What if Kerensky delayed his offensive until mid October 1917? What would be the effects of this on Caporetto and WW1? Would the Austrians have to cancel their attack ?
Kerensky delays his offensive until mid October 1917
- Thread starter ghappy1000
- Start date
The Russian Army will be no more ready for an offensive in October than it was in mid-year. It would be more sensible to cancel the offensive altogether. No such offensive is necessary; as Orlando Figes writes, ""No doubt the military leaders assumed that by launching an early offensive they could pre-empt a German attack, which their intelligence had misinformed them was set to take place in the summer. But the Germans had in fact been committed for some time to a 'peace offensive' in the east so that they could release troops for transfer to the west." *A People's Tragedy*, p. 408
But then, the failure of the otl July offensive resulted in the Bolshevik revolution, which made it rather impossible. I mean what if he delayed his offensive until mid October 1917, just before Caporetto. And the last offensive on the eastern front was based on the assumptions that it would succeed greatly and force the Russians to sign for peace. That was because of the failure of the otl Kerensky offensive . Even if not launched, if the Germans wanted to knock the Russians out of the war, they would've used the resources they used for Caporetto to knock out the Russians [ and I've read that they actually wanted to knock out Romania first ].
The point is that after the February Revolution and the weakening of military discipline (Order No. 1 is often blamed for this, perhaps not entirely fairly http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Petrograd_Soviet_Order_No._1) the Russian army is just not in any condition for an offensive, in either the summer or the autumn of 1917.
No offensive in Europe, is certainly the best bet-
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Maybe, just maybe, an offensive in the Armenian and Black Sea front could have resulted in, at best, gains for Russia on that front, and an earlier Ottoman defeat. Or at worst, a non-disaster for Russia.
The anti-Ottoman option is briefly discussed it here:
https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=222475&highlight=Kerensky
I also raised it in SHWI, but Alex Milman in particular was not having any of it.
Author Sean McMeekin that discipline problems were not so bad in the Black Sea fleet or the Tiflis Caucasus Command at this time. This implies that it should not have been impossible start, and even to sustain, an offensive against the Ottomans.
A Russian British press against the Ottomans in the second half of 1917 could have been interesting, and probably a less disastrous use of their forces than OTL's course of action. Probably would have made more sense than repeated efforts against the Germans, at least until the Americans are reinforcing the western front in 1918.
this
is true.
Maybe, just maybe, an offensive in the Armenian and Black Sea front could have resulted in, at best, gains for Russia on that front, and an earlier Ottoman defeat. Or at worst, a non-disaster for Russia.
The anti-Ottoman option is briefly discussed it here:
https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=222475&highlight=Kerensky
I also raised it in SHWI, but Alex Milman in particular was not having any of it.
Author Sean McMeekin that discipline problems were not so bad in the Black Sea fleet or the Tiflis Caucasus Command at this time. This implies that it should not have been impossible start, and even to sustain, an offensive against the Ottomans.
A Russian British press against the Ottomans in the second half of 1917 could have been interesting, and probably a less disastrous use of their forces than OTL's course of action. Probably would have made more sense than repeated efforts against the Germans, at least until the Americans are reinforcing the western front in 1918.
Well that's interesting, so moving slightly away from ghappy1000's original post what do people think would be the effects of Kerensky quietly going over to purely defensive operations with the occasional small action to keep the Germans on their toes, in effect becoming an 'army in being'?
Disastrous as it was, Kerensky's offensive was widely regarded as a "good" or "vital" idea. Could he attain power without promising an offensive? Could he retain power if he promised one but refused to actually deliver it?
What will military leaders like Kornilov, Pyotr Krasnov, Brusilov, Yudenich et cetera, and political party leaders think of an SR Premier like Kerensky who has basically ordered a Fabian strategy of delay and watchful waiting for the near-term?
No Offensive
There is a thread about no Kerensky offensive, which would bring about the same results as launching the attack in autumn 1917 by Catspoke [similar to my scenario in consequences]
1.Maybe, but given his attitude, he would find this unlikely, especially with his commitment to the Allies.
Side Effects:
1.Yes, the Romanians wouldn't launch an offensive at Marasti. However, they still hold the frontline as per otl.
2.Given the purpose of knocking Russia out of the war, the Germans will launch their Baltic Offensive. I mean however that the attack in October 1917 be directed against Austria Hungary, but if the Germans attack, impossible.
3.If the Germans launch an offensive against Russia, not many supplies and troops can be used in Caporetto, especially if an offensive is still launched against Austria Hungary in October 1917. If the Germans stay on the defensive in the East, a bigger push might be tried, but it won't force Italian surrender, which is the important thing despite more Italian troop losses.
4. Depends on the Kornilov affair. If not [maybe no offensive and demonstrations in St. Petersburg might help but not sure], the Bolsheviks won't have a chance until 1918.
Otherwise, it would still happen.
5. Probably, but most likely not. Without the Bolsheviks, the Russian army would have higher morale, especially to defend Russia only .
There is a thread about no Kerensky offensive, which would bring about the same results as launching the attack in autumn 1917 by Catspoke [similar to my scenario in consequences]
1.Maybe, but given his attitude, he would find this unlikely, especially with his commitment to the Allies.
Side Effects:
1.Yes, the Romanians wouldn't launch an offensive at Marasti. However, they still hold the frontline as per otl.
2.Given the purpose of knocking Russia out of the war, the Germans will launch their Baltic Offensive. I mean however that the attack in October 1917 be directed against Austria Hungary, but if the Germans attack, impossible.
3.If the Germans launch an offensive against Russia, not many supplies and troops can be used in Caporetto, especially if an offensive is still launched against Austria Hungary in October 1917. If the Germans stay on the defensive in the East, a bigger push might be tried, but it won't force Italian surrender, which is the important thing despite more Italian troop losses.
4. Depends on the Kornilov affair. If not [maybe no offensive and demonstrations in St. Petersburg might help but not sure], the Bolsheviks won't have a chance until 1918.
Otherwise, it would still happen.5. Probably, but most likely not. Without the Bolsheviks, the Russian army would have higher morale, especially to defend Russia only .
Offensive launched against Ottomans 1
There is a scenario suggesting what if the offensive had been launched on the Ottomans.
1. Probably no Romanian offensive at Marasti, but if the Turks are worried about protecting Constantinople, there might suggest that German troops in the Balkans defend the city. If so, the Romanian offensive would still happen as per otl using reinforcements.
2. Same as earlier posted. If the offensive was launched on the Ottomans, the Germans may have more troops depending on the situation. Very likely, they launch an offensive to stop the Russians or reinforce the Turks and probably take the offensive in Salonika to kick the Allies.
3. and 4. Same, depending on the results and the political situation.
5. Probably, but most likely not because without the Bolsheviks, the Russians are more willing to fight, especially if defending their homeland only. Also, it depends on the results.
Amphibious attack on Constantinople. If launched and succeeds, it forces the government to evacuate or surrender and German reinforcements arrive. If it fails, it gets treated like Gallipoli. Central Powers might give support, but not much and through reinforcements from the Balkans or Eastern Front. Any offensive launched to relieve pressure experiences a similar situation.
There is a scenario suggesting what if the offensive had been launched on the Ottomans.
1. Probably no Romanian offensive at Marasti, but if the Turks are worried about protecting Constantinople, there might suggest that German troops in the Balkans defend the city. If so, the Romanian offensive would still happen as per otl using reinforcements.
2. Same as earlier posted. If the offensive was launched on the Ottomans, the Germans may have more troops depending on the situation. Very likely, they launch an offensive to stop the Russians or reinforce the Turks and probably take the offensive in Salonika to kick the Allies.
3. and 4. Same, depending on the results and the political situation.
5. Probably, but most likely not because without the Bolsheviks, the Russians are more willing to fight, especially if defending their homeland only. Also, it depends on the results.
Amphibious attack on Constantinople. If launched and succeeds, it forces the government to evacuate or surrender and German reinforcements arrive. If it fails, it gets treated like Gallipoli. Central Powers might give support, but not much and through reinforcements from the Balkans or Eastern Front. Any offensive launched to relieve pressure experiences a similar situation.
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Part 2
A successful offensive might sustain the Provisional Government longer, but the Bolshevik revolution might still happen if it fails, although not automatic. If it succeeded, see Kornilov affair and July days, but more likely they risk defeat and revolution later, or at least incapable of offensive operations after Ottoman defeat.
Maybe the British and French are in a position to get their promised lands out of the Ottoman Empire. Russia is generally better off.
A successful offensive might sustain the Provisional Government longer, but the Bolshevik revolution might still happen if it fails, although not automatic. If it succeeded, see Kornilov affair and July days, but more likely they risk defeat and revolution later, or at least incapable of offensive operations after Ottoman defeat.
Maybe the British and French are in a position to get their promised lands out of the Ottoman Empire. Russia is generally better off.