Does it lead to a space race between the USAF and the USN?
Can't find it now, but I had seen a '50s Cartoon of an Army Moonlanding.
Pilot: We aren't the first here, look at that ship.
Copilot: Russians?
Pilot: Worse. Navy.
Justice for Von Braun, when is there a Moon landing?
- Thread starter Derek Jackson
- Start date
Can't find it now, but I had seen a '50s Cartoon of an Army Moonlanding.
Pilot: We aren't the first here, look at that ship.
Copilot: Russians?
Pilot: Worse. Navy.
Fasquadron wrote:
Maybe? After all the USAF and USN already had significant 'bad-blood' from the cancellation of the USS America, Revolt of the Admirals, and both loss of funding and loss of prestige to the "upstart" new service.
(In many ways the Army was in worse shape having been completely overshadowed by their 'offspring' service and their capability and utility being constantly chipped away at whereas the Navy at least still had some seriously obvious relevance. It did NOT help that one of Eisenhower's appointees basically told the Navy specifically and the Army by inference that with the advent of the Atomic Bomb and large bombers they were effectively 'obsolete' services which would eventually be disbanded. I love my service but they really were a-holes for most of the early decades of existence both in the Army and as a separate service)
So IF the Navy manages to launch Vanguard before or very soon after Sputnik, (I'm debating on which way to go there as the former very much lessens the 'impact' of Sputnik but while the latter will keep the pressure on it may be 'enough' to get a slow-down in effort, in general I think I won't have such a public 'failure' as it will detract far too much from the Navy PR wise and give the Air Force to much of a boost) they will have 'saved' the US reputation and might be able to ride that public and political good will into a slice of the "space" pie. Despite Air Force efforts to make it a solely Air Force show.
See it occur to me with some butterflied changes added on top of no Von Braun, (dead in the car crash as the OP suggestion would have to far ranging an effect) such as having Eisenhower 'out' somewhere between 1954 and 1957 and Nixon having to step in which would give the Navy a friendly ear in the White House. If you don't have the TV3 spectacular, (and very public) failure then LBJ has a bit less political ammo and no Ike means less emphasis on a 'civilian' space program. Downside is the Navy has basically nothing to follow up Vanguard and when the Air Force gets the SCORE Atlas-B up in late 1958 there will be little to stop them from pushing through a version of "Man In Space Soonest" and with people like Bernard Schriever managing the program I wouldn't be at all surprised with them hitting the 1960/early-1961 launch date.
Now the idea is not to directly take away from the Air Force effort which would cause delays and cause public and private flare ups of the inter-service rivalry everyone knows is there but no one talks about. (And the 'history' shows that in the courts of public and political opinion the Air Force tends to win more often than not when confronted directly. Yet the Air Force is subject to hubris and complacency as well ) If ARPA were to be directed to allow the Navy to carry out "supplemental" testing using "non-critical" (aka nothing that would affect Atlas or Titan work) resources up to and including sub-orbital testing of components and systems in support of the Air Force orbital effort. And hey, look at that, North American Aviation has a bunch of completed and partially completed boosters for the canceled Navaho program that are just going to be scrapped anyway because the Air Force can't/won't use them. (Get Stormy onboard by noting it's still a work-load even if it's not the whole X15B/Navaho he'd proposed and can he really afford to be THAT choosy?)
Now this can take some interesting twists and turns from here, but while the Air Force will definitely complain and try and block the Navy they are still getting, (or at least seeming to as they plan on getting all launch activities under their wing but there is already building friction between the 'regular' Air Force and the group working with the CIA on actual spy satellite design and launch capability) the majority of what they want and even if the Navy gets some good PR out of it it will be the Air Force that puts an American in space... Or will it?
Randy
Does it lead to a space race between the USAF and the USN?
Maybe?
After all the USAF and USN already had significant 'bad-blood' from the cancellation of the USS America, Revolt of the Admirals, and both loss of funding and loss of prestige to the "upstart" new service.(In many ways the Army was in worse shape having been completely overshadowed by their 'offspring' service and their capability and utility being constantly chipped away at whereas the Navy at least still had some seriously obvious relevance. It did NOT help that one of Eisenhower's appointees basically told the Navy specifically and the Army by inference that with the advent of the Atomic Bomb and large bombers they were effectively 'obsolete' services which would eventually be disbanded. I love my service but they really were a-holes for most of the early decades of existence both in the Army and as a separate service)
So IF the Navy manages to launch Vanguard before or very soon after Sputnik, (I'm debating on which way to go there as the former very much lessens the 'impact' of Sputnik but while the latter will keep the pressure on it may be 'enough' to get a slow-down in effort, in general I think I won't have such a public 'failure' as it will detract far too much from the Navy PR wise and give the Air Force to much of a boost) they will have 'saved' the US reputation and might be able to ride that public and political good will into a slice of the "space" pie. Despite Air Force efforts to make it a solely Air Force show.
See it occur to me with some butterflied changes added on top of no Von Braun, (dead in the car crash as the OP suggestion would have to far ranging an effect) such as having Eisenhower 'out' somewhere between 1954 and 1957 and Nixon having to step in which would give the Navy a friendly ear in the White House. If you don't have the TV3 spectacular, (and very public) failure then LBJ has a bit less political ammo and no Ike means less emphasis on a 'civilian' space program. Downside is the Navy has basically nothing to follow up Vanguard and when the Air Force gets the SCORE Atlas-B up in late 1958 there will be little to stop them from pushing through a version of "Man In Space Soonest" and with people like Bernard Schriever managing the program I wouldn't be at all surprised with them hitting the 1960/early-1961 launch date.
Now the idea is not to directly take away from the Air Force effort which would cause delays and cause public and private flare ups of the inter-service rivalry everyone knows is there but no one talks about. (And the 'history' shows that in the courts of public and political opinion the Air Force tends to win more often than not when confronted directly. Yet the Air Force is subject to hubris and complacency as well
) If ARPA were to be directed to allow the Navy to carry out "supplemental" testing using "non-critical" (aka nothing that would affect Atlas or Titan work) resources up to and including sub-orbital testing of components and systems in support of the Air Force orbital effort. And hey, look at that, North American Aviation has a bunch of completed and partially completed boosters for the canceled Navaho program that are just going to be scrapped anyway because the Air Force can't/won't use them. (Get Stormy onboard by noting it's still a work-load even if it's not the whole X15B/Navaho he'd proposed and can he really afford to be THAT choosy?)Now this can take some interesting twists and turns from here, but while the Air Force will definitely complain and try and block the Navy they are still getting, (or at least seeming to as they plan on getting all launch activities under their wing but there is already building friction between the 'regular' Air Force and the group working with the CIA on actual spy satellite design and launch capability) the majority of what they want and even if the Navy gets some good PR out of it it will be the Air Force that puts an American in space... Or will it?
Randy
Would not surprise me at all, they all were 'planning' on being players even if they couldn't get Washington to "buy" it. (Literally
)And they couldn't NOT respond to each others attempts at cornering the market either. Hence the Navy's "HATV" study begot the Air Force's "Word Circling Spaceship" which begot the Army's "Project Horizon" which begot, the Air Force's "Project LUNEX" and on and on. And despite all that long range rockets STILL came in at the bottom of the priority list until way to late.
Randy
Now this can take some interesting twists and turns from here, but while the Air Force will definitely complain and try and block the Navy they are still getting, (or at least seeming to as they plan on getting all launch activities under their wing but there is already building friction between the 'regular' Air Force and the group working with the CIA on actual spy satellite design and launch capability) the majority of what they want and even if the Navy gets some good PR out of it it will be the Air Force that puts an American in space... Or will it?
I imagine the navy would be most interested in observation satellites - robotic or manned.
I wonder if the USN could get the CIA and NRO to work with them?
It would be interesting to see Polaris turned into a LV.
I also wonder if the navy would pursue something like the Nike system to defend its bases from nuclear attack (and to get more funding for navy rocketry).
fasquardon
For awhile, they did try to push Talos for land based SAM, but that decision in 1956 to give long range missiles to the USAF and under 100 mile missiles to the Army. So Army got that program, and shut it down since it competed with Nike Hercules. USAF kept BOMARC, though, as it pass that range cut-off
The Radar for that Land Talos did end up with NASA for tracking Mercury missions
In an ATL where the Army isn't competing for rocketry, could the navy perhaps end up with short range rockets?
Doesn't seem the most natural division of labour between the USAF and the USN in rocketry though...
fasquardon
Fasquadron wrote:
Actually they had a higher interest in communications, navigation and weather satellites than straight-up observation. Both weather and observation required a way to return high quantities of data which early on was difficult and the Navy had a lot of experience with doing both with aircraft. (And a very good reason to continue to do so as it supported carrier operations) The Air Force was only 'interested' in observation in a general way, (again the difference between the ones actually working on the problem and those who are using the problem to justify keeping all the capability) mostly for target and threat location and identification. The Army was interested in tactical observation which didn't lend itself well to satellites at the time though they shared the Navy's interest in tactical, theater, global communications.
Most of the services had sections that were tasked with and worked with the CIA to gather and disseminate intelligence. The Air Force had a closer and more 'dedicated' as aircraft were initially the most capable vehicles for gathering direct observational data. In truth the segment of the Air Force that had already been working closely with the CIA and what would become the NRO had been doing so as far back as the late 40s through Project Mogul and reconnaissance activities carried out with more conventional aircraft. These are the folks who worked the military and support side of the U2 and later SR71 programs and transitioned later into satellite observation. The Navy had begun some work in 1957/58 on what we'd title today as "quick-response" mini-satellites using air-launching and off-the-shelf solid boosters through Project Pilot and Caleb but Air Force pressure, (as this threatened their attempts to be the sole military launch provider) caused the effort to be dropped. (The Air Force ended up 'loosing' to the combined military/CIA organization that became the NRO. Nominally the Air Force does the launching but in reality they have little 'say' over the requirements and operations)
With some support, (and less kowtowing to the Air Force in general) we could see an expansion of the Navy effort, (since they were also working on advanced sensor systems which were continued OTL but separate from the launch program we can assume similar success) which will draw interest.
Part of the difficulty of trying to write a credible TL for this idea is that you have to fight two major factors of the Air Forces generally successful attempts from about 1947, (while still the Army Air Force) to the late-50s to gather all long-range strategic nuclear attack capability into themselves while generally gutting as much as possible the other services ability to deliver any significant offensive nuclear capability, airpower, or ability to project force beyond artillery range. The second is the political situation that both encouraged the Air Force to take on most of the responsibility of being the United States' primary defense arm and then enabled them before attempting to curtail and re-balance the defense policy of the US.
Everything from Truman's obsessive focus on domestic policy and funding frugality, to Eisenhower who's "fear" of the MIC but appointment and support of advisors and policy makers who were eager to expand it as much as possible ensured that would become the standard of operations, were based on an idea of finding a way to allow fighting any future 'war' as cheap as possible to maintain while being devastating should it come about. The problem was, as later proven, the 'all-or-nothing' concept doesn't leave much political or military flexibility to deal with situations SHORT of total war. To make this 'work' you have to stop or at least slow the amount of influence and "power" the Air Force gets during this period.
But, (no surprise ) it's tricky to get the proper 'progress' without majorly upsetting the flow so... At this point I think Nixon taking over for Ike somewhere after 1954-ish is a good starting point.
(To be honest I've already pretty much decided that any full-up "Alt-Space" time line I do is going to have to put Dewey in for Truman as at least HE planned on increasing military spending whereas Truman took his victory as a sign Americans wanted him to continue favoring domestic spending over military which is what forced most of the early missile programs to be canceled)
An early "Minotaur" type LV? Not sure how good it would be or the overall "case" for it. What are you thinking?
As marathag noted but the idea was to use the Talos as an interim land-based long range AAM until the Bomarc came online but the Air Force wasn't that interested. Then when the split was made and all point-defense assigned to the Army and non-point defense to the Air Force the Navy dropped the program. Talos had about half the Bomarc's range but was about half the size and a third the cost. The other limitation to the early design was command and control against multiple targets. The main issue is it probably won't help Navy ROCKETS all that much as its main component was a ramjet Note that this was actually credited as a reason for its success and long life as the attack pattern with the ramjet had the missile normally coming in from ABOVE the target rather than below as pilots were trained to look for.
As an aside the Bomarc never really made a lot of sense to me as it's basically an expendable interceptor designed to take out a packed formation of bombers which the Air Force at the time had already decided wasn't a viable way to attack with nuclear weapons. It really wasn't a cost effective weapon for the purpose it was built. I've thought it might have been 'better' as an interim cruise missile design rather than an interceptor missile, you can get almost 1000 miles range if you really work at it.
Randy
Actually they had a higher interest in communications, navigation and weather satellites than straight-up observation. Both weather and observation required a way to return high quantities of data which early on was difficult and the Navy had a lot of experience with doing both with aircraft. (And a very good reason to continue to do so as it supported carrier operations) The Air Force was only 'interested' in observation in a general way, (again the difference between the ones actually working on the problem and those who are using the problem to justify keeping all the capability) mostly for target and threat location and identification. The Army was interested in tactical observation which didn't lend itself well to satellites at the time though they shared the Navy's interest in tactical, theater, global communications.
Most of the services had sections that were tasked with and worked with the CIA to gather and disseminate intelligence. The Air Force had a closer and more 'dedicated' as aircraft were initially the most capable vehicles for gathering direct observational data. In truth the segment of the Air Force that had already been working closely with the CIA and what would become the NRO had been doing so as far back as the late 40s through Project Mogul and reconnaissance activities carried out with more conventional aircraft. These are the folks who worked the military and support side of the U2 and later SR71 programs and transitioned later into satellite observation. The Navy had begun some work in 1957/58 on what we'd title today as "quick-response" mini-satellites using air-launching and off-the-shelf solid boosters through Project Pilot and Caleb but Air Force pressure, (as this threatened their attempts to be the sole military launch provider) caused the effort to be dropped. (The Air Force ended up 'loosing' to the combined military/CIA organization that became the NRO. Nominally the Air Force does the launching but in reality they have little 'say' over the requirements and operations)
With some support, (and less kowtowing to the Air Force in general) we could see an expansion of the Navy effort, (since they were also working on advanced sensor systems which were continued OTL but separate from the launch program we can assume similar success) which will draw interest.
Part of the difficulty of trying to write a credible TL for this idea is that you have to fight two major factors of the Air Forces generally successful attempts from about 1947, (while still the Army Air Force) to the late-50s to gather all long-range strategic nuclear attack capability into themselves while generally gutting as much as possible the other services ability to deliver any significant offensive nuclear capability, airpower, or ability to project force beyond artillery range. The second is the political situation that both encouraged the Air Force to take on most of the responsibility of being the United States' primary defense arm and then enabled them before attempting to curtail and re-balance the defense policy of the US.
Everything from Truman's obsessive focus on domestic policy and funding frugality, to Eisenhower who's "fear" of the MIC but appointment and support of advisors and policy makers who were eager to expand it as much as possible ensured that would become the standard of operations, were based on an idea of finding a way to allow fighting any future 'war' as cheap as possible to maintain while being devastating should it come about. The problem was, as later proven, the 'all-or-nothing' concept doesn't leave much political or military flexibility to deal with situations SHORT of total war. To make this 'work' you have to stop or at least slow the amount of influence and "power" the Air Force gets during this period.
But, (no surprise
) it's tricky to get the proper 'progress' without majorly upsetting the flow so... At this point I think Nixon taking over for Ike somewhere after 1954-ish is a good starting point.(To be honest I've already pretty much decided that any full-up "Alt-Space" time line I do is going to have to put Dewey in for Truman as at least HE planned on increasing military spending whereas Truman took his victory as a sign Americans wanted him to continue favoring domestic spending over military which is what forced most of the early missile programs to be canceled)
An early "Minotaur" type LV? Not sure how good it would be or the overall "case" for it. What are you thinking?
As marathag noted but the idea was to use the Talos as an interim land-based long range AAM until the Bomarc came online but the Air Force wasn't that interested. Then when the split was made and all point-defense assigned to the Army and non-point defense to the Air Force the Navy dropped the program. Talos had about half the Bomarc's range but was about half the size and a third the cost. The other limitation to the early design was command and control against multiple targets. The main issue is it probably won't help Navy ROCKETS all that much as its main component was a ramjet
Note that this was actually credited as a reason for its success and long life as the attack pattern with the ramjet had the missile normally coming in from ABOVE the target rather than below as pilots were trained to look for.As an aside the Bomarc never really made a lot of sense to me as it's basically an expendable interceptor designed to take out a packed formation of bombers which the Air Force at the time had already decided wasn't a viable way to attack with nuclear weapons. It really wasn't a cost effective weapon for the purpose it was built. I've thought it might have been 'better' as an interim cruise missile design rather than an interceptor missile, you can get almost 1000 miles range if you really work at it.
Randy
Marathag wrote:
Wasn't it the basis of the Mini-Trac tracking system?
Fasquadron wrote:
To be clear I don't see the Army as 'not-competing' for rocketry but not competing DIRCTLY against the Air Force for long range rockets which they did OTL once they started work on the Redstone and Jupiter. The Army would still want "tactical" long range rockets capable of carrying nuclear warheads but they would have other fish to fry with less overt support for the Air Force over everyone else as was the case OTL. (They had significant issues with planned Air Force support on a tactical and battlefield level as the Air Force wasn't really PLANNING on supporting them! And all the services had issues with the Air Force control of the "Military Air Transport Service" as it was focused specifically on Air Force needs rather than the needs of the various other services)
In a 'logical' world I'd argue the Army should end up with ICBMs not the Air Force and all the services would have a share of the air-space defense mission. Then again I'd let the Army keep close air support and have a separate transport service rather than one controlled by a single service as well. The grab for missions by the Air Force seems to be based on the philosophy/history of trying to be a separate "air service" ever since WWI and finally getting it along with enough support to have it all go to one's head. Considering the Air Force's "hero" is Billy Mitchell who frankly wanted to not only have a separate "Air Service" that controlled ALL US military air power, (as per the British model which he worshipped it seems) but one in which he was in charge of, it makes some sense to see where the whole mess started.
The other problem OTL was the actual planning around both nuclear weapons and missiles which varied from service to service with multiple overlapping 'missions' as well. In general the Army was focused on supporting infantry in the field both in defense and offensive actions. The Navy was focused on attaining and maintaining sea superiority to limit enemy Navy ability and trade. The Air Force was focused mostly on strategic delivery of (supposedly) accurate firepower to enemy industrial and military infrastructure to end their ability to make war.
Seems pretty straight forward but add in nuclear weapons and things get "difficult" especially if politicians, policy, makers and other leaders are trying to find a way to have the "most" defense for the "least" amount of money and you are at a point where the fundamentals of warfare have changed. The Army had won WWII by using overwhelming local control of the air and massive direct air support used in a tactical manner. The Navy had won WWII by using overwhelming local and long range control of the air to destroy and deter enemy combatants followed up by application of highly concentrated fire power used in direct tactical support of ground and air elements and the total control of the sea above, on and below the surface of the ocean. The Air Force had won WWII by massive application of long range strategic bombing to reduce the enemies infrastructure and military capability, attaining and maintaining local and strategic control of the air over the battlefield and enemy nations and applying overwhelming firepower delivered by aircraft to specific tactical and strategic targets. (Oh and were the only service capable of delivering nuclear weapons by the end of WWII)
So it is quite obvious who was responsible for winning WWII...
(If you answered that trick question you're obviously biased )
The end point which WAS obvious to everyone in 1946 was generally that:
1) The Atomic bomb won the war
2) The Air Force was the only service capable of delivering A-bombs to targets
Therefor the Air Force needs to get the lion's share of what funding there is and the other services are left with the scraps. This in no way contributes to a "humble-and-cooperative" Air Force and the trend continued though the late-50s.
Injecting some sense and avoiding panic as a policy would help a lot, but then again that's an American way of life
Randy
Wasn't it the basis of the Mini-Trac tracking system?
Fasquadron wrote:
To be clear I don't see the Army as 'not-competing' for rocketry but not competing DIRCTLY against the Air Force for long range rockets which they did OTL once they started work on the Redstone and Jupiter. The Army would still want "tactical" long range rockets capable of carrying nuclear warheads but they would have other fish to fry with less overt support for the Air Force over everyone else as was the case OTL. (They had significant issues with planned Air Force support on a tactical and battlefield level as the Air Force wasn't really PLANNING on supporting them! And all the services had issues with the Air Force control of the "Military Air Transport Service" as it was focused specifically on Air Force needs rather than the needs of the various other services)
In a 'logical' world I'd argue the Army should end up with ICBMs not the Air Force and all the services would have a share of the air-space defense mission. Then again I'd let the Army keep close air support and have a separate transport service rather than one controlled by a single service as well. The grab for missions by the Air Force seems to be based on the philosophy/history of trying to be a separate "air service" ever since WWI and finally getting it along with enough support to have it all go to one's head. Considering the Air Force's "hero" is Billy Mitchell who frankly wanted to not only have a separate "Air Service" that controlled ALL US military air power, (as per the British model which he worshipped it seems) but one in which he was in charge of, it makes some sense to see where the whole mess started.
The other problem OTL was the actual planning around both nuclear weapons and missiles which varied from service to service with multiple overlapping 'missions' as well. In general the Army was focused on supporting infantry in the field both in defense and offensive actions. The Navy was focused on attaining and maintaining sea superiority to limit enemy Navy ability and trade. The Air Force was focused mostly on strategic delivery of (supposedly) accurate firepower to enemy industrial and military infrastructure to end their ability to make war.
Seems pretty straight forward but add in nuclear weapons and things get "difficult" especially if politicians, policy, makers and other leaders are trying to find a way to have the "most" defense for the "least" amount of money and you are at a point where the fundamentals of warfare have changed. The Army had won WWII by using overwhelming local control of the air and massive direct air support used in a tactical manner. The Navy had won WWII by using overwhelming local and long range control of the air to destroy and deter enemy combatants followed up by application of highly concentrated fire power used in direct tactical support of ground and air elements and the total control of the sea above, on and below the surface of the ocean. The Air Force had won WWII by massive application of long range strategic bombing to reduce the enemies infrastructure and military capability, attaining and maintaining local and strategic control of the air over the battlefield and enemy nations and applying overwhelming firepower delivered by aircraft to specific tactical and strategic targets. (Oh and were the only service capable of delivering nuclear weapons by the end of WWII)
So it is quite obvious who was responsible for winning WWII...
(If you answered that trick question you're obviously biased
)The end point which WAS obvious to everyone in 1946 was generally that:
1) The Atomic bomb won the war
2) The Air Force was the only service capable of delivering A-bombs to targets
Therefor the Air Force needs to get the lion's share of what funding there is and the other services are left with the scraps. This in no way contributes to a "humble-and-cooperative" Air Force and the trend continued though the late-50s.
Injecting some sense and avoiding panic as a policy would help a lot, but then again that's an American way of life
Randy
Pretty much an equivalent rocket that could launch between 500kg and 5 tonnes (so enough for satellites or at the very most a Mercury-style manned capsule, which is the most I can imagine the navy being interested in at first - no point in trying to run before they can walk when the USAF is getting all the R&D money).
A minotaur equivalent could be made like this:
1st stage: 3 or 4 clustered stretched Polaris 1st stages (289 kN thrust each, compared to the Minotaur 1st stage thrust of 935 kN)
2nd stage: 1 stretched Polaris 1st stage (289 kN thrust, Minotaur 2nd stage is 268 kN)
3rd stage: Vangard 1st stage with 135 kN thrust (Minotaur 3rd stage is 118 kN)
4th stage: Vangard 2nd stage with 33.8 kN thrust (Minotaur 4th stage 34.8 kN)
Should be able to launch a bit more into LEO than the 580kg the Minotaur I can launch.
That said, I'm very dubious that such a rocket would have any room for growth. Such a thing wouldn't be any challenge to the USAF and thus perhaps more likely to be built, but it would not be a system that you could use for a USAF/USN space race.
I was counting weather satellites as observation sats (different type of observation, of course).
Good point about coms and navigation though.
fasquardon
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The RCA AN/FPS-16 Monopulse Tracking Radar, still in use at Vandenberg AFB for tracking.
Thanks
Part of the 'story' is finding a plausible way for the Air Force NOT to get all the R&D money and the Navy to get part. As you note it's going to be very limited launch system which is actually a problem as the idea is to get the USAF and Navy. In OTL they Navy got the nod for the early satellite program due to both a very limited LV, (Vanguard) which had no "military" background and very limited payload built by an organization, (Naval Research Laboratory) which most considered more 'civilian-science' then 'military-science' orientated. That being said while the "big" competition was between the Army and Air Force due to ABMA on the one side and ARDC/AS on the other the Navy DID propose and study various very aggressive and long-range space programs but never had much chance of getting funding or support. If we assume that without VB and most of his team, (which would rapidly have been dispersed to industry or back to Germany/Europe) that the Army doesn't move as aggressively towards large, long-range missiles as they did OTL then the Air Force is going to be a lot more complacent and less likely to have been as aggressive in opposing what they might see as a non-threatening Naval space program.
(Specifically given the cooperation that happened in later "X-plane" programs)
With some inner Washington 'help', (especially if Vanguard isn't as spectacularly a failure as OTL which it might not have been given better and earlier support) a credible Navy space effort becomes possible which can be used to both spur the Air Force effort and trim it's power as a counter balance.
They are going to have to have a better LV than something based on Polaris or Vanguard though...
Wanted to make sure we were on the same page
And they specifically needed ocean weather data AND accurate navigation data to support the Polaris Subs once they came online where as most of the focus by the Air Force and what became the NRO was on direct observation from space to replace similar reconnaissance capability from manned aircraft. You can get away with lower resolution and lower data transfer rates with former where as you really need to have higher resolution and fast data return for the latter. At the time though the Navy had the most advanced micro-electronics where as the Air Force/CIA had the most advanced optical systems based on aircraft systems. But the Navy wasn't that far behind in some advanced areas such as infrared and radio/radar sensors specifically because they had more space/power constraints than the Air Force did. (Falcon versus Sidewinder is a great example)Somewhere in my notes, or articles is a mention that when "New Look" was being proposed the Air Force embraced it, especially with the idea of massive retaliation against civilian targets, (because missiles just were not that accurate) but one Navy Admiral called the idea 'disgusting' because it was an obvious choice of 'easier-and-cheaper' rather than trying to improve systems to the point where they could hit actual military targets. In this the Navy and Army's views were similar and opposite of the Air Force in regards to missiles. Both the Navy and Army wanted accurate missiles rather than general area-effect weapons where as the Air Force simply assumed that missiles would never be as accurate as manned bombers and therefore assigned missile guidance a lower priority. (The Army had an advantage in that they could accurately survey and 'locate' the missile before firing and so ensure pretty accurate targeting. The Air Force as noted didn't really bother while the Navy would not 'know' where they were launching from accurately until the advent of much more sophisticated satellite navigation capability)
On the other hand the Soviets simply didn't have the necessary tech to be highly accurate with their missiles so tended towards larger warheads to compensate. Tactical, and short range missiles were more accurate for the same reason as the Army missiles but neither strategic nor naval missiles were going to be accurate enough to do more than hit in the general area even using nuclear warheads. So I don't think it the Navy's point on accuracy can be used to garner public or political support unless, (for example) Nixon and Khrushchev come to an early agreement which favors fewer, more accurate missiles over quantity of warheads. Something to think about.
Randy
Fasquadron wrote:
My "take" would be 'stretching' Polaris moves it too far away from production and while clustering is possible I'd think it may be too much effort for the pay-off. Yes the 'goal' is to have a possible Navy manned space mission but any way you look at it they would need something "outside" the box they have to make it happen. There are probably ways to 'upgrade' Vanguard, (OTL they went from 1.5kg to 23kg in the end with some minimal modifications) but I suspect somewhere around 30kg is its limit. I plugged some numbers into Silverbird for a notional Polaris based minimum launch vehicle but it limits me to only 3 stages where as I'm assuming at least 4:
Polaris stages 1 and 2, clustered Altair-1 third, (5 each) and forth (3 each) stages.
As noted Silverbird only allowed me three stages which gave an estimated 33/35kg to 40kg-ish to LEO but I'm going to assume at least half-again with a fourth stage so 60kg-80kg at least with all solids, maybe some more with Vanguard-legacy liquid parts which I haven't calculated yet.
But eventually we're going to get a "new" LV along the lines of the Scout which as we know will cover from 59kg to over 200kg, and we need to keep in mind there were other 'interim' launcher possibilities around as well. For example the "Little Joe" was originally conceived as a very basic, cheap, minimum space launch vehicle and kludging solids together was fairly 'easy' as long as you kept it simple, (5-9 Sargent motors depending on the mission requirements) and there was concept for a combined Little Joe/Minuteman LV so I should play with LJ/Polaris as an idea. On the other hand I don't think they Navy is going to get very far by depending on solids for main propulsion if they plan on launching larger satellites and people
But while the Navy doesn't have significant 'native' LV program they could, (with support) develop some interesting possible options. As I noted they could "take-over" the ex-Navaho boosters for 'testing' and I would believe that North American Aviation would not be overly concerned to get the extra work. After that I'd imagine that there would be some Air Force 'resistance' to expanding Navy launch capability but I also recall that around 1960 Robert Truax, and John Draim were demonstrating and proposing "ocean" launch with Project Hydra. Some demonstrations using the Polaris or Vanguard based LVs would keep the Navy in the spotlight and avoid issues with building new launch pads, (Something the Air Force 'technically' controlled at the Cape and where they could cause problems if they got the mind) and might have some operational and logistical advantages for polar orbital insertion in the near term. (According to Draim's later 1980s MX study's they pretty much established that while it wasn't a very good concept operationally/logistically/strategically for actual missile launch as a low-cost, high pace launch operational concept it was pretty damn good especially if you had really cheap LVs as a basis)
Given enough positive PR and support, (and no NASA) I'd give the Navy an even shot to manage to gain at least a few 'firsts' before the Air Force if someone organizes and pushes the program which I'm still open to suggestions on who I can use to do that
Randy
My "take" would be 'stretching' Polaris moves it too far away from production and while clustering is possible I'd think it may be too much effort for the pay-off. Yes the 'goal' is to have a possible Navy manned space mission but any way you look at it they would need something "outside" the box they have to make it happen. There are probably ways to 'upgrade' Vanguard, (OTL they went from 1.5kg to 23kg in the end with some minimal modifications) but I suspect somewhere around 30kg is its limit. I plugged some numbers into Silverbird for a notional Polaris based minimum launch vehicle but it limits me to only 3 stages where as I'm assuming at least 4:
Polaris stages 1 and 2, clustered Altair-1 third, (5 each) and forth (3 each) stages.
As noted Silverbird only allowed me three stages which gave an estimated 33/35kg to 40kg-ish to LEO but I'm going to assume at least half-again with a fourth stage so 60kg-80kg at least with all solids, maybe some more with Vanguard-legacy liquid parts which I haven't calculated yet.
But eventually we're going to get a "new" LV along the lines of the Scout which as we know will cover from 59kg to over 200kg, and we need to keep in mind there were other 'interim' launcher possibilities around as well. For example the "Little Joe" was originally conceived as a very basic, cheap, minimum space launch vehicle and kludging solids together was fairly 'easy' as long as you kept it simple, (5-9 Sargent motors depending on the mission requirements) and there was concept for a combined Little Joe/Minuteman LV so I should play with LJ/Polaris as an idea. On the other hand I don't think they Navy is going to get very far by depending on solids for main propulsion if they plan on launching larger satellites and people
But while the Navy doesn't have significant 'native' LV program they could, (with support) develop some interesting possible options. As I noted they could "take-over" the ex-Navaho boosters for 'testing' and I would believe that North American Aviation would not be overly concerned to get the extra work. After that I'd imagine that there would be some Air Force 'resistance' to expanding Navy launch capability but I also recall that around 1960 Robert Truax, and John Draim were demonstrating and proposing "ocean" launch with Project Hydra. Some demonstrations using the Polaris or Vanguard based LVs would keep the Navy in the spotlight and avoid issues with building new launch pads, (Something the Air Force 'technically' controlled at the Cape and where they could cause problems if they got the mind) and might have some operational and logistical advantages for polar orbital insertion in the near term. (According to Draim's later 1980s MX study's they pretty much established that while it wasn't a very good concept operationally/logistically/strategically for actual missile launch as a low-cost, high pace launch operational concept it was pretty damn good especially if you had really cheap LVs as a basis)
Given enough positive PR and support, (and no NASA) I'd give the Navy an even shot to manage to gain at least a few 'firsts' before the Air Force if someone organizes and pushes the program which I'm still open to suggestions on who I can use to do that
Randy
Wallops Island gets built up more?
It's not ideal, not far off from Vandenberg AFB but way closer to the Equator than Baikonur
Did the Navy have other cruise missile engines and tanks that they could convert to a rocket?
And what would a missile made of Navaho boosters look like?
Bob Truax being the ideas man for a Navy space program is a fun idea. I don't think much of Sea Dragon as a launch system (it's too damn big and the unknowns in the design could throw up some nasty surprises), but I like the design principals Truax worked to. Rockets in the 1-100 tonne-to-LEO bracket built to Truax's principals could, I think, be very good.
Hmm. How about this: Truax proposes a sea-launched ICBM (the advantage of sea launch of course, being that it would be darn hard for the Soviets to find the ICBMs, while the navy having ICBMs based at sea would both make for an unambiguous "water" nuclear delivery system to keep the system out of the AF's hands and would give the navy a counter argument to "but your submarine based systems are too weak and too inaccurate to do what they claim"), gets some money for it, and this allows the Navy to build a rocket that is competitive with Atlas and Titan.
fasquardon
Marathag wrote:
Well considering certain people within NACA, (later NASA) had originally intended to launch suborbital manned spaceflights from there I could see any TL without the obsessive focus on the Moon under a single agency like OTL setting up more than one launch site I believe, (IIRC) that Wallops is size limited but it was proposed for everything from manned suborbital flights using "Little Joe" type clustered solids to Space Station delivery of supplies by Scout so I don't see why it wouldn't be utilized. "More" is a question but I note that the Navy established the Surface Combat Systems Center there early on for radar and electronics testing so if they have to have their own launch site that'd be a possible site.
Politically in order to get LBJ buy-in it might behoove someone to court Texas as a launch site. Matagorda and Padre were suggested OTL.
Fasquadron wrote:
Not really, which was one of the main problems as OTL the 'big' engines were being developed under Army and Air Force contracts but with the Army less involved there's a way the Navy can get a foot in. The Navy was rapidly moving away from liquid propellants due to the results of early testing in Nevada where liquid propellants were intentionally detonated on and over ship structures with significant damage.
That's not to say the Navy would be adverse to keeping its hand in but with the limited budget and support between Truman and Eisenhower choices had to be made. TTL, especially if you have some of the butterflies I've mentioned, the Navy gets some leeway to stay more involved.
The engine(s) are the key as tankage is actually pretty "easy" though both the Navy and Army had a more 'government' run system so you'd have a less 'lead-contractor' based operation, (though by the late 50s most of the military R&D and procurement was heading in that direction anyway, hence the "MIC" fears of Eisenhower) but with the right motivation, leadership, and support you can drive through a project on a reasonable timetable. You're looking at an airframe/tankage built around existing or very near-term engines which at the time was pretty much the motors for the Navaho, Atlas and Titan in some sort of cluster configuration with the tankage to feed them and an airframe to carry them. Since 'technically' all those engines are under Air Force control getting them to the Navy is going to be difficult. Difficult but not impossible as it can be argued that using the Navaho engines and parts will not affect either the Atlas or Titan program and depending on the assumptions, (one I'm tentatively considering since the Navy plays a larger part than OTL is they manage to get the Douglas D-558-III as the X-15 instead of the North American design, see: http://www.astronautix.com/d/d-558-3.html) NAA is really desperate for some more work. "Fun" part here is NAA was also chosen to build the Little Joe test vehicle and there's no reason not to assume they might very well use that as a 'basis' for an airframe you can install tankage and extend as needed with clustered engines to get the performance you need. Not exactly the "Saturn-1" but...
An LV? Well it was proposed to cluster three or four and an X-15 mounted in place of the actual Navaho.
See: http://www.astronautix.com/n/navahox-15.html
http://astronautix.com/x/x-15b.html
But that's of course just a 'first-concept' take and the first 'obvious' change would be modification of the tankage/airframe to hold more propellant. (I can't find any good discussion of the overall "plan" for this concept but it would appear that two or three of the four 'boosters' are lit on the pad while the last one pushes the X-15 to a point where its own engine can put it into a single-orbit trajectory. Single and clustered G-26 boosters would be used to push the X-15 higher and faster, and then later G-38's to orbital speed)
"Quick-and-dirty" you would initially use up the in-warehouse G-26s in various configurations while completing the initial run of G-38s, probably with re-built/designed forward sections to carry more propellant. Off-hand I'd say there's going to be aerodynamic issues with the concept launch configuration and stability but I could see it reaching Mach-7-ish (which would be a serious problem with the X-15 anyway) but if they didn't insist on a 'lifting/winged' vehicle a capsule or lifting body design might turn out with better performance before you have to move away from the 'side/top' mount configuration. Less-changes obviously means less costs and R&D time.
Eventually if you keep going with a basic G-26/38 design as a basis, (see: http://www.astronautix.com/graphics/n/navg26br.jpg) you end up with a more full 'cylinder' design looking like a twin engine, (G-26) or three engine (G-38) Thor or Jupiter like vehicle. Then you can go either with 'clustered' separate vehicles or more likely the evolution goes towards actual clustered tanks ala-Saturn-1 with a new thrust structure all together. Or as I noted above you can use the Little Joe as a baseline for airframe/tankage and cluster engines to get an LV.
Understatement much? Oh heck yes it would be!
Well the problems with the Sea Dragon are manifest, but in the main it only works if you have a REALLY, REALLY, REALLY high demand for payload to orbit BUT, (and this is actually exactly opposite of what Truax thought as he decried anything LESS than Sea Dragon as 'un-economical' which is why he referred to the 1/2-1/3-rd size Sea Dragon concept called "Excalibur" he work on for NASA as "Sub-caliber" ) floating launch LVs around the throw-weight you suggest are actually the more useful concept. Hence the "Aquarius" concept, (http://astronautix.com/a/aquarius.html) of the 90s which while quite interesting, (they actually developed the 'vortex' engine and it's amazing) trying to combine 'cheap' (as in accepting a high un-reliability/failure rate) with a high launch rate AND high operations cost, (LOX/LH2 and SSTO) didn't make all that much sense even for the proposed 'grocery service' operations plan. (Frankly the original "Neptune" 1.5 STO concept from Interorbital Services, and propellant combination of LOX/LNG, are more operationally useable) Despite the evidence of his own work, (Seabee, Sea Horse, Dolphin and SEALAR, etc.) Truax remained convinced that Sea Dragon was the really 'viable' concept and everything else was just marking time towards that goal
Draim seems to have gotten the 'point' given his continued advocacy of the launch/operations CONCEPT rather than the VEHICLE as the main point
Er, that's actually the original concept which started the whole process but it was very quickly shown that such launch operations were MORE, (much more actually) vulnerable to Soviet counter measures than submarines. Especially once they had proven underwater launch capability. The Air Force never argued the Navy getting sub-launched IRBMs as there's no actual 'logical' argument that can be made and the capability and operational experience the Navy had was a perfect fit for SLBMs. They immediately ceded the "second strike" mission to the Navy just like they let the Army have tactical/battlefield nuclear capability because they were interested in the overall 'strategic' (and technically "first strike" but that was never actual 'policy' even though it was implied) roles. They had initially opposed Navy and Army development of and deployment of 'competing' systems in the form of large aircraft carriers capable of carrying long-range nuclear bombers, (USS America) and long-range land based missiles, (Army Jupiter) BECAUSE they directly competed for limited funding at a time when the actual role of who would be the 'primary' service for the US military was in question. But they quickly narrowed their focus as technology and doctrine changed. Smaller warheads meant that both the Army and Navy would obviously have delivery capability soon so they narrowed the focus to denying "strategic" roles to either of the other services as official policy became 'deterrent' rather than direct war-fighting. They also focused on gaining for themselves all roles for 'space' related systems and OTL they almost managed it OTL but ended up 'losing' to both NASA, (manned) and the NRO (satellite) due to an unfocused space policy and in-fighting between groups.
That's of course really 'simplified' but the latter issues, (focus and in-fighting) are an opportunity that could be exploited in TTL by the Navy. The idea for TTL version of 'sea-launch' is to exploit the 'advantages' over similar Air Force capability quickly and decisively. For example while the Polaris based LV I exampled above is LESS capable than the Atlas or Titan by launching it at sea operations and per-unit cost could be very much lower allowing more satellites on the same budget. You're also avoiding the payload penalty for the 'dog-leg' that launches from the Cape and Vandenberg require to reach polar orbit. There is also the idea of pushing recovery/reuse which may be easier 'at-sea' as was shown during the Seabee trials so that you get something similar to the Sea Horse or Dolphin/Constellation LV with at least first stage recovery and reuse. (The H1 showed that the worries over ocean recovery and reuse were a lot less than was assumed but this was never pursued OTL to the extent it might have been, and frankly the Navy has all sorts of experience with high-tech equipment and salt water)
Randy
Well considering certain people within NACA, (later NASA) had originally intended to launch suborbital manned spaceflights from there I could see any TL without the obsessive focus on the Moon under a single agency like OTL setting up more than one launch site
I believe, (IIRC) that Wallops is size limited but it was proposed for everything from manned suborbital flights using "Little Joe" type clustered solids to Space Station delivery of supplies by Scout so I don't see why it wouldn't be utilized. "More" is a question but I note that the Navy established the Surface Combat Systems Center there early on for radar and electronics testing so if they have to have their own launch site that'd be a possible site.Politically in order to get LBJ buy-in it might behoove someone to court Texas as a launch site. Matagorda and Padre were suggested OTL.
Fasquadron wrote:
Not really, which was one of the main problems as OTL the 'big' engines were being developed under Army and Air Force contracts but with the Army less involved there's a way the Navy can get a foot in. The Navy was rapidly moving away from liquid propellants due to the results of early testing in Nevada where liquid propellants were intentionally detonated on and over ship structures with significant damage.
That's not to say the Navy would be adverse to keeping its hand in but with the limited budget and support between Truman and Eisenhower choices had to be made. TTL, especially if you have some of the butterflies I've mentioned, the Navy gets some leeway to stay more involved.
The engine(s) are the key as tankage is actually pretty "easy" though both the Navy and Army had a more 'government' run system so you'd have a less 'lead-contractor' based operation, (though by the late 50s most of the military R&D and procurement was heading in that direction anyway, hence the "MIC" fears of Eisenhower) but with the right motivation, leadership, and support you can drive through a project on a reasonable timetable. You're looking at an airframe/tankage built around existing or very near-term engines which at the time was pretty much the motors for the Navaho, Atlas and Titan in some sort of cluster configuration with the tankage to feed them and an airframe to carry them. Since 'technically' all those engines are under Air Force control getting them to the Navy is going to be difficult. Difficult but not impossible as it can be argued that using the Navaho engines and parts will not affect either the Atlas or Titan program and depending on the assumptions, (one I'm tentatively considering since the Navy plays a larger part than OTL is they manage to get the Douglas D-558-III as the X-15 instead of the North American design, see: http://www.astronautix.com/d/d-558-3.html) NAA is really desperate for some more work. "Fun" part here is NAA was also chosen to build the Little Joe test vehicle and there's no reason not to assume they might very well use that as a 'basis' for an airframe you can install tankage and extend as needed with clustered engines to get the performance you need. Not exactly the "Saturn-1" but...
An LV? Well it was proposed to cluster three or four and an X-15 mounted in place of the actual Navaho.
See: http://www.astronautix.com/n/navahox-15.html
http://astronautix.com/x/x-15b.html
But that's of course just a 'first-concept' take and the first 'obvious' change would be modification of the tankage/airframe to hold more propellant. (I can't find any good discussion of the overall "plan" for this concept but it would appear that two or three of the four 'boosters' are lit on the pad while the last one pushes the X-15 to a point where its own engine can put it into a single-orbit trajectory. Single and clustered G-26 boosters would be used to push the X-15 higher and faster, and then later G-38's to orbital speed)
"Quick-and-dirty" you would initially use up the in-warehouse G-26s in various configurations while completing the initial run of G-38s, probably with re-built/designed forward sections to carry more propellant. Off-hand I'd say there's going to be aerodynamic issues with the concept launch configuration and stability but I could see it reaching Mach-7-ish (which would be a serious problem with the X-15 anyway) but if they didn't insist on a 'lifting/winged' vehicle a capsule or lifting body design might turn out with better performance before you have to move away from the 'side/top' mount configuration. Less-changes obviously means less costs and R&D time.
Eventually if you keep going with a basic G-26/38 design as a basis, (see: http://www.astronautix.com/graphics/n/navg26br.jpg) you end up with a more full 'cylinder' design looking like a twin engine, (G-26) or three engine (G-38) Thor or Jupiter like vehicle. Then you can go either with 'clustered' separate vehicles or more likely the evolution goes towards actual clustered tanks ala-Saturn-1 with a new thrust structure all together. Or as I noted above you can use the Little Joe as a baseline for airframe/tankage and cluster engines to get an LV.
Understatement much?
Oh heck yes it would be!Well the problems with the Sea Dragon are manifest, but in the main it only works if you have a REALLY, REALLY, REALLY high demand for payload to orbit BUT, (and this is actually exactly opposite of what Truax thought as he decried anything LESS than Sea Dragon as 'un-economical' which is why he referred to the 1/2-1/3-rd size Sea Dragon concept called "Excalibur" he work on for NASA as "Sub-caliber"
) floating launch LVs around the throw-weight you suggest are actually the more useful concept. Hence the "Aquarius" concept, (http://astronautix.com/a/aquarius.html) of the 90s which while quite interesting, (they actually developed the 'vortex' engine and it's amazing) trying to combine 'cheap' (as in accepting a high un-reliability/failure rate) with a high launch rate AND high operations cost, (LOX/LH2 and SSTO) didn't make all that much sense even for the proposed 'grocery service' operations plan. (Frankly the original "Neptune" 1.5 STO concept from Interorbital Services, and propellant combination of LOX/LNG, are more operationally useable) Despite the evidence of his own work, (Seabee, Sea Horse, Dolphin and SEALAR, etc.) Truax remained convinced that Sea Dragon was the really 'viable' concept and everything else was just marking time towards that goalDraim seems to have gotten the 'point' given his continued advocacy of the launch/operations CONCEPT rather than the VEHICLE as the main point
Er, that's actually the original concept which started the whole process but it was very quickly shown that such launch operations were MORE, (much more actually) vulnerable to Soviet counter measures than submarines. Especially once they had proven underwater launch capability. The Air Force never argued the Navy getting sub-launched IRBMs as there's no actual 'logical' argument that can be made and the capability and operational experience the Navy had was a perfect fit for SLBMs. They immediately ceded the "second strike" mission to the Navy just like they let the Army have tactical/battlefield nuclear capability because they were interested in the overall 'strategic' (and technically "first strike" but that was never actual 'policy' even though it was implied) roles. They had initially opposed Navy and Army development of and deployment of 'competing' systems in the form of large aircraft carriers capable of carrying long-range nuclear bombers, (USS America) and long-range land based missiles, (Army Jupiter) BECAUSE they directly competed for limited funding at a time when the actual role of who would be the 'primary' service for the US military was in question. But they quickly narrowed their focus as technology and doctrine changed. Smaller warheads meant that both the Army and Navy would obviously have delivery capability soon so they narrowed the focus to denying "strategic" roles to either of the other services as official policy became 'deterrent' rather than direct war-fighting. They also focused on gaining for themselves all roles for 'space' related systems and OTL they almost managed it OTL but ended up 'losing' to both NASA, (manned) and the NRO (satellite) due to an unfocused space policy and in-fighting between groups.
That's of course really 'simplified' but the latter issues, (focus and in-fighting) are an opportunity that could be exploited in TTL by the Navy. The idea for TTL version of 'sea-launch' is to exploit the 'advantages' over similar Air Force capability quickly and decisively. For example while the Polaris based LV I exampled above is LESS capable than the Atlas or Titan by launching it at sea operations and per-unit cost could be very much lower allowing more satellites on the same budget. You're also avoiding the payload penalty for the 'dog-leg' that launches from the Cape and Vandenberg require to reach polar orbit. There is also the idea of pushing recovery/reuse which may be easier 'at-sea' as was shown during the Seabee trials so that you get something similar to the Sea Horse or Dolphin/Constellation LV with at least first stage recovery and reuse. (The H1 showed that the worries over ocean recovery and reuse were a lot less than was assumed but this was never pursued OTL to the extent it might have been, and frankly the Navy has all sorts of experience with high-tech equipment and salt water)
Randy
Vandenberg has clear range due south, so it doesn't require a dog-leg to put satellites into polar orbit. That's more or less why it exists...
Now that is fascinating.
Hm. I hadn't realized the Navaho could scale up so well.
The X-15B looks interesting. I wonder if it would have been able to manage re-entry as well as advertised.
The X-15B definitely needs a better way of getting the pilot to the ground though.
I had not thought Truax was quite so monomaniacal.
fasquardon
Workable Goblin wrote:
Well, THAT'S embarrassing... I'm from just north, (and a bit east) of there and saw occasional launches from the back porch/yard and I SHOULD have remembered that...
Fasquadron wrote:
It's really interesting to read the original (1960s) proposal and the later (1980s)MX basing proposals together because except for a very few 'outliers' all the basing concepts were the same with very similar arguments both for and against each concept. In the end you still come away with the "most obvious" given the US situation being subs and silos where as for the USSR/Russia land-mobile/silo actually comes out on top with subs a very secondary.
I should probably expand on WHY the concept was rejected for missile deployment. First and foremost the main operational and doctrinal consideration was basically launching nuclear weapons was a 'one-time-thing' in that there would be no reloading the submarines once they were used. (The Air Force was the same way since silos need extensive repairs once used. Notably the Soviets silos used the 'cold-launch' and could, in theory be reused) So there is little requirement for NOT launching directly from the sub if you can do it. Secondly while the possible 'survival' odds of a submarine that 'laid' missiles and remote launched them is probably higher than one that directly launched it's very much not that clear as there are still some transient sounds from such deployment which a trailing enemy sub could use to target and destroy the deployed missiles which would have no defense whereas on-board a missile sub there is a chance to use on-board systems to evade and/or destroy the trailer. Also each canister/missile would require separate support and control systems that are all-inclusive in a standard missile sub increasing the cost and complexity of the overall system. And command and control would be more vulnerable due to physical separation of the launch command center and the missile.
The other 'option' was to use surface ships to deploy the missiles but that ran head long into the obvious fact that submarines are inherently more 'survivable' (also stealthy, sneaky, harder to track, I could go on ) than surface ships which can be tracked and destroyed by among other assets, enemy submarines. (One of the 'new' arguments for using floating launch for the MX was the idea of using 'disguised' container ships as deployment systems and having them simply 'dump' the canisters/containers overboard when given the launch alert. Nice idea actually but for one thing you couldn't simply use a 'standard' container ship due to the required care and monitoring of a missile which meant non-standard and therefor more 'visible' deployment ships which defeats the purpose. Then there's the fact that while the primary target of attack submarines is enemy missile submarines a very close secondary target is enemy merchant shipping of any stripe and unless you provide a dedicated escort to the missile ship, in which case why not use a purpose built and more capable ship from the start, it's going to be highly vulnerable to attack and destruction anyway)
Lastly the missiles required a variable amount of time to settle and ready for firing. In a missile sub every missile on-board can be ready in a set time and fired in a salvo of close spaced launches with active maneuvering and control of the submarine for stabilization. Separate floating missiles will need to be spaced far enough apart to not interfere with each other on launch and this will add time between deployment and firing during which the missile could be vulnerable to destruction or malfunction.
Still it SOUNDS awesome in theory to be able to 'dump' 60 containers/missiles over the side in under 5 minutes and sail towards the horizon as each one pops out an MX fire minutes later
Fasquadron wrote:
I was pretty surprised as I went through the evolution myself. The Atlas engines are significantly 'better' than those of the Navaho booster in general but the basics are all there and you can do a lot with it if you think about it and don't obsess over the 'bleeding edge' which unfortunately is sometimes a really, really tough to avoid
Probably not as it hadn't actually flown by the time the proposal was made and more significantly it ended up not being able to reach the original goals of the program speed-wise, (Mach-7) and had to be extensively modified to reach Mach-6. (Yes it was seriously damaged in that run but the majority of the damage came from the dummy Scramjet attached on that run not the basic design. Having said that however they had to reinforce and rebuild the airframe because it was having issues at lower speeds already and the need for a different TPS wasn't discovered until flight testing began. And they never did manage a viable thermal coating for sharp surfaces and angles like the X-15) One of the reasons I'm considering having the Navy change heart on backing the Douglas version.
And even if they had managed to make the flight it wouldn't have 'counted' because the pilot didn't LAND in the orbital vehicle This is why the Soviets hid the fact Gagarin ejected before landing. It wouldn't of 'mattered' really but to be recognized under international rules the 'pilot' had to complete the entire journey in his vehicle. Which was based on early air record attempts where things like jettisoning the landing gear at take-off and having 'extra' crew members jump in mid-flight were common in making record attempts. Whereas the Soviets could get away with it, (obviously) there'd be almost no way to 'hide' the fact the way the US was operating. TTL I could see it being considered a bit more seriously but not using the X-15 and with any water landing the 'need' goes away pretty quickly.
And considering the pressure to get 'someone' into space as fast as possible, (a bit more so TTL than OTL even) any plan based on a vehicle that will need a significant development period will rapidly drop off the list of proposals. I think I can make a case for looking into the M1 lifting shape, on the outside maybe the Kellet saucer, but it wouldn't be the primary choice simply due to the lack of hard research data and testing at the time. Really your only 'choice' is a ballistic shape capsule based on warhead (or spy satellite return capsule ) design. I'm thinking the Air Force will probably 'default' to a Corona shape with a man crammed into it so as to avoid any compromise on warhead design information. Which to me leaves a chance for the Navy to propose experimenting with the M1 as a 'maneuverable' reentry shape. One issue is WAS actually under consideration for a maneuvering warhead application which restricted a lot of data and limited testing but since there was the major problem of how to command those maneuver during reentry it kept dropping in and out of classification
Depends on the context really Truax was actually 'monomaniacal' about general access to space as cheaply and available as possible which is what he was always working on concepts for. When it came to cargo lift he was pretty much convinced that you needed to lift as much payload as cheaply as possible per launch and he wasn't really 'wrong' in any assumption just really, really impatient. Sea Dragon is a VERY efficient and economic LV if you NEED that much up-mass on a regular basis, it is however ASB-level crazy UNLESS you already have that requirement and Truax always believed that that 'need' was just around the corner and determined to make it happen.
Arguably not a 'bad' thing to be maniacal about I'd say
Randy
Well, THAT'S embarrassing... I'm from just north, (and a bit east) of there and saw occasional launches from the back porch/yard and I SHOULD have remembered that...
Fasquadron wrote:
It's really interesting to read the original (1960s) proposal and the later (1980s)MX basing proposals together because except for a very few 'outliers' all the basing concepts were the same with very similar arguments both for and against each concept. In the end you still come away with the "most obvious" given the US situation being subs and silos where as for the USSR/Russia land-mobile/silo actually comes out on top with subs a very secondary.
I should probably expand on WHY the concept was rejected for missile deployment. First and foremost the main operational and doctrinal consideration was basically launching nuclear weapons was a 'one-time-thing' in that there would be no reloading the submarines once they were used. (The Air Force was the same way since silos need extensive repairs once used. Notably the Soviets silos used the 'cold-launch' and could, in theory be reused) So there is little requirement for NOT launching directly from the sub if you can do it. Secondly while the possible 'survival' odds of a submarine that 'laid' missiles and remote launched them is probably higher than one that directly launched it's very much not that clear as there are still some transient sounds from such deployment which a trailing enemy sub could use to target and destroy the deployed missiles which would have no defense whereas on-board a missile sub there is a chance to use on-board systems to evade and/or destroy the trailer. Also each canister/missile would require separate support and control systems that are all-inclusive in a standard missile sub increasing the cost and complexity of the overall system. And command and control would be more vulnerable due to physical separation of the launch command center and the missile.
The other 'option' was to use surface ships to deploy the missiles but that ran head long into the obvious fact that submarines are inherently more 'survivable' (also stealthy, sneaky, harder to track, I could go on
) than surface ships which can be tracked and destroyed by among other assets, enemy submarines. (One of the 'new' arguments for using floating launch for the MX was the idea of using 'disguised' container ships as deployment systems and having them simply 'dump' the canisters/containers overboard when given the launch alert. Nice idea actually but for one thing you couldn't simply use a 'standard' container ship due to the required care and monitoring of a missile which meant non-standard and therefor more 'visible' deployment ships which defeats the purpose. Then there's the fact that while the primary target of attack submarines is enemy missile submarines a very close secondary target is enemy merchant shipping of any stripe and unless you provide a dedicated escort to the missile ship, in which case why not use a purpose built and more capable ship from the start, it's going to be highly vulnerable to attack and destruction anyway)Lastly the missiles required a variable amount of time to settle and ready for firing. In a missile sub every missile on-board can be ready in a set time and fired in a salvo of close spaced launches with active maneuvering and control of the submarine for stabilization. Separate floating missiles will need to be spaced far enough apart to not interfere with each other on launch and this will add time between deployment and firing during which the missile could be vulnerable to destruction or malfunction.
Still it SOUNDS awesome in theory to be able to 'dump' 60 containers/missiles over the side in under 5 minutes and sail towards the horizon as each one pops out an MX fire minutes later
Fasquadron wrote:
I was pretty surprised as I went through the evolution myself. The Atlas engines are significantly 'better' than those of the Navaho booster in general but the basics are all there and you can do a lot with it if you think about it and don't obsess over the 'bleeding edge' which unfortunately is sometimes a really, really tough to avoid
Probably not as it hadn't actually flown by the time the proposal was made and more significantly it ended up not being able to reach the original goals of the program speed-wise, (Mach-7) and had to be extensively modified to reach Mach-6. (Yes it was seriously damaged in that run but the majority of the damage came from the dummy Scramjet attached on that run not the basic design. Having said that however they had to reinforce and rebuild the airframe because it was having issues at lower speeds already and the need for a different TPS wasn't discovered until flight testing began. And they never did manage a viable thermal coating for sharp surfaces and angles like the X-15) One of the reasons I'm considering having the Navy change heart on backing the Douglas version.
And even if they had managed to make the flight it wouldn't have 'counted' because the pilot didn't LAND in the orbital vehicle
This is why the Soviets hid the fact Gagarin ejected before landing. It wouldn't of 'mattered' really but to be recognized under international rules the 'pilot' had to complete the entire journey in his vehicle. Which was based on early air record attempts where things like jettisoning the landing gear at take-off and having 'extra' crew members jump in mid-flight were common in making record attempts. Whereas the Soviets could get away with it, (obviously) there'd be almost no way to 'hide' the fact the way the US was operating. TTL I could see it being considered a bit more seriously but not using the X-15 and with any water landing the 'need' goes away pretty quickly.And considering the pressure to get 'someone' into space as fast as possible, (a bit more so TTL than OTL even) any plan based on a vehicle that will need a significant development period will rapidly drop off the list of proposals. I think I can make a case for looking into the M1 lifting shape, on the outside maybe the Kellet saucer, but it wouldn't be the primary choice simply due to the lack of hard research data and testing at the time. Really your only 'choice' is a ballistic shape capsule based on warhead (or spy satellite return capsule
) design. I'm thinking the Air Force will probably 'default' to a Corona shape with a man crammed into it so as to avoid any compromise on warhead design information. Which to me leaves a chance for the Navy to propose experimenting with the M1 as a 'maneuverable' reentry shape. One issue is WAS actually under consideration for a maneuvering warhead application which restricted a lot of data and limited testing but since there was the major problem of how to command those maneuver during reentry it kept dropping in and out of classification Depends on the context really
Truax was actually 'monomaniacal' about general access to space as cheaply and available as possible which is what he was always working on concepts for. When it came to cargo lift he was pretty much convinced that you needed to lift as much payload as cheaply as possible per launch and he wasn't really 'wrong' in any assumption just really, really impatient. Sea Dragon is a VERY efficient and economic LV if you NEED that much up-mass on a regular basis, it is however ASB-level crazy UNLESS you already have that requirement and Truax always believed that that 'need' was just around the corner and determined to make it happen.Arguably not a 'bad' thing to be maniacal about I'd say
Randy
And considering the pressure to get 'someone' into space as fast as possible, (a bit more so TTL than OTL even) any plan based on a vehicle that will need a significant development period will rapidly drop off the list of proposals. I think I can make a case for looking into the M1 lifting shape, on the outside maybe the Kellet saucer, but it wouldn't be the primary choice simply due to the lack of hard research data and testing at the time. Really your only 'choice' is a ballistic shape capsule based on warhead (or spy satellite return capsule
Hmm. I wonder how the USAF pilots would react to the _Navy_ having a spaceship that can "fly" while they are stuck with capsules...
Depends on the context really
Arguably not a 'bad' thing to be maniacal about I'd say
To be fair, the 60s, 70s and 80s do seem to have been dominated by the idea that if launch costs became cheap enough, a market would be priced into existence that would be demanding hundreds of thousands of tonnes of mass be placed into orbit every year.
I can't think of any books, editorials or articles I read from that period that suggested that the real market was for simple reliable machines that could launch a few tens of tonnes of mass be placed in orbit every year.
I'd not heard of it before, I confess.
fasquardon