Jutland Redux - A summer soltice shootout

0200 26 June 1916 - German deployment
  • So, after an absence of 18 months or more, I am back posting. Why I hear you ask? Well, I retired in June and am now a gentleman of leisure...and you can only play so much golf, after all. What have I been doing since June? Well, I have modified all my large timelines that I posted on Kindle, Rudolf will Reign, Consequences of an Errant Shell, the Australasian Kingdom, Leyte Gulf Redux and A Reluctant Fuhrer. Proof reading 2500 pages of text can take some time. Plus I have cleaned the house and published a book on the Post Office in Tasmania. And dealt with the usual drama of having children, albeit they are supposed to be adults.

    So why I have I posted this when I already had a half commenced timeline? I wanted to make a fresh start, not only on this, but also on two other timelines, one a pre 1900 Australia one, another an Alien Space Bats scenario based on my Errant Shell World where Imperial Russia is still hanging around in 2020?

    So, you ask, you intend to write three timelines at once. When I am rolling, which I hope to be now, I have always updated two timelines at once. Three is a bit more of a stretch, so we will see how I go. I don't have those other annoying distractions, such as clients, to take up my time, anymore, so it's virgin ground, so to speak.

    Thanks to all those that have read my previous works and hopefully more will jump on board. Anyways, here we go.


    0200, Jade estuary, German Empire, 22 June 1916

    After the disappointing results of the 31st May, when two out of three ships of the 6th Division had grounded and subsequently fouled their condensers, the operation was cancelled and rescheduled until the 20th June, subsequently amended to the 22nd. It had allowed him to add ships to his order of battle, notably Koenig Albert and the newly completed Bayern, the latter manned by the transfer of the crew from the newly decommissioned old pre dreadnought Lothringen.

    The plan was simple enough. It represented his basic strategy since he had taken over command of the High Seas Fleet in January 1916 from the perennially cautious Hugo von Pohl. Scheer was aware that he could not match the Grand Fleet for sheer numbers, even taking into consideration British naval deployments in the Mediterranean. With the Baltic activities of the Russians curtailed, Scheer had gathered as much of the High Seas Fleet as possible for the operation, in an attempt to draw forth and trap part of the Grand Fleet and destroy it comprehensively, namely David Beatty's battlecruiser force; hopefully the Harwich Force as well.

    The unfortunate cancellation of the May operation due to two ships grounding and fouling their condensers meant the submarine forces available to lie off major British bases were not as they had been a month ago, but the plan was unchanged. Hipper had already sortied at 0030 with the 1st and 2nd Scouting Groups, consisting of five battle-cruisers, four light cruisers and 32 torpedo boats.

    They were to bombard Sunderland and draw David Beatty's battle-cruiser force South from the Firth of Forth. Hipper would then to lead the battle-cruiser force back onto the guns of Scheer's High Seas Fleet, waiting 45-50 miles off Flanborough Head. He had originally counted on Zeppelin intelligence; however, June 1916 had been a month of extremely poor summer weather, with a maximum four days running at 8 degrees Celsius in Hamburg. Forecast for the day was modest, with gusting winds, all of which would hamper zeppelin operations.

    The last month had not been a kind one for the Central Powers, Russia destroying Austro-Hungary's armies in Galicia and the Ottomans also in retreat in the East. A victory was badly needed. For that reason alone, Scheer had pulled together as much fighting power as possible. After Hipper drew the British scouting forces South, they would be confronted with 18 dreadnoughts, seven pre dreadnoughts, an armoured cruiser, 13 light cruisers and 49 torpedo boats.

    This had been the original plan, however, with zeppelin reconnaissance not a possibility, Scheer had amended it to encompass Hipper's forces converging on the Skagerrak, engaging and destroying any commerce and Royal Navy patrols that frequented the area. He was hopeful this would lure part of the British fleet out to drive his forces away. The High Seas Fleet could then overwhelm this under gunned force in waters much closer to home, their flanks covered by light forces and their relatively short path to retreat assured. In all total forces were:
    1. Battlecruiser force, Vice Admiral Franz von Hipper

    I Scouting Group
    Vizeadmiral Franz von Hipper, 1. Admiralstabsoffizier Korvettenkapitän Erich Raeder
    SMS Lützow, flag, Vizeadmiral Franz von Hipper, Kapitän zur See Harder
    SMS Derflinger, Kapitän zur See Hartog
    SMS Seydlitz, Kapitän zur See von Egidy
    SMS Moltke, Kapitän zur See Harpf
    SMS von der Tann, Kapitän zur See Zenker

    IXth Flotilla
    V 28, Kapitänleutnant Lenßen hoisting Korvettenkapitän Goehle (Flottila-Leader) - screening 1SG
    IXth Flotilla, 17th Half Flotilla, V27, V28, V26, S36, S51, S52

    IXth Flotilla, 18th Half Flotilla
    V30, Oberleutnant zur See Ernst Wolf hoisting Korvettenkapitän Werner Tillessen (flag), S34, S33, V29, S35, V30

    II Scouting Group
    Konteradmiral F. Boedicker
    SMS Frankfurt, Kapitän zur See Thilo von Trotha hoisting Konteradmiral F. Boedicker (flag)
    SMS Pillau, Fregattenkapitän Konrad Mommsen
    SMS Elbing, Fregattenkapitän Madlung
    SMS Wiesbaden, Fregattenkapitän Reiß

    IInd Flotilla
    B98, Kapitänleutnant Theodor Hengstenberg hoisting Fregattenkapitän Schuur (flag)
    IInd Flotilla, 3rd Half Flotilla
    Korvettenkapitän Boest (flag) on B 98, B98, G101, G102, B112, B97, S49, V43

    IInd Flotilla, 4th Half Flotilla
    Korvettenkapitän Dithmar (flag) on B 109, B109, B110, B111, G103, G104

    VIth Flotilla
    G41 Kapitänleutnant Hermann Boehm hoisting Korvettenkapitän Max Schultz (flag)
    VIth Flotilla, 11th Half Flotilla, Kapitänleutnant Wilhelm Rümann on G 41, G41, V44, G87, G86

    VIth Flotilla, 12th Half Flotilla
    V69, Kapitänleutnant Stecher hoisting Kapitänleutnant Lahs (flag), V69, V45, V46, S50, G37

    2. High Seas Fleet, Main Body
    Chef der Hochseestreitkräfte:Vizeadmiral Reinhard Scheer
    Chef des Stabes: Kapitän zur See Adolf von Trotha
    Chef der Operationsabteilung: Kapitän zur See von Levezow

    IIIrd Squadron, 5th Division
    Konteradmiral Paul Behncke, 1. Admiralstabsoffizier Korvettenkapitän Freiherr von Sagern
    SMS König flag, Kapitän zur See Brüninghaus
    SMS Grosser Kurfürst, Kapitän zur See Goette
    SMS Markgraf, Kapitän zur See Seiferling
    SMS Kronprinz, Kapitän zur See Konstanz Feldt

    IIIrd Squadron, 6th Division
    Konteradmiral H. Nordmann (2nd Admiral of IIIrd Squadron)
    SMS Kaiser, flag, Konteradmiral H. Nordmann, Kapitän zur See Freiherr von Keyserlingk
    SMS Prinzregent Luitpold, Kapitän zur See Heuser
    SMS Koenig Albert, Kapitän zur See Gaskell
    SMS Kaiserin, Kapitän zur See Sievers
    SMS Friedrich der Große, Kapitän zur See Theodor Fuchs

    Flottenflaggschiff: SMS Bayern, Kapitän zur See Max Hahn(not in squadron or divisional organisation)

    Ist Squadron, 1st Division
    Vizeadmiral E. Schmidt, 1. Admiralstabsoffizier Korvettenkapitän Wolfgang Wegener
    SMS Ostfriesland flag, Vizeadmiral Schmidt, Kapitän zur See von Natzmer
    SMS Thüringen, Kapitän zur See Hans Küsel
    SMS Helgoland, Kapitän zur See von Kamecke
    SMS Oldenburg, Kapitän zur See Höpfner

    Ist Squadron, 2nd Division
    Konteradmiral W. Engelhart (2nd Admiral of Ist Squadron)
    SMS Posen, flag, Konteradmiral Engelhart, Kapitän zur See Richard Lange
    SMS Rheinland, Kapitän zur See Rohardt
    SMS Nassau, Kapitän zur See von Schlee
    SMS Westfalen, Kapitän zur See Redlich

    Vth Scouting Group
    Kommodore L. von Reuter, Admiralstabsoffizier Korvettenkapitän Heinrich Weber
    SMS Stettin, Fregattenkapitän Friedrich Rebensburg
    SMS Stuttgart, Fregattenkapitän Hagedorn
    SMS Graudenz, Fregattenkapitän von Steiglitz
    SMS Straslund, Fregattenkapitän Boller
    SMS Brummer, Fregattenkapitän Drygala

    IInd Squadron
    Konteradmiral F. Mauve
    IInd Squadron, 3rd Division
    Konteradmiral Mauve, 1. Admiralstabsoffizier Korvettenkapitän Kahlert
    SMS Deutschland, flag, Konteradmiral Mauve, Kapitän zur See Meurer
    SMS Pommern, Kapitän zur See Bölken
    SMS Pruessen, Kapitän zur See Lammers
    SMS Schlesien, Kapitän zur See Fr. Behncke

    IInd Squadron, IVth Division
    Konteradmiral Freiherr F. von Dalwigk zu Lichtenfels (2nd Admiral of IInd Squadron)
    SMS Schleswig-Holstein, Kapitän zur See Barrentrapp
    SMS Hessen, Kapitän zur See Bartels
    SMS Hannover, flag, Konteradmiral Baron von Dalwigk zu Lichtenfels, Kapitän zur See Wilhelm Heine
    SMS Roon, Kapitän zur See Wilhelm von Karpf

    IVth Scouting Group
    SMS München, Korvettenkapitän Oscar Böcker
    SMS Frauenlob, Fregattenkapitän Georg Hoffman
    SMS Berlin, Fregattenkapitän Hahn
    SMS Lubeck, Fregattenkapitän Priilowitz
    SMS Danzig, Fregattenkapitän Wagner

    Attached IVth Scouting Group
    SMS Hamburg, Kapitän zur SeeBauer, Leader of Submarines

    1st Leader of Destroyers
    Kommodore A. Michelsen, Admiralstabsoffizier Korvettenkapitän Junkermann
    SMS Rostock, Kommodore A. Michelsen, Fregattenkapitän Otto Feldmann

    2nd Leader of Destroyers
    Kommodore P. Heinrich, Admiralstabsoffizier Kapitänleutnant Meier
    SMS Regensburg, Kommodore P. Heinrich, Fregattenkapitän Heuberer

    Ist Flotilla, 1st Half Flotilla
    Kapitänleutnant Conrad Albrecht (flag) on G39, G38, G39, G40, S32, V170, G197

    Ist Flotilla, 2nd Half Flotilla
    G192, G195, G196, G193

    IIIrd Flotilla
    S53, Kapitänleutnant Friedrich Götting hoisting Korvettenkapitän Hollman (flag)
    IIIrd Flotilla, 5th Half Flotilla, V71, V73, G88, V74, V70

    IIIrd Flotilla, 6th Half Flotilla
    Kapitänleutnant Fröhlich, S54, V48, G42, G85, S55

    Vth Flotilla
    G11, Kapitänleutnant Adolf Müller hosting Korvettenkapitän Heinecke (flag)
    Vth Flotilla, 9th Half Flotilla
    Kapitänleutnant von Pohl, V2, V4, V6, V1, V3

    Vth Flotilla, 10th Half Flotilla
    G8, Oberleutnant zur See Rodenberg hosting KapitänleutnantFriedrich Klein, G7, V5, G9, G10, G8

    VIIth Flotilla
    S24 Kapitänleutnant Fink hoisting Korvettenkapitän von Koch (flag)
    VIIth Flotilla, 13th Half Flotilla
    Kapitänleutnant G. von Zitzewitz on S15, S15, S17, S20, S16, S18, S24

    VIIth Flotilla, 14th Half Flotilla
    Korvettenkapitän Hermann Cordes
    S19, Oberleutnant zur See Reimer hoisting Korvettenkapitän Hermann Cordes, S19, S23, V189, V186

    XIth Flotilla, 21st Half Flotilla
    Kapitänleutnant G. von Bulow on S59, S59, S58, S57, G89, G90

    XIth Flotilla, 22nd Half Flotilla
    Korvettenkapitän H.Curnow, V75, V76, V77, V78
    In all, it represented five battle-cruisers, 18 dreadnoughts, seven pre dreadnoughts, one armoured cruiser, 17 light cruisers and 81 torpedo boats, all of the High Seas Fleet's strength, 119 ships of war.
    1634612694713.png
     
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    0215 22 June 1916, British dispositions
  • 0215 40 nautical miles Northeast of Rosyth, 22 June 1916

    Beatty was at sea with three battle-cruiser and three light cruiser squadrons. Forewarned by Room 40 interceptions of German naval communication, his force followed Jellicoe's Grand Fleet. The Grand Fleet put to sea without incident. His own force had not been so lucky. For the last month, concerned by the possibility of U Boats lying in wait near fleet bases, particularly Rosyth, he had adopted an arrangement on Jellicoe's suggestion. This had been the sailing of the pre dreadnought HMS Albemarle up to 30 minutes ahead of his battlecruisers. As he prepared to leave on the previous day, Albemarle had taken two torpedoes from a German U Boat, itself sunk by ramming from an escorting destroyer. The old pre dreadnought had slowly settled, a fate that may have befallen some of his more modern ships. Beatty wondered if, unlike the warnings of the 31st May, the Germans would actually put to sea this time. He was eager to come to grips with them after the disappointments of the Battle of Dogger Bank. His was a substantial force, bolstered by the return of HMAS Australia from a refit. It consisted of:

    Battle Cruiser Force, Vice Admiral Sir David Beatty, Rosyth

    1BCS
    HMS Lion, flag, Vice Admiral Sir David Beatty, VABCS, Captain A.E.M. Chatfield
    HMS Princess Royal, flag, Rear Admiral O.de Brock, RA1BCS, Captain W.H. Cowan
    HMS Queen Mary, Captain C.I. Prowse
    HMS Tiger, Captain H.B. Pelly

    2BCS
    HMAS Australia, Capt. S.H. Radcliffe flag Rear Admiral W.C. Packenham, RA2BCS
    HMS New Zealand, Captain H.Green
    HMS Indefatigable, Captain C.A. Selby

    3BCS
    HMS Invincible, flag, Rear Admiral the Hon. H.A. Hood, RA3BCS, Captain A.L. Cay
    HMS Inflexible, Captain EHF Heaton-Ellis
    HMS Indomitable, Captain F.W. Kennedy

    1LCS
    HMS Galatea, flag, Commodore E.S. Alexander-Sinclair, Cmdre 1LCS
    HMS Phaeton, Commander JE Cameron
    HMS Inconstant, Capt. BS Thesiger
    HMS Cordelia, Capt. TPH Beamish

    2LCS
    HMS Southampton, flag, Commodore W.E. Goodenough, Cmdre, 2LCS
    HMS Birmingham, Captain A.A.M. Duff
    HMS Nottingham, Captain C.B. Miller
    HMS Dublin, Captain A.C. Scott

    3LCS
    HMS Falmouth, flag, Rear Admiral TDW. Napier, RA3LCS, Captain J.D. Edwards
    HMS Yarmouth, Captain T.D. Pratt, (linking ship between light cruiser screen and VABCF)
    HMS Birkenhead, Capt. E Reeves
    HMS Gloucester, Capt. WF Blunt
    HMS Chester, Captain R.N. Lawson

    Seaplane carrier
    HMS Engadine, Lt.Commander C.G. Robinson (4 Short Type 184 seaplanes)
    HMS Riviera, Lt.Commander H.K Foulkes (4 Short Type 184 seaplanes)
    HMS Onslow and HMS Moresby detached from 1DF to escort HMS Engadine

    13 DF screening 1BCS:
    HMS Champion, Captain J.U. Farie (D.13)

    16 Admiralty M Class destroyers:
    HMS Nestor, HMS Nomad, HMS Narborough, HMS Obdurate, HMS Petard, HMS Pelican, HMS Onslow, HMS Moresby, HMS Nicator, HMS Negro, HMS Nereus, HMS Paladin, HMS Pidgeon, HMS Penn, HMS Nepean, HMS Observer

    10DF (part, detached from Harwich Force), screening 3BCS
    2 Talisman Class destroyers, HMS Turbulent, TMS Termagant, 1 Yarrow M Class destroyer: HMS Nerissa, 2 Admiralty M Class destroyers Paladin, Penn

    9DF (part, detached from Harwich Force), screening 2BCS
    4 L Class destroyers
    HMS Lydiard, HMS Liberty, HMS Landrail, HMS Laurel

    In all, not counting the forces allocated to his scouting seaplane carrier, he had ten battle-cruisers, 13 light cruisers and 26 destroyers. This was backed by Jellicoe's massive Grand Fleet, consisting of:

    Grand Fleet, Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, Scapa Flow

    2BS, 1st Division, Cromarty
    HMS King George V, flag, Sir Martyn Jerram, VA2BS
    HMS Ajax, Capt. GH Baird
    HMS Centurion, Capt. M Culme-Seymour
    HMS Erin, Capt. VA Stanley

    2BS, 2nd Division, Cromarty
    HMS Monarch, flag Rear Admiral Arthur Leveson, RA2BS
    HMS Conqueror, Capt. HHD Tothill
    HMS Orion, Capt. O Backhouse
    HMS Thunderer, Captain J.A. Ferguson

    Attached 2BS: HMS Boadicea, Captain L.C.S. Woollcombe

    4BS, 3rd Division, Scapa Flow
    HMS Iron Duke, flag, Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, CinCGF, Captain F.W. Dreyer
    HMS Emperor of India, Capt. C.W.R. Royds
    HMS Superb, flag Rear Admiral Duff, RA4BS, Capt. E Hyde-Parker
    HMS Canada, Capt. WCM Nicholson

    Attached Fleet Flagship: HMS Active, Captain P.Withers
    Tender to HMS Iron Duke: HMS Oak, LtCdr. D Faviell (Destroyer Tender to the Flagship)
    Marksman class destroyer-minelayer: HMS Abdiel, Commander Curtis

    4BS, 4th Division, Scapa Flow
    HMS Benbow, flag, Vice Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee, VA4BS; Capt. HW Parker
    HMS Bellerophon, Capt. EF Bruen
    HMS Temeraire, Capt. EV Underhill
    HMS Vanguard, Capt. JD Dick

    Attached 4BS
    HMS Blanche, Captain J.M. Casement
    HMS Blonde, Commander J.E.A. Mocatta

    1BS, 5th Division, Scapa Flow
    HMS Colossus, flag, Rear Admiral E.F.A. Gaunt, RA1BS, Captain A.D.P.R. Pound
    HMS Collingwood, Capt. JC Ley
    HMS Neptune, Capt. VHG Bernard
    HMS St. Vincent, Captain W.W. Fisher
    HMS Hercules, Captain Clinton-Baker

    1BS, 6th Division,
    HMS Marlborough, flag Vice Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, VA1BS, Captain G.P. Ross
    HMS Revenge, Capt. ES Kiddle
    HMS Royal Sovereign, Capt. A.T. Hunt
    HMS Royal Oak, Capt. C. MacLachlan
    HMS Agincourt
    , Capt. HM Doughty

    5BS Scapa Flow
    13th Subdivision:
    HMS Barham, flag, Rear Admiral Hugh Evans-Thomas, RA5BS, Captain A.W.C. Waller
    HMS Valiant, Captain M. Woollcombe
    14th Subdivision:
    HMS Warspite, Captain E. Phillpotts
    HMS Malaya, Captain the Hon. A.D.E.H. Boyle
    HMS Queen Elizabeth, Capt. G.P.W. Hope

    1DF, screening 5BS
    HMS Fearless, Captain C.D. Roper, Captain (D.1)
    I Class destroyers:
    HMS Acheron, HMS Ariel, HMS Attack, HMS Hydra, HMS Badger, HMS Goshawk, HMS Defender, HMS Lizard, HMS Lapwing, HMS Botha, HMS Jackal, HMS Phoenix, HMS Archer, HMS Tigress

    Attached 1BS: HMS Bellona, Captain A.B.S. Dutton

    1CS, Cromarty
    HMS Defence, flag Rear Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot, Bt., RA1CS, Captain S.V. Ellis
    HMS Warrior, Captain V.B. Molteno
    HMS Duke of Edinburgh, Captain H. Blackett
    HMS Black Prince, Captain T.P. Bonham

    2CS, Scapa Flow
    HMS Minotaur, flag, Rear Admiral H.L. Heath, RA2CS, Captain C.S.H. D’Aeth
    HMS Hampshire, Capt. HJ Savill
    HMS Cochrane, Capt. E la T Leatham
    HMS Shannon, Capt. JS Dumaresq
    HMS Achilles, Capt. F.M. Leake
    HMS Donegal, Capt. W.H. D'Oyly

    4LCS, Scapa Flow
    HMS Calliope, flag, Commodore C.E. le Mesurier, Cmdre, 4LCS
    HMS Constance, Capt. CS Townsend
    HMS Comus, Capt. AG Hotham
    HMS Caroline, Captain HR Crooke
    HMS Royalist, Capt. H Meade
    HMS Cambrian, Capt AH Read

    4DF, Scapa Flow
    Destroyer leaders: HMS Tipperary, flag, Captain C.J. Wintour (D.4)
    HMS Broke, Commander AL Wilson

    1 Admiralty M Class
    HMS Ophelia
    , Commander LGE Crabbe (escorting 3BCS)
    16 K Class destroyers
    HMS Achates, HMS Porpoise, HMS Spitfire, HMS Unity, HMS Garland, HMS Ambuscade, HMS Ardent, HMS Fortune, HMS Sparrowhawk, HMS Contest,
    HMS Shark, HMS Acasta, HMS Christopher, HMS Owl, HMS Hardy, HMS Midge, HMS Cockatrice, HMS Victor, HMS Paragon


    11DF, Scapa Flow
    HMS Castor, Commodore J.R.P. Hawksley, Commodore (F)

    Destroyer leader: HMS Kempenfelt, Commander HE Sullivan

    13 Admiralty M Class destroyers
    HMS Ossory, HMS Mystic, HMS Magic, HMS Mandate, HMS Minion, HMS Martial, HMS Milbrook, HMS Marne, HMS Manners, HMS Michael, HMS Mons, HMS Marmion, HMS Musketeer

    3 Yarrow M Class destroyers: HMS Morning Star, HMS Mounsey, HMS Moonvin

    12DF, Scapa Flow
    Destroyer leaders: HMS Faulknor, Captain A.J.B. Stirling, D.12
    HMS Marksman, Cdr. NA Sullivan (Flag, 2nd Half Flotilla)

    16 Admiralty M Class destroyers
    HMS Obedient, HMS Maenad, HMS Opal, HMS Mary Rose, HMS Marvel, HMS Menace, HMS Nessus, HMS Narwhal, HMS Mindful, HMS Onslaught, HMS Munster, HMS Nonsuch, HMS Nobel, HMS Mischief, HMS Napier, HMS Mameluke

    Seaplane carrier (Scapa Flow): HMS Campania, Captain O. Schwann, 10 aircraft

    In all, 31 dreadnoughts, 10 armoured cruisers, 10 light cruisers and 73 destroyers. Also in support was the Harwich Force of 5 light cruisers and 29 destroyers, consisting of:
    5LCS
    HMS Carysfoot, flag, Commodore R. Tyrwhitt
    HMS Arethusa, Captain TP Hutchinson
    HMS Cleopatra, Captain GH West
    HMS Conquest, Captain EE Withers
    HMS Penelope, Captain T Amos
    HMS Canterbury, Captain P.M.R. Royds

    9th DF
    1 destroyer leader (Marksman class)
    HMS Lightfoot, Captain T. Leverson-Gower

    17 L Class destroyers:
    HMS Lark, HMS Laverock, HMS Linnet, HMS Laertes, HMS Laforey, HMS Lance, HMS Lawford, HMS Legion, HMS Lennox, HMS Leonidas, HMS Llewellyn, HMS Lookout, HMS Loyal, HMS Lucifer, HMS Lysander, HMS Lassoo, HMS Lochinar

    1 destroyer leader
    HMS Nimrod, Captain HW Gardam

    10 Admiralty M class destroyers
    HMS Manly, HMS Mansfield, HMS Matchless, HMS Mentor, HMS Meteor, HMS Milne, HMS Minos, HMS Miranda, HMS Murray, HMS Myngs

    Finally, based at Sheerness was the Nore Force, consisting of 1 dreadnought, 7 pre dreadnoughts, 3 armoured cruiser and 11 destroyers consisting of, Nore Command. Based at Sheerness, but actually lying in the Swin, the Northern passage of the Thames estuary:

    3BS
    HMS Dreadnought, flag, Admiral Sir George Callaghan
    HMS Hibernia, HMS Zealandia, HMS Africa, HMS Britannia, HMS Commonwealth, HMS Dominion, HMS Hindustan

    3CS
    HMS Antrim, HMS Devonshire, HMS Roxburgh

    6DF
    Leader HMS Swift
    10 Tribal Class destroyers
    HMS Afridi, HMS Cossack, HMS Gurkha, HMS Mohawk, HMS Tartar, HMS Crusader, HMS Saracen, HMS Nubian, HMS Viking, HMS Zulu

    9CS
    HMS Swiftsure, HMS King Alfred
     
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    0316 22 June 1916, Hood's thoughts on the Royal Navy
  • 0316, North Sea, 22 June 1916

    Sleep would not come for Rear Admiral Horace Hood. He had a number of concerns over the practices and composition of Beatty's battle-cruiser force, plus some over the Grand Fleet as a whole. In particular, for the battle-cruiser force, a lack of opportunity to practice gunnery, with no ranges available near their main base, Rosyth. For that reason alone, he took every opportunity available to avail his own command of such opportunities and his own ships had only returned to Rosyth from Scapa Flow after such a practice of the 14th.

    His three ships of the Invincible Class were the weakest in Beatty's force. They mounted the same 8 12inch Mark X guns as their near sisters the Indefatigable Class, however, the amidships turrets of the Invincible Class ships were positioned too close together in the interests of saving weight and therefore speed. This did not allow them to fire across the deck, reducing the broadside to six guns only. The Invincible Class ships were poorly protected by a waterline belt of only 6 inches, only running from the rear X turret to just forward of A turret. Past A turret, the belt decreased to only 4 inches. The main battery guns and their supporting barbettes carried only 7 inches of armour and very little of her overall armour was below the waterline. It was quite apparent to Hood that his three ships were delicate beasts.

    Nor was that the only concern. RN cordite charges were stored in pairs in metal containers in the magazines. The igniters in the charges were protected by a thick paper cover that was removed prior to loading. Hood had seen the crews regularly remove the paper caps in the magazines, as opposed to waiting until loading, which lead to a trail of propellant all the way from the gun turret to the magazine, a far from ideal practice and he had used his time at Scapa to strictly forbid such a practice, once he become aware of it. It had not, however, spread to the rest of Beatty's command. The Battle of Dogger Bank and its attendant disappointments were blamed on the slow rate of fire, yet Hood was of the opinion that lack of gunnery and signals practice were more to blame. Hood made closure of the magazine door, except when ammunition was passed through, mandatory. This was not enforced in other ships, again due to a manna for more speed of loading. Ammunition stockpiling outside the magazines was another dangerous practice that had become common, despite the almost loss of the cruiser Kent at Falkland Islands in 1914. It was officially banned by the Admiralty, but widely condoned, especially by Beatty.

    Hood was unaware of other lurking problems, firstly, the very nature of the RN propellant charges themselves. They degraded faster than those of the High Seas Fleet and were therefore much more likely to explode spontaneously. Changes later in the war were to ameliorate these problems, but never completely solve them. Secondly, the quality of heavy shells was not all it should have been. Tests conducted as early as April 1914 showed that there were serious problems with RN armour piercing shells. This showed that the shells could not reliably penetrate heavy armour, even head on at closer ranges. At long ranges where the angle was 30 degrees or more, many shells disintegrated on even 6 inches of armour. Yet, nothing was done with these findings until much later. It was not until later in the war the new "greenboy" shells removed the defective lyddite bursters and shellite was added instead.

    No, there were issues to be sure, but one thing the RN had on its side, Hood was sure, was tradition, training and the will to win. Losing was unthinkable. He had trained his own squadron to what he felt was its peak. In any case, weight of metal was always a decisive factor. There was a reason the big battalions always won. Beatty's force would consist of ten ships. If the High Seas Fleet's scouting force was to be encountered, they would have only half that number of ships. This time, unlike Dogger Bank, they would not escape.
     
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    0320 22 June 1916, Hipper's thoughts on the High Seas Fleet
  • 0320, 22 June 1916, North Sea

    On board Lutzow, Hipper was also contemplating the potential weaknesses of his command. There was no question of fighting all of Beatty's force, if they were encountered. His own force, consisting as it did of only five ships, was too outnumbered for that. No, his task was to draw Beatty's ships towards Scheer, where they could be engaged, slowed and destroyed under the guns of the High Seas Fleet. The inclusion of Mauve's 2nd Battle squadron, with its seven slow pre dreadnoughts was, in his mind, scarcely an advantage. They would restrict the fleet to 16 knots, however, the decision as to their inclusion had not been his.

    He would back his own ships against those of the British any day of the week, however, that was in a one-on-one fight. It was likely that they would not be fighting one on one and that some of his opponents would be shooting at him unmolested by return fire, an incentive for good gunnery. His ships were well armoured, the result of a different design philosophy than that of the RN. In the High Seas Fleet, the Scouting group was designed to return to the main body and then fight with it, against enemy dreadnoughts, as normal capital ships. Hence, their armour structure.

    Of concern to Hipper was the relative lack of offensive power of his ships. The three oldest ships all used the 11-inch gun. These, both the L45 in the Von der Tann and the L50 in the latter two ships, all fired the 304kg AP shell. It was a reliable enough weapon, but lighter than the 385kg projectile of the RN 12-inch gunned ships and far less than the 635kg shells of two latest British ships, Tiger and Queen Mary. Only the Derfflinger and Lutzow used the 12-inch gun firing a 404kg projectile. The 13.5-inch guns of the latest British ships gave them greater range and would give them the advantage of firing first. On the flip side, as the range decreased, his own ships 11inch guns would need to close to 13,000 yards or less to penetrate the better armoured RN ships, such as Tiger.

    Although Hipper's ships were better armoured, they were not immune to damage. One concern was, that in order to save weight and therefore generate speed, the torpedo bulkheads in all ships did not run the entire length of the hull. This left them with almost no armour at the furthest forward and furthest astern compartments, a feature that may yet prove of concern.

    His final concern was for his light forces. His light cruisers were smaller than their RN contemporaries and armed with 4.1 inch, rather than the 6-inch guns of their opponents. His torpedo boats were similar, smaller and less well armed than their RN contemporaries. Even their torpedoes were inferior. The 50cm G7 torpedo that was standard mounted a 195kg warhead and had a maximum range at "slow" speed(27kts) of 9300m. It was less than the RN 21inch MK IV, which had a larger 235kg warhead and was capable of a range of 13,500 yards at 25 knots.
     
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    1515 22 June 1916, empty seas
  • 1515 22 June 1916, Skagerrak, North Sea, 250 nautical miles from Rosyth

    The day had been uneventful so far for Beatty's squadron, with no trace of the German High Seas Fleet to be found. The strength of the wind had only just started to abate had precluded aerial reconnaissance. He had gone directly East for 230nm, then turning North-East and now commenced a run back to the North-West, back towards Jellicoe's Grand Fleet, now only 48 nautical miles to the North and coming South. Beatty was not to know that he had actually proceeded far enough East that he had inadvertently split the gap between the two German Fleets, passing exactly between the two German forces led by Hipper and Scheer, placing his own battle-cruisers to the East of both, an invidious position to be in.

    Likewise Scheer was blissfully unaware that Beatty was, in fact, South East of his force and now steaming back to the North-West. Whilst this seemed to on the surface to have trapped the British force, the complication was he was steaming North-northwest, directly into the face of Jellicoe, now only 32 nautical miles to the North. Both battlecruiser forces were in a tight spot, although both remained unaware until 1515, when Rear Admiral Napier's 3LCS, dispatched to investigate reports of smoke to the North-West, ran into Konteradmiral Boedicker's IInd Scouting Group. This was the impetus for both Hipper and Beatty's heavy forces to investigate and battle to commence.
     
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    1518 22 June, the wobbly eight
  • 1518 22 June 1916, 20 nautical miles Southeast of Lowestoft

    It was a poor command for George Callaghan. He had done so much to ready the Grand Fleet for a war and when it had finally come, he had been removed from command of the Grand Fleet and shuffled to the Nore Command. The main function was to ensure security of the Channel, however, with reports that the Germans may be readying a sortie, he led HMS Dreadnought and his seven remaining members of the "wobbly eight" to sea, taking HMS Swiftsure, normally deployed with the 9th Cruiser Squadron, with him. He had no desire to meet the main body of the High Seas Fleet with his eclectic collection of ships, most now only good for 18 or so knots. However, he could and would not let enemy forces break out into the English Channel and threaten both shipping and bombardment forces located there.

    If, however, the Germans dispatched a light raiding force into the Channel he would be ready. With 12 heavy ships, even if eight were pre dreadnoughts and three armoured cruisers, he could quickly dispatch anything that was not the main German body. In truth Callaghan wanted action, to prove both to others and himself that he could have successfully helmed the Grand Fleet as well as any other man. As it was, he would establish a patrol line between Lowestoft and The Hague, blocking any entry to the Channel.
    HMS Hindustan
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    1519 22 June 1916, enemy in sight
  • 1519 22 June 1916, Skagerrak, North Sea, 250 nautical miles from Rosyth

    It had been a routine investigation of the old tugboat, converted to a steam trawler and operated under the Danish flag. 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron under Rear Admiral Napier only noticed the three low slung destroyers when they moved within 6,000 yards of the huffing old tug. Rapidly, he ordered full steam rung up. Aboard HMS Gloucester, he settled into his position on the bridge. "Sparks, this is important enough to break silence. Tell the flagship we have made a sighting of enemy forces."

    "Sir." The greyhound unleashed on his flagship; the engines throbbed to the sound of gongs as the cruiser heeled heavily to port. There was a boom and then a shudder. Their quarry commenced zig zagging to avoid their shells. The German destroyer's speed was good, but then so was theirs.

    The lookout shouted "Torpedoes, starboard quarter! The long steel projectile passed harmlessly by. There were flashes, distant rolling noise, a salvo from her smaller opponent. Small waterspouts rose from the sea, short. The Germans were game, or mad. Gloucester had fired twelve salvos as her and her sisters closed the range on the three smaller German ships. Finally, a different flash of red from the German. The destroyer's mast and part of her bridge were wreathed in smoke. Within three minutes four shells had penetrated her vitals, the ill-fated ship a mass of flame. Then the lookout shouted down again. "Four larger enemy ships, cruisers.....to starboard, fast movers!" The battle was about to be joined in earnest.
     
    1523 22 June 1916, hold on a minute, aren't they going the wrong way?
  • 1523 22 June 1916, Skagerrak, North Sea, 250 nautical miles from Rosyth

    Friedrich Boedecker’s IInd Scouting Group consisted of the most modern light cruisers in the High Seas Fleet, at least until the new Konigsberg Class became available later in 1916. They were the only light cruisers in the fleet that carried the 5.9-inch gun, all previous ships carrying the now inferior 4.1-inch weapon. He rapidly moved his ships to engage the British cruisers, even though he was outnumbered 4 to 5. At the same time, he signalled Hipper, indicating that Royal Navy light units had been contacted. He needed to relieve the fleeing torpedo boats, one of which was already sinking and at the same time bring Hipper’s battle-cruisers, some ten miles to the North, back down on the British cruisers, which were already cut off from their bases.

    Could they lure out the British battle-cruisers, if indeed they were not already at sea? Hipper had responded to Boedecker’s summons at 1525, initiating a battle turn that moved his fleet from a North-northwest course back onto a course of South southeast to come to his cruisers squadron’s aid. It was just as well he had done so as converging on his position was Jellicoe and the main body of the Grand Fleet, only 27 nautical miles away from his position when the turn was initiated. It was a curious situation, Beatty’s forces cut off by Hipper and potentially Scheers, Hipper to the North and West, Scheer the North and East. Bearing down on all of this was Jellicoe, steering South southeast at 19.7 knots, his flag in the Iron Duke.

    A running battle over the next five minutes saw HMS Yarmouth hit three times by Pillau, Birkenhead and Falmouth once each by Frankfurt and Elbing. In return, Wiesbaden was hit twice by Falmouth and twice by Chester, starting fires aboard the new cruiser.

    Aboard HMS Chester, Captain Rodney Lawson cheered as another hit from his ships 5.5-inch battery impacted on the last German cruiser in line. Rear Admiral Napier had the squadron running back North northwest in chase of the German ships. That was all very good in his own mind, but why would the six remaining German ships be “fleeing” in that direction, back towards Britain and directly away from their bases? Had that been considered?
    HMS Chester
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    1528 22 June 1916, enemy heavy ships
  • 1528 22 June 1916, Skagerrak, North Sea, 240 nautical miles from Rosyth

    Beatty had worked his battlecruisers up to 24.5 knots as they attempted to turn due North and "cut the corner on the fleeing German light cruisers that were being pursued by Napier's light cruisers. It was speed that presented no problem for the four large, sleek and modern ships of 1BCS. At the rear of his formation laboured the three I Class ships of Horace Hoods 3rd BCS, newly returned from Scapa, where they had changed places with Evan-Thomas 5th Battle Squadron. For all that, the ships were faster than Evans-Thomas Queen Elizabeth Class ships.

    The contact report came rapidly. "Masts.....came the report from the lookout, one, no two...sorry four, no five, also general haze, bearing 330 degrees, range...possibly 12 miles as a calculation." Beatty now had a choice to make. Could this be the German battle-cruisers? Why else would the German light cruisers flee North, if not towards supporting forces? It made sense and from his own intelligence reports, 5-6 ships would make the right amount of numbers. If Hipper's battle-cruisers were out, what about the High Seas Fleet? His musings were broken by another report from his signals officer. Napier had broken radio silence to report himself under fire from "five enemy capital ships". It was enough information for Beatty. Signalling Jellicoe his intentions, he ordered an intercept course for the German heavy ships and ordered action stations. Jellicoe was some 30 nautical miles to the North northeast. Yet where was the High Seas Fleet, if indeed they were at sea?
     
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    1531 22 June 1916, lets have a look whats out there
  • 1531 22 June 1916, North Sea, 240 miles from Rosyth

    HMS Riviera had actually been leading Beatty's battle-cruisers force, along with her fellow seaplane carrier HMS Engadine, the requirement for calm water to launch their aircraft the main reason for the placement in the van, where the wakes of Beatty battle-cruisers would not affect the launch of their Short Type 184 seaplanes. However, with the nearness of the German light cruisers, the two ships had rapidly come to a full stop, allowing Beatty's capital ships to move ahead of the 1,600 ton seaplane carriers. Harold Foulkes crew were frantically working on hoisting her aircraft over the side and prepare it for launch, a process that took at least 20 minutes in calm seas, likely longer in the light chop. He looked over at Engadine; at least his own ship was in the lead in preparing the seaplane for launch and take off. Beatty ordered Engadine to make a search to the South-southeast, Riviera to the North-northeast. Yet, all this would take time.
     
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    1532 22 June 1916, Jellicoe seperate some tendrils
  • 1532 22 June 1916, 210 miles from Rosyth

    Admiral Sir John Jellicoe was in an invidious position. Described by many as "the only man who can lose the war in a day", he was eager to gain a victory over the German fleet, a decisive one if at all possible, yet he was also conscious of the need to preserve the Grand Fleet, so that the all pervasive stranglehold of the the blockade could be maintained on Germany, so as to gradually sap her will to fight. He had a truely stupendous concentration of metal under his command, some 32 battleships, not counting Beatty's forces or those of Callaghan, which comprised another 18 ships of the line.

    He was confident enough of crushing the Germans, if he was able to come to grips with the High Seas Fleet. To that end, he had detached three separate forces. Whilst his main body steered 30 points to port, where it would maintain speed and then steer back to starboard, hopefully putting his forces to the South and East of the Germans, blocking their escape, he detached Rear Admiral Robert Arbuthnot's 1st Cruiser Squadron to scout ahead to starboard and Rear Admiral H.L. Heath's 2nd Cruiser Squadron to scout to port, whilst his main body held a speed of 20.2 knots. He had also detached Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas's 5th Battle Squadron and screen to make a least time course to Beatty in an endeavor to assist the battlecruiser force.
     
    Map 1537
  • Jutland, a rather crude map of positions at 1537. red is Jellicoe, Orange is Beatty, Black is Hipper, Grey Scheer. Smaller lines are cruiser squadrons or Evan Thomas 5th BS
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    1547 22 June 1916, opening salvos
  • 1547, 22 June 1916, North Sea, 235 miles from Rosyth

    Hipper had duly viewed the updates passed down from the lookouts so far above. Three columns of masts, all representing British battle-cruisers, started to come over the horizon, numbers going upwards from four, to six, to seven, then nine and finally ten. He was outnumbered two to one, not an envious position to be in, yet the British were unaware of Scheer and his nearing battle-line, which was sweeping to the Southeast to cut off the retreat of the British ships. Sadly, burdened with the "five minute ships", this would take some time at 16 knots.

    Hipper knew his ships were tough and was confident in holding the line until Scheer arrived, although he did reduce speed to 16 knots to reduce the rate of closure. He could see that the enemy was cutting between himself and Scheer and forming line of battle, moving from three columns to one. He ordered a turn of 40 degrees to the South to catch the British between Scheer's forces and his own and to keep the range open. Although a windless day with excellent visibility, already the smoke from numerous ships moving at speed was beginning to mar the visibility of gunnery officers.

    Hipper noted Beatty's ships turning slightly South to clear the smoke and wondered yet again why the British ships armed with the longer ranged 13.5 inch guns were holding fire, rather than using their range advantage to zero in on his own ships as the distance between the two forces wound down. Not that he was complaining, of course. Finally, at 15,600 meters, the British line belched fire. He ordered an immediate reply. After three salvos, his own ships, with their superior range finders, were the first to bracket enemy ships, even considering the British were only 1,000 meters off maximum range. The British fire was initially wild, only Von der Tann sprayed by seawater as shells drew close.
    SMS Derfflinger "The Iron Dog"
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    1553 22 June 1916 - Cut them off at the pass
  • 1553 22 June 1916, 40 nautical miles Northeast of Great Yarmouth

    Admiral George Callaghan looked behind at the heavy ships plowing through the seas in the wake of HMS Dreadnought. Eight older battleships and three armoured cruisers, surrounded by a screen of eleven destroyers. Tyrwitt's Harwich force had been sighted astern by lookouts, closing quickly on the larger ships, which were cruising at only 16 knots, awaiting the arrival of smaller force.

    It was already quite clear the Germans were not going to enter the Channel. He himself had not been ordered to engage the Germans, yet, with the arrival of Tyrwitt's command, he would have a dreadnought, 8 battleships, 3 armoured cruisers, 6 light cruisers and 40 destroyers under his command. It would be foolish to seek battle with the main German line, yet he could potentially sit astride their retreat, if they arrived back a broken force.

    Callaghan was naturally a cautious man, yet at the same time his replacement by Jellicoe as C in C Grand Fleet at the commencement of the war rankled. He would proceed with his combined force to a location off Texel, informing the Admiralty of his intention, then review the situation from there. He ordered the squadron to 18 knots, knowing full well it would be nearing sunset or later before his force was off the entrance to the Jade, longer perhaps taking into account the need to skirt the minefields.
     
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    1605 22 June 1916 - Princess Roils
  • 1605, 22 June 1916, North Sea, 230 miles from Rosyth

    Beatty's head whipped around to the signalman and then toward the stricken ship. "Princess Royal blown up, sir" had been the laconic report. It was all to true. With the range steady at 11,700 to 11,950 meters, hits were being obtained all to readily. He would have thought, with his own ships outnumbering those of the Germans, he would be obtaining more hits on the five enemy heavy ships, yet this was not the case. Yet, for all that, his own formation had some ships that were not damaged at all. The Germans could no longer say that. Lion had been hit six times. Two had not exploded, doing little damage. A third had deflected off Q turret, not penetrating. A fourth had pitched short, ducking under the armour, penetrating a compartment and letting 500 tons of water into the ship, dropping her speed by 1.5 knots. A fifth shell that exploded on the mess deck in the canteen flat, eviscerating many of the men gathered there. Finally, a sixth shell had struck the port 4 inch battery, which the crew extinguished rapidly, thankfully. Australia had been hit twice, Indefatigable four times, Invincible three times. The damage toll on his ships was rising. He was not sure what had happened to Princess Royal.

    In fact, Princess Royal had suffered a fate Lion avoided. A hit on the 4 inch magazine had shaken the ship. The after 4-inch battery was smashed out of all recognition. The handling room had spare propellant and this was ignited by the shell burst. The venting plates likely admitted flame into the magazine. This explosion detonated Q turret. Immediately, the ship had a huge explosive cloud above her, taking a large list to port. One of the survivors, asked whether the order to evacuate the magazine and shell room had been given, but was told it was no use, as the water was right up the truck leading from the shell room, so the bottom of the ship must have been out of her. The explosion was followed by clouds of dense and dark smoke, a distinctive byproduct of burning cordite used as shell propellant

    Yet, it was not only the British ships that were now taking damage. The two British ships who proved most accurate were HMS Invincible and Queen Mary, the latter free to shoot, not being engaged at all. Queen Mary, however, fired at the wrong target, bringing herself, as well as Lion and Tiger, to bear on the German flagship Lutzow. By 1605, Tiger had still not scored, but Lion had hit the German ship twice, once on the forecastle, the second a hit near the conning tower that did not explode. Sadly, this was a problem the British would face through the battle, shells breaking up on impact. It was not the only problem with the shells, however. The Royal Navy used lyddite as the explosive burster. This, unlike some other explosive compounds, generally exploded on impact, not after a penetration was made. The problems and shortcomings of lyddite were known, but due to shortages of a more effective explosive, such as trinitrotoluene, lyddite continued to be used. Queen Mary had been active. A heavy shell penetrated the main armored deck of Lutzow toward the bow, where there was little armour. Another shell hit a bulkhead even further forward and shoved it back over two meters, both hits letting water into the ship. Shell splinters from another hit penetrated several of the case-mates that held the secondary guns, three of which were disabled. The ammunition stores for these guns were set on fire and the magazines had to be flooded to prevent an explosion.


    Derfflinger, the famous "iron dog", was hit twice by Princess Royal before her demise, but both shells broke up on impact. Seydlitz was hit three times, but seemed to shrug these off. Moltke was not so lucky. Hit five times, a shell from New Zealand had hit her port wing turret, jamming the turret traverse completely from the shock. A second had pitched short, flooding the ship with almost 650 tons of seawater. Von Der Tann had been hurt the most. Hit four times by Invincible and twice by Indomitable, a shell from Invincible penetrated the bow turret barbette. Flames flashed into the turret and down into the ammunition chamber. The entire gun crew were killed and flames rose above the turret as high as a house, yet she did not explode, as the magazine was flooded quickly. It was not the only damaging blow. A shell landed near the stern, penetrating the weak armour there and bursting in the port feed tank, breaking the bulkhead and causing flooding and seawater contamination in the port engine room, dropping her speed by over two knots, with flooding unable to be stopped, at least immediately.

    It was at 1606 that Beatty received a report that HMS Rivriera had finally launched a Short seaplane and the aircraft was able to communicate with it's mother ship via wireless. This was infinitely more efficient than the last practice exercise, where the wireless had malfunctioned the aircraft had to send it's messages via the seaplane carriers onboard pigeon loft, of all things. Maybe it would help to establish where the Germans actually were.
     
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    1618 22 June 1916, Seaplane sighting
  • 1618, 22 June 1916, North Sea, 235 miles from Rosyth

    Lieutenant Frederick Rutland, doomed to be known for the remainder of his life as "Rutland of Jutland" had climbed the sluggish Short 184 to 2000 feet. His initial plan after takeoff had been to bank to starboard and head Southeast to investigate the German battle-cruisers. That had been superseded when the full panorama that being over 1,000 feet up had revealed itself. As he cruised toward the newly sighted ships, Rutland was concerned that Admiral Beatty was not aware of this current formation, although at the rate of closure his lookouts would likely spot this new formation of ships within 20 minutes at most. That was only his first concern. His second was that his own home ship, HMS Riveriera and her "sister" HMS Engadine, were stationary and directly in the path of the Germans, bearing down remorselessly on them on a steady Southwesterly course.

    He commenced a count of the the large German units. The first ten were easily visible, then 4...14...4 more...18, then another two groups, 3-4 each.....he was awoken from his counting reverie by the sound of shrapnel hitting the aircraft and puffs of angry black cloud. It was a timely reminder that some of the ships below carried anti aircraft guns. He swung the aircraft away, at the same time signalling his observer, George Trewin, passing a small note, saying 24? Trewin gave him the thumbs up, commencing a transmission on the wireless that took up so much space in the rear cockpit.

    He had not gone two miles, only just receiving a tap on the shoulder and a thumbs up from his observer to indicate the transmission had gone out, then he noticed the engine beginning to run rough. Two minutes later, it was to cut out altogether, the aircraft's nose dipped down towards the sea, some 1,900 feet below.

    1623, 22 June 1916, North Sea, 230 miles from Rosyth


    Lt Commander Harold Foulkes turned to reprimand the signalman who flew up the ladder and into the bridge of the small seaplane carrier, inadvertently knocking the young subbie aside as he did so. Yet the panicked appearance of the man was enough to give him pause. "Captain, urgent transmission from 9062", he said, offering a message crawled in some haste on standard Royal Navy S1320B signal paper. "From Riviera 9062, To:Riviera. (Priority) Sighted 24 capital ships, 60 plus light units, range 11 miles, course 230."

    Dear God, he thought, it was the main German body, the whole bloody High Seas Fleet. And it's heading straight for your position, where you are stationary, engines stopped, he thought. He turned back to the signalman. "Sparks, alert both Admiral Beatty of Lion and Admiral Jellicoe on Iron Duke, most immediate. Pass this message on as received and at the same time transmit our own position, which is....here," he wrote down the current position of the command and handed it to the young wireless operator. The young man stared at him, agog. "Move it man!" he yelled, as the young man tore back down the stairs from the bridge. He turned to his XO, "Signal, Engadine, Onslow and Moresby, ring up full speed and as soon as able set a course for 290 degrees. We need to clear the area as soon as possible; any aircraft recovery will have to wait."

    HMS Riviera
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    1619 22 June 1916 - 5th Battle Squadron gets a 6th ship
  • 1619, 22 June 1916, North Sea, 215 miles from Rosyth

    It was not a happy time for Captain Charles Donnison Roper or HMS Fearless. Rear Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas had accelerated 5th Battle Squadron to 23.6 knots, as the five huge dreadnoughts ate up the distance to where Beatty's battle-cruisers were under pressure to the Southeast. With little more than a very light chop, visibility was good and the five big ships were performing the task for which they had been designed, that of a fast wing. However, his own flagship, although less than three years old, was already an outdated concept. Scout cruisers were intended as flotilla leaders or scouting for the fleet, but was superseded by the newer, bigger and faster light cruisers for the later and she were outpaced by the new destroyers for the former. Poor Fearless proved unable to keep up with her charges, failing to take station in the submarine screen and getting in the way of the dreadnoughts. Rear Admiral Evan Thomas has signaled her to take station astern, where she wallowed unhappily in the wash of HMS Malaya, an unlikely 6th ship, with her 4-inch guns, in the battle line.
    HMS Fearless
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    1620 22 June 1916 - 5 Minute ships at 16 knots
  • 1620 22 June 1916, North Sea, 235 miles from Rosyth

    From the bridge of SMS Bayern, Scheer's frustration was all too obvious. Hipper had trapped a portion of the British fleet, however, the appearance of the aircraft meant they would likely be aware of his position soon enough. That should have been a signal to dash forward with as much speed as possible, yet here he was, plowing down a path to the Southwest at just a fraction over 16 knots, hopelessly hampered by Mauve's II Squadron. Even that speed was proving a strain for some ships, especially SMS Deutschland and the two older ships, Preussen and Hessen, which were all equipped with the older fire tube, rather than water tube, boilers.

    Despite the need for speed, he could hardly drop the ships off now, straining as they were at the rear of the formation, since he had not, as yet, even sighted the enemy. All he could do was continue on, hoping to close the British forces as soon as possible. In fact, he was to gain his first sighting of the enemy in less than 15 minutes.

    SMS Bayern, the German flagship
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