Kantokuen

What if, in September of 1939, when Japan threatened to withdraw their ambassador and break off relations with Germany becasue of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact violating prior anti-soviet plans between Germany and Japan, Hitler decided to accept Ribbentrop's suggestion and reveal the plans for Operation Barbarossa to Hiroshi Ōshima and the Japanese High Command.

Knowing that the Germans had no intention of keeping their treaty with Russia, the Japanese would stick to the original Imperial Defence Plan of 1936, where Japan would not attack the US and rely on American neutrality, while invading Russia to supply their oil needs.

The plan they almost launched in OTL in July of 1941 was called Kantokuen. ITTL, they would have been firmly set on this plan since 1939, but would a Japanese invasion of Russia be successful, assuming that the USA remains neutral?

Also, irregardless of the Japanese success in their own war objectives, would forcing the USSR into a two front war improve German success on the Eastern Front?
 
I'm inclined to say yes to both questions, but mind that this wouldn't necessarily mean neither an Axis victory nor a lack of US intervention. You might see a longer war with still victorious Allies, and a tattered Soviet Union that is hardly a superpower.
 
I appreciate the feedback. When I shared this inspiration with a friend who is a WW2 enthusiast, his opinion was that the inferiority of Japanese planes and tanks compared to Soviet ones, as well as the difference in numbers would make the Japanese invasion ineffective. I thought he was being to dismissive. The Japanese clearly thought they had a chance, and they had a lot of time to plan this out.
 

HJ Tulp

Donor
I appreciate the feedback. When I shared this inspiration with a friend who is a WW2 enthusiast, his opinion was that the inferiority of Japanese planes and tanks compared to Soviet ones, as well as the difference in numbers would make the Japanese invasion ineffective. I thought he was being to dismissive. The Japanese clearly thought they had a chance, and they had a lot of time to plan this out.

The Japanese thought they had a chance when they started the war against the Allies as well.
 
I mean... Japan did really bad on their skirmishes against the Soviets in Siberia and Mongolia, plus the all around resource shortage they were having on 1941, so their prospects are quite dim.
 

nbcman

Donor
What if, in September of 1939, when Japan threatened to withdraw their ambassador and break off relations with Germany becasue of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact violating prior anti-soviet plans between Germany and Japan, Hitler decided to accept Ribbentrop's suggestion and reveal the plans for Operation Barbarossa to Hiroshi Ōshima and the Japanese High Command.

Knowing that the Germans had no intention of keeping their treaty with Russia, the Japanese would stick to the original Imperial Defence Plan of 1936, where Japan would not attack the US and rely on American neutrality, while invading Russia to supply their oil needs.

The plan they almost launched in OTL in July of 1941 was called Kantokuen. ITTL, they would have been firmly set on this plan since 1939, but would a Japanese invasion of Russia be successful, assuming that the USA remains neutral?

Also, irregardless of the Japanese success in their own war objectives, would forcing the USSR into a two front war improve German success on the Eastern Front?
Whether the IJA could pull off Kantokuen or not is debatable-and there have been debates on this topic for years, but the concept to invade Russia to supply their oil needs is impossible. The major oil producing area in the Soviet Union around Baku is about 10,000 km from Vladivostok. The Japanese aren't going to get there and even if they do, how are they going to get the oil back to Japan?
 
I appreciate the feedback. When I shared this inspiration with a friend who is a WW2 enthusiast, his opinion was that the inferiority of Japanese planes and tanks compared to Soviet ones, as well as the difference in numbers would make the Japanese invasion ineffective. I thought he was being to dismissive. The Japanese clearly thought they had a chance, and they had a lot of time to plan this out.

The Soviet Far East forces, being dependent on the single Trans Siberian railway into Europe, would have been doomed the moment the Japanese attacked. Militarily their position was even more vulnerable than America's was in the Philippines during 1941/1942. The real 'butterflies' would have been political and economic.

In addition to a second land theater for the Soviets to contend with (though planned reinforcements to the Far East were relatively small: four tank brigades, five artillery regiments, six guards mortar regiments, and five armored train divisions), the major impact that Kantokuen would have had on the German-Soviet front would have been the loss of a port (Vladivostok) that historically handled 50% of all Lend-Lease aid from the USA. This would have forced the Allies to direct their efforts toward supplying the Soviets through Persia and the White Sea, the latter of which was within easy interdiction range of Hitler's forces.

On the Japanese side, invading the USSR likely would have immediately brought on a total oil embargo from the United States similar to the one imposed on them after their occupation of South Indochina (this embargo was the main reason Japan historically refrained from attacking the Soviets). According to Masanobu Tsuji, had the attack proceeded under such conditions the IJA would have run out of fuel within 6 months to a year, and with no readily exploitable oil reserves in the Russian Far East (save modest deposits on Sakhalin), the need to secure the "Southern Resource Area" would be even more pressing.

The problem was, between the China theater and Kantokuen, the IJA would have no men to spare for conquering Southeast Asia, where the oil and other raw materials were located. Because of this, war in the south (and the state of Japan's economy) would be directly contingent on the speed at which organized resistance in Siberia could be squelched.
 
On the Japanese side, invading the USSR likely would have immediately brought on a total oil embargo from the United States similar to the one imposed on them after their occupation of South Indochina

I always felt that, in the absence of an attack direct attack on the US, the isolationist faction in congress would have eventually gained the majority and forced the end of the oil embargo. That was the opinion of the German ambassador to the US, Hans Thomsen.
 

nbcman

Donor
I always felt that, in the absence of an attack direct attack on the US, the isolationist faction in congress would have eventually gained the majority and forced the end of the oil embargo. That was the opinion of the German ambassador to the US, Hans Thomsen.
Gallup polling doesn’t support that opinion. The May 9 1941 poll indicated that 63% of people who were aware of (isolationist) Charles Lindbergh’s agenda didn’t agree with it. The Sept 22nd poll had 84% of people opposed to voting for a candidate from a possible ‘Keep Out of the War’ party. There wasn’t that much isolationist support and it was dwindling as 1941 progressed.
 

thorr97

Banned
johnreiter,

Economically and materially, there's nothing to be gained for Japan in attacking the Soviet Union in 1941.

There's no oil wells in that part of the USSR at that time. The natural resources that were then being extracted there were more or less also available within the territories Japan already possessed. So there's no prospect of immediate looting or any long term solution to Japan's chronic dependence on foreign oil to be had by starting a war with the Soviets.

While there might be the will among Japan's leadership to start such a war, the economic and material realities of doing so would be prohibitive.

I don't think the US would have instituted a full oil embargo of Japan had it attacked the Communists however. But that brings up an interesting option here.

How about an ALT where the Japanese strike some sort of "secret deal" with the US in which America will actually increase it's oil sales to Japan if the Japanese not only lay off their expansionism into China but then turn their armies on the Communists instead. From America's perspective it'd be a win/ win/ win.

Japan's militants get the war they've been drooling to have. But it's a war that doesn't involve any of America's allies or potential allies and instead only involves America's opponents - Japan and the USSR. It'd be a war that halts Japan's advances in China and thus gives the Chinese more time to get their act together - and they'll have to do that by relying more on the US for assistance since the Soviets would be rather... occupied... otherwise. It'd be a war which helps keep the Soviets busy fighting the Japanese instead of trying to expand and conquer Europe. And it'd be a war in which the US could profit handsomely by supplying the Japanese with all the oil and material they needed to bleed themselves out on the Soviet steppes.

This wouldn't involve forcing the militants in Japan to renounce their imperialist ways or admit their errors of committing atrocities and genocide in China. Instead, they'd just have to set all their dreams of glory in China on the back burner while they focused on the Soviets first. From the Japanese perspective, eliminating the Soviet threat would then give them the free hand in China they'd long sought. So that'd help with "selling" the policy change among the IJA. And while avoiding conflict with the US might not leave the Imperial Navy all that happy since there'd be no opportunities for ocean borne glory in the land war against the Soviets, it would give the IJN more time to build their fleets. For the "realists" in Japanese politics, sending the militarist fanatics off to die gloriously in Siberia would be an excellent solution to their problems at home. Fewer fire breathing militarists running around Tokyo would make it easier for the realists to keep Japan out of a war with America or the British.

Plus, when it all came apart and the Soviets finally gained enough of the upper hand in the West such that they could spare sufficient attention to deal with the Japanese in the East, Japan could then turn to the US for aid against the "Red Menace."
 
What if, in September of 1939, when Japan threatened to withdraw their ambassador and break off relations with Germany becasue of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact violating prior anti-soviet plans between Germany and Japan, Hitler decided to accept Ribbentrop's suggestion and reveal the plans for Operation Barbarossa to Hiroshi Ōshima and the Japanese High Command.

Knowing that the Germans had no intention of keeping their treaty with Russia, the Japanese would stick to the original Imperial Defence Plan of 1936, where Japan would not attack the US and rely on American neutrality, while invading Russia to supply their oil needs.

The plan they almost launched in OTL in July of 1941 was called Kantokuen. ITTL, they would have been firmly set on this plan since 1939, but would a Japanese invasion of Russia be successful, assuming that the USA remains neutral?

Also, irregardless of the Japanese success in their own war objectives, would forcing the USSR into a two front war improve German success on the Eastern Front?

It's not happening. Japan would be to be busy with China, for a war against the Soviets to be feasible.
 

Deleted member 1487

I mean... Japan did really bad on their skirmishes against the Soviets in Siberia and Mongolia, plus the all around resource shortage they were having on 1941, so their prospects are quite dim.
Not really, they inflicted significantly more losses on the Soviets than they took in return and with less firepower and material.
 

Deleted member 1487

The Soviet Far East forces, being dependent on the single Trans Siberian railway into Europe, would have been doomed the moment the Japanese attacked. Militarily their position was even more vulnerable than America's was in the Philippines during 1941/1942. The real 'butterflies' would have been political and economic.

In addition to a second land theater for the Soviets to contend with (though planned reinforcements to the Far East were relatively small: four tank brigades, five artillery regiments, six guards mortar regiments, and five armored train divisions), the major impact that Kantokuen would have had on the German-Soviet front would have been the loss of a port (Vladivostok) that historically handled 50% of all Lend-Lease aid from the USA. This would have forced the Allies to direct their efforts toward supplying the Soviets through Persia and the White Sea, the latter of which was within easy interdiction range of Hitler's forces.

On the Japanese side, invading the USSR likely would have immediately brought on a total oil embargo from the United States similar to the one imposed on them after their occupation of South Indochina (this embargo was the main reason Japan historically refrained from attacking the Soviets). According to Masanobu Tsuji, had the attack proceeded under such conditions the IJA would have run out of fuel within 6 months to a year, and with no readily exploitable oil reserves in the Russian Far East (save modest deposits on Sakhalin), the need to secure the "Southern Resource Area" would be even more pressing.

The problem was, between the China theater and Kantokuen, the IJA would have no men to spare for conquering Southeast Asia, where the oil and other raw materials were located. Because of this, war in the south (and the state of Japan's economy) would be directly contingent on the speed at which organized resistance in Siberia could be squelched.
I wonder how much of an impact on Japanese decision making the discovery of the Daqing oil field in Manchuria would have had if found in the early-mid 1930s.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daqing_Oil_Field
 
I wonder how much of an impact on Japanese decision making the discovery of the Daqing oil field in Manchuria would have had if found in the early-mid 1930s.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daqing_Oil_Field

If I recall correctly, the technology necessary for properly exploiting Daqing didn't exist in the 1930s, though if 1960s China could do it, World War era Japan probably could have too. The discovery of such a large reserve of crude would have given the Army faction a lot more leverage in strategic planning since the Navy's argument about the necessity of SEA for Japan's war economy would have been undercut. However, there were still certain commodities, such as rubber, that could only be harvested in the south.
 

Deleted member 1487

If I recall correctly, the technology necessary for properly exploiting Daqing didn't exist in the 1930s, though if 1960s China could do it, World War era Japan probably could have too. The discovery of such a large reserve of crude would have given the Army faction a lot more leverage in strategic planning since the Navy's argument about the necessity of SEA for Japan's war economy would have been undercut. However, there were still certain commodities, such as rubber, that could only be harvested in the south.
Didn't Japan have some synthetic rubber going?
 
Didn't Japan have some synthetic rubber going?

When the Japanese took SEA they captured the vast majority of the world's rubber supply; synthetics were mostly an American thing. Japan tried to synthesize oil, but production was never enough to keep up with demand.

AFAIK synthetic rubber in the pre-war period was minor to nonexistent given the vast majority of Japan's stockpile was comprised of imports from the south.
 
What if, in September of 1939, when Japan threatened to withdraw their ambassador and break off relations with Germany becasue of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact violating prior anti-soviet plans between Germany and Japan, Hitler decided to accept Ribbentrop's suggestion and reveal the plans for Operation Barbarossa to Hiroshi Ōshima and the Japanese High Command.

Knowing that the Germans had no intention of keeping their treaty with Russia, the Japanese would stick to the original Imperial Defence Plan of 1936, where Japan would not attack the US and rely on American neutrality, while invading Russia to supply their oil needs.

The plan they almost launched in OTL in July of 1941 was called Kantokuen. ITTL, they would have been firmly set on this plan since 1939, but would a Japanese invasion of Russia be successful, assuming that the USA remains neutral?

Also, irregardless of the Japanese success in their own war objectives, would forcing the USSR into a two front war improve German success on the Eastern Front?

what if they just try to keep the two fighting in 1939? try to push Poland into the conflict also?

THAT seems more ideal scenario rather than risk sharing their most critical planning for future operations?
 
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