Jutland Redux - A summer soltice shootout

2032 22 June 1916 - The situation at 2032
The situation at 2032 - Orange Beatty and 5th BS, Grey Scheer, Black - Remains for HSF Scouting Force, red - Jellicoe
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2033 22 June 1916 - Roon pulls away
2033 22 June 1916, SMS Roon, North Sea

The 12 inch shell streaked in, hitting the upper-works and bursting. Splinters eviscerated the crew of the 4 inch gun near the burst site, whilst the blast canted the third funnel at a crazy angle, leaving it drunken and sagging. It was, in actual fact, the first hit the armoured cruiser had taken, although there had been many near misses. Kapitän zur See Wilhelm von Karpf closed his eyes. This was madness, he thought. His lightly armoured cruiser had no business in a line of battle, her guns out-ranged, not able to effectively reply her opponent. The 2nd Battle Squadron had already been decimated, only four ships remaining out of eight. All of these four had been hit, the flagship seriously.

The signal was clear enough - cruisers to the starboard side of the fleet. Well, his ship was a cruiser, so technically he was only following orders and he had no desire to sacrifice his men when they had no chance of scoring on the enemy. Hipper's battle-cruisers, of which there appeared to be only two, would join the head of the line within the next 20 to 30 minutes, they were well in sight, although taking no enemy fire. At 2034, Roon turned away to starboard, moving to take up a sixth spot in Kommodore Ludwig von Reuters 4th Scouting Group, reducing the German mine battle line to 21 ships, at least for the moment.
 
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2034 22 June 1916 - Things are always bad in the stans
2034 22 June 1916, SMS U-67, 25 nautical miles West of Texel

Admiral George Callaghan's twelve large ships had assumed line ahead. After flogging both their engines and crews in what turned out to be a fruitless pursuit of the High Seas Fleet, they were cutting through the seas at a much more sedate 11.5 knots, heading back to Sheerness or The Swin. Most of the crew of the pre dreadnoughts had stood down.

Lieutenant Hans Nieland's U-67 had seen ships in the distance nearly two hours ago, yet had been unable to intercept as they swept by at high speed. Nieland and U-67 had been ordered to patrol off Terschelling, however, he had always been the sort of man who had done his own thinking. He considered Texel a much more likely position to intercept enemy heavy units and so it had proven. U-67 was a great boat to have. Originally constructed for the Austro-Hungarian Navy, she had no means of getting to the Mediterranean once war had been declared, so had been purchased for the German Navy upon her 1915 completion. She was faster than German boats and packed four tubes in the bow, as opposed to two in most earlier German submarines. He was to fire all four tubes at HMS Hindustan, hitting with two, although only one was to explode. The torpedo that did explode tore a huge hold in her side and within five minutes the ship was listing ten degrees. With an hour, she had gone.
 
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2034 22 June 1916, 25 nautical miles West of Texel

Admiral George Callaghan's twelve large ships had assumed line ahead. After flogging both their engines and crews in what turned out to be a fruitless pursuit of the High Seas Fleet, they were cutting through the seas at a much more sedate 11.5 knots, heading back to Sheerness or The Swin. Most of the crew of the pre dreadnoughts had stood down.

Lieutenant Hans Nieland's U-67 had seen ships in the distance nearly two hours ago, yet had been unable to intercept as they swept by at high speed. Nieland and U-67 had been ordered to patrol off Terschelling, however, he had always been the sort of man who had done his own thinking. He considered Texel a much more likely position to intercept enemy heavy units and so it had proven. U-67 was a great boat to have. Originally constructed for the Austro-Hungarian Navy, she had no means of getting to the Mediterranean once war had been declared, so had been purchased for the German Navy upon her 1915 completion. She was faster than German boats and packed four tubes in the bow, as opposed to two in most earlier German submarines. He was to fire all four tubes at HMS Hindustan, hitting with two, although only one was to explode. The torpedo that did explode tore a huge hold in her side and within five minutes the ship was listing ten degrees. With an hour, she had gone.
missing threadmark @johnboy
 

Ramontxo

Donor
2031 22 June 1916, SMS Bayern, North Sea

Vize Admiral Reinhard Scheer had almost constant reports of damage coming in. He had ordered his light units to make smoke, however, the wind direction mitigated against the smoke staying intact over his ships now that a stiff sea breeze had sprung up later in the day. He was in the unfortunate situation that the British knew exactly what course he had to steer as a base. Any deviation may throw their gunnery off, but would also serve to increase the amount of time that was required to reach a safe haven.

He tried to put himself in the situation of what he was sure was likely Jellicoe. It seemed unlikely that an Admiral with a reputation of being cautious would take the sort of risk that would see him pursue the High Seas Fleet after dark. Especially since such a pursuit would draw him to within an hour of the minefields protecting the Jade, where he was sure to be aware German light forces were stationed.

Reinforcement were coming from the Jade, meager though they were. Of more use was Hipper's reduced Scouting Force, unfortunately coming sans it's commander, who had been on board the ill fated Lutzow. At current pace, these would be 30-40 minutes away from joining his line.

He need to do something to try and take the pressure off his main battle line. Yes, they had damaged the British, but they had taken plenty of damage to. With 90 minutes to sunset, his command would be silhouetted against the setting sun, providing good gunnery visibility for the British. The rear of his line, consisting as it did of vulnerable ships, was coming under enormous pressure. Within the last 15 minutes Deutschland had taken three damaging hits, as had Pommern. Preussen was already a lost cause. Schlesien had also been hit and was taking 15 inch gunfire. The old pre dreadoughts might be considered almost expendable, however, their crewss were far from that. Of the more modern ships, Oldenburg was badly damaged. He had started the engagement with 24 ships in his main line, now he had 22. The ships in his main line had taken 44 heavy caliber shell hits. He needed to minimize the fire on his own ships and the simplest way to do that was to increase the range from it's current 14,500 meters. Hamstrung by being unable to alter course away, the only option left was to try and force the British to do so. That meant sending in his own light forces, which, he was quite sure after what had happened to Hipper's would cause casualties amongst them. Yet there was no other way. At 2032, he ordered his light forces to engage, keeping only four torpedo boats. 27 more were to begin their run in.
Is there so much danger in a night battle when the German light forces has expended all their torpedoes?
 
Is there so much danger in a night battle when the German light forces has expended all their torpedoes?
Do you want to bet a large portion of the Grand Fleet on the Germans being out of torpedos?

Some commanders will, but a cautious commander may well say that inflicting losses and chasing them off with their tails between their legs is a good day's work.
 
Do you want to bet a large portion of the Grand Fleet on the Germans being out of torpedos?

Some commanders will, but a cautious commander may well say that inflicting losses and chasing them off with their tails between their legs is a good day's work.
This is essentially correct. Night fighting was in it's infancy at this stage and blundering around in the dark with searchlights on near the edge of a minefield is generally a bad idea for capital ships.
 
Is there so much danger in a night battle when the German light forces has expended all their torpedoes?

Do you want to bet a large portion of the Grand Fleet on the Germans being out of torpedos?

Some commanders will, but a cautious commander may well say that inflicting losses and chasing them off with their tails between their legs is a good day's work.

This is essentially correct. Night fighting was in it's infancy at this stage and blundering around in the dark with searchlights on near the edge of a minefield is generally a bad idea for capital ships.

Agreed, and to add to this Jellicoe was correctly identified as one of the few people who could lose the war in an afternoon (or night). Beatty is the one for risk taking.

In addition, just as the Harwich force was heading towards the battle on the British side, Jellicoe probably suspects that Scheer has called for every remaining destroyer, cruiser, and torpedo boat that didn't come with him in the first place to come and reinforce him. It might not be that many, but they will all have loaded torpedo tubes. For that matter, the closer he gets to the German bases the more likely he is to find German U-boats that are departing or returning.
 
2035 22 June 1916 - Beatty in pursuit
2035 22 June 1916, HMS Lion, North Sea

David Beatty had his command slicing though the waves at 23.8 knots as they closed on the German formation. At his current pace and the calculated pace of the German line, he was gaining at a rate of 2,000 yards every ten minutes. This was good, as he was currently 28,000 yards estimate from the Germans. That meant his own command and Evan-Thomas's 5th Battle Squadron would hopefully get to direct some more fire on the German line, albeit briefly, before sunset fell. Of course, to achieve such a closing rate, he had to come directly at the German ships, which would likely allow him to engage, at least initially, with only his main armament.

At the urging of his officers, he had broken radio silence to apprise Jellicoe of his position. When the range fell to 20,000 yards, he would deploy his ships into what was normally the cruising formation of the fleet, his remaining seven battle-cruisers and Evan Thomas's five large Queen Elizabeth Class dreadnought deploying abreast each other in two ship divisions, allowing them the best use of their main armaments forward when they achieved a reasonable firing range, which he considered to be 18,000 yards or a tad over. He could not be profligate with ammunition, having expended much on his previous combat with Hipper's Scouting force.

It had been a difficult battle so far for Beatty's battle-cruiser force, with fully three ships lost - New Zealand, Indefatigable and Princess Royal. Not only that, the very nature of their loss (explosions), meant that crew casualties would be shocking. They had sunk three German ships in conjunction with 5th Battle Squadron. All they could do now was increase the toll on the Germans.
 
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Agreed, and to add to this Jellicoe was correctly identified as one of the few people who could lose the war in an afternoon (or night). Beatty is the one for risk taking.

In addition, just as the Harwich force was heading towards the battle on the British side, Jellicoe probably suspects that Scheer has called for every remaining destroyer, cruiser, and torpedo boat that didn't come with him in the first place to come and reinforce him. It might not be that many, but they will all have loaded torpedo tubes. For that matter, the closer he gets to the German bases the more likely he is to find German U-boats that are departing or returning.
Wasn’t it only Hippers scouts that spent their torpedoes?
 
Wasn’t it only Hippers scouts that spent their torpedoes?
It was, but I think the person who suggested a pursuit into the night was responding to Scheer's decision to send in all of his remaining cruisers and torpedo boats (IIRC all but 4 torpedo boats) to cause Jellico to increase the range. Scheer's light craft still have torpedoes, but they will not after that attack happens, except for those 4 torpedo boats.

The ships in his main line had taken 44 heavy caliber shell hits. He needed to minimize the fire on his own ships and the simplest way to do that was to increase the range from it's current 14,500 meters. Hamstrung by being unable to alter course away, the only option left was to try and force the British to do so. That meant sending in his own light forces, which, he was quite sure after what had happened to Hipper's would cause casualties amongst them. Yet there was no other way. At 2032, he ordered his light forces to engage, keeping only four torpedo boats. 27 more were to begin their run in.
 
Bad news for the predreadnoughts at the tail of the high seas fleet. They are already slow and a few of them are being doubled but here we have battlecruisers closing them from behind too.

I wonder if Beatty and Jellicoe are considering letting their light forces off the leash as sunset nears or if they will stick to typical British strategy of holding them for defensive operations.

If you know you will break away at sunset why hold back. Perhaps after the German torpedo boat charge the British will launch their own attack if they can.
 
This is essentially correct. Night fighting was in it's infancy at this stage and blundering around in the dark with searchlights on near the edge of a minefield is generally a bad idea for capital ships.
Hah. You have spoiled what Beatty is going to do!
 
A battle summary part 1
Extract from "Great Sea Battles", William Koening, Abracadabra Press, 1979

The action of 22 June 1916, later known as the Battle of Jutland or the Solstice Shootout, was the largest naval battle of World War 1. It was also the only battle of the war that saw the loss of multiple capital ships, unless one looks at the Gallipoli campaign, where losses were caused by mines. In general terms, the actions came down to three sections. The initial engagement and the run North, essentially an action between the battle-cruisers on either side until the arrival of 5th Battle Squadron. Then Scheer's retreat under fire from Jellicoe. Finally, the action after Scheer committed his light forces at 2035, exactly 90 minutes before sunset. Much as the arrival and sighting of Jellicoe, which caused Scheer's to reverse course, was a vital time in the battle, so was the commitment of the High Seas Fleet's light forces in an effort to assist the escape of the larger ships.

Losses up until that time were plentiful enough. They consisted of(counting some ships still afloat but likely to sink):
Pre battle:
High Seas Fleet: nil
Grand Fleet: PD Abermarle

Initial engagement and run to the North
High Seas Fleet: Torpedo Boats: G197, G101, G102, B110, B111, V44, G87, S49, B 98
Grand Fleet: BC Indefatigable, New Zealand, Princess Royal, AC Defense, CL Champion, DD Lizard

Jellicoe's appearance to attack of German light forces:
High Seas Fleet: BC Seydlitz, Lutzow, Von der Tann, PB Hessen, Hannover, Preussen, Schleswig-Holstein, CL Wiesbaden, Torpedo Boats V27, V28, S35, V30, S52
Grand Fleet: BB Vanguard, PB Hindustan, AC Donegal, CL Fearless, DD Ariel, Nomad
 
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To list loses another way. British losses on the left. German losses on the right.

BC 3v3
DN 1v0
Pdn 1v4
AC 2v0
CL 2v1
DD 3v0
TB 0v14

About the high seas fleet light unit charge. I expect that a number of tb and cl would be heavily employed in rescue operations for battleship crews and are likely to ignore orders to take part in a full charge.

It's worth noting that while historically pdn were withdrawn from the hsf after jutland they continued to be used in the baltic and allowed the retirement of older pdn used in the baltic. Their crews were important to replace men transferred to submarines.
 
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Driftless

Donor

About the high seas fleet light unit charge. I expect that a number of tb and cl would be heavily employed in rescue operations for battleship crews and are likely to ignore orders to take part in a full charge.

It's worth noting that while historically pdn were withdrawn from the hsf after jutland they continued to be used in the baltic and allowed the retirement of older pdn used in the baltic. Their crews were important to replace men transferred to submarines.
With this many ships being sunk or severely damaged, there's going to be high levels of loss of skilled sailors, many to the effects of gunfire and some losses in the water once the ship has been abandoned.

Grim calculus, but would it have been more difficult for the HSF to replace those skills, on a comparative basis?
 
As well as the Hindustan the British have also lost the predreadnought Albemarle to a Uboat off Rosyth as the Battlecruisers were putting to sea.
 
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