Keeping Russia North of the Caucacus

The idea here is to prevent Russia to expand South of the Caucasus. What is necessary to achieve this?

The situation South of the Caucasus is optional to you.

Edit: PoD: 1768
 
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The idea here is to prevent Russia to expand South of the Caucasus. What is necessary to achieve this?

The situation South of the Caucasus is optional to you.

Edit: PoD: 1768


Very simple: stay on the Kuban river and reject anything beyond a purely military alliance with Georgian kingdoms. Actually, reject even that because as the allies they caused nothing but problems both militarily and politically.

Situation with Azerbaijan would be more or less similar: conquests of Peter I had been given away by Anne. Presumably, Derbent was of some strategic importance but until the late XIX the area was not very valuable economically.

BTW, the first Russian troops arrived only in 1769 and Treaty of Georgievsk had been signed in 1783 so why POD 1768?
 
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Very simple: stay on the Kuban river and reject anything beyond a purely military alliance with Georgian kingdoms. Actually, reject even that because as the allies they caused nothing but problems both militarily and politically.

Situation with Azerbaijan would be more or less similar: conquests of Peter I had been given away by Anne. Presumably, Derbent was of some strategic importance but until the late XIX the area was not very valuable economically.

BTW, the first Russian troops arrived only in 1769 and Treaty of Georgievsk had been signed in 1783 so why POD 1768?

Start of the Russo-Turkish War of 1768.
 
Start of the Russo-Turkish War of 1768.

I see. But that date has very little to do with any serious Russian engagement South of Caucasus. Totleben’s force was small and accomplished pretty much nothing and the whole operation was nothing more than unsuccessful diversion. By the peace treaty Turkey denounce rights to Kabarda and acknowledged independence of the Crimean Khanate (and Nogay Horde) and after the war it took some time to even squeeze the Nogays beyond Kuban.
 
I see. But that date has very little to do with any serious Russian engagement South of Caucasus. Totleben’s force was small and accomplished pretty much nothing and the whole operation was nothing more than unsuccessful diversion. By the peace treaty Turkey denounce rights to Kabarda and acknowledged independence of the Crimean Khanate (and Nogay Horde) and after the war it took some time to even squeeze the Nogays beyond Kuban.

Maybe PoD was a bad name for it. I could have said no earlier than 1768. The PoD might Catherine II showing no interest in the region or dies early.
 
Maybe PoD was a bad name for it. I could have said no earlier than 1768. The PoD might Catherine II showing no interest in the region or dies early.

Let's not push too heavy into "personality cult" :)

I'd suggest that Catherine was rather a symptom than a disease which started in the XVI century and disease's name was "expansionism". Once you start along that road every step makes further expansion necessary to protect what you already have. The principle was perfectly described by Karel Čapek in his short novel "Letter to Aristotle" (Alexander describes his initial conquests as a need to protect the Greeks and each following step as needed for protection of the earlier conquest). So, short of not going to Caucasus being something of a firm Russian policy in the XVIII - XIX, the adventures would go on.


As I understand, there were 2 distinct processes.

1st, establishing secure border on Kuban and Terek rivers which was more or less done by 1763 by establishing North Caucasus Line guarded by various Cossack hosts and numerous forts. Of course, there were regular raids in both directions but in general the border was reasonably secure and getting more so with construction of the new forts and increasing numbers (and experience) of the border Cossack hosts.

2nd was directly linked to the annexation of Georgia (by Paul in 1800; at with time it was vassal of Persia). Not only this acquisition was of an extremely questionable economic value, it, being well to the South of the Russian border, required a reliable line of communication and supply with the rest of the Russian empire, which meant gradual conquest of everything in between. Situation was somewhat similar with Dagestan except that Derbent Khanate went under the Russian rule voluntarily and the following troubles with Imamate of Dagestan were more or less a byproduct of incompetent administration. Again, at the time of conquest, economic value of the area was questionable (AFAIK).

Of course, it was not that the Ottomans and Persia were absolutely innocent and passive victims of the Russian aggression and some of their losses could qualify as the "self-inflicted wounds" (in Pratchett's definition): getting back to Kuban - Terek line after a successful war would only encourage the next war. So for your schema to happen you need the cool heads on all 3 sides of equation. Basically, for a while it would be enough for Russia to keep North of the Mountains (and their population, which had problems with recognizing any power).

500px-Caucasus_topo_map-blank.svg.png
 
The Ottomans would probably me most likely, as they were militarily stronger than Iran.

By the early XIX most of the Caucasus had been controlled by Iran.

"Much stronger" Iran or Ottoman Empire at that time would require the active ASBs involvement: both had been regularly beaten by the smaller Russian numbers.

In 1812 - 13 Iranians advanced "using European-style infantry and a few British officers" (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russo-Persian_War_(1804–13)#Origins) and their greatest success was surrender of a single Russian battalion after which 2,000 Russians with 6 cannons defeated 30,000 Persians (including 10,000 regular infantry) with 12 cannons at the Battle of Aslanduz causing loss of 2,000 and all artillery (the British numbers) and then took by storm fort Lenkaran killing all 4,000 of its garrison.

The Ottomans routinely had French artillery and fortifications specialists and did not fare much better. François de Tott succeed in having a new foundry built to make artillery and building a new naval base but could not do much more and returned home. In 1795 Napoleon Bonaparte was to be sent to Constantinople in 1795 to help organize Ottoman artillery but instead of going there he proved himself useful to the Directory by putting down a Parisian mob in the whiff of grapeshot and was kept in France. You can speculate about byproducts of this possible POD or about him getting commission in the Russian army for which he applied earlier but was rejected (person in charge did not like the Corsicans and Nappy refused to get a lower rank, which was a general practice). The meaningful Ottoman reform started only in 1826 but they had been beaten in the war of 1828 - 29, in 1853 - 56 saved by the international intervention and in 1877 - 78 beaten again.
 
By the early XIX most of the Caucasus had been controlled by Iran.

"Much stronger" Iran or Ottoman Empire at that time would require the active ASBs involvement: both had been regularly beaten by the smaller Russian numbers.

In 1812 - 13 Iranians advanced "using European-style infantry and a few British officers" (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russo-Persian_War_(1804–13)#Origins) and their greatest success was surrender of a single Russian battalion after which 2,000 Russians with 6 cannons defeated 30,000 Persians (including 10,000 regular infantry) with 12 cannons at the Battle of Aslanduz causing loss of 2,000 and all artillery (the British numbers) and then took by storm fort Lenkaran killing all 4,000 of its garrison.

The Ottomans routinely had French artillery and fortifications specialists and did not fare much better. François de Tott succeed in having a new foundry built to make artillery and building a new naval base but could not do much more and returned home. In 1795 Napoleon Bonaparte was to be sent to Constantinople in 1795 to help organize Ottoman artillery but instead of going there he proved himself useful to the Directory by putting down a Parisian mob in the whiff of grapeshot and was kept in France. You can speculate about byproducts of this possible POD or about him getting commission in the Russian army for which he applied earlier but was rejected (person in charge did not like the Corsicans and Nappy refused to get a lower rank, which was a general practice). The meaningful Ottoman reform started only in 1826 but they had been beaten in the war of 1828 - 29, in 1853 - 56 saved by the international intervention and in 1877 - 78 beaten again.

On the form of reforms, the Ottomans started earlier during the reign of Selim III but was halted in 1807 during a Janissary Coup and again in 1808 during an attempted coup, again by the Janissaries.

Ottoman or Persian Caucasus is not out of question on asb levels. Especially for the latter hence why the minimum year is 1768. Avoiding the War of 1768 and you pretty much butterfly away the other Russo-Turkish Wars since. Although that is up to speculations. The problem is... without this war, the Ottomans have no view on how backwards the Military has become by then.

Coming on how the Ottoman Military performed. Up until the late 18th century the Ottoman Military still used imbalanced numbers of cavalry and Infantry. The infantry being not much better as the Janissaries refused to adapt to their enemies ever since the early XVIII century making a successful war impossible. As soon as this changed, military results were better (ie no more defeats like Kozludzha as in 1774) but the Russians had numerical advantage now.
 
On the form of reforms, the Ottomans started earlier during the reign of Selim III but was halted in 1807 during a Janissary Coup and again in 1808 during an attempted coup, again by the Janissaries.

Ottoman or Persian Caucasus is not out of question on asb levels. Especially for the latter hence why the minimum year is 1768.

I was commenting only upon a suggestion that to keep Russia off the Caucasus the stronger Ottomans and Iran would be needed. While reforms providing them with a strength adequate to stop Russian expansion should be well above and beyond the realities of OTL, absence of the Russian interest in the area (which would leave it under Iranian and Ottoman control) is quite realistic. Look at the 1st Russian experience there: Peter I conquered a big chunk of Azerbaijan and Southern coast of the Caspian Sea and his successors could not wait until Persia gets some stable government to which they can return that acquisition because it was producing nothing but expenses and trouble. If the same attitude persists (until oil became a valuable commodity and was discovered in the region, there was very little there of a tangible value), then the problem does not exist and you don't need any reforms.

Avoiding the War of 1768 and you pretty much butterfly away the other Russo-Turkish Wars since. Although that is up to speculations. The problem is... without this war, the Ottomans have no view on how backwards the Military has become by then.

This one or its equivalent was more or less inevitable: Russian Empire could not tolerate forever the Crimean raids and the Ottomans were not going to do anything to stop them (and could not, taking into the account that slave trade was a major part of the Crimean economy).

Coming on how the Ottoman Military performed. Up until the late 18th century the Ottoman Military still used imbalanced numbers of cavalry and Infantry. The infantry being not much better as the Janissaries refused to adapt to their enemies ever since the early XVIII century making a successful war impossible. As soon as this changed, military results were better (ie no more defeats like Kozludzha as in 1774) but the Russians had numerical advantage now.

IMO, you are rather pessimistic: in the 2nd half of the XVIII the Ottomans were more than once successful against the Austrians.

I'm not sure about the Russian numeric advantage in 1828 - 29 (it seems that in 1829 the Ottomans had 150K against 100K in Europe and 100K against 20K in Asia) but this was definitely the case in 1877-78.
 
I was commenting only upon a suggestion that to keep Russia off the Caucasus the stronger Ottomans and Iran would be needed. While reforms providing them with a strength adequate to stop Russian expansion should be well above and beyond the realities of OTL, absence of the Russian interest in the area (which would leave it under Iranian and Ottoman control) is quite realistic. Look at the 1st Russian experience there: Peter I conquered a big chunk of Azerbaijan and Southern coast of the Caspian Sea and his successors could not wait until Persia gets some stable government to which they can return that acquisition because it was producing nothing but expenses and trouble. If the same attitude persists (until oil became a valuable commodity and was discovered in the region, there was very little there of a tangible value), then the problem does not exist and you don't need any reforms.



This one or its equivalent was more or less inevitable: Russian Empire could not tolerate forever the Crimean raids and the Ottomans were not going to do anything to stop them (and could not, taking into the account that slave trade was a major part of the Crimean economy).



IMO, you are rather pessimistic: in the 2nd half of the XVIII the Ottomans were more than once successful against the Austrians.

I'm not sure about the Russian numeric advantage in 1828 - 29 (it seems that in 1829 the Ottomans had 150K against 100K in Europe and 100K against 20K in Asia) but this was definitely the case in 1877-78.

After Russian conquest of the area it is highly impossible to reconquer the Southern Caucasus unless a Crimean War equivalent happens which also Includes Austria. Which of course means a European Coalition. But the Ottomans or Persians alone it is highly unlikely the Russians will be drive away from there. My personal view. To maintain a defense in Bulgaria while also preparing an offensive (the last successful offensive in Europe until the Crimean War was against Austria in 1739 not counting the Serb and Greek Rebels) on the Caucasus. Unless you mean something different that, the stronger Ottoman/Persian Empires conquering the Caucasus is asb-ish?

The problem of the 1768 war was Mustafa III and his Pashas feeling strong enough to face Russia after the Balta Incident. Avoiding that means avoiding the War. To solve the Crimean Raids is a different matter. I'll leave that as well to speculations. Between 1730 and 1789, there were 4 sultans, all of them being not too capable after years of being locked up in Palace, Osman III being the worst of them. Unable to be Sultans and not really keeping the Janissaries or Eyalets in check, let alone creating a stable state and military. A Selim III might have understand the danger of the continuous raids of the Tatars with the risk of war with Russia. Again, with no 1768-1774 disaster, Selim III as well might be overconfident just as he was in 1806, letting the Tatars do as he feels like. Not sure what the Crimeans will do if they are forced to stop. The Khan may even change allegiance to Russia but that is pretty much giving up sovereignty to the Russians.

Pessimistic? Meh... The Austrians did conquer Belgrade and parts of Central Serbia in 1790. They assisted the Russians facing a much bigger army in Wallachia and Moldova. They did not get much results but they did not lose as well. One defeat in 1716-1718, one victory in 1737-1739 and one status quo in 1788-1791 against the Austrians.

With regards to 1828. The Ottomans in 1828 had just gotten rid of the Janissaries and formed a new Army in merely two years. I'd say, the Ottomans had an advantage in the Caucasus, but failed. The Balkans were quite close I guess.
 
After Russian conquest of the area it is highly impossible to reconquer the Southern Caucasus unless a Crimean War equivalent happens which also Includes Austria. Which of course means a European Coalition. But the Ottomans or Persians alone it is highly unlikely the Russians will be drive away from there. My personal view. To maintain a defense in Bulgaria while also preparing an offensive (the last successful offensive in Europe until the Crimean War was against Austria in 1739 not counting the Serb and Greek Rebels) on the Caucasus. Unless you mean something different that, the stronger Ottoman/Persian Empires conquering the Caucasus is asb-ish?

I was just commenting on a post saying that it would take the stronger Ottomans or Iranians.
 
Or a Pan-Migrelian uber-Empire consisting of all lands settled by Migrelian and Adyghe peoples. Georgia in the Center.
This would be only a part of Caucasus. Actually, something close existed in the late XII - early XIII but was falling apart before Mongolian conquests.

The obvious questions are:
Would such Uber-empire be able to withstand Persia and Ottomans?
How would it stop Russian penetration into the area? Especially in Azerbaijan which is seemingly not a part of the Uber-empire.
 
This would be only a part of Caucasus. Actually, something close existed in the late XII - early XIII but was falling apart before Mongolian conquests.

The obvious questions are:
Would such Uber-empire be able to withstand Persia and Ottomans?
How would it stop Russian penetration into the area? Especially in Azerbaijan which is seemingly not a part of the Uber-empire.
Yes, that would be difficult since it couldn' t Fight back against the Mongols it wasn' t probably strong enough against other competers aswell.
 
Yes, that would be difficult since it couldn' t Fight back against the Mongols it wasn' t probably strong enough against other competers aswell.

Before the Mongols came into the picture a big art of Georgia, including Tbilisi, was looted by Khwaresm Shah Jelal ad Din (who was already beaten by the Mongols) which gives an idea of its military strength at that time. AFAIK, by the XVIII the whole region disintegrated into a mess of the small kingdoms (3 Georgian only) and smaller entities down to the tribal groups fighting each other in all possible combinations while being vassals of either Persia or Ottomans. Creation of a strong national state was simply impossible.

As I keep saying, the best way of keeping the Russia out of Caucasus is to change its policy regarding the region from “oops, we are there and had to proceed or the face is being lost” to “thanks, not interested”.
 
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