Keynes' Cruisers

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Why risk the carriers at all? Just send the air groups to Cornwall.

Better yet, send the air groups to Cornwall, then send the carriers, with fighters on deck and a maybe a few bombers (need to look good for the reconnaissance aircraft) up to Norway to feign an attack on Tirpitz in her lair. Then when the Germans are looking that way, Brest gets hammered.
 
Could the Carrier aircraft even launch from the UK fly out to sea and then attack Brest ? That protects the carriers completely and if the Germans see them they maybe convinced they're planning something but nothing immediately.
They could easily launch from the UK, the Swordfish for example had a range of about 450 NM, the distance to Brest from Falmouth is 110 NM. However, navigation over sea by dead reckoning is difficult, you'd have to put a ship at the turn point.
 
Why risk the carriers at all? Just send the air groups to Cornwall.

Better yet, send the air groups to Cornwall, then send the carriers, with fighters on deck and a maybe a few bombers (need to look good for the reconnaissance aircraft) up to Norway to feign an attack on Tirpitz in her lair. Then when the Germans are looking that way, Brest gets hammered.

That's too long a distance too fly without the groups becoming disorganized and strung out, when flying at night. You'll end up with far fewer than necessary arriving at all, and many not getting there at all. Losses would be catastrophic. You need to get in close, launch, recover and retire. Use your numbers to your advantage with one concentrated blow and then run. Plus if you fly over France from the UK, the Germans will recognize it as an incoming strike. This negates the advantage of striking from the sea.
 
Why not something like this:

Early morning bomber raid [out of England]
Mid day raid by fighters doing sweeps [out of England]
Second bomber raid in early afternoon [out of England]
US carrier strike timed to hit just as the British bombers are leaving Brest (not quite dusk but close to it, US planes should be landing at dusk or right after)
FAA strike right after dusk (better night attack experience and if lucky all the fires from the bombing gives them some nice light to guide by)
Heck you could even follow up with a smaller night time bomber raid too just to rub it in.

The defenders would be exhausted with all day attacks. Also throw in some diversionary attacks elsewhere if possible to draw off some fighter cover it might make this quite the assault.
 

Errolwi

Monthly Donor
People realise that there were a lot of attacks on Brest at this time OTL, right?

British air offensive, 1941
At the start of the month, the Brest Group was made the Bomber Command priority again and from 11 December, bombing and minelaying took place nightly. When Prinz Eugen was found out of dry dock on 16 December, a plan for a big night raid, followed up by a day raid was implemented, with a 101-bomber raid on the night of 17/18 December and a daylight raid by 41 heavy bombers on the afternoon of 18 December, escorted by ten fighter squadrons. Gneisenau was lightly damaged and dock gates were smashed, stranding Scharnhorst for a month, for a loss six bombers. Big attacks continued all month and another day raid by Halifaxes was made on 30 December. From 1 August to 31 December, 1,175 long tons (1,194 t) of high explosive and 10 long tons (10 t) of incendiaries were dropped, eleven heavy bombers were shot down and considerable damage inflicted on the docks and the town but none of the ships were hit again. Gneisenau was damaged on the evening of 6 January and between 10 December and 20 January 1942, 37 percent of Bomber Command sorties were flown against the ships at Brest.

Also, it's winter, getting decent conditions for dive-bombing could be a challenge, you don't want the carriers hanging about the in the Atlantic waiting for a reasonable day. OTL they departed Brest 10th Feb.
 
December 10, 1941 North Atlantic
That U-boat skipper will be court-martialled when he gets back to France. He just committed the same error as Jaroschek, only worse - engaging the enemy without first making a contact report. It's worse because he's not a lieutenant in his first combat action, he's veteran senior officer, and because he has explicit orders to make such a report and not engage. The standard U-boat tactic was to post a group of U-boats in a scouting line to detect convoys. They would run surfaced, submerging if an airplane came over (rare at this time) or any Allied ships got near. In the latter case they would rely on hydrophones and periscope to identify and track the Allied ships.

When a U-boat sighted a convoy, it would wait until the convoy was well clear, then surface and radio the convoy's position, course, and speed to U-boat HQ in France. HQ would then issue orders to all U-boats in that group to assemble ahead of the convoy (which they could do because their surfaced speed was much greater than the convoy's. The next night, the entire group of U-boats would attack the convoy simultaneously, running surfaced. (A U-boat's low profile was nearly invisible in darkness, and the cold Atlantic often provided fog and mist.) Such a "wolfpack" attack could overwhelm the convoy's escorts, leading to slaughter of the merchant ships.

This tactic was far more effective than the usual practice of individual submarines loitering around shipping lanes, waiting for targets. However, it was very dependent on sighting reports, and generated lots of radio traffic between U-boats and HQ, fodder for Allied HF/DF.

More importantly, when the Allies were reading U-boat Enigma traffic, they knew where the U-boat scouting lines were and could route convoys around them. ("Playing blind-man's-bluff with their eyes open", in one chronicler's phrase.) The Allies enjoyed this advantage from mid-1941 through January 1942, when losses were much reduced.

In February 1942, the Germans adopted a new Enigma key for U-boats only, which included additional rotor wheels. This new key was finally broken in November 1942 by Alan Turing - but the Allies lost six million tons of ships in the meantime.

In March 1943, the Germans tweaked U-boat Enigma, and it was secure for ten days. During those ten days the Germans savaged several convoys, especially HX229 and SC122, which lost 22 ships. Until Turing re-broke the U-boat key, the Admiralty feared the Battle of the Atlantic was lost.

(Running off at the fingers here, but I hope the information is useful.)
 
Terrible move then, terrible move now....
This is a popular error. OTL, Gallup took a poll on December 9, 1941. Over 90% of respondents agreed that the US should have declared war on Germany as well as Japan. FDR could have gotten a declaration of war on Germany whenever he wanted it, probably within six months. In the meantime, the US could do nothing in the Atlantic or Europe that it was not already doing. Hitler's action was therefore of no real significance.
 
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This is a popular error. OTL, Gallup took a poll on December 9, 1941. Over 90% of respondents agreed that the US should have declared war on Germany as well as Japan. FDR could have gotten a declaration of war on Germany whenever he wanted it, probably within six months. In the meantime, the US could do nothing in the Atlantic or Europe that it was not already doing. already. Hitler's action was therefore of no real significance.

I generally find that someone's opinion on Hitler's declaration of war on the US makes a useful rule of thumb as to whether they really understand the economics and politics around WW2.
 
That's too long a distance too fly without the groups becoming disorganized and strung out, when flying at night. You'll end up with far fewer than necessary arriving at all, and many not getting there at all. Losses would be catastrophic. You need to get in close, launch, recover and retire. Use your numbers to your advantage with one concentrated blow and then run. Plus if you fly over France from the UK, the Germans will recognize it as an incoming strike. This negates the advantage of striking from the sea.
The only thing all pilots could be told is that if they get really lost, fly due north and land at a British airfield.
 
I notice that the planners of the attack talk about the air groups having practiced this, not the carriers themselves. Perhaps because some of the assets were in dry dock, but that could be a clue that the op will be launched from the mainland. If this is the case, having one or more carrier sighted up north would be a benefit to the attack, as it would focus attention on Norway.
Then we get the USN doing a daytime attack supported by as many RAF fighters as can be spared (both as direct raid escort and conducting rhubarbs elsewhere), followed by a night time attack by the FAA. If Bomber Command get pissed at their lack of involvement, tell them to get busy mining Brest after the FAA depart. PR Spitifres to make overflights first light following day, rinse and repeat if required.
 

Ramp-Rat

Monthly Donor
Operation Bathhouse, do's and dont's.

Don't make things too complicated, keep it simple.
Do use each asset to its best.

Personally I think that an attack in three parts, using each different force to its best advantage.

First attack, FAA at night on the harbour and shipping, between two and four in the morning, with strict instructions that if not committed by ten to four, then pull away.

Second attack by Bomber Command, four thirty until dawn, bombing from inland out to sea, harbour, docks and shipyards.

Third attack, USN launched before dawn to arrive at dawn plus thirty minutes, any remaining ships plus harbour.

The FAA, are the masters of low level in harbour shipping strikes, and have the smallest force available. Attacking at night reduces the risk from fighters. And the Germans should be too busy with everything else going on to chase after the RN group.

Bomber Command are the ones that can deliver the greatest weight of explosives to the target. They can also launch a diversionary raid towards Northern France/Southern Germany , drawing away any night fighters. The second attack will also help to deplete the anti-aircraft batteries ammunition supply, and tier the gunners out.

With the German air defences trying to chase the bombers back to England, and find the British Carriers, the USN, should have a clear run in. And be able to target any remaining ships, against a much reduced AA component. The Germans lack in France an effective anti shipping air attack capacity, and the Americans should be able to fight off any air strikes against them.


RR.
 
December 11, 1941 1730 Norfolk Virginia
Admiral Hewitt paused for a moment as he considered his words...

Which would be "Are you all brain-damaged? Why on earth should we risk aircraft carriers to strike a target which is in easy attack range of lots of our land-based aircraft?" (SW England is only 250-300 km from Brest, and air bases, unlike carriers, cannot be sunk.)
 
How about - the RAF conducts a series of attacks vs the ships and facilities at Brest through out December instead of March and April 42 - this causes light damage to all 3 German ships (as OTL a large % of bombs hit but do not explode) and possibly any escorts etc.

The Germans - aware that they have gotten lucky with failed bombs etc decide to abandon Brest as it is too close to the UK and instead base their ships at Saint-Nazaire taking them outside of single engine strike aircraft range for torpedo carrying aircraft and single engine fighter escort range

Enter Operation Drumbeat - stage left - as a massed carrier strike now makes sense
 
Which would be "Are you all brain-damaged? Why on earth should we risk aircraft carriers to strike a target which is in easy attack range of lots of our land-based aircraft?" (SW England is only 250-300 km from Brest, and air bases, unlike carriers, cannot be sunk.)

"For Practice" or "As a morale boosting exercise for the public" are the only reasons I can think of.

The proposed operation is like the Doolittle Raid writ very large, and in a far more dangerous location, with heavier defences. Also patrol planes and submarines to slip past - a whole Atlantic ocean of them - on the way in and fight their way past on the way out. The Luftwaffe in France in late 1941 is a large, well equipped and trained force.

If they get any real warning at all - a submarine sighting a day or two from Brest say - the attack will be on a large prepared defence, with the carriers also targets of Goering's desire for the glory and the prestige of smashing the combined fleet carrier force. All Hitler will care about is results, he will NOT be understanding about failure to detect and destroy this force.

How many carriers will survive this?

How many of them will have little or no air wing aircraft when they do get back to a friendly port?
 
Which would be "Are you all brain-damaged? Why on earth should we risk aircraft carriers to strike a target which is in easy attack range of lots of our land-based aircraft?" (SW England is only 250-300 km from Brest, and air bases, unlike carriers, cannot be sunk.)

Among other things there is the eternal rivalry between army, navy and air force. If the air force can do it, then the navy can do it better. :p

A lot depends on the element of surprise and response time of the Luftwaffe.
Just how good is the German radar coverage in France in 1941 and how much warning does it provide against relatively fast carrier aircraft compared to against slow lumbering bombers.
 
"For Practice" or "As a morale boosting exercise for the public" are the only reasons I can think of.

The proposed operation is like the Doolittle Raid writ very large, and in a far more dangerous location, with heavier defences. Also patrol planes and submarines to slip past - a whole Atlantic ocean of them - on the way in and fight their way past on the way out. The Luftwaffe in France in late 1941 is a large, well equipped and trained force.

If they get any real warning at all - a submarine sighting a day or two from Brest say - the attack will be on a large prepared defence, with the carriers also targets of Goering's desire for the glory and the prestige of smashing the combined fleet carrier force. All Hitler will care about is results, he will NOT be understanding about failure to detect and destroy this force.

How many carriers will survive this?

How many of them will have little or no air wing aircraft when they do get back to a friendly port?

The Doolittle raid couldn't have been launched from land.

Also, I think you're vastly overestimating the anti-shipping abilities of the Luftwaffe.
 
the cv's will have to fight there way out of reprisal attack featuring the worst anti shipping striking force in the region under a protective umbrella of several hundred land based veteran fighter squadrons....

subs are the real risk here.
 
the cv's will have to fight there way out of reprisal attack featuring the worst anti shipping striking force in the region under a protective umbrella of several hundred land based veteran fighter squadrons....

subs are the real risk here.

Again, the Luftwaffe was not generally good at anti-shipping operations. And German submarines were pretty useless in places under Allied air cover.
 
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