Jutland rematch 1918

I basically agree and I am aware of the limitations ;)

But the original plan called for the subs to be place "in the likely approach" of the RN (not to HUNT after BBs) - if Hipper knows WHERE he goes with his fleet he can estimate what probably course the RN will take, so its possible - if a larger number of subs is spread out along the approaches (even near Rosith and/or Scapa;)) and if they manage to let loose a sizeable number of fishes that the RN might take some sizeable losses - of course it depends on the question of timing and the "luck" Hipper has with guessing where to place them. Its like hiding your snipers, if they are in the right place they can hurt the enemy, if the enemy chosses another path they will achieve nothing.

But in this case your 'snipers' can only crawl from position to position!
 
Zeppelins for reconnaissance won't be available but seaplanes should be. Might be interesting if the Gotha fleet got thrown against the Grand Fleet instead of London...
 

Thomas1195

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Well, what if Furious got some credit by sinking some BBs with some lucky one-hit one-kill shots from its 18 inch gun? XD Would this affect RN BB design after that?
 

CalBear

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Yes, all of these attempts to get some changess into the Grand Fleet/HSF battles seems to be quite futile. Very one sided in 1918.
Could we imagine an alternate path for Germany that would make it less one sided?
I am certainly not an expert, but I have been drilled through some of the WW2 practicalities so I'll try a POD here.
1916, analysis of the battle of Jutland reveals that incapacitating hits came from plunging fire through the thinly armored decks. Krupp and Zeiss vouch that they could make modifications to the gun trajectories and better range finders to enable long range precision fire. HSF is modified for 30+ degree elevation.
Next battle of Jutland is started on a clear day with bright skys and sees the German battlecruisers pick apart the grand fleet battle cruisers and inflict heavy casualties on the Grand fleet before the distance can be closed.
Just a try.
The redesign of the turrets and barbette to allow that sort of modification is anything but trivial. It would put a ship into the yard for the better part of a year. There are not enough yards to alter more than a few ships, even then the concept of plunging fire would need to be developed, Ironically, IOTL the German naval community was very tardy in understanding the lessons of Jutlend, or in learning the wrong ones, hence the fatally flawed design of the Bismarck and her sister, which were built to stand toe-to-toe with an enemy BB at 18K yards or less.
 

Thomas1195

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The redesign of the turrets and barbette to allow that sort of modification is anything but trivial. It would put a ship into the yard for the better part of a year. There are not enough yards to alter more than a few ships, even then the concept of plunging fire would need to be developed, Ironically, IOTL the German naval community was very tardy in understanding the lessons of Jutlend, or in learning the wrong ones, hence the fatally flawed design of the Bismarck and her sister, which were built to stand toe-to-toe with an enemy BB at 18K yards or less.
But British smaller 14 inch guns (KGV) were not good for long range gunnery as well.
 

CalBear

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But British smaller 14 inch guns (KGV) were not good for long range gunnery as well.
The 14"/45 Mark VIII on the KGV was not a good of a long range GUN as the U.S. 16"/45 MK 6 and was of similar quality to the 38 CM/45 that was mounted on the Bismarck class (thanks to the class' limited 30 degree elevation), but the RN ship was far better protected than her KM opponent.

The KM ships, more or less uniformly from the Deutschland class up carried a belt that was too narrow and shallow to be useful against plunging fire and deck armor that was also much too thin. German BB were built to refight Jutland, although they did embrace the addition of radar gunnery assistance, their defenses failed to show the same awareness of potential hits at 25k+ yards.
 
The redesign of the turrets and barbette to allow that sort of modification is anything but trivial. It would put a ship into the yard for the better part of a year. There are not enough yards to alter more than a few ships, even then the concept of plunging fire would need to be developed, Ironically, IOTL the German naval community was very tardy in understanding the lessons of Jutlend, or in learning the wrong ones.
So, in this case the change of the bolded bit would be the actual POD. ALso, before the British learns to shoot 20000+ yards, the German armor does not need an upgrade. However, with a 1916-18 time-frame I guess the capacity for redesign puts some severe limitations to what could happen in 1918.
Could we at least see a repeat of Jutland were German redesigned BC's (the 2 derflinger's and Hindenburg) maul the British BC's? I know it doesn't really provide much of a change in things, but it might shake the British confidence quite a bit to have their scouts incapacitated again. With a number of interesting butterflies to naval treaties etc.
I am just exploring if we can find another semi-plausible outcome than the most likely one. That the Germans get severely beaten.
 

CalBear

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So, in this case the change of the bolded bit would be the actual POD. ALso, before the British learns to shoot 20000+ yards, the German armor does not need an upgrade. However, with a 1916-18 time-frame I guess the capacity for redesign puts some severe limitations to what could happen in 1918.
Could we at least see a repeat of Jutland were German redesigned BC's (the 2 derflinger's and Hindenburg) maul the British BC's? I know it doesn't really provide much of a change in things, but it might shake the British confidence quite a bit to have their scouts incapacitated again. With a number of interesting butterflies to naval treaties etc.
I am just exploring if we can find another semi-plausible outcome than the most likely one. That the Germans get severely beaten.
There is always the chance that the BC force commander gets mauled again, the ships had no business facing off with anything heavier than a pre-drednought/armored cruiser, although with the addition of all five of the QE class BB the chances of the HSF BC force getting away with a positive loss exchange ratio is much lower the second time around.

The only reason the HSF survived Jutland is that the fleet refused battle and broke for home. Even considering fighting it out would be Trafalgar II.
 
There is always the chance that the BC force commander gets mauled again, the ships had no business facing off with anything heavier than a pre-drednought/armored cruiser, although with the addition of all five of the QE class BB the chances of the HSF BC force getting away with a positive loss exchange ratio is much lower the second time around.

The only reason the HSF survived Jutland is that the fleet refused battle and broke for home. Even considering fighting it out would be Trafalgar II.

As far as I can see QE was with the main fleet the way the Grand Fleet was organized (I may have missed something). So it could be the Derflingers and Hinderburg vs. 1 BC squadron (repulse, renown, Princess Royal and Tiger) and 2 BC squadron Australia, New Zealand, Indomitable, inflexible.
For the Germans hopefully only one at the time.
Could a redesigned German BC's in principle thoroughly beat the British BC's and would this cause serious doubts about the British ships/the royal navy?
 

CalBear

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As far as I can see QE was with the main fleet the way the Grand Fleet was organized (I may have missed something). So it could be the Derflingers and Hinderburg vs. 1 BC squadron (repulse, renown, Princess Royal and Tiger) and 2 BC squadron Australia, New Zealand, Indomitable, inflexible.
For the Germans hopefully only one at the time.
Could a redesigned German BC's in principle thoroughly beat the British BC's and would this cause serious doubts about the British ships/the royal navy?
Doubt about the BC concept, sure, there already was some serious questions (you can see that in the proposed G3 design, which were actually "fast battleships", and to a lesser degree in the "Admiral" class i.e. HMS Hood), although the chances of the BC all being refit to allow 30 degree elevation in a couple years is fairly questionable. It is a serious redesign, one that goes well beyond the already daunting task of clearing sufficient room for the breeches, and would be closer to a complete rebuild of the turret and powder handling system(the recoil distance for the 30.5cm/50 is nearly a full meter).

Shaking the British public's faith the RN is a much more difficult task. The HSF closes with the main battleline, with or without the USN battle squadron, it is going to get chewed to furless bits. This being the case the best the HSF is sink a couple BC and run like hell for safety, leaving the seas under unchallenged GF control.

What is much more likely is that the BC get caught up in a fight and Beatty sends out the QE 15" ships and the HSF BC have a REALLY bad day.
 

Coulsdon Eagle

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As far as I can see QE was with the main fleet the way the Grand Fleet was organized (I may have missed something). So it could be the Derflingers and Hinderburg vs. 1 BC squadron (repulse, renown, Princess Royal and Tiger) and 2 BC squadron Australia, New Zealand, Indomitable, inflexible.
For the Germans hopefully only one at the time.
Could a redesigned German BC's in principle thoroughly beat the British BC's and would this cause serious doubts about the British ships/the royal navy?

Assuming the GF is composed as it was in 1918 OTL then only 4 QE's could sail with the BCF. One of the criticisms of Beatty is his choice of GF flagship Queen Elizabeth. Even if the QE's don't join the BCF it removed 20% of the fast battleship wing. I could understand his desire to move out of Jellicoe's Iron Duke but his desire to have the biggest / fastest vessel was a potential waste of a prime asset. What would have been wrong with Royal Oak or another of the R-class?

On a slight debit for the RN they would of course be missing the ill-fated Vanguard.
 
Assuming the GF is composed as it was in 1918 OTL then only 4 QE's could sail with the BCF. One of the criticisms of Beatty is his choice of GF flagship Queen Elizabeth. Even if the QE's don't join the BCF it removed 20% of the fast battleship wing. I could understand his desire to move out of Jellicoe's Iron Duke but his desire to have the biggest / fastest vessel was a potential waste of a prime asset. What would have been wrong with Royal Oak or another of the R-class?
Beatty's staff commander, Reginald Plunkett, thought as late as mid-Jan '17 that Ramillies would be flagship. So why QE?
Beatty explained, unconvincingly, that he needed his flag on QE because "she had the speed to enable him at short notice to get to the most favourable position for exercising supreme command in battle". Actually, he had lusted after the ship since the end of '14, when Churchill had promised the class to him. She was in dock for a month undergoing the requisite flag modifications, and officially became Beatty's ship on 16/2/17. Since one of the class would usually in for routine refit or overhaul, then 5BS would frequently be down to a practical operational strength of three ships.
 

Saphroneth

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There is always the chance that the BC force commander gets mauled again, the ships had no business facing off with anything heavier than a pre-drednought/armored cruiser, although with the addition of all five of the QE class BB the chances of the HSF BC force getting away with a positive loss exchange ratio is much lower the second time around.
In total fairness to the BCs, they weren't very heavily armoured but they were reasonable ships to take fire - some of the British BCs absorbed dozens of hits before/without exploding, and we know the cause of the explosion and it's one which was subsequently corrected. (There were several turret penetrations on the German BCs at Jutland, it's just that they didn't make the whole ship explode.)
With better gunnery in Jutland (or in an ATL battle later where the gunnery flaws are corrected) Beatty would probably have done much more damage to the German BCs; with the flash problem fixed as well you probably get more German ships lost than British even without the 5BS simply as there's more British BCs than German. (Lanchester Square.)

The BCs are precisely intended to fight enemy BCs and on down - they're the fast/scounting wing.
 

CalBear

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In total fairness to the BCs, they weren't very heavily armoured but they were reasonable ships to take fire - some of the British BCs absorbed dozens of hits before/without exploding, and we know the cause of the explosion and it's one which was subsequently corrected. (There were several turret penetrations on the German BCs at Jutland, it's just that they didn't make the whole ship explode.)
With better gunnery in Jutland (or in an ATL battle later where the gunnery flaws are corrected) Beatty would probably have done much more damage to the German BCs; with the flash problem fixed as well you probably get more German ships lost than British even without the 5BS simply as there's more British BCs than German. (Lanchester Square.)

The BCs are precisely intended to fight enemy BCs and on down - they're the fast/scounting wing.
Not really. The idea of the BC was that it could out-gun anything it couldn't out-run and out-run anything it couldn't out-gun. Even after Jutland Fischer never lost his rather silly notion that a low armor, heavy gunned design had a place, in fact he doubled down on the notion with the Large Light Cruisers. Instead of understanding the weakness of the basic design the RN, not surprisingly given the main battery, the decision was made that they belonged in the main battle fleet, and in the van at that. The RN never really fixed the flash problem, they instituted additional training, but there was no mechanical fix made, something that was incorporated on later post war designs such as making it physically impossible to bypass anti-flash devices.

The destruction at Jutland of the RN BC force can not be put down to a "it's just". The RN ships had a severe series of design flaws, none of which would have mattered had they been used in the basic manner for which they were designed. They were designed to be exceptionally fast, capable of overpowering the light scouting screens of 1910-12, where they would face no caliber over 6". Putt9ng them into a situation where they would face serious opposition was a terrible error, similar to the one the USN would made 26 year later when they used Atlanta class CLAA in the role of a cruiser since that was the when the class was called, rather than what they were, really long destroyers packed to the rafters with high explosives and almost no armor. You could, I supposes, say that the HSF BC were an acceptable design to confront the enemy BC force, but they had the advantage of being built in RESPONSE to the RN ships and therefore were designed to counter them.

That Beatty managed to perform his primary scouting mission is thanks to the bravery of the individual ship's commanders in the face of remarkable short-sightedness by Fischer. Just a glance at the defensive scheme of the Derffinger & Moltke classes compared to the Indefatigable and Invincible class ships demonstrates that. A ship with a MAX 6" of belt armor had no business trading with ships that could penetrate that armor out to 20K yards.
 
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Saphroneth

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That Beatty managed to perform his primary scouting mission is thanks to the bravery of the individual ship's commanders in the face of remarkable short-sightedness by Fischer. Just a glance at the defensive scheme of the Derffinger & Moltke classes compared to the Indefatigable and Invincible class ships demonstrates that. A ship with a MAX 6" of belt armor had no business trading with ships that could penetrate that armor out to 20K yards.

But no BC was lost to belt armour penetrations anyway. All the BC losses were due to turret penetrations and flash, and while it's true the British BCs were less heavily armoured than the comparable German ships (note comparable - Derfflinger compares not to Indefatigable but to Tiger, a ship which did not in fact explode despite taking very heavy German fire; Moltke and Vonn der Tann are the comparable ships to the Indefatigable class while the Invincibles don't really have a German twin of the same time) they were also firing heavier guns.


Not really. The idea of the BC was that it could out-gun anything it couldn't out-run and out-run anything it couldn't out-gun. Even after Jutland Fischer never lost his rather silly notion that a low armor, heavy gunned design had a place, in fact he doubled down on the notion with the Large Light Cruisers. Instead of understanding the weakness of the basic design the RN, not surprisingly given the main battery, the decision was made that they belonged in the main battle fleet, and in the van at that. The RN never really fixed the flash problem, they instituted additional training, but there was no mechanical fix made, something that was incorporated on later post war designs such as making it physically impossible to bypass anti-flash devices.

All indications I have seen were that the flash problem was fixed post Jutland; that is, that the training had rectified. If this is the case then it seems far more sensible to keep the ships in action than to take them out to install mechanical flash protection (which would have required doing structural work inside the barbette, so far as I can tell, if not completely rebuilding the ship).

I'm of course completely aware of what the original BC concept was
  • Heavy reconnaissance. Because of their power, the Invincibles could sweep away the screen of enemy cruisers to close with and observe an enemy battlefleet before using their superior speed to retire.
  • Close support for the battle fleet. They could be stationed at the ends of the battle line to stop enemy cruisers harassing the battleships, and to harass the enemy's battleships if they were busy fighting battleships. Also, the Invincibles could operate as the fast wing of the battlefleet and try to outmanouevre the enemy.
  • Pursuit. If an enemy fleet ran, then the Invincibles would use their speed to pursue, and their guns to damage or slow enemy ships.
  • Commerce protection. The new ships would hunt down enemy cruisers and commerce raiders
and I happen to think that not only is it correct, but that if you have BCs and the enemy has BCs then to refuse action against his BCs with your BCs is to surrender to him the scouting battle.
I cannot stress this enough - if you don't engage the German BCs with the British BCs, you engage the German BCs with exactly the kind of ships BCs are designed to mulch.

The destruction at Jutland of the RN BC force can not be put down to a "it's just". The RN ships had a severe series of design flaws, none of which would have mattered had they been used in the basic manner for which they were designed. They were designed to be exceptionally fast, capable of overpowering the light scouting screens of 1910-12, where they would face no caliber over 6". Putt9ng them into a situation where they would face serious opposition was a terrible error, similar to the one the USN would made 26 year later when they used Atlanta class CLAA in the role of a cruiser since that was the when the class was called, rather than what they were, really long destroyers packed to the rafters with high explosives and almost no armor.

Firstly the "destruction" you cite involved the loss of three ships for one German, leaving the British still having the numerical superiority in ship count and at least one of the surviving German BCs barely making it home - "destruction" is rather an overstatement.
Hipper on the German fleet post-battle:
Close to the end of the battle, at 03:55, Hipper transmitted a report to Scheer informing him of the tremendous damage his ships had suffered. By that time, Derfflinger and Von der Tann each had only two guns in operation, Moltke was flooded with 1,000 tons of water, and Seydlitz was severely damaged.[65] Hipper reported: "I Scouting Group was therefore no longer of any value for a serious engagement, and was consequently directed to return to harbor by the Commander-in-Chief, while he himself determined to await developments off Horns Reef with the battlefleet."
Secondly the RN BCs were designed to act as the fast wing of the battlefleet and as scouts, which is the role they performed in - their cruiser-killer role was actually secondary. This was based off both logical and practical experience, given battles such as Tsushima and indeed borne out by much of the World War One naval experience - a fleet without a fast wing facing a fleet with a fast wing is at a major disadvantage both in battle line combat and in the scouting engagements.
Thirdly the German 'light scouting screens of 1910-12' included as many as three German battlecruisers along with up to nine armoured cruisers (guns up to 9.4" calibre) and five PrC with guns over 8" - so I'm not sure what you mean by that.
And fourthly Dogger Bank (and arguably Falklands) show that the British BC force could in fact defeat enemies with guns of greater size than 6".


What I suspect may be going on is that you're conflating several different situations.
Firstly, the battlecruiser concept is essentially one of making a fast ship by trading off something else. The Germans traded off gunpower to keep armour; the British traded off armour to keep gunpower. When matched against one another the two BC forces are fairly evenly matched absent flash problems (as the heavier German armour and the heavier British shells largely trade off - the British shells may be less likely to penetrate, but they have a larger bursting charge and do more damage when they do) and indeed at Dogger Bank the 'heavily armoured' Seyditz comes very close to exploding due to a hit from Lion on her turret. (She only escaped exploding at Jutland due to the safety measures put in place after Dogger Bank; from this we can tell that safety measures can indeed prevent a flash situation).
Secondly, the value in the battlecruiser concept is the speed. A fleet with BCs has an enormous advantage against one which does not.
Thirdly, the ability to build a fast-enough ship to provide the (very important in battle line tactics) fast wing while still remaining fully protected and having the kind of guns to mix it up with the battlefleet does not come along until the QE class. The British are not designing their battlecruisers with a war in 1914 in mind - they don't know when the war might be.
Fourthy, the use of the battlecruisers does not fit with the idea that they're used 'like battleships' - they're not, they form a separate but integral tactical component. Beatty's use of his battlecruisers (engaging enemy battlecruisers, running from the enemy battleships, screening the Grand Fleet as it deploys, taking up a position on their bow to continue enveloping the enemy) consists almost entirely of appropriate uses for fast, heavily armed, lightly armoured ships.
And fifthly, the way the US didn't build any. This does not necessarily make it a bad idea... (Though it's interesting that the Lexington class as-designed would have had Invincible grade armour in the mid 1920s - one inch more than Invincible on the belt, identical deck, thicker turret face and weaker sides)


But really, I think the bottom line is threefold:

1) Did the belt armour matter?
Was any British BC lost or seriously damaged due to belt armour penetration? If they were all lost to turret armour penetration then their belt armour appears functionally adequate.
2) Is turret flash inevitable for the British BCs and only the British BCs?
Was turret penetration the inevitable fate of a British BC that got shelled by German battleships? If so, whither Lion's survival?
Why did Seyditz nearly explode at Dogger Bank if it was only a British problem? If anti-flash procedures do not work, why did Seyditz successfully prevent flash at Jutland?
3) What else could have taken their role?
In an alternate Jutland with no British battlecruisers present, what should Beatty have used instead? Did it exist from the same time the German battlecruisers joined their fleet?
 
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CalBear

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But no BC was lost to belt armour penetrations anyway. All the BC losses were due to turret penetrations and flash, and while it's true the British BCs were less heavily armoured than the comparable German ships (note comparable - Derfflinger compares not to Indefatigable but to Tiger, a ship which did not in fact explode despite taking very heavy German fire; Moltke and Vonn der Tann are the comparable ships to the Indefatigable class while the Invincibles don't really have a German twin of the same time) they were also firing heavier guns.




All indications I have seen were that the flash problem was fixed post Jutland; that is, that the training had rectified. If this is the case then it seems far more sensible to keep the ships in action than to take them out to install mechanical flash protection (which would have required doing structural work inside the barbette, so far as I can tell, if not completely rebuilding the ship).

I'm of course completely aware of what the original BC concept was - and I happen to think that not only is it correct, but that if you have BCs and the enemy has BCs then to refuse action against his BCs with your BCs is to surrender to him the scouting battle.
I cannot stress this enough - if you don't engage the German BCs with the British BCs, you engage the German BCs with exactly the kind of ships BCs are designed to mulch.



Firstly the "destruction" you cite involved the loss of three ships for one German, leaving the British still having the numerical superiority in ship count and at least one of the surviving German BCs barely making it home - "destruction" is rather an overstatement.
Hipper on the German fleet post-battle:

Secondly the RN BCs were designed to act as the fast wing of the battlefleet and as scouts, which is the role they performed in - their cruiser-killer role was actually secondary. This was based off both logical and practical experience, given battles such as Tsushima and indeed borne out by much of the World War One naval experience - a fleet without a fast wing facing a fleet with a fast wing is at a major disadvantage both in battle line combat and in the scouting engagements.
Thirdly the German 'light scouting screens of 1910-12' included as many as three German battlecruisers along with up to nine armoured cruisers (guns up to 9.4" calibre) and five PrC with guns over 8" - so I'm not sure what you mean by that.
And fourthly Dogger Bank (and arguably Falklands) show that the British BC force could in fact defeat enemies with guns of greater size than 6".


What I suspect may be going on is that you're conflating several different situations.
Firstly, the battlecruiser concept is essentially one of making a fast ship by trading off something else. The Germans traded off gunpower to keep armour; the British traded off armour to keep gunpower. When matched against one another the two BC forces are fairly evenly matched absent flash problems (as the heavier German armour and the heavier British shells largely trade off - the British shells may be less likely to penetrate, but they have a larger bursting charge and do more damage when they do) and indeed at Dogger Bank the 'heavily armoured' Seyditz comes very close to exploding due to a hit from Lion on her turret. (She only escaped exploding at Jutland due to the safety measures put in place after Dogger Bank; from this we can tell that safety measures can indeed prevent a flash situation).
Secondly, the value in the battlecruiser concept is the speed. A fleet with BCs has an enormous advantage against one which does not.
Thirdly, the ability to build a fast-enough ship to provide the (very important in battle line tactics) fast wing while still remaining fully protected and having the kind of guns to mix it up with the battlefleet does not come along until the QE class. The British are not designing their battlecruisers with a war in 1914 in mind - they don't know when the war might be.
Fourthy, the use of the battlecruisers does not fit with the idea that they're used 'like battleships' - they're not, they form a separate but integral tactical component. Beatty's use of his battlecruisers (engaging enemy battlecruisers, running from the enemy battleships, screening the Grand Fleet as it deploys, taking up a position on their bow to continue enveloping the enemy) consists almost entirely of appropriate uses for fast, heavily armed, lightly armoured ships.
And fifthly, the way the US didn't build any. This does not necessarily make it a bad idea...


But really, I think the bottom line is threefold:

1) Did the belt armour matter?
Was any British BC lost or seriously damaged due to belt armour penetration? If they were all lost to turret armour penetration then their belt armour appears functionally adequate.
2) Is turret flash inevitable for the British BCs and only the British BCs?
Was turret penetration the inevitable fate of a British BC that got shelled by German battleships? If so, whither Lion's survival?
Why did Seyditz nearly explode at Dogger Bank if it was only a British problem? If anti-flash procedures do not work, why did Seyditz successfully prevent flash at Jutland?
3) What else could have taken their role?
In an alternate Jutland with no British battlecruisers present, what should Beatty have used instead? Did it exist from the same time the German battlecruisers joined their fleet?
Actually the RN itself recognized the underlying weakness of their BC classes in the case of combat with peers, the answer was the Queen Elizabeth class BB, the first true "fast BB" and in the design of the never built G3 class.

Fischer's concept was fatally flawed, however, as was/is commonly the case with great innovators, they are given the rope necessary to hang themselves. In Fischer's case the slack he gained with Dreadnought allowed him to create an extremely costly class of ships that was absolutely unbeatable until someone else got wind of the idea and built a much better all around version, although undergunned, as was the case with ALL HSF ships up to Jutland (one shudders to think what the result would have been had the Lutzow been gunned with the 35cm/45 and not the 30.5cm guns she carried. The RN really had no choice but to deploy the ships, they were, as noted extremely expensive, and, prior to Jutland, their fatal flaws had not been revealed.

As to as the rather out of the blue comment regarding the U.S. never commissioning any, all I can say is that the USN dodged a massive broadside of bullets (mixed metaphor, oops). The Lexington class BC would have been an utter disaster, a bigger and more expensive version of the Lion class, but with none of the even semi reasonable excuses that forgive a multitude of Fischer's sins. For that matter the original South Dakota class BB were also a relatively horrible design. While I have never found the N3 BB design to be particularly special (unlike the G3), it is fairly clear in 20/20 hindsight that the U.S. Treasury was saved a massive outlay on ships that would have been obsolete by 1935.
 

Thomas1195

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What if several German BCs sunk by Cuckoos? Or Furious 18 inch guns score some lucky shots on German capital ships. I dont believe that some BBs could withstand 18 inch shell, not even KGV in ww2.
 

Thomas1195

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Actually the RN itself recognized the underlying weakness of their BC classes in the case of combat with peers, the answer was the Queen Elizabeth class BB, the first true "fast BB" and in the design of the never built G3 class.

Fischer's concept was fatally flawed, however, as was/is commonly the case with great innovators, they are given the rope necessary to hang themselves. In Fischer's case the slack he gained with Dreadnought allowed him to create an extremely costly class of ships that was absolutely unbeatable until someone else got wind of the idea and built a much better all around version, although undergunned, as was the case with ALL HSF ships up to Jutland (one shudders to think what the result would have been had the Lutzow been gunned with the 35cm/45 and not the 30.5cm guns she carried. The RN really had no choice but to deploy the ships, they were, as noted extremely expensive, and, prior to Jutland, their fatal flaws had not been revealed.

As to as the rather out of the blue comment regarding the U.S. never commissioning any, all I can say is that the USN dodged a massive broadside of bullets (mixed metaphor, oops). The Lexington class BC would have been an utter disaster, a bigger and more expensive version of the Lion class, but with none of the even semi reasonable excuses that forgive a multitude of Fischer's sins. For that matter the original South Dakota class BB were also a relatively horrible design. While I have never found the N3 BB design to be particularly special (unlike the G3), it is fairly clear in 20/20 hindsight that the U.S. Treasury was saved a massive outlay on ships that would have been obsolete by 1935.
But Lexington or SoDak can still have big chance against things like Iron Duke or even Renown, Revenge or QE provided that they open fire first. I expect their 16 inch guns could sink Iron Duke or Renown with just few accurate shots, since these older ships could not withstand 16 inch guns. Lexington had weak armour, but SoDaks, they were very heavily armoured and its guns overpowered British 15 inch guns, while not too slow.
 

CalBear

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But Lexington or SoDak can still have big chance against things like Iron Duke or even Renown, Revenge or QE provided that they open fire first. I expect their 16 inch guns could sink Iron Duke or Renown with just few accurate shots, since these older ships could not withstand 16 inch guns. Lexington had weak armour, but SoDaks, they were very heavily armoured and its guns overpowered British 15 inch guns, while not too slow.
Of course the N3 BB were designed to carry 18" guns.
 
Fischer's concept was fatally flawed, however, as was/is commonly the case with great innovators, they are given the rope necessary to hang themselves. In Fischer's case the slack he gained with Dreadnought allowed him to create an extremely costly class of ships that was absolutely unbeatable until someone else got wind of the idea and built a much better all around version, although undergunned, as was the case with ALL HSF ships up to Jutland (one shudders to think what the result would have been had the Lutzow been gunned with the 35cm/45 and not the 30.5cm guns she carried. The RN really had no choice but to deploy the ships, they were, as noted extremely expensive, and, prior to Jutland, their fatal flaws had not been revealed.
I think that this nails it pretty much right on the head. This post makes me feel like revisiting the idea that came out in the thread in my signature.
 
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