Kerensky Makes Peace in 1917

[Tom_B]

A matter of timing

Why are people getting the impression that Russia withdrawing from the war early somehow prevents Lenin from getting home?

If we assume that Lvov soon shows that he is willing to make peace first with some secret negotiations leading to a late April armistice and a May peace treaty then there is no sealed train. However once peace is formally concluded there is the question of whether Lenin, no longer a belligerent national, is permitted to make his way home. My best guess is yes but not right away as the Third Military Council might fear he might undo the new peace. So in late June or early July a very ordinary train arrives at Petrograd with Lenin just another passenger.

So the "April Theses" are delayed and thus not presented to the All-Russia Conference of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. It should be noted that before the April Theses the consensus amongst the Bolsheviks was to cooperate with the provisional government. When Lenin does arrive ITTL he will probably make similar "June Theses" but the timing is off. Russia is demobilizing with workers returning to peacetime occupations. This is why I believe that if Lenin does attempt a power grab it will be in 1918 not 1917.

 

[warsfan]

Eh, mea culpa on Kerensky not being Prime Minister before July. Yes, I was thinking of Russia making peace before then-as I said, April or May.

And judging from some of the other posts, it seems that I was being overly pessimistic in the terms Russia could get from Germany. Maybe a revised treaty:

-Independent Lithuania and independent Poland (the latter with close to its post-WWII eastern border). Russia agrees to these countries being ruled by German princes in exchange for Germany giving up the Polish Border Strip idea.

-No reparations. Russia gives Germany some trade concessions and agrees to immediately let Germany buy Russian grain and other wartime supplies on the open market.

So, let's say BlondeBC's earlier post was right and, around June we get an earlier Spring Offensive. Its probably going to have the same problems with leadership and (lack of) focus that the OTL Spring Offensive had, but the supply situation will be better (with Germany now importing from Russia). This, IHMO, has three possible outcomes:

-German breakthrough. Germans capture Paris or get in a position to do so. Peace heavily favorable to Germany.

-No German breakthrough, but they do well enough to exhaust the Entente. More of a status-quo peace, maybe mildly favorable to Germany.

-The Franco-British manage to hold out until large numbers of American troops start entering the battlefield in 1918. The war then goes similar to OTL.


As for how Russia goes:

Lvov was a Kadet-a party more moderate than the SR's, not to mention Bolsheviks. Now the historic Constituent Assembly elections were dominated by the SR's, with the Bolsheviks coming in second place and the Kadets doing rather poorly. But, in TTL's 1917, Lvov and the Kadets are the people who negotiated a peace with Germany. Most Russians, by 1917, wanted the war to end, and now it's ended without Russia loosing any large area with lots of Russians (or Ukrainians or Belarussians, for that matter). Soldiers are demobilizing and coming home, the core of the army is intact, and the Russian economy has probably benefited some from selling supplies to Germany. Thus, by late 1917, I think Russia's political landscape is going to be much more moderate, and the Bolsheviks much less popular as a result. Perhaps this is enough to make the Kadets the second party in he alt-constituent assembly, instead of the Bolsheviks. After doing poorly in the election, the Bolsheviks declare it a fraud and eventually try to take over-but this goes much more poorly for them than OTL. Lenin gets arrested, and, at least for the short term, the Bolsheviks are finished as a major political force. Russia's political landscape, at least for the next few years, is dominated by the SR's, with the Kadets as their main opposition.

 

[Anaxagoras]

Why are people getting the impression that Russia withdrawing from the war early somehow prevents Lenin from getting home?

I think he was saying that Lenin would not be in control of Russia, not that he would not physically be in Russia.

 

[onthewayout]

I know this is a sleeping thread, but consider me interested anyway. My thoughts are as follows:

If the PG was able to stay in control while negotiating a reasonable peace with Germany, Lenin's moment would never come. A Russia at peace, demobilising much of its army, would not reach the sort of boiling point that a socialist revolution would require. That's still a fairly big if, given that right-wing generals and politicians (and Entente diplomats who might encourage them) would be reluctant to quietly accept the war was lost, but it's a short-term one.

What is likely though, is food (and land reform) revolts in early 1918 that fail to overthrow the regime, but do lead it to call in right-wing military help. Sending the troops home in summer 1917 leaves too little time for a decent harvest that year, but does distribute a lot of idle and hungry men with military experience across the countryside. The Central Powers, whose people are equally hungry by this point, would demand substantial amounts of grain and other food as part of the peace deal, making matters worse.

Crushing those disturbances by force, with the Russian equivalent of Freikorps if enough professional troops were no longer available, would push the regime in a more authoritatian direction, so I think a genuine democracy emerging any time soon is pretty unlikely. A right-wing, hyper-nationalist, military backed regime like that in Lithuania after 1926 sounds pretty plausible. The Duma would only be window dressing, and Kerensky (who was actually a moderate socialist) wouldn't actually be in power even if he stayed in office.

Someone mentioned Hapsburg war aims in the East. Basically they would want a bigger chunk of western/central Ukraine to add to what they already had. Given how shaky Kakanien authority had become closer to home by late 1917, the conflict with a resurrected Poland that would result from a new Hapsburg Ukraine could be enough to tip A-H into disintegration, even in an overall CP victory. Btw, I've just finished reading The Red Prince, by Timothy Snyder, about a minor Hapsburg royal who tried to set himself up as a future crown prince of Ukraine. Recommended.

 

[Simreeve]

Good chance a true negotiation could get the Germans to agree that both countries would have a mutually acceptable leader and have the neutrality permanently guaranteed. Think Belgium status.

You mean, neutral only until the Germans decide to march through it?

 

[MrHaakwood]

You mean, neutral only until the Germans decide to march through it?

Some lands are better roads than others!

 

[BBadolato]

From what I understand everyone save the Bolsheviks was for continuing the war. What astounds me is that while that Brusilov as a general they didn't bother to ask could the war be won.

 

[Simon]

If Kerensky does make peace in 1917, what do the Austro-Hungarians gain from a Russian defeat?

The end of the bloody eastern front without losing any territory, a free hand to do as they please in the Balkans, and the ability to move all the troops from the east to the west to stomp on the Italians and the Balkan states would be my guess.

 

[David T]

IMO making a separate peace with Germany was just not politically possible for the PG. Everyone assumed that a separate peace would mean a German victory, and that there was no way revolutionary Russia could preserve its newly-won freedoms in a German-dominated Europe. Indeed, if Kerensky were even to try a "Brest-Litovsk" (even with better terms for Russia) Lenin and the Bolsheviks would be the first to scream "treason!" and "sell-out to German imperialism!" (They were for peace, of course, they would explain, but only with the "German workers and soldiers," not with the Kaiser.)

In any event, asking a government with Kadets in it to make a separate peace was hopeless, and even a government consisting entirely of moderate socialists would not have been capable of doing so. (Lenin after all had a hard enough time just getting the *Bolsheviks* to accept Brest-Litovsk.) Many of the Mensheviks and Right SRs identified themselves as thoroughly with the Allies' cause as the Kadets did. Kerensky could not govern all by himself.

 

[Wendell]

I don't see Russia giving up Lithuania. Poland, yes, Finland, yes, Kars, yes, but beyond that only Bessarabia would be in play.

 

[katchen]

If the US declares war as IOTL and mobilizes fully but by the time the troops are ready to go the Germans have taken Aimens and it IS basically too late to do much good in the Western European THeatre, might the US attack the Ottoman Empire to liberate amongst other things the Holy Land from the Turks instead of going to Europe on a fools errand and instead of simply demobilizing?

 

[Wendell]

If the US declares war as IOTL and mobilizes fully but by the time the troops are ready to go the Germans have taken Aimens and it IS basically too late to do much good in the Western European THeatre, might the US attack the Ottoman Empire to liberate amongst other things the Holy Land from the Turks instead of going to Europe on a fools errand and instead of simply demobilizing?

No. I see the Turks getting peace when their German allies do.

 

[Jurgen Wullenwever]

If the Russian government in early 1917 voices some support for the late 1916 "return to the pre-war situation" peace proposal of the Central Powers, would not the Central Powers be happy to accept this on the Russian front?

It would give the CP an advantage (compared to OTL) on the other fronts, and a greater possibility for successful peace initiatives overall.

 

[David T]

If the Russian government in early 1917 voices some support for the late 1916 "return to the pre-war situation" peace proposal of the Central Powers, would not the Central Powers be happy to accept this on the Russian front?

It would give the CP an advantage (compared to OTL) on the other fronts, and a greater possibility for successful peace initiatives overall.

What is your source for the Central Powers offering a return to pre-war lines in 1916? I know there were peace feelers for a German-Russian separate peace, but my understanding is that they foundered on Germany's refusal to restore Congress Poland to Russia. http://books.google.com/books?id=T0FdAgAAQBAJ&pg=PT773

Also, see Arthur Link, *Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era*, p. 259

"While Wilson was debating with Lansing and House the wisdom of launching his peace bolt, the civilian and military leaders of Germany agreed that events had finally created a situation favorable to a peace move. Poor harvests in the United States and Britain and the ravages of the submarines would make the British susceptible, while the spectacular success of the German campaign in Rumania had stabilized the military situation. Bethmann-Hollweg and Hindenburg reached accord on peace terms by November 7, and when Wilson did not act during November the Germans grew restive. Bucharest fell on December 6; two days later Hindenburg and the Emperor allowed
Bethmann-Hollweg to launch an independent peace campaign. If it failed, unrestricted submarine warfare should be inaugurated in January, 1917.

On December 12, therefore, the Chancellor announced to an excited Reichstag that the Imperial government was ready to join with its enemies to end the war. 18 He said nothing about the German terms,w hich, if they had been disclosed, would have shocked the world. They included, in the East/ establishment of the Kingdom of Poland and German annexation of the Baltic provinces of Courland and Lithuania; in the West, "guarantees in Belgium" or the annexation of Liege and "corresponding areas," annexation of Luxemburg and the French territories of Briey and Longwy, which contained great iron deposits, strategic boundary adjustments in Alsace-Lorraine, and indemnities; overseas, the return of German colonies, except Kiaochow, the Carolines, and the Marianas, and acquisition of all or part of the Belgian Congo. 19

19 These were the terms agreed upon by the Emperor, Hindenburg, and Bethmann-Hollweg. See Official German Documents, II, 1059-1062, 1064. For an excellent discussion see Hans W. Gatzke, Germany's Drive to the West
(Baltimore, 1950), pp. 139-144."
http://archive.org/stream/woodrowwilsonand007665mbp/woodrowwilsonand007665mbp_djvu.txt

That doesn't look like the pre-war borders to me...

 

[Jurgen Wullenwever]

Perhaps I read some biased texts a few years ago. I will have to search for them, but they were probably not as detailed as your post above. The gist of it was a simple return to prewar, but if that was not the case then it is understandable that it failed.

 

[Mikestone8]

No. I see the Turks getting peace when their German allies do.

Incidentally, the United States was never at war with Turkey (or Bulgaria).

In theory Wilson might ask Congress to declare such a war, but I don't think he was ever much interested in Turkey. His quarrel was with Germany, and you couldn't hurt Germany from Palestine or even (absent the other fronts) from Salonika. Also, if France and Italy have been knocked out, presumably their troops will have been recalled from the Balkans, where iirc they (esp the French) provided the bulk of the Allied force.

 

[Mikestone8]

And judging from some of the other posts, it seems that I was being overly pessimistic in the terms Russia could get from Germany. Maybe a revised treaty:

Though a cynic might wonder how long Germany would be satisfied with them, once the Russian army had melted away and gone home, as it presumably will once the shooting stops.

Incidentally, what was the Ukrainians' attitude to the PG? Are they still likely to declare independence at some point?

 

[Mikestone8]

Mikestone8 had a really good post about the value of Amiens in another thread about US neutrality.

Thank you . However, 90% of it is quotes, so most of the credit should go to the good general. Imho his book is an absolute "must read" for anyone interested in its subject.

Losing Amiens might be sufficient to end the war by itself. It would seriously unhinge the entire British position.

And indirectly the French as well. If Haig's diary can be trusted (and on this point I see no reason not to) he was under pressure from the French not to let the Bruay coal mines (near Bethune) fall into German hands, as they provided 70% of the fuel for the munitions works' supplying the French Army, and these works had only five days reserve. So a British disaster would be a French disaster also.


In general, I'm highly sceptical of the talk that we get here from time to time, of the Germans "doing better" than OTL in their 1918 offensives, but still somehow losing. There seem to have been just too many critically important points too close to the front. While not viewing Liddell Hart as infallible, I think his statement that Ludendorff "missed vital arteries and decisive results by the narrowest of margins" is substantially correct.

 

[DrakonFin]

I don't see Russia giving up Lithuania. Poland, yes, Finland, yes, Kars, yes, but beyond that only Bessarabia would be in play.

Like I commented on this thread a year ago, Finland is very unlikely this early as it is strategically too important to Russia (proximity to Petrograd) and it is still unmistakably in Russian control - no Finnish troops yet, no even German foothold. Russia has no reason to relinquish Finland and knowing this the Germans would most likely not even demand it.

 

[abc123]

I always thought this is a rather underused area of potential AH.

Indeed. I would like to see a TL about this.