sloreck]

As long as the US holds Bataan and the harbor islands, Manila is useless as a port for the Japanese. Since Manila was declared an open city, and for other reasons, there were no major demolitions at the port so it represented one of the best ports available in the conquered territories for the Japanese - but the entrance was locked up tight, which was the purpose of the harbor forts.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

As to the Americans besieged in the Philippines, I don’t think it’s a question so much of how to rescue them or relieve them as it is of why the Japanese are still fighting there in the first place.

In OTL the Japanese needed to take the Philippines in order to secure their conquests to the west. Had they not secured the Philippines then the US would’ve used their position there to immediately and continually threaten the rest of the Japanese lines. This, in particular, to threaten Japan’s hold on the vital Dutch East Indies oil fields.

In this ATL the situation is essentially reversed. The Japanese have largely failed at securing all their other targets and are severely delayed in finishing off the Philippines.

This, to the point that the actual conquest of the Philippines would be a net loss for the Japanese. It will take an even greater expenditure of men and resources to finally secure Bataan and force the surrender of the remaining US forces in the Philippines. And then it would take a relatively massive amount of continual resupply of the multiple division sized IJA units necessary to continue holding on to the Philippines.

In the rest of the Pacific the Japanese strategy was to install small garrisons on their island conquests such that they could be relatively easy to keep supplied once they’d dug them in deeply. The cost of doing that was deemed worthwhile in exchange for the amount of resources and men the Americans would have to expend in grinding the Japanese out of those redoubts.

The Philippines are different. Their sheer size requires a much larger amount of troops to be deployed and that requires a vastly larger amount of material support. When the Japanese held all of the approaches to the Philippines this was not as much of a problem. Yet in this ATL they do not hold those or do not hold them securely. Thus those supply lines to the Philippines are under much more intense threat of interdiction and that intense threat has started much earlier.

While it could be worth it to the Allies to “bleed” the Japanese in their attempt to continue holding on to the Philippines there would be a political cost to doing so for the Americans. The Japanese also have to be aware of the “math” involved here and none of it is good.

The longer the siege goes on the worse it gets for them. Having failed to have conquered the Americans as quickly as they planned and as quickly as they needed to, the Japanese are already “in the hole” as far as their strategic abilities go even had their other offensives gone according to their plans. That those offensives have failed means that even a successful conquering of the American garrison in the Philippines will only make things worse for Japan, not better.

With that in mind, and with the Imperial Japanese Navy’s decreasing ability to support the IJA’s operations in the Philippines even now, it would only make sense for the Japanese to call off their operations in the Philippines and extract what troops and material they can before they’re all entirely lost in that effort.

The defense of the Japanese home islands has to now become a priority. The Japanese have to be running out of oil for any further offensive operations at the least if not soon running out of it for defensive ones as well.

Thus continuing to besiege the Americans in the Philippines is an untenable proposition for the Japanese empire.

Good post - a Successful resupply mission or even the perception of a good resupply mission is going to boost the defenders morale and hit the Japanese Morale (if only their commanders)

 

[Viper91]

Well folks, we got to figure out a way to supply an adequate amount of food to the soldiers holding the Bataan peninsula. As long as the risk from mines is not too high it looks like ammunition, medical supplies and other vital and fragile items can continue to be sufficiently supplied by submarine transport to Mariveles to deal with the current level of combat activities.

The problem is food. How to prevent the defenders from being weakened by starvation until such time (in TTL remember) that an invasion force begins the retaking of the Philippines, starting in Luzon, possibly landing at Lingayen Gulf in the mid to late 1943 maybe.

So how to supply the 45 tons of food a day that has been calculated to be the minimum needed to sustain the health of these soldiers. In Zheng He's TL we've recently read a very vivid and I think generally realistic description of what happens if transport ships are exposed to uncontested airstrikes.

In festers TL we can assume the Japanese have at least 200 to 300 aircraft of various types deployed at several different airfields in the P.I. Unless the British generously agree to protect the resupply ships with their Far East carrier force or the USN is directed to do likewise the resupply ships are easy pickings as soon as it get's light. The RN has other things to use their carriers for at the moment and so does the USN so no carrier protection. Any resupply run must be done at night. But how?

Simple, right now, until probably June or July 1943 at the earliest, it simply can't be done with surface ships without air cover, and any ships that would attempt it are going to operate for 24 to 48 hours at minimum with no friendly air support whatsoever.

The best thing the US can do is make plans to clear the Marshall Islands, then make planes for the Marianas and Caroline Islands, and plan the smash the Japanese fleet at the first opportunity.

The only realistic option that exists right now above what is already being done would be to find three or four additional submarines that would be willing or able to be pressed into regular supply runs. That and maybe have some creative engineers and supply officers perhaps go over the half dozen boats already making runs and see if there's anything at all that can be done to modify or upgrade the boats so that they can add any extra supplies, or see if there is any way possible to make it so that they can take two or three extra people with them on return trips to Singapore.

One thing that I've not thought of, if the British can't spare any of their submarines, might the Dutch be willing or able to loan the US a couple of boats, even if it's a one time deal? The US has spent a lot of resources and manpower helping hold onto Java and Timor, so loaning one or two boats for a few ferry missions might be seen as a reasonable exchange. It would still be a drop in the bucket overall, but that could still allow several dozen, perhaps even several hundred additional personnel the chance to get out, and depending on the supplies brought in, maybe it will buy a few days, maybe a week or so.

 

[Zheng He]

As long as the US holds Bataan and the harbor islands, Manila is useless as a port for the Japanese. Since Manila was declared an open city, and for other reasons, there were no major demolitions at the port so it represented one of the best ports available in the conquered territories for the Japanese - but the entrance was locked up tight, which was the purpose of the harbor forts.

And that was Mac’s argument OTL, “They hold the bottle but I hold the cork.” There are other ports as well that they now hold and there is nothing based there that is a threat to them, so I’m not sure it is worth the effort to finish off Bataan by this point.

 

[Draconis]

How to supply the soldiers on Bataan with at least a bare minimum of food without taking exorbitant losses to the ships and crews? I have an idea that might solve the two most dangerous problems in attempting to supply the food with the minimal force available.

The first problem is how to get the tons of food unloaded off the ships as quickly as possible, moved ashore and hidden while it's still night Someone posted about using DUKWs which in not a bad idea except they aren't available. What could be built in Singapore with minimum of material and skill are flat-bottomed wooden skiffs or rowboat sized boats. These skiffs can be roughly built with no effort wasted on looks or durability as long as they are built sturdy enough to hold together for their one little trip.

Built out of any scrap wood from crates or any low quality wood on hand these boats only have to last one trip from ship to shore. They should be built large enough to carry about 5 tons. They must be flat bottomed and constructed in such a way that the bottom is sturdy enough to carry the weight of the food and to stiffen the rest of the boat's structure. That flat bottom will also have two axles mounted externally with wheels with one axle near the bow and other axle at the rear of the boat. This allows the boat to be moved when it reaches the shallow water at the shore and to be moved over land.

Problem number two is protecting the ships from air attack.
The ships needed for this operation are the APDs, better the ones that haven't had any boilers removed and the ATL cruiser transports. The food skiffs will be deck cargo only. The ships will need to be modified to the extent that there will need to be a short simple ramp or two ramps built at the stern to facilitate launching the food skiffs quickly. Also as much deck space as possible toward the stern of the ship need to be cleared to create enough room to carry as many skiffs as possible. The cruiser transports might be able to carry close to twenty. The APDs perhaps half that. I'm unsure what the exact dimensions of the food skiffs would be. The RN's high speed minelayers would be ideal for this job but the RN is not likely to make them available for this purpose.

The plan would be not to unload at Mariveles or try to enter Manila Bay but to use the small coves and beaches located at the Southwest edge of the Bataan peninsula. These locations support fishing villages and are connected to the rest of the peninsula by crude roads. The fast transports would come dashing in under the cover of darkness to arrive about midnight. Naturally their arrival will be expected and Allied personnel will be waiting for them. Not all the ships need be any any one location but they will split up and unload at three or four locations. This is in case of any IJN patrol boats showing up thus only part of the delivery gets interrupted instead of all of it. Also by spreading out the drop-offs between different locations this avoids overwhelming the cargo handlers on shore at each location who must finish their tasks before dawn.

After arriving around midnight at their previously arranged locations the ships' deck crews push the food skiffs down the ramps and into the ocean. This activity should only take 10 to 20 minutes. As soon as the food skiffs are in the water the ships will head out Westward at fastest speed to put as much distance between them and the P.I. as possible before daylight. There should be a rendezvous point the ships should meet at by dawn so as to provide mutual protection as they continue back to Singapore. Perhaps the same location they started the high speed approach run at sunset that night. Also if any enemy patrol boats are detected before the unloading is started or completed the ships can depart the area at high speed if the threat is considered too big to fight off. They will try again some other night.

What happen to the food skiffs that have been quickly unloaded near the shore? That would depend on the water depth and how close the unloading ships could safely approach the beach. If they can get in really close, within a couple of hundred yards or less then the cargo personnel can bring out a rope from the shore by boat and fasten it to the food skiffs and pull the food skiffs ashore like the old style lifeboats. It might be helpful if the food skiffs were daisy-chained together in groups of 3 or 4 before they were dropped off to help facilitate recovery. If the food skiffs are dropped off further out then they must be towed closer in by a boat of some type.

Either way the last part in the very shallow water will be accomplished by people and/or water buffalos towing the food skiffs ashore. Once the skiffs get in the shallows they will be running on their wheels and are now more like a wagon then a boat. This makes it much easier to move the 5 tons of food aboard each food skiff/wagon. Using teams of people and/or water buffalos to manhandle each boat/wagon there will be enough time before dawn to move these wagons inland off the beach and hide them somewhere singly or in small groups under trees or some kind of camouflage. The following night these wagons can be towed and unloaded anywhere the quartermasters want them.

If there are no losses this food supply run could bring in as much as 600 tons of food using about 120 disposable cheaply made food skiffs and 2 ATL cruiser transports and 8 APDs. That's enough for about half a month or so. While this isn't as much as the fast transports can carry fully loaded this system is optimized for unloading speed so as to reduce the risk as much as possible. Hopefully they won't sustain too heavy losses doing these runs the 8 or 10 times they may need to do to keep people fed until July 1943 or thereabouts.

 

[Butchpfd]

A thought on the CLD and APD force, perhaps they are headed somewhere to set up a base within the Phillipines, such as Jolo or Zamboanga, and use that as an intermediate base for air supply of the the besieged forces. This base could be supplied by these ships from the DEi, and protected by their own fighters.

 

[andys]

I suspect you'd need to allow for some of the skiffs sinking, so perhaps getting anything over 75% ashore would be a success.

 

[vl100butch]

How to supply the soldiers on Bataan with at least a bare minimum of food without taking exorbitant losses to the ships and crews? I have an idea that might solve the two most dangerous problems in attempting to supply the food with the minimal force available.

The first problem is how to get the tons of food unloaded off the ships as quickly as possible, moved ashore and hidden while it's still night Someone posted about using DUKWs which in not a bad idea except they aren't available. What could be built in Singapore with minimum of material and skill are flat-bottomed wooden skiffs or rowboat sized boats. These skiffs can be roughly built with no effort wasted on looks or durability as long as they are built sturdy enough to hold together for their one little trip.

If there are no losses this food supply run could bring in as much as 600 tons of food using about 120 disposable cheaply made food skiffs and 2 ATL cruiser transports and 8 APDs. That's enough for about 4 more months. While this isn't as much as the fast transports can carry fully loaded this system is optimized for speed so as to reduce the risk as much as possible. Hopefully they would only need to do this run once. February 1943 plus 4 months is nearing July 1943.

It may take two or three runs, supplemented with the submarines....you have 4-6 submarines, probably one a week....keep ammo and medical supplies going in and wounded coming out....

 

[sonofpegasus]

Not so different from the suggestion in my earlier post thenQ!

 

[Draconis]

Not so different from the suggestion in my earlier post thenQ!

Was that you that suggested using DUKWs? It was a pretty good idea I thought. If only they were available.

 

[Draconis]

As to the Americans besieged in the Philippines, I don’t think it’s a question so much of how to rescue them or relieve them as it is of why the Japanese are still fighting there in the first place.

In OTL the Japanese needed to take the Philippines in order to secure their conquests to the west. Had they not secured the Philippines then the US would’ve used their position there to immediately and continually threaten the rest of the Japanese lines. This, in particular, to threaten Japan’s hold on the vital Dutch East Indies oil fields.

In this ATL the situation is essentially reversed. The Japanese have largely failed at securing all their other targets and are severely delayed in finishing off the Philippines.

The longer the siege goes on the worse it gets for them. Having failed to have conquered the Americans as quickly as they planned and as quickly as they needed to, the Japanese are already “in the hole” as far as their strategic abilities go even had their other offensives gone according to their plans. That those offensives have failed means that even a successful conquering of the American garrison in the Philippines will only make things worse for Japan, not better.

With that in mind, and with the Imperial Japanese Navy’s decreasing ability to support the IJA’s operations in the Philippines even now, it would only make sense for the Japanese to call off their operations in the Philippines and extract what troops and material they can before they’re all entirely lost in that effort.

The defense of the Japanese home islands has to now become a priority. The Japanese have to be running out of oil for any further offensive operations at the least if not soon running out of it for defensive ones as well.

Thus continuing to besiege the Americans in the Philippines is an untenable proposition for the Japanese empire.

I think that is a very astute appraisal of this time line's current and developing strategic situation for the Japanese Empire. The realistic move at this point would be to pull back and set up a defensive perimeter based on the Home Islands, Formosa and China. But they won't of course. And this is why it's important to maintain supply to the defenders of Bataan. Because the pressure they are under will lessen in the near to midterm. They just need to hold on in the meantime.

 

[Draconis]

A thought on the CLD and APD force, perhaps they are headed somewhere to set up a base within the Phillipines, such as Jolo or Zamboanga, and use that as an intermediate base for air supply of the the besieged forces. This base could be supplied by these ships from the DEi, and protected by their own fighters.

It's a brave idea. They would need an awful lot of fighters and a substantial garrison all on the end of a long contested supply line. This operation would attract a significant Japanese response.