Personally I think the Hs123 was the best bet for the LW for a CAS aircraft until the Ju87G and Hs129 showed up (and all were replaced by the FW190F/G). I don't know enough about the situation to categorically state that the Ha-137 would have ever been produced ITTL once the He-118 shows up. I think it could have been an early CAS aircraft and is thus removed from the dive bombing category, so there would still be a dive bomber, which the Ha-137 would not be.Yes, but before that Blohm und Voss presented the Ha-137 entered the contest and that was the aircraft Richtofen wanted. It was disqualified for entering late/too many jews/I want the Stuka and nothing else reasons, after all, the final specs were pretty much copied from Junkers proposal in order to ensure a Ju-87 win. Funny that the other allowed entry could not hope to reach the Ju-87s dive angles, and Heinkel had so indicated so from the start...
Me too. The aircraft was to be able to handle medium dives from the very inception of the Bomber A requirement issued under Wever, so that's not going to change one iota. Instead what is being fixed is Udet not coming in in late 1937 and asking for deep dive capabilities. So the He-177 design team gravitated toward to the start to the two propellor design for a variety of reasons based on the original, pre-Udet spec. Though the DB606 wasn't given as an option the project demanded it so were allowed to have it. Supposedly Heinkel had misgivings about the two prop design and asked for a four prop prototype just in case, but Heinkel is the only source for that claim, so I don't take that at face value, as there is no corroborating evidence for that.I got the infor from Griehl's book, he indicated that the companies were informed on June 3rd that the aircraft was to dive bomb, now, it doesnt specify, but Udet has a history of going directly to the companies and specify requirements different to those of the RLM specs (pp. 8). The list of engines the book mentions only includes the DB-601 as Daimler's entry.
The problem is that the HE177 was conceived as a two prop design from the beginning based on the Bomber A spec given by Wever; its worth wondering if the Wimmer-led Technical Branch would have accepted the concept during development, as that was mostly during Udet's tenure, but it seems the officer supervising the project was a hold over from the Wimmer era, which means that the design slips in and continues as a two prop-er until it proves a failure in testing (pretty much the exact same situation as the Avro Lancaster). Its just a question of how quickly the solution is arrived at (abandoning the twin prop idea).True, but it is to be expected to have a different behavior if you change the wing, but if the aircraft is projected with a 4-engine wing from the start the issues should be less severe and without the constant interference of the engines problems testing should be a lot less protracted affair than ITTL.
Yes, but after years of development and experience with the He177 frame. So saying that the quickness of the problems being recognized in 1939 is comparable to 1943-44 is neglecting all of the work done and experience gained IOTL from 1939-1943 when the twin tail rudder appeared.There was a 1 month difference between the He-177 B-5 V101 and V102 (single and twin rudder) prototypes, and the test pilots were happy with the behaviour of V102 (as a matter of fact V103 reached 700Kmh in inclined flights) but, there were only 4 more months for trials before they were destroyed in raids.
Sure it was the right fix for the airframe, the problem is whether that solution will be reached in two years and properly tested by 1942. IOTL the twin tail arrangement was only reached after years were wasted trying to fix the single rudder trail.Now the French kept and operated the 2 He-274 prototypes for 8 years so the twin fin arrangement must have worked fine for them, with a little more time (2 months is really nothing) the stability problems would have been overcome, and I seriously doubt that it would take a full 2 years to do so being the only major issue of the aircraft.
Why do you see that? They didn't IOTL and were generally pretty backwards on naval matters.It works out, as a matter of fact in 1938 IIRC it was considered to drop the 15cm guns and replace them with further 10,5cm flak, it turned out to be impractical due to the angles and the issue was dropped, but if the guns end up being needed I see the KM having no problems in just letting them go and complete the carrier without them.
The problem was not just with the air group. I still think even with them available there was just no reason to have a carrier of such a poor design (relative to every other major naval power) when there are now continental airbases that surround Britain, bases that need to be defended and can be used to attack Britain directly. The Graf Zeppelin was meant to be a test bed for future designs and Raeder never really knew what to do with it, just that all the other navies had them, so he should have one too and figure out what to do with it later (or leave that job to his successor). Frankly there is no reason for the KM to have one given that their designs were on controlling the North Sea. Once the Fall of France and Norway happened, then the surface fleet lost its purpose and was shoe-horned into new roles for which they were not designed...for example commerce raiding in the Atlantic. The Bismarck-class Battleships were not designed for Atlantic service, nor were the Scharnhorst and Gniesenau. All had to be refitted with Atlantic bows after their commissioning. So the Graf Zeppelin also was not designed to serve in the Atlantic, which was recognized by the KM, so it was generally considered a waste now that they had the North Sea to spend money and resources on finishing the vessel, which was to them a luxury and unnecessary.Its demise was related to the constant issues with the LW, its air group squadrons were taken away as soon as the war started and Raeder probably didnt expect to see them any time soon, if ever. Plus the fire control system was sold to the URSS. In the end the complicated marriage with the LW made the availability of aircraft unlikely so if anything had to go GZ was the candidate in spite of being 90% complete.
Which is crazy.
Would the Hs 129 see more exposure and success in this timeline?
Once the Fall of France and Norway happened, then the surface fleet lost its purpose and was shoe-horned into new roles for which they were not designed...for example commerce raiding in the Atlantic. The Bismarck-class Battleships were not designed for Atlantic service, nor were the Scharnhorst and Gniesenau.
am I misreading your post, or are you thinking Kriegsmarine should've been made much smaller?
Germany really didn't need any, being primarily a land power without colonies.There weren't many carrier proponents in the Kriegsmarine, AFAIK.
It really didn't need anything beyond a coastal defense force unless it planned on fighting Britain; if it planned on that, then it needed Uboats and a smaller surface fleet to supplement that effort.So I believe it was destined to be either a surface force, or a mere commerce raider force.
It had some, the HE111, which was used effectively in that role in 1939 and 1940. The problem is establishing a torpedo bombing force, which was the fault of Raeder, as the KM wouldn't give the LW any of theirs and none they had actually worked.The absence of Göring could help with naval bombers, though.
Can't be any earlier than it was, because it wasn't designed until 1937. Germany wasn't planning on fighting Britain until Fall 1938. Plus with commitments in Spain the LW or KM weren't in a position to establish a special naval bomber Geschwader around the HE111 until mid-1939. Existing assets were more than able to handle patrolling the North Sea to areas that mattered to Germany, so when the Atlantic opened as a theater Germany was totally unprepared, because no one thought that level of success was even possible. So it would require massive hindsight to have a long range naval bomber ready in 1940. The FW200 wasn't really that good in that role until 1942, by which time the moment had passed and there were better aircraft available like the Ju290.An earlier and better Fw-200?
Personally I think the Hs123 was the best bet for the LW for a CAS aircraft until the Ju87G and Hs129 showed up (and all were replaced by the FW190F/G). I don't know enough about the situation to categorically state that the Ha-137 would have ever been produced ITTL once the He-118 shows up. I think it could have been an early CAS aircraft and is thus removed from the dive bombing category, so there would still be a dive bomber, which the Ha-137 would not be.
But again then the Ha-137 would have to compete with the Hs123, which is stiff competition once combat experienced showed the capabilities of the Hs123 in Spain.
Me too. The aircraft was to be able to handle medium dives from the very inception of the Bomber A requirement issued under Wever, so that's not going to change one iota. Instead what is being fixed is Udet not coming in in late 1937 and asking for deep dive capabilities. So the He-177 design team gravitated toward to the start to the two propellor design for a variety of reasons based on the original, pre-Udet spec. Though the DB606 wasn't given as an option the project demanded it so were allowed to have it. Supposedly Heinkel had misgivings about the two prop design and asked for a four prop prototype just in case, but Heinkel is the only source for that claim, so I don't take that at face value, as there is no corroborating evidence for that.
The issue then is the problems with the two prop still remaining, but the question is whether the Technical Branch would demand a four prop version sooner (there was no indication of problems with the DB606 in pre-clearance testing for the design) than IOTL, which I think it very likely, but it pushes back development.
Yes, but after years of development and experience with the He177 frame. So saying that the quickness of the problems being recognized in 1939 is comparable to 1943-44 is neglecting all of the work done and experience gained IOTL from 1939-1943 when the twin tail rudder appeared.
Sure it was the right fix for the airframe, the problem is whether that solution will be reached in two years and properly tested by 1942. IOTL the twin tail arrangement was only reached after years were wasted trying to fix the single rudder trail.
Why do you see that? They didn't IOTL and were generally pretty backwards on naval matters.
There were defects in its design, the horizaontal armour being the most damning, but by simply making a logical use of the hangar space you would already have a carrier more capable than most of the RN ones.The problem was not just with the air group. I still think even with them available there was just no reason to have a carrier of such a poor design (relative to every other major naval power) when there are now continental airbases that surround Britain, bases that need to be defended and can be used to attack Britain directly. The Graf Zeppelin was meant to be a test bed for future designs and Raeder never really knew what to do with it, just that all the other navies had them, so he should have one too and figure out what to do with it later (or leave that job to his successor). Frankly there is no reason for the KM to have one given that their designs were on controlling the North Sea. Once the Fall of France and Norway happened, then the surface fleet lost its purpose and was shoe-horned into new roles for which they were not designed...for example commerce raiding in the Atlantic. The Bismarck-class Battleships were not designed for Atlantic service, nor were the Scharnhorst and Gniesenau. All had to be refitted with Atlantic bows after their commissioning. So the Graf Zeppelin also was not designed to serve in the Atlantic, which was recognized by the KM, so it was generally considered a waste now that they had the North Sea to spend money and resources on finishing the vessel, which was to them a luxury and unnecessary.
Would the Hs 129 see more exposure and success in this timeline?
This idea is very intriguing. What if the GZ was primarily designated to be a submarine target recon hub? I think it's the only way Dönitz would have allowed it to exist, if he were the head of KM, instead of Raeder.Now, if the inmates dont take over the LW asylum then I believe the GZ project would have a different fate, it would be simply crazy to scrap a carrier that would be pretty much ready and with its airgroup trained and waiting to be embarked. Even as a single raider or as a part of a raiding force its effect would be significant, not to mention the aistance it could offer to the Uboats as a recce asset.
I've always been under the impression that Goering was extremely jealous to have anything to do with aviation under his command. If he had not been in the picture, might they have made the CAG crews be KM personnel, and done away with all LW regulations and impediments?
Don't forget, there were actually two carriers under construction.
If the capitol ships of the KM could have been bunched together into a single fleet with carrier support, they could have done some serious damage out in the Atlantic by 1943. This assumes no loss of the Bismarck.
Now if your POD could include the loss of Raeder too, replaced with someone like Doenitz, some additional interesting things could happen.
This idea is very intriguing. What if the GZ was primarily designated to be a submarine target recon hub? I think it's the only way Dönitz would have allowed it to exist, if he were the head of KM, instead of Raeder.
That is what I was talking about. A big recon plane hub. I don't know which admiral would be interested in having the GZ get a bigger role.I think that alone might not justify a carrier on itself, a supply sub and diesel powered flying boats would have done the trick as well. In any case the Brits were truly worried about GZ, here is what they were thinking in 1940:
“It is the aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin, which is likely to provide our most disagreeable problem. If this ship, accompanied by Bismarck or one of the Scharnhorsts (the Scharnhorst and her sister ship, the Gneisenau), were to break out, we should have to be prepared for very serious depredations on our trade. In good weather, the aircraft carrier could reconnoitre some 20,000 square miles in one day and could hardly fail to locate some of our large convoys. Her reconnaissance would serve equally to defend the attackers from our hunting groups. This power of evasion might enable raids to be pressed to the Western Approaches, our most vulnerable area. The conclusion is that the Bismarck herself is not likely to prove the menace that would at first seem likely. It is the aircraft carrier which is going to turn the scales in favour of any raider.”
JAG, it does seem to me, that if the KM were truly intent on relying mainly on their U-boats for their commerce raiding strategy, then GZ's biggest value would have been accompanying the wolf packs (from a distance) and providing both reconnaissance AND air support. One of the biggest problems the U-boats faced was from being attacked by aircraft-- both land-based, such as the Sunderlands, Catalinas, and Liberators, --and sea based, such as the escort carriers and the CAM fighters. Also, the naval escorts grew to be troublesome for the U-boats, too. Friendly carrier aircraft keeping the escorts busy would make it easier for the U-boats to move in and attack the convoys. A carrier in the vicinity would also be able to use fighters to escort land-based bombers, such as Fw 200's or Ju 290's, into range to deploy their air-to-surface missiles. The heavies otherwise would have to face harassment from the CAM fighters and escort carrier fighters.
Being able to fight back against the Allies' air and sea escorts protecting the convoys, I think, would be one of the CV's greatest abilities.
Also, thinking ahead a little later, I have always imagined (with no historical literature to back it up) that if the GZ and the other carrier had made it into action and survived, and if the war was going fairly well for the Axis, they could have converted some merchant ships into ad hoc carriers, or built more from the hull up. I have always imagined around early 1944, the introduction of the Fw 190T series to replace the Bf 109T. The wide track landing gear would be beefed up, and the carrier's compliment would be equipped entirely with the Fw 190T as it would take on the roles of fighter, night fighter, surface strike (rockets and/or torpedo), dive bomber, and reconnaissance. If you look at the shore-based Fw 190 series, you will see that they were modified for all these same roles as well. The advantage on board a carrier would be parts and maintenance commonality. All a/c would have the same basic parts, with just minor modifications for their specific tasks. Every pilot would be capable of flying every aircraft on board, and perhaps most importantly, in a pinch, every single aircraft could be used effectively as a fighter.
I imagine the Fw 190T to use the BMW radial, and to have a base armament of the twin 13mm above the engine along with twin MG 151/50 outside of the landing gear and wing fold. The inner wing guns carried by land-based 190's would be deleted in the interest of additional fuel storage. The wings would fold upward outside the landing gear, a la Corsair. The redesigned wing would be slightly longer for more area, and have a bent toward extra fuel tankage. I see a base range of around 7-800 miles for the Fw 190T, a max speed of around 385 mph (depending on configuration), and a ceiling and rate of climb slightly less than its land-based contemporaries, since the emphasis would be on combat below 20,000 ft.
Just a pipe dream, but in my scenarios, it is one of my pet projects.
That is what I was talking about. A big recon plane hub. I don't know which admiral would be interested in having the GZ get a bigger role.