Jutland in morning

Cook

Banned
What would the battle of Jutland look like it began at 10 am, not 2 pm?

Sheer timed his sorties against the English coast so that, if he encountered the main British battle fleet, he would be able to disengage in the fading light.
 
Well advance it 12 hours and you get dark, shadows, and peering eyes looking for targets.
 
Sheer timed his sorties against the English coast so that, if he encountered the main British battle fleet, he would be able to disengage in the fading light.

Okay. How about Jellicoe, whether by skill or by chance, finds himself between the HSF and the Jade at dawn the next day, or at least close enough to restart the battle.

Where exactly would they be geographically? Would the HSF have to break through or go around the GF, or could it just move north to the Skagerrak?
How many torpedoes did the HSF have left? Enough for another battle turn?
 
The High Seas Fleet was twice a few minutes from being pounded to scrap. Good luck, superb tactics, high quality training, Admiral Beatty, Admiral Beatty, Admiral Beatty, Admir...,poor fuses and confusion between the Battlecruisers and the Grand Fleet let the HSF escape. If Jellicoe has more daylight or just a teensy bit of good luck and Beatty falls off the gangplank pished before the BCsquadron sails then the German fleet is Trafalgared.
 
The High Seas Fleet was twice a few minutes from being pounded to scrap. Good luck, superb tactics, high quality training, Admiral Beatty, Admiral Beatty, Admiral Beatty, Admir...,poor fuses and confusion between the Battlecruisers and the Grand Fleet let the HSF escape. If Jellicoe has more daylight or just a teensy bit of good luck and Beatty falls off the gangplank pished before the BCsquadron sails then the German fleet is Trafalgared.

The HSF did do well, although the manoeuvre that led to the second T-crossing seems to have been a gross mistake.

But what is Beatty's role in the failure to decisively defeat the HSF? Yes, he lost some battlecruisers and his signalling was awful, but, despite all that, Jellicoe deployed the GF perfectly and Beatty led an astonished HSF right into its jaws. Or is it that better communications from Beatty would have allowed the battle to take place sooner, giving more time before dark?
 
The HSF did do well, although the manoeuvre that led to the second T-crossing seems to have been a gross mistake.

But what is Beatty's role in the failure to decisively defeat the HSF? Yes, he lost some battlecruisers and his signalling was awful, but, despite all that, Jellicoe deployed the GF perfectly and Beatty led an astonished HSF right into its jaws. Or is it that better communications from Beatty would have allowed the battle to take place sooner, giving more time before dark?

From wiki https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Beatty,_1st_Earl_Beatty
A number of serious errors have been identified in Beatty's handling of his squadron at the Battle of Jutland:


  • He failed to engage the German battlecruiser squadron with all his ships, thus throwing away a two-to-one numerical superiority and instead fighting one-to-one. Beatty was given command of the 5th Battle Squadron to replace a squadron of battlecruisers away for training. These were four of the most powerful ships in the world, but he positioned them so far away from his six battlecruisers that they were unable to take part in most of the engagement with Admiral Hipper's squadron of five battlecruisers.[67]
  • Beatty did not take advantage of the time available to him between sighting the enemy and the start of fighting to position his battlecruisers to most effectively attack the enemy. At the point the German ships opened fire with accurately determined ranges for their guns, Beatty's ships were still manoeuvring, some could not see the enemy because of their own smoke, and hardly any had the opportunity of a period of steady course as they approached to properly determine target range. As a result, the German ships had a significant advantage in early hits, with obvious benefit. During this time he also lost the potential advantage of the larger guns on his ships: they could commence firing at a longer range than the German ships.[68]
  • He did not ensure that signals sent to his ships were handled properly and received by the intended ships. Lost signals added to the confusion and lost opportunities during the battle. This issue had already arisen in previous battles, where the same signals officer had been involved, but no changes had been made.[69] Although Beatty was supposed to act as a fast armoured scout and report to Jellicoe the exact position of the German ships he encountered, or to keep in contact with the German fleet while he retreated to the main British Grand Fleet, he failed to do so. This information was important to Jellicoe to know how best to position the main fleet to make the most of its eventual engagement with the German High Seas Fleet. Despite this, Jellicoe succeeded in positioning his ships to good advantage, relying on other closer cruisers for final knowledge of the German's position, but necessitating last-minute decisions.[70]
  • Additionally, the gunnery of Beatty's ships was generally poor compared to the rest of the fleet. This was partly a consequence of his ships being stationed at Rosyth, rather than Scapa Flow with the main fleet, since local facilities at Rosyth were limited, but this was a problem identified months before Jutland which Beatty had failed to correct.[71]
After the war a report of the battle was prepared by the Admiralty under First Sea Lord Rosslyn Wemyss. Before the report was published, Beatty was himself appointed First Sea Lord, and immediately requested amendments to the report. When the authors refused to comply, he ordered it to be destroyed and instead had prepared an alternative report, which proved highly critical of Jellicoe.
 
Sure, but how does changing all that result in a decisive defeat of the HSF? You can save battlecruisers and men, and savage the German battlecruisers, but the target is the HSF's dreadnoughts. Despite Beatty, Jellicoe twice had the HSF on the ropes, and both times it sensibly turned away under torpedoes, and both times Jellicoe sensibly turned away also, demonstrating the difficulty of forcing a decision with the technology available.

The only way I can think of is if better signalling from Beatty had allowed the GF to engage earlier, giving more time before dark. But even then, what happens when the HSF just turns away again, covered by torpedoes?
 
I wonder if HMS Campania getting the order to sail with the rest of the Grand Fleet would have made any difference. Her aircraft could have given Jellicoe a better picture of where the H.S.F were and in what strength, as well as possibly spotting for the British guns.
 
The criticism that Beatty didn't engage with 5th BS at the start is overblown. 5th BS was good for just over 23kt on a good day, and Hipper could do 26kt. Beatty must have thought there was no way Hipper was going to allow a 10 on 5, and would just increase speed to leave E-T behind anyways. The way he actually did it allowed 5th BS to approach from the cover of behind Beatty's line. I have seen a, I think, Derfflinger account that suggests that the distraction of battle and angle of approach caused 5th BS to be mistaken for 3rd BC.
 
According to Massie's 'Castles of Steel', there were quite a few lost opportunities


Jackson in Room 40 did not ask the right question and did not work out Scheer was at sea with the HSF - if Jellicoe had been told, he would have increased speed and action could have started 2hrs? earlier.

Tiger did not pass on the turn message to Evan Thomas

Beatty did not make use of the longer range of his 13.5” guns

Scheer’s Battle Turn was noticed by the cruisers Falmouth and Canterbury and by the Iron Duke’s own gunnery control staff but no-one told Jellicoe

The Admiralty failed to pass on 7 messages to Jellicoe that would have shown where Scheer was heading, one was a message asking for Zeppelin reconnaissance of Horns Reef at dawn and another was a message instructing all destroyer flotillas to rendezvous at Horns Reef by 02.00

Seven RN battleships saw the HSF engaging RN destroyers but did not engage even though some had guns trained as they did not have the orders to.

The HSF passed safely over three RN submarines that were bottomed as they had orders not to surface until June 2nd.

Seydlitz passed by Agincourt, Marlborough, Malaya and Revenge but was not engaged as the RN ships did not have orders to or were too late in giving the order.

Moltke with Hipper on board was seen by Thunderer but not engaged.
 
According to Massie's 'Castles of Steel', there were quite a few lost opportunities:

[SNIP]
Interesting. Has anyone ever done a realistic, and I stress the word realistic, timeline where different choices and orders are made and given so that things go much better for the British and worse for the Germans?
 
It shouldn't be too difficult to have the battle result in more even losses, for example Seydlitz was more than half sunk so a realitively small number of extra hits would have put her down. That means 3 British BCs are sunk for 2 Germans, and proper handling of charges would reduce the chance of British BCs blowing up. Had Jellico turned into the German torpedo attacks instead of away the Germans would have had a harder time running away. Had the German Pre Dreadnought squadron been engaged by British Dreadnoughts likely none would have survived. Lets not forget though that for all the German bluster and the criticism of the Grand Fleet Jutland was a British strategic victory that kept the High Seas Fleet hiding in port until the end of the war.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
There's a great bit in Padfield where he describes the situation the Germans found themselves in OTL, where he invites the reader to put themsleves in the position of Hipper - who has just run north, chasing the British battlecruisers, and then suddenly an entire quarter of the horizon erupts in muzzle flashes as the entire Grand Fleet opens fire.



The other bit he notes is that Jellicoe's turn ("hoist equal speed pendant south-east!") was one of the masterstrokes of naval tactics, deserving of far more recognition than it currently gets as basically every move he made for the hour up to it was to try to get in a perfect position for gunnery and he nailed it.

It gave the Grand Fleet every advantage it could wish for, cutting the Germans from their base, crossing their T as they advanced north-easterly, ensuring the advantage of the light, of the wind and of the visibility for gunnery. It also ensured that the whole fleet would be in line in four minutes and at a sufficient distance from the German van to prevent its own van from becoming embroiled in a torpedo boat melée. As the line was forming Beatty was steaming easterly across its front belching funnel and gun smoke, a squadron of Jellicoe's cruisers was bearing down to finish off the cruiser Wiesbaden, which Hood's battle cruisers had previously stopped and set ablaze, and at the rear the Warspite of the Fifth Battle Squadron was circling towards the Germans with a jammed rudder. So Hipper was denied any sight of the Grand Fleet as he steamed up at the head of Scheer's battle line. It was not until these distractions had dispersed and he had come within 12,000 yards of the British van that he gradually became aware that the battle cruisers he had been engaging had been reinforced by a much larger fleet. The ships of the fleet were invisible though; all he could make out were their gun flashes which stretched in a ring from the north-eastern to the north-western horizon, and as he closed to 9,000 yards the salvoes rained thickly about his ships. Still so little was visible that his gunnery officers could only reply by ranging on the enemy flashes, and he shortly turned south, reporting to Scheer 'TURNING AWAY BECAUSE OBSERVATION AGAINST THE SUN IMPOSSIBLE.'

Padfield, Peter. Battleship (p. 285). Thistle Publishing. Kindle Edition.
 
The HSF did do well, although the manoeuvre that led to the second T-crossing seems to have been a gross mistake.

But what is Beatty's role in the failure to decisively defeat the HSF? Yes, he lost some battlecruisers and his signalling was awful, but, despite all that, Jellicoe deployed the GF perfectly and Beatty led an astonished HSF right into its jaws. Or is it that better communications from Beatty would have allowed the battle to take place sooner, giving more time before dark?

I have also just found out Beatty forced his Fleet Navigation Officer to falsify the charts to show Beatty in a better tactical position and Jellicoe in a bad light. Not only was he an incompetent promoted above others because of social connections but he encouraged his captains to go for rate of fire over accuracy by storing charges in the turret and removing flash doors that protected the magazines. He even cancelled an exercise because he wanted to ride to Hounds, preferring to wear a silly outfit chasing a Fox rather than practising to fight the enemy.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
Beatty was perhaps the most successful social climbing, incompetent, opportunist in the Edwardian period
This is quite possibly true - though it should be remembered that Beatty was not a simple caricature either. While his actions were undoubtedly materially a considerable problem for the Royal Navy (from demanding that a QE class ship was made his flagship while at Grand Fleet, because he'd always wanted one - thus splitting up the 5th BS - to everything that's already been mentioned) he did in fact come through at the critical time, at Jutland.

Mostly.
 
Lets not forget though that for all the German bluster and the criticism of the Grand Fleet Jutland was a British strategic victory that kept the High Seas Fleet hiding in port until the end of the war.


In August 1916, Scheer tried a repeat of the plan to lure part of the Grand Fleet into a trap.

Again thanks to signals intelligence, the Grand Fleet knew the HSF was at sea but the HSF had no idea the GF was as its scouting subs and Zeppelins had missed the GF's departure.

The two fleets were about an hours steaming apart when an incorrect sighting report from Zeppelin L13 sent Scheer off away from the GF.

The GF had 29 Battleships and 6 Battlecruisers vs the HSF 18 Battleships and 2 Battlecruisers and IIRC, the point of contact would have put the HSF further away from home than at Jutland.

The RN BCF and Main BF were linked by a cruiser line allowing visual passage of signals while Hipper and Scheer had to rely on wireless, which was being intercepted by Room 40.

Hercules had Campania’s balloon up but Hercules was at the rear of the RN formation – Beatty is supposed to have said ‘the balloon should have been flown from a ship in the advance cruiser line to increase the range of vision ahead of the fleet. Had the balloon been well forward during the operations. I am of the opinion that the enemy might possibly have been sighted’.

Scheer also looked at another operation the following month but was put off by bad weather which would have hampered Zeppelin ops and wanted to try again even after that but had his U-boats assigned to attacking MV's rather than used as scouts and he was convinced he needed U-boat scouts for any operation to succeed.
 
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