Keynes' Cruisers Volume 2

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Simple google maps. From Rabaul to Luzon is roughly 4,100 kilometers.

Ulithi to Luzon is around 2,100 kilometers.

For other comparison, Pearl Harbor to Ulithi is around 3100 miles. Pearl Harbor to Rabaul is around 3800 miles. 700 miles may not seem like that much in and of itself, but when you're talking about moving hundreds if not thousands of ships, many hundreds of thousands of men, and tens of millions of tons of supplies and material, that 700 miles of difference can add up significantly. for a slow freighter or auxiliary warship that might be able to do 20 knots in good sea conditions if the crew violates a number of safety proceedures, that 700 miles difference could easily add 2 or 3 days travel time. That's 2 or 3 extra days a ship or convoy will need escorts that can't be used at the front lines, 2 or 3 days more of being at risk from submarine attack, 2 or 3 days more wear and tear on the ship before it needs to stop in a decent port or possibly go into drydock for upkeep and overhaul.

There's a very good reason that in late 1943 and after once the US was finally ready to go all out against Japan that they largely stayed on an axis of advance laid out pre war.

I was thinking Rabaul as a staging base to Ulithi (coming up from Australia) instead of moving through the Marshalls. Also, are you looking at the same map as me. Mine shows PH to Ulithi being 4200 miles vs. 3800 between PH and Rabaul.
 
I was thinking Rabaul as a staging base to Ulithi (coming up from Australia) instead of moving through the Marshalls. Also, are you looking at the same map as me. Mine shows PH to Ulithi being 4200 miles vs. 3800 between PH and Rabaul.

I just looked, you're right. Rabaul is closer to Pearl Harbor in a straight line.

Looking at the map though, I could only find kilometers, it's 6700 kilometers to Ulithi via Pearl, and 6100 kilomoters to Rabaul from Pearl. But it's also 2,096 additional kilometers from Rabaul to Ulithi.

I don't know how many forces are at Rabaul ITTL, but I'm guessing that in order to take it, the US would probably have to commit at least a couple divisions plus support units, and even in success, whichever two divisions and change get the job, they'd probably be out of action for at least a couple of months afterwards for resupply and bringing in replacements. I also don't know which other islands in the area have Japanese garrisons that might have to be dealt with. I know it's far less then OTL, but there could still be one or two garrisons that need to be dealt with. That could take anywhere from a few days to a months or anywhere in between or maybe longer.

Given the Japanese aren't on New Guinea and the supply lines to Australia are safe, I still feel the best thing in that region is for Australia, New Zealand, and maybe the US to use anywhere from 2 to 4 brigades/regiments, maybe penny packet them out in battalion or company sized units, and surround Rabaul, launch to occasional bombing raid, and let the garrison rot and die.
 
Story 1781
Celebes Sea, 1500 January 2, 1943


The taciturn admiral looked at the message. He glanced at a chart. Lines furrowed on his brow as lines formed in his head. Six carriers. That is what the message said. Since sun-up, the best naval squadrons in the entire world had been devastated. Their losses would be felt for years, but their losses would buy years as they had sent to the bottom six enemy aircraft carriers.

The Americans and the British would eventually be able to swamp the Imperial Japanese Navy with sheer weight of numbers, but now that they were six carriers and a battleship down, that time would be pushed back to at least 1945. And then they would be going against hardened forward bases backed by a fully rebuilt and reconstituted Combined Fleet with two more super battleships due to commission by then as well as another half dozen modern aircraft carriers due to have new airgroups built upon the core of veteran survivors.

Now his seven battleships could intervene and destroy the American beachhead and any escorts. He was more than confident in matching ship versus ship and gun versus gun. His carriers had paid dearly attriting the American fleet to open the gap that he could slide through. Four seconds after reading the message in his hand for the first time, he gave an order to head due south instead of the slightly southwest course and to accelerate to twenty two knots. Contact would be expected before midnight.
 
Well, based on his estimate of the situation, the decisive moment in the decisive battle has arrived. Time to commit the battle line and finish the job. Of course, if his estimate is in error...........
 
Story 1782
Paleware, Celebes 1503 January 3, 1943


“Just need to close him up.” The surgeon was silent as his skilled and well practiced hands quickly and professionally began to close a hole in another young Marine. This one had been brought to the battalion aid station ninety seven minutes ago and was put under anesthesia three minutes after arrival. He was lucky as the triage line was not long. The wounds were superficially extensive and the blood loss severe after a mortar shell burst yards away from him. Three of his buddies pulled him under cover and applied pressure until the corpsman could arrive with morphine, tourniquets and bandages. The other Marines rejoined the attack on the improvised bunker while PFC Jaroschek was soon sent to the rear first by stretcher party and then by jeep to the aid station.


8th Marines were still grinding their way forward against determined opposition. Intelligence from Dutch guerillas and a few commandos had indicated that the entire Japanese garrison in the city was no more than a reinforced battalion. The 8th Marines had pushed the defenders off the docks and away from the road where the Seabees were already laying out the markings for a major airfield complex. Now the last few hundred defenders were pushed back into a dozen square blocks where each building was a strongpoint. Tanks and engineers were the primary wall busters although a battery of four 155 millimeter guns had been dragged forward. Direct fire with a six inch high explosive shell fired over open sights from eight hundred yards had a salutory effect on all but the most well constructed positions.


2nd Marines had taken a blocking position north of the port while 6th, 1st and 5th Marines along with most of 10th Marines and all of 11th Marines were already pushing south to Makassar.


All of that would not matter. Thomas Jaroschek had seen the elephant and it had barely missed crushing him. His war would be over once he was safe enough to evacuate to one of the transport hospitals. The surgeon barely looked at the fit young man who was now being moved to a recovery bed. Another Marine needed his expertise so he washed his hands as the nurse gave him a full report.
 

Driftless

Donor
Paleware, Celebes 1503 January 3, 1943

All of that would not matter. Thomas Jaroschek had seen the elephant and it had barely missed crushing him. His war would be over once he was safe enough to evacuate to one of the transport hospitals.

Well, he's still got to get off the island before he gets on his way home....
 
The 10th & 11th Marines would be artillery units OTL. The other three would be infantry regiments (three battalions each nominally about 3500 personnel).
 
IIRC when measuring distances between two places on a flat chart, the shortest distance is actually a curved course drawn on the chart. This is the great circle route along the curved surface of the planet! It's years since I last plotted a trans oceanic passage so I am somewhat rusty on the correct terminology. I am not sure how modern computers mapping systems like Google earth calculate transoceanic distances but I would assume that they automatically calculate the great circle distance.
 
IIRC when measuring distances between two places on a flat chart, the shortest distance is actually a curved course drawn on the chart. This is the great circle route along the curved surface of the planet! It's years since I last plotted a trans oceanic passage so I am somewhat rusty on the correct terminology. I am not sure how modern computers mapping systems like Google earth calculate transoceanic distances but I would assume that they automatically calculate the great circle distance.
Just tried it , definitely does the great circle as the shortest distance shows as a curve not a straight line due to the projection used.
 

formion

Banned
The last glimpse on Yamamoto's line of thinking is at 15:00. When the bigger strike from the Yorktowns arrive, will he consider it as coming from the now "sunk" Lex and Sara ? Or will it be too big and reveal the presence of more CVs ? If so, will a retreat order be issued and how much south will the Main Body will have steamed until that point? Seems that even with a retreating Main Body later in the afternoon, a single night-time strike may be possible.
 
I think they'd want to press on, apparently 6 carriers have been sunk, so any inbound strike could well be mistaken for a kind of Parthian shot. But with six carriers 'sunk', in Yamamoto's head, there's going to be perhaps one more air strike and then that's it, tank that and push on through. Common sense would have the enemy either withdrawing with their injured and wounded. The IJN still has a significant advantage in Battleships, and a big chunk of the IJN's doctrine evolved around night fighting and they are very comfortable (and VERY good) at this kind of thing. Now the chance of their decisive battle is being offered on a plate, and this is something the IJN worshipped at the feet of in the interwar years.

If they think the 5 (or was it 6) allied Battleships have stuck around then you've got two battleships that theoretically can take on 2 at a time and you've got more ships than they do in terms of battleships. Yes your carriers have been wrecked, but you've peeled away the enemies air cover with their sacrifice and now the landing zone and any allied warships are within your grasp. Me thinks thats too big a cake to ignore.
 
The last glimpse on Yamamoto's line of thinking is at 15:00.

and unfortunately that soliloquy just doesn't make sense :confounded:

The Americans and the British would eventually be able to swamp the Imperial Japanese Navy with sheer weight of numbers, but now that they were six carriers and a battleship down, that time would be pushed back to at least 1945.

Yamamoto was one of the few Japanese strategists who truly understood the industrial potential of the USA.
He knew that the Japanese had less than a year in 1942 ...
even with the victory he is projecting, he would not expect to gain 2 more years in early 1943.

BTW is it a really victory, even with the self deluding estimates of Allied Casualties?
Japan is 3 carriers and two Battleships down (and this Y knows for certain)

And then they would be going against hardened forward bases backed by a fully rebuilt and reconstituted Combined Fleet with two more super battleships due to commission by then as well as another half dozen modern aircraft carriers due to have new airgroups built upon the core of veteran survivors.

which of course was the exact same plan and same force ratio projected as in December 41
... except that in that case the line of "hardened forward bases" was to be set up beyond the Southern Resource area.
which the Japanese have entirely failed to seize.

Those resources were the very reason Japan went to war because without them they had barely a year of reserves!
So exactly how is Japan going to survive ... let alone prosper .. for two years ?
and then win a war of attrition against a superior enemy ?
 
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and unfortunately that soliloquy just doesn't make sense :confounded:



Yamamoto was one of the few Japanese strategists who truly understood the industrial potential of the USA.
He knew that the Japanese had less than a year in 1942 ...
even with the victory he is projecting, he would not expect to gain 2 more years in early 1943.

BTW is it a really victory, even with the self deluding estimates of Allied Casualties?
Japan is 3 carriers and two Battleships down (and this Y knows for certain)



which of course was the exact same plan and same force ratio projected as in December 41
... except that in that case the line of "hardened forward bases" was to be set up beyond the Southern Resource area.
which the Japanese have entirely failed to seize.

Those resources were the very reason Japan went to war because without them they had barely a year of reserves!
So exactly how is Japan going to survive ... let alone prosper .. for two years ?
and then win a war of attrition against a superior enemy ?
It doesn't; it gives the diplomats something to work with.
 
It doesn't; it gives the diplomats something to work with.

In that case his thought processes should be very different .

His conclusion might be the same

Now his seven battleships could intervene and destroy the American beachhead and any escorts.

but he would be recognizing that the Allies would be able to recover far faster than the IJN could
and during 1943 they would be the one building "hardened forward bases" locking Japan out from the resources it needs.

His rational for the "banzai charge" would be to bleed the Allies now so that the diplomats could get some terms soon

In other words you have TTL Yamamoto (of all people) thinking like a Japanese Admiral of mid 1941 OTL
when IMHO he would be thinking like a Japanese Admiral of mid 1944 OTL

No need to retcon the action, but please retcon the thought processes
 
and unfortunately that soliloquy just doesn't make sense :confounded:



Yamamoto was one of the few Japanese strategists who truly understood the industrial potential of the USA.
He knew that the Japanese had less than a year in 1942 ...
even with the victory he is projecting, he would not expect to gain 2 more years in early 1943.

BTW is it a really victory, even with the self deluding estimates of Allied Casualties?
Japan is 3 carriers and two Battleships down (and this Y knows for certain)



which of course was the exact same plan and same force ratio projected as in December 41
... except that in that case the line of "hardened forward bases" was to be set up beyond the Southern Resource area.
which the Japanese have entirely failed to seize.

Those resources were the very reason Japan went to war because without them they had barely a year of reserves!
So exactly how is Japan going to survive ... let alone prosper .. for two years ?
and then win a war of attrition against a superior enemy ?

What appears to be the critical error is believing that the Jeep carriers were fleet carriers. If the IJN had sunk three fleet carriers and on top of that the attacks against Lexington / Saratoga and the RN then in any reasonable calculation they would have the advantage. After all 4 RN carriers in the Pacific is ridiculous, isn't it? With the Yamato / Mushashi they could also expect to come off better in any gun line engagement (again not recognising the maximum effort the RN has made to fight alongside the USN).

How much were the Japanese aware of the the escort carriers before 1943 in OTL. Could they be forgiven for not realising they had sunk converted merchantmen?

As it happens, the sub lines haven't really played their part yet. I have a feeling that the retreat could be worse even than the approach battles for the IJN surface action groups.
 
In that case his thought processes should be very different .

His conclusion might be the same



but he would be recognizing that the Allies would be able to recover far faster than the IJN could
and during 1943 they would be the one building "hardened forward bases" locking Japan out from the resources it needs.

His rational for the "banzai charge" would be to bleed the Allies now so that the diplomats could get some terms soon

In other words you have TTL Yamamoto (of all people) thinking like a Japanese Admiral of mid 1941 OTL
when IMHO he would be thinking like a Japanese Admiral of mid 1944 OTL

No need to retcon the action, but please retcon the thought processes
I do not think that he thinks he is Banzai charging. By the time night falls, he anticipates being reinforced by the carrier screen. He will have 9 capital ship's including the two Yamato. His best appreciation of the Allied OOB is they have anywhere from 3-5 BB. In terms of effective firepower in a night action, he anticipates doubling up on any Allied gun line and that is before any of the torpedo battles happen.

He is taking a calculated risk to go from winning the battle to breaking Allied naval power for a long while. His information is bad but working on what he knows or believes to know he has a chance to get a decisive victory and/or smash the Allied amphib lift.

As new information comes in he may change his mind.
 
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