Jutland in morning

Saphroneth

Banned
That's information I hadn't known @PMN1 - very cool!
One wonders if, had that actually taken place, the perception of the battle-lines would have been a bit different postwar.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
Oh, further info - here's the bit from Padfield where he describes the section just leading up to Jellicoe's order. Longer, but still very good - one of my favorite parts of the book!



A curious feature of this race to the north is that Beatty, heading directly for a junction with Jellicoe, could by no stretch of the imagination have been making for any British bases; all were westerly. It seems astonishing in retrospect that neither Hipper nor Scheer apparently realized this but in the heat of the chase followed him blindly into a trap. By 5.35, with Jellicoe's fleet only some 16 miles to the northward and the forces closing each other at a combined speed of nearly 40 knots, Beatty altered from his north north-westerly course to northeasterly for the double purpose of regaining contact with Hipper, and heading him off from any sight of the Grand Fleet as it bore down. It was a well-conceived manoeuvre and brilliantly fulfilled its purpose. As Hipper had already altered two points towards the British forces, also in an effort to regain contact, the battle cruisers soon sighted each other again and re-opened fire. This time all the advantages were with Beatty; he was crossing Hipper's T, and the sun at last clear and low in the north-west both dazzled the German gunlayers and lit their ships for the British who found spotting conditions better than ever before. About the same time the Fifth Battle Squadron also re-opened fire and, caught between these two, Hipper turned north east, then east as Beatty closed. The Grand Fleet was now only 10 miles to the north, but Hipper caught no glimpse of it; instead he heard gunfire ahead of his course in a position which none of Beatty's forces could possibly have reached. This came from an advance detachment of cruisers and three battle cruisers led by Rear Admiral Hood in the Invincible which Jellicoe had sent on ahead to support Beatty. They had arrived some 20 miles east of Beatty, and one of the light cruisers had run into a German cruiser squadron. By this time the earlier good visibility was giving way to mist patches and the lone British cruiser actually approached within 7,000 yards of the Germans before being chased off. Both Hood and Hipper turned their big ships towards the sound of the action and Hood, arriving first, reduced one German cruiser, Wiesbaden, to a blazing wreck at something under 12,000 yards before he was forced to turn away by the threat of torpedoes. The destroyers with him pressed in to make a counter attack and shortly coming in sight of Hipper's big ships forced Hipper in his turn to alter away; he went south towards Scheer. At this point none of the commanders on either side had any clear idea of what was happening, Scheer and Hipper least of all. The cruisers attacked by Hood had reported battleships in the northeast— they were of course battle cruisers— but their number was uncertain; the only certain point was that they could not be part of Beatty's force. However Scheer was not a man to be frightened by shapes in the mist, and believing from earlier and erroneous U-boat reports that the Grand Fleet was split in several directions, he altered north-easterly to probe this new force; Hipper, coming towards him, made an about turn and reformed at the head of the battle line. As for Jellicoe, he was scarcely better informed. Cruisers ahead of Beatty's force had sighted the most westerly of the Grand Fleet advanced cruiser screen about the time of Beatty's easterly alteration to regain contact with Hipper but they had not signalled the position of the enemy relative to themselves or relative to Jellicoe's cruisers— as the Grand Fleet Battle Orders stipulated— nor had Beatty himself given any indication of where the enemy lay; meanwhile Jellicoe could make out nothing for himself; the light southwesterly breeze was blowing all the smoke and haze of the northing action across his front and the slow mists of the North Sea were gathering in pockets so that visibility varied from moment to moment and from sector to sector:

The average visibility was never greater than 12,000 yards (at this time), and was in most cases far less. In exceptional cases in certain directions, objects could be seen up to 16,000 yards, but in other directions they could only be seen 2,000 to 3,000 yards.
Jellicoe had already instructed his Flag Captain to take bearings all round the compass and find the best direction for gunnery; the report had been that it was clearer to the south, but the advantage to an easterly force would grow as the sun set and threw the western horizon into silhouette; in addition the westerly wind would blow the smoke clear of the easterly force. This was ideal from the point of view of cutting the Germans off from their base. But where were the Germans? Although gunfire could be heard to the southward it was vital for Jellicoe to know much more about their bearing and course before he deployed his own fleet from cruising formation into line of battle; so far the few reports had been baffling. The first had been from the most westerly of his own cruiser screen, 'BATTLECRUISERS IN ACTION SOUTH SOUTH-WESTERLY.' But whose? A few minutes later another of his cruiser screen had reported 'SHIPS IN ACTION SOUTH SOUTH-WESTERLY STEERING NORTH-EASTERLY.' Next one of Beatty's cruisers had signalled her own position followed by 'ENEMY ALTERED COURSE NORTH NORTH-WESTERLY.' As the estimated position of Beatty's forces was some seven miles east of true and of Jellicoe's four miles west of true, this signal was not helpful about the relative position— although by this time Jellicoe must have realised that there was a discrepancy between the navigators, and that the enemy whom he had expected to meet ahead was somewhere to the west, or starboard of his starboard column. A few minutes later the same cruiser from Beatty's force signalled 'ENEMY ALTERED COURSE TO NORTH. ENEMY BATTLECRUISERS BEAR SOUTH-WESTERLY FROM BATTLESHIPS.' This further confused the issue as the battle cruisers bore north-east not south-west from their battlefleet. Jellicoe remarked testily to his flag captain, 'I wish someone would tell me who is firing and what they are firing at.' And in desperation he signalled to the leading ship of his starboard division, 'WHAT CAN YOU SEE?' He received a model answer: 'OUR BATTLECRUISERS BEARING SOUTH SOUTH-WESTERLY THREE TO FOUR MILES STEERING EAST. LION LEADING SHIP.' At the same moment Jellicoe saw the battle cruisers himself two points before his starboard beam and heading easterly across his course; Beatty was obviously engaging an enemy somewhere to the south and Jellicoe altered his six columns due south together to face them, at the same time flashing Beatty: 'WHERE IS THE ENEMY'S BATTLEFLEET?' Beatty was not sure; he replied, 'ENEMY BATTLECRUISERS BEARING SOUTH-EAST.' This didn't help Jellicoe, but as the direction of the battle appeared to be drifting easterly, and he wished to cut the Germans from their base he altered his columns back to their original south-easterly direction. It is evident he was now thinking in terms of deploying easterly on his port column, for at the same time he ordered two destroyer flotillas to port, only one to starboard. The situation was now critical; it was essential for the Grand Fleet to be formed in line of battle by the time the enemy came in sight or it would be at a crippling disadvantage with nearly all guns masked; it is a measure of Jellicoe's stature that despite this he held on at 20 knots, determined to wait for precise information before committing himself.
Many had been the critical situations which British Admirals in the past had been called upon suddenly to solve, but never had there been one which demanded higher qualities of leadership, ripe judgement and quick decision than that which confronted Admiral Jellicoe in this supreme moment of the naval war. There was not an instant to lose if deployment were to be made on time . . .
Almost at the last moment, the veil was lifted. The Fifth Battle Squadron which had now come into sight some way astern of Beatty's battle cruisers signalled 'ENEMY IN SIGHT SOUTH-SOUTH-EAST,' and at the same time Beatty himself saw Scheer's ships and flashed 'SIGHTED ENEMY'S BATTLEFLEET SOUTH-SOUTH-WEST' Jellicoe made a quick mental cross between the lines of bearing, and working on a visibility of five miles, placed the enemy almost due south of his starboard column of battleships. He stepped towards the central compass platform where his flag captain was watching the course being steered.

I heard the sharp, distinctive step of the Commander-in-Chief approaching— he had steel grips on his heels. He stepped quickly on to the platform around the compass and looked in silence at the magnetic compass card for about 20 seconds. I watched his keen, weather-beaten face with tremendous interest, wondering what he would do . . . I realized as I watched that he was as cool and unmoved as ever. Then he looked up and broke the silence . . .' Hoist equal speed pendant south-east!'

The effect of the signal was that while the port wing column continued on its south-easterly course, the leaders of all other columns turned 90 degrees to port, followed by the ships behind as they reached the leader's turning points, thus forming one line heading towards the port column— then swinging round southeasterly in its wake.

Padfield, Peter. Battleship (p. 279-285). Thistle Publishing. Kindle Edition.
 
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