U Boats and submarines on the way home.
AFTER 0400 ON 1 June there were two brief contacts between surface units, but the return of the fleets was not without incident, though neither side achieved any success with their submarines, and the only damage was caused by a British minefield laid four weeks previously.
Commodore Hawksley continued on 347° at 20kts in single line ahead until 0342, with the 5th BS 2 miles ahead of the 2nd BS. There was, however, only one destroyer, the Oak, in company and the most recent information concerning the enemy was the Admiralty's 0148 signal to the effect that the damaged Lutzow had been in 56° 26'N, 5° 41'E at midnight, steering 167° at 7kts, that all submarines were being hurried from German ports to attack, and that one flotilla was returning round the Skaw. This probably reached Jellicoe at about 0300 and in a searchlight signal timed at 0330, Jerram was warned to look out for damaged battlecruisers ahead or on either bow, and probably with a large number of destroyers.
Meanwhile to the westward the Zeppelin L11 had approached Le Mesurier's ships, and their brief firing at her was heard in the battlefleet just before 0520, and more continuous firing from the 3rd LCS at 0535. The reason for this was not immediately known, and at 0342 he ordered his divisions to alter course separately to 257°, but 10 minutes later resumed his previous course in line ahead. The 5th BS conformed generally to these movements a few minutes after the other battleships, while some of the latter fired briefly at the L11. Jellicoe's intention on the evening of 31 May had apparently been to close Horns Reef if the German fleet were not encountered at daylight, but the absence of destroyers prevented this, though it was increasingly doubtful if the enemy were in his vicinity. Now that the battleships were sunk, such a decision couldn't be undertaken. Definite information on the High Seas Fleet reached Jellicoe at about 0450 in a signal from the Admiralty timed at 0359. This gave the deciphered text of Scheer's 0230 position signal, which had been passed to the Operations division at 0300, and stated that at 0230 the retreating units of the German main fleet had been in 55° 33'N, 6° 50'E, steering 133° at 16kts.
Accordingly at 0413 , Le Mesurier signalled his ships to form divisions in line ahead, disposed abeam to port of the 5th division, and at 0430 to resume course 347°. Visibility was still only 21/2 miles at this time.
There was still, as far as Le Mesurier was aware, the possibility of meeting disabled German ships. An Admiralty signal, timed at 0312, and based on a signal of the S53 to the Regensburg, referring to the Stralslund, stated that the crew had been taken off a damaged light cruiser in 55° 45'N, 6° 25'E, and that destroyers were standing by at 0300. This time should have been 0200 but the Admiralty passed it on incorrectly, while the position was actually the S53's 0200 reckoning and far to the south-eastward of where the Straslund was scuttled. The chances of finding the Lutzow, Derrflinger, Bayern and Seydlitz, which for all he knew were still afloat, were incomparably more important than a damaged light cruiser, and in a searchlight signal timed at 0430 Jellicoe warned the leading ships of his divisions to look out for the Lutzow, damaged, ahead.
The next information regarding possible German stragglers came from the Fearless in a wireless message timed at 0430, stating that a cruiser and two destroyers, probably hostile, were in sight, bearing 77°, course 167°. The Dublin had lost touch with the British fleet and her position given as 55° 30'N, 6° 33'E was too far to the south-eastward, and the time of sighting half an hour late. The ships seen were the Rostock shortly before she was scuttled, and her attached destroyers but the former's crippled condition escaped notice.
Another signal from the Admiralty timed at 0530, was probably received by Jellicoe soon after 0600. This stated that the Straslund was still afloat at 0347 without her crew, and gave her supposed 0300 position as in the 0312 signal. It is not clear on what intercepted but misunderstood German signal, this totally erroneous information was based, though it may have been a further signal from the S53 to the Hamburg but at 0603 Jellicoe altered course, leading ships together and the rest in succession to 122°, and steered towards the Elbing's reported position, instead of the Lutzow's.
The damaged Barham was joined by the Fearless soon after 0400, and both ships briefly fired at the L 11. They steered 351 ° until about 0430, and then altered course to 205° to make for `M' channel. The Barham was able to maintain revolutions for 14kts giving about 12'/2kts over the ground.
Speed was increased to 20kts at 0415 and steered 10° or 353° until 0444 when course was altered to 325°. Some of his ships fired at the L11 and about 0320 both the Falmouth and Canterbury sighted an imaginary torpedo. Le Mesurier had little if any knowledge of the night's events and the Admiralty signal of 0248 regarding the Lutzow was not received in the Lion until 0340 via the Iron Duke. In a signal timed at 0350 and despatched 14 minutes later, Beatty pointed out that when last seen the enemy were to the west, steering 212° proceeding slowly, and that a Zeppelin had passed astern steering 257°. He requested permission to sweep on 212° to locate the enemy, and ordered his light cruisers, to spread well to the westward. Shortly after this Beatty may have received the Admiralty 0329 signal giving the German fleet's 0230 position, and at 0423 course was altered back to c353° and by 0510 he joined astern of the battlefleet. In a wireless signal timed at 0440, trying to locate the cripples was the most important priority. At 0520 he increased to 20kts altering course, as Jellicoe asked him where he was going, and pointed out that the fleet's course was 347° at 17kts. Beatty's replies indicated that he wanted to sweep southward and eastward in search of the cruiser reported by the Dublin at 0430, which he now apparently believed to be the Lutzow, before again turning to 347°. Accordingly at just after 0540 the battlecruisers turned to 122° and proceeded on this course at 20kts until 0616 when they turned to 167°.
The Harwich Force received orders at 0309 to join Jellicoe and replace units short of fuel. This was far too late, and though Tyrwhitt sailed at 0350 the only service he could perform was to provide screening destroyers for the Marlborough.
For news of the British fleet Scheer depended on his airships, but visibility conditions, which were no better at sea-level off Horns Reef than further west, were also difficult for them. The L24 had already made two reports of imaginary forces and in a signal timed at 0300 and received at 0319, she reported that numerous enemy vessels, at least 12 units, were at 0300 15-20 miles to the north-westward of Hanstholm in northern Denmark, and Scheer considered that the L24 had sighted the British battlefleet, which he now believed had withdrawn to this area at nightfall. This sighting again appears to have been entirely imaginary. The German 2nd Flotilla were about 30-35 miles north-eastward of the reported position at 0300 but it does not seem that this was the force concerned. Apart from imaginary submarines and a supposed torpedo from the second of them, the 2nd Flotilla's return was uneventful, and there is no mention of an airship in any of their reports. Further signals from the L24 received at 0333 and at 0520 referred to non-existent ships.
Meanwhile the L 11 had located part of the British fleet, but Scheer seems to have considered that her first report might refer to the Harwich force, and though her later reports indicated that much stronger forces than had at first been thought were to the north-westward of Heligoland, it was not realised that the whole Grand Fleet was in this area.
The LI I had seen nothing of Heligoland which was hidden in low lying fog, when she passed over the island, and mist at greater heights limited visibility to 2-4 miles. However, at 0500 smoke was seen to the northward and the L I I made out what were thought to be six British cruisers and numerous destroyers. These were reported in a signal timed at 0410 and received at 0430, in sight in c54° 45'N, 5° 25'E steering 10° at high speed. Their position was at least twenty-five miles to the north-eastward of that given.
The L11 took station astern of the force sighted at 3600-3900ft but she was fired at, and had to make several circles to the eastward. While thus engaged at 0340, she sighted a second group of six battleships with two tripod masts and two funnels, with light forces in company, steering 347° and then altering course to 257°. These were duly reported as six more enemy dreadnought-type ships in c55° 03'N, 5° 35'E in a signal timed at 0340, but not apparently received until 0435. This signal also gave their alteration of course and added that the LI I was being driven off by gunfire and was in touch with the enemy battlefleet. This time the L I I had sighted the rear ships of Jellicoe's battle line and correctly identified them, but the position given was similarly in error to that in her previous signal.
Several ships of the last two forces sighted, now engaged the LI1 which presented a good target at 3600ft - 6200ft. She was not hit though badly shaken by near-misses, and eventually had to run before the wind to the north-eastward and at 0420 lost sight of all British ships. It had rarely been possible to make out more than one squadron at a time in the mist and fog over the sea, though others were disclosed by their gun-flashes. The L11's fourth signal, timed at 0410 and received at 0447, stated that the reported enemy vessels were steering 347° and that several in c55° 27'N, 5° 45'E were now out of sight in the haze; the L11's position was uncertain and visibility low. At 0435 she came down to 1600ft but visibility was no better, and no further contact with British ships was obtained.
In spite of mistakes in identification and incorrect positions, the L11 had performed well in difficult conditions, and Scheer now knew that the British forces to the north-westward of Heligoland were not seeking battle near Horns Reef, and as he believed the rest of the British fleet had been located by the L24, informed the Naval Airship Division at 0608 that airship reconnaissance was no longer necessary.
A number of imaginary submarine alarms disturbed the High Seas Fleet's return. The Prinz Heinrich had opened fire on a supposed submarine at 0253, and 10 minutes later, it signalled that a submerged enemy submarine was in sight to starboard and ordered a 45° turn together to port. Several ships at the rear of the line believed themselves to be attacked in the area to the south-westwards of Horns Reef. At 0406 imaginary submarines to starboard were fired on by the destroyers escorting the cruiser Brummer and the fleet turned away to port for a short time. A supposed torpedo track was sighted from the fore-top, while the Hamburg fired rapid salvos, not at the usual imagined periscope, but at an alleged submarine, 10° forward of the starboard beam that was said to have dived with her conning tower above water 700-900yds away! At 0413 the Hamburg opened fire on an imaginary submarine to port, and their violent shooting threatened to damage the escorts closing in from the eastward, so that Scheer had to order cease fire.
At 1520 there was an explosion on the starboard side of the Ostfriesland, at first thought to be from a submarine's torpedo, but the Ostfriesland soon signalled that bits of a mine had been found on her quarter deck. She had in fact struck one of those laid by the Abdiel on 4 May. No very great damage was done, but the Ostfriesland, after sheering out of line, was scuttled when deemed unsalvagable by the G 11, and screened by the V3 and V5, followed astern of the 3rd, and presently of the 2nd Squadron.
The ships of the 3rd Squadron turned sharply to port when it was realised that the Ostfriesland had struck a mine and this caused the 2nd Squadron to close up, so that some of the pre-dreadnoughts had to stop, but Scheer ordered the 3rd Squadron to maintain the present course, and in a signal to the fleet timed at 0533, further ordered that ships were to keep straight on in the event of danger from mines.
Meanwhile the 3rd Squadron had entered the minefield and most of the ships reported mines. Munchen dropped a mine-buoy, and this was mistaken for a periscope by the Regensburg, which both opened fire at about 0555. The firing was described as violent or heavy by other ships, and in these actions with imaginary submarines, the cruisers fired a few rounds from their 4 in. The Regensburg at the rear of the fleet signalled at 0603 that a torpedo track had been sighted to port, and 3 minutes later the Brummer signalled that a submarine had been sighted to starboard, but neither was real.
The Seydlitz passed Horns Reef Lightship at 0400, and steered for the Lister Deep, screened against submarines by six destroyers (the S24 and 13th Half-Flotilla) that had sighted her at 0345. The S24 and S18 were detached at 0515 and at 0540 the Seydlitz joined the fleet, and took station astern of the 2nd Squadron at 0605, while the Bayern went ahead. It was no longer possible to maintain the fleet's speed of 15kts, as the Seydlitz was now so low forward that her bow-wave broke over the forecastle and the planing action of the inclined decks increased the danger so that she had to reduce to 10 and then to 7kts.
In a wireless signal timed at 0444, the Regensburg had ordered the 7th Flotilla to act as submarine screen for the battlecruisers, the V28, the 12th Half-flotilla and the 5th Flotilla for the dreadnoughts, and three of the 6th Flotilla for the 2nd Squadron, while the remaining available destroyers were to close the 3rd Squadron. As noted above some of the 5th and 7th Flotillas were screening the damaged Bayern and Seydlitz, and at 0600 the other dreadnoughts and battlecruisers were being screened by a total of sixteen destroyers. There was none screening the 2nd Squadron at that time, as the V44 and the G86, which had been by the head of the line, failed to find them until shortly after 0700, and during the search in poor visibility the V44 had mistaken the 3rd Squadron for British battlecruisers which contributed to the delay. Five destroyers of the 9th Flotilla, G42, and the 14th Half-Flotilla had not joined by 0600, and the last named did not do so until about 0850 when they screened the Derfflinger, while the other six destroyers were still further astern.
The four destroyers with the Lutzow's crew on board -- the G40, G38, V4S and G37 - sighted the Royalist with the Obdurate, Moresby, Marksman and Maenad at about 0325. A brief action developed on approximately opposite courses at 2400--7400yds. The German destroyers opened a rapid but ineffective fire, and the G40 fired one and the V45 two torpedoes at 2400-2700yds. The Royalist replied, but according to one account only fired a single 6in round, and turned away to avoid two torpedoes, the first track passing under her bows and the other missing close astern. The Moresby also sighted two torpedoes, one of which hit the ship, and three were seen from the Maenad. The British destroyers opened fire, the Obdurate's forward 41n gun bursting. The Germans soon vanished in the mist and were not pursued.
The G40 was hit by a 6in shell which damaged her after turbine, but was able to keep going at 26kts for another 10 minutes before stopping from loss of steam, and was taken in tow by the G37.
The Dublin at 0430 had reported the Rostock and her destroyers as a cruiser and two destroyers, probably hostile, bearing 77° and steering 167°. In reply to subsequent signals this was amplified to the armoured cruiser Roon apparently steaming fast, with at least two destroyers and possibly another cruiser, all being lost sight of in the fog.
In fact the Rostock was proceeding southward in tow of the S54 and screened by the V71 and V73, when at about 0355, the Dublin, taken to be either two light cruisers of the Birmingham class, or an armoured cruiser and two destroyers, was sighted approaching four or five miles away to the south-westward. At about this time the L1 I's report of twelve British ships steering 10° at high speed came in, and it was incorrectly thought that the Rostock might be only about 20 miles away. The S54, V71 and V73 were called alongside to take off her crew. The Dublin did not close, while the Rostock and the S54 continually made the first two letters - 'UA' - of the British challenge, and smoke screens were employed so that the Dublin which replied repeatedly to the challenge, was uncertain of the ship's identity.
At about 0405 the S54 put off and proceeded eastwards and l0mins later the Dublin, this time taken to be two further cruisers, was sighted c35° to starboard and 3-4 miles away, steering 10°. Once again the S54 continually flashed `UA' as well as other disconnected letters, to which the Dublin again replied, and made off at full speed. The Dublin steamed towards her at high speed, and then turned away to port so that the S54 could steer for Horns Reef.
Meanwhile the V71 and V73 remained near the Rostock, and although scuttling charges had been placed, three torpedoes (two by the V71 and one by the V73) were fired to hasten her sinking, which
occurred bows first, at c0425; the V71 and V73 then proceeded at full speed to Horns Reef.
Although the Dublin was taken to be at least two ships when sighted, no other vessel was present. The V71's signal reporting the Rostock's sinking, was timed at 0412 and gave a position c55° 18'N, 6° 18'E which was over 20 miles too far to the south.
Neither of the above encounters was creditable to the British, and there is farcical element in the proceedings of the three submarines sent to intercept returning German ships, as their orders were those for the operation planned for 2 June, and although their time of leaving Harwich was advanced by 15 hours to 1900 on 30 May, they were not told of any change in the plan, and to save their batteries for 2 June, neither the E26 nor E55 kept a continuous watch on the previous day, although the DI apparently did so. Under their orders the E55, E26 and DI were to spread on a line bearing 2 70° from the Vyl lightship and 4, 12 and 20 miles from this mark.
The E26 was the first to sight Horns Reef at 2335 on 31 May. The Vyl lightship was sighted at 0100 and the E26 settled on the bottom in her position between 0200 and 0300. The High Seas Fleet passed not very far away at about 0400, but the E26 sighted nothing all day. The E55 sighted Horns Reef half an hour after the E26, and at 0020 a Zeppelin, probably L24, approached flying low, and the E55 went to the bottom to the west of Horns Reef. At 0045 a noise was heard as of a sweep passing very close, and between 0215 and 0530 eleven explosions of varying strength were audible, but nothing was seen during daylight on 1 June except an out of range destroyer at 0825. The D1 reached her position and dived at 0430 1 June, not long after the High Seas Fleet had passed, and sighted nothing throughout her patrol. All three left after dark on 3 June, and although several German submarines had been sighted, only the E55 was able to get in a shot at the U64 at 1813 2 June, but the torpedo narrowly missed and exploded on the sea bed.
The Talisman with the G2, G3, G4 and G5 was approaching her station (approximately 54° 30'N, 4° 00'E) when a wireless message from the Admiralty was received, ordering two submarines to be detached towards the Lister Deep, to remain 48 hours and attack damaged German ships. The G3 and G5 were accordingly detached at 0400 1 June, and by cl130 reached positions near the westward or north-westward edge of the British minefields laid on 10/ 11 September 1915, but the German route lay to the east of the minefields. On the way G3 and G5 sighted the Barham and Fearless, and began an attack before the latter were recognised. The G5 returned over 12 hours before the G3, and in company with the G2 and G4, unsuccessfully attempted to attack a German submarine, probably the U46, on the morning of 3 June. The Talisman and all four submarines arrived at Blyth during 4 June.
The firing at the LI1 was unsystematic and that from the turret guns was handicapped by the need to expend the projectiles in the guns and cages before shrapnel could be used. The destroyers opened fire with 15in to 3pdr guns but no hits were made on the LI1 which was at a height of 3600ft - 6200ft and was 536ft Sin long and 61ft 41n diameter, though she was badly shaken by heavy shells passing near and perhaps by bursts of 61n and smaller time fuzed shells.
The area of the night actions was swept for another 5 hours and it was not until 1108 that a signal timed at 1044, was sent to the Admiralty stating that the Harwich force was not required except for destroyers to screen the Barham, and that Jellicoe was ascertaining that no disabled ships were left and was returning to base. The signal also stated that the whole area had been swept for disabled enemy cruisers without result and that the weather was very misty, and in fact visibility was seldom more than 3 to 4 miles during the forenoon.
Wreckage from the Turbulent, Ardent, Fortune and Black Prince was passed, and a supposed submarine, apparently oil from the Ardent's wreck, and perhaps her submerged hull was sighted. The 2nd CS sighted the bows of the Sparrowhawk but nothing further was found. In a signal timed at 0917 and based on intercepted German signals, the Admiralty told Jellicoe that at 0620 submarines had been ordered to close the Elbing, whose position was now given as 55° 51'N, 5° 55'E. The fleet had passed through this position shortly before 0600, and was again approaching it, but 1000 alteration of course to 336° removed the ships from the submarine danger, and he maintained this course without incident until 1108 when it was altered to 302°. They had passed wreckage from the Black Prince, possibly the Elbing and the Frauenlob.
Jellicoe did not receive any news of the Indefatigable and Queen Mary having sunk until a signal from Beatty, sent at 1001, was taken in and this only gave the approximate position of their wrecks. Information on the cause and time of their loss was not given until two further signals from Beatty were sent at 1250 and 1303, and in the interim Jellicoe seems to have thought that they might have been mined.
The Dublin joined the battlefleet shortly before 0800 and transferred to the 2nd LCS when Beatty's force made contact about 2 hours later. Of the flotilla-leaders and destroyers not in touch with any heavy ships at 0600, mostr had joined Jellicoe into the ocean, while the Narborough, Nerissa and Pelican, which until 0535 had been proceeding further and further westward with the Lydiard, joined the battlecruisers soon after 1000. The Champion in company with the Obdurate, Moresby and Maenad was still not in touch. These three destroyers and the Marksman had picked up three survivors from the Ardent and seventeen from the Fortune at 0430-0530 and at about 0600 the Marksman was detached to the totally disabled Sparrowhawk. An attempt to tow the latter failed, and Burney, who passed by at 0845, ordered the Marksman to sink her, and the Marksman then joined the Faulknor at about 1000. The Sparrowhawk's bows had previously parted from the rest of her hull, and remained afloat until sunk by the Laurel on 3 June. The remaining eight destroyers of the above thirty-nine were returning home by 1100, in most cases from shortage of fuel.
The light cruiser Munchen sighted an imaginary torpedo coming from port aft at 1040 when off Heligoland, and opened fire on an equally imaginary periscope.
Units of the mine sweeping and harbour flotillas had been sent out to provide an additional screen for the fleet against possible submarine attack, and a number of seaplanes were also employed, one of which reported a hostile submarine to the westward of the Amrum Bank, while there was a subsequent report of three bombs having been dropped where a submarine had dived near the Amrum Bank lightship. No British submarines were near these positions, which were well to the eastward of the G3 and G5.
At 0835 the Regensburg received a signal from the V45 stating that the G40 had been damaged in action and taken in tow, and giving a 0700 position near the Horns Reef lightship, which was nearly 15 miles in error to the southward. A further signal came in at 0903 from the S32 that she was completely disabled and had anchored 2 miles from Lyngvig lighthouse. The Regensburg, which was in the Amrum Bank channel, turned back at 0910 to meet the group with the G40, and was accompanied by the V30, S34 and S33. The Regensburg took on 1177 of the Lutzow's survivors from the G40, V45 and G3 7, but the G38 had gone on ahead, and proceeded home with the V71. The V73 transferred her Rostock survivors to the V71, and then proceeded to the S32, and after taking her in tow, was met by the G39 and G88 released from screening the Moltke. The G40, though at times under her own steam, proved very troublesome to tow, seven lines having broken. The S32 was also difficult, but both were brought back safely. The rest of the British battlefleet's return to Scapa Flow was comparatively uneventful. The three `K' class destroyers of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron's screen were detached between 1300 and 1400 as they were short of fuel while the Mischief eventually joined the battlefleet's screen, and together with all the other destroyers of Jellicoe's or Burney's force, except for the two detached with the Barham, remained in company. The Sparrowhawk's bow, wreckage from the Wiesbaden, and a boat marked V29 had been passed while the wreck of the Invincible, whose bow was still above water, was also sighted. The Birmingham reported a submarine's periscope in sight at 1548 which was probably imaginary.
